Abstract
“The Death of the Bureaucrat.” Not long ago this was the headline of a daily column in a Turkish newspaper.1 The author, a student of Turkish politics, had read into the passing away of a high civil servant the demise in Turkey of a whole tradition, what I have called elsewhere “the historical bureaucratic ruling tradition.” (Heper, 1976a). I quote at some length from the newspaper:
Living with the state, identifying with it by considering oneself an integral part of that institution, perceiving the state as a father-figure that would act toward all his children with compassion and justice, endeavoring to help realize that idea.... In his person, [Memduh] Aytür represented the noble enthusiasm of the old bureaucratic generation. It was this enthusiasm which kept them at the public payroll, when, elsewhere, they could have much higher incomes. What kept them there were the respect accorded them and the ‘privilege’ of signing some documents, which would presumably shape, for the better, the course of events in society. The politician Inönü [sic] had considered himself the state; so had the bureaucrat Aytür.
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Notes
Mümtaz Soysal, “Bürokrat’in Ölümü,” Milliyet, 17 November 1981.
Cahit Kayra, “Aytün Biraktiği Mesaj,” Milliyet, 21 November 1981.
The state in question can be compared to a neutral, i.e., a “transformatory structure” that would be “captured” by elected regimes and used as an instrument for their own specific political purposes. For the latter formulation, see Easton (1965) and Scase (1980: 11–22).
In a paper to be entitled “The State Tradition in Turkey: From Atatürk to 12 September 1980 Military Intervention,” Frank Tachau and I will elaborate on this point. Ersin Kalaycioğlu (1981) has made an interesting analysis of the same. Developments leading to the September 1980 military intervention are now quite well documented. See, inter alia, Karpat (1981); Ahmad (1981); MacKenzie (1981); Harris (1976; 1977; 1981); Rustow (1979); Weiker (1981); Sunar and Sayari (1982); Heper (1979–80). Perspectives, conclusions and evaluations naturally differ.
Mango (1979: 122). Before the new Constitution went into effect in 1961, many purges were made on the basis of the legislation enacted by the Democrat Party regime: see Tutum (1972: 96).
In a radio-television broadcast.
His address in Konya and Adana on January 15 and 16, 1981, respectively. Earlier this point was implied in the Program of the civilian government of the military regime, submitted on September 27, 1980.
Yanki, 9–15 February 1981, p. 50.
Yeni Forum III, no. 57 (15 January 1982).
Resmî Gazete, 1 March 1982.
Milliyet, 2 March 1982.
Milliyet, 19 February 1982.
“Yüksek Öğretim Kanunu,” Resmî Gazete, 6 November 1981.
“Üniversitelerde Akademik Teşkilât Yönetmeliği,” Resmî Gazete, 28 January 1982.
The absence of political parties seems to have aggravated the problems of people in their encounters with the civil bureaucracy. The difficulties encountered by a Central Anatolian farmer are conveyed by Erel (1982a). The unbalanced relations in Turkey between the people and the civil bureaucrats is taken up in Heper (1981a; 1983).
With the establishment of the Constituent Assembly in October 1981, some committees which, among other things, were carrying out the function of overseeing the civil bureaucracy and which had been operating within the framework of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, were abrogated. The Constituent Assembly, however, was not granted corresponding powers. This development rendered the supervising of the civil bureaucracy even more difficult.
Milliyet, 6 January 1982. For a long time, civil servants had been leaving the civil bureaucracy for posts elsewhere but the recent exodus far surpassed the earlier trends. For the past trends, see Canman (1975) and Bozkurt (1980: 143–48).
The Prime Minister is the former Commander of the Navy (retired before September 1980) and one fourth of the cabinet now consists of high-ranking officers.
That creating a loyal institution requires a different set of measures from that of transforming it into an effective and efficient institution has not yet been adequately appreciated in Turkey, neither by the present nor by the past governments. This issue will be taken up below.
That this has been the predominant cleavage in the Ottoman-Turkish polity was indicated by Mardin (1973).
I take this cleavage in the same terms as Hegel does: see Avineri (1972).
I take the concepts of “social differentiation” and “social integration” after Binder (1974).
In order to bring my point home I am presenting a somewhat simplified picture of the reality: there is not a one-to-one relationship between the spectrum of political parties (in Turkey or elsewhere) on the one hand and the configuration of the socio-economic fabric on the other. There had been, of course, a greater affinity between certain political parties and socio-economic groups. These correspondences are discussed by Ahmad (1977) and Gevgilili (1981). For further nuances in these developments, see Sayan (1978).
Quoted in Erel (1981b); Mehmet (1983) describes the Turkish economy as “Grants Economy,” “a system of self-serving elite management of the economy.”
Hasan Ali Yücel, “Hükümet ve Idare,” Cumhuriyet, 5 September 1954; Cahit Tanyol, “Memur Mekanizmasi ve Politika,” Cumhuriyet, 17 December 1954; both cited in Tutum (1972:91, n. 18).
“Data” reported for this period are qualitative. At a recent conference on bureaucracy in Turkey it was observed more than once that the Democrats did not remove many civil servants: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Gelişme Sürecinde Bürokrasi Semineri, Istanbul, May 21–25, 1980. Tutum (1972: 83ff), whose study remains the best, notes that the Democrat Party was particularly sensitive to the complaints of the local party organizations and removed those civil servants who proved to be intractable to their intercessions on behalf of the citizens. Presthus (1961: 19–20), who studied one of the State Economic Enterprises, reported that “there has been little turnover of engineers (except directors) since 1950 when the political party in power changed.”
See Heper (1981b): patrimonial-legalism refers to an orientation of placing undue emphasis on rules with a readiness to violate them.
At the time of its establishment the Middle East Technical University in Ankara was known as the Democrats’ University. For the early history of this institution, see Heper (1973). The traditional civil bureaucracy must have presented quite an alien territory for the Democrat Party, so much so that the Party even resorted to sending “spies” to that stronghold through appointing janitors: Bener (1978: II, 39).
Milliyet, 17 February 1982.
These were undersecretaries, assistant undersecretaries, directors general, assistant directors general and governors.
A recent publication by the Prime Minister’s Office, Psikolojik Savunma ve Kamu Kuruluşlari (Ankara, 1982) states the following: “As the citizens and the public servants are all loyal to Atatürkism, [they] reject socialist and communist propaganda and activities against the idea of free enterprise”: Milliyet, 12 February 1982. On the other hand, Evren himself more than once pointed out that the private sector should not divest from those principles that would contribute to internal peace” and that “the employers should give a greater part of their honestly-made profit to workers”: speeches on September 10, 1980 and October 14, 1980. Later, when extensive campaigns were undertaken to assure tax compliance and in the auditing of income tax returns not even the leading firms were spared.
A point developed in my forthcoming “Atatürk and the Civil Bureaucracy,” in Jacob Landau, ed., Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey.
Karpat (1981) notes the “profound deterioration” of the civil service after 1977.
I have elsewhere noted similar implications of such a tension between an all-dominant state and the people (Heper, 1980).
Kazanci (1978: 111 ff); Bener (1978: II, 71) relates that once an applicant sent him a letter and thanked him not because his petition was favorably received but because it was explained to him why it was rejected.
At the conference mentioned in no. 26 above. A recent comment by Sakip Sabanci, a leading industrialist, on the need for “indicative” planning in the public sector (Milliyet, 13 March 1982) may be interpreted in the same light.
It is not generally realized that such frequent change of rules is incompatible with the rule of law, which is held in very high esteem in Turkey.
Erhan Işil, who also served as minister, made this point at the conference mentioned in no. 26 above.
Mehmet Barlas (1982); for the increasing reliance of the military regime on specific individuals or critical issues, including the “streamlining” of universities, see Erel (1982c).
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Heper, M. (1984). Bureaucrats, Politicians and Officers in Turkey: Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm. In: Evin, A. (eds) Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change. Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-01177-4_4
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