Abstract
Many power indices on simple games have been defined trying to measure, under different points of view, the “a priori” importance of a voter in a collective binary voting scenario. A unified probabilistic way to define some of these power indices is considered in this paper. We show that six well-known power indices are obtained under such a probabilistic approach. Moreover, some new power indices can naturally be obtained in this way.
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Acknowledgements
This research was partially supported by funds from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) and from the European Union (FEDER funds) under grant MTM2015–66818-P(MINECO/FEDER).
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Freixas, J., Pons, M. (2019). A Probabilistic Unified Approach for Power Indices in Simple Games. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J., Motylska-Kuźma, A. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXIV. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11890. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_11
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