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CRM in the Field of OMD

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Online Music Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed?

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 12))

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Abstract

Supplementing the analysis of the limits to rights in the previous two chapters, this chapter deals with collective rights management (CRM) in the field of OMD. The relevance of CRM in the context of the limits to rights is twofold. Firstly, CRM is related to the voluntary limits of exclusivity, as opposed to the statutory ones. The sheer quantity of rightholders and services in the field of music creates very high transaction costs, making the individual rights management inefficient in many cases. As a result, in some areas rightholders traditionally opt for CRM, abandoning their own possibility of excluding third parties from the use of the subject-matter following the granting of rights to collective management organizations (CMOs). The rights management for a CMO typically becomes efficient only after it has accumulated a repertoire of a considerable size, and many CMOs tend to grow into natural monopolies. As a result, out of competitive concerns, CMOs are typically deprived by law or by a judicial order of the possibility of excluding from the use those third parties who are willing to pay the licensing fees, and are required to license their whole repertoire against the uniform royalty rates discriminating neither between the licensees nor between the rightholders. This situation stands in the middle between the full exclusive right (property rule) and the statutory limit of exclusivity (liability rule), and has sometimes been referred to as “contracting into liability rules” or “private liability rules”.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Merges, 84 Cal L. Rev. 1293, 1392 (1996); van Overwalle, in: Rosén (ed.), Individualism and Collectiveness in Intellectual Property Law, 71, 96–97; Krauspenhaar, Liability Rules in Patent Law, pp. 97–98.

  2. 2.

    See Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29. It should be noted that UNESCO and especially WIPO have nevertheless been active in discussing organizational and legal issues regarding CRM and drafting model statutes for CMOs; on these activities see Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29, 30–40.

  3. 3.

    Such provisions are laid down with similar wording in Art. 36(1) BC, Art. 26(1) RC, Art. 14(1) WCT, Art. 23(1) WPPT; at the same time, such a provision is missing in the TRIPS Agreement (Art. 41(1) TRIPS is not of help here as it is limited to enforcement procedures provided for in TRIPS).

  4. 4.

    Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29, 66.

  5. 5.

    Ibid.; see also Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, pp. 141–142.

  6. 6.

    See Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29, 42–60.

  7. 7.

    von Lewinski, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 5–6 (January-March 2004); Geiger, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 9–10 (January-March 2007).

  8. 8.

    See von Lewinski, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 5–10 (January-March 2004); Geiger, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 9–12 (January-March 2007).

  9. 9.

    See the first paragraph of this subsection with further references.

  10. 10.

    However, this again seems to be limited to cases in which CRM indeed presents the most viable option for most rightholders.

  11. 11.

    This seems to be confirmed even by advocates of the first opinion, see Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29, 60–62.

  12. 12.

    International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, founded in 1926.

  13. 13.

    Including the U.S. performing rights societies ASCAP, BMI and SESAC as well as the German GEMA.

  14. 14.

    CISAC, Professional Rules for Musical Societies, adopted by the General Assembly on June 8, 2017.

  15. 15.

    See also Uwemedimo, GRUR Int 2010, 685, 687.

  16. 16.

    See ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, paras. 11–14; national territorial limitations are still in force and follow from Art. 1(1) in conjunction with Art. 6(1) CISAC Model Contract (available in: Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, pp. 256–265).

  17. 17.

    See European Commission Case COMP/C2/38.698, Decision of July 16, 2008—CISAC, see also Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1881.

  18. 18.

    ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, paras. 80–182; for further analysis see also Quintais, 8 JIPLP 680–683 (2013).

  19. 19.

    Bureau International des Sociétés Gérant les Droits d'Enregistrement et de Reproduction Mécanique, founded in 1929.

  20. 20.

    Including the German GEMA and the U.S. Harry Fox Agency, both listed as voting members, see BIEM, Statutes, modified by the General Assembly, London, June 5, 2014, available in: Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, pp. 199–216.

  21. 21.

    See Arts. I(2), III of the BIEM Model Contract, available in: Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, pp. 266–271.

  22. 22.

    See also the analysis of the U.S. and German factual situation in Sects. 6 C II 2 and 6 D II 2.

  23. 23.

    International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, founded in 1933 and currently operating in 66 markets worldwide; members of the IFPI are not CMOs but record labels (producers of phonograms).

  24. 24.

    See ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, para. 109; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 96–97; Heine, Wahrnehmung von Online-Musikrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften im Binnenmarkt, pp. 201–205.

  25. 25.

    See European Commission, Press Release IP/04/586, Brussels, May 3, 2004.

  26. 26.

    See ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, para. 109; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 98.

  27. 27.

    For further details see Frabboni, in Derclaye (ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, 373, 383–384; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 98.

  28. 28.

    Parties to this agreement are i.a. GVL in Germany and SoundExchange in the U.S.

  29. 29.

    Art. 3(1) of the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement.

  30. 30.

    Art. 5(2) of the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement.

  31. 31.

    European Commission Case No COMP/C2/38.014, Decision of October 8, 2002—IFPI "Simulcasting", para. 123.

  32. 32.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 99.

  33. 33.

    See above Sect. 6 A I.

  34. 34.

    Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of February 26, 2014 on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal market, OJ L 84/72, March 20, 2014.

  35. 35.

    For further study see Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 1157–1190; Guibault/van Gompel, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 135–167; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 91–404 with further references.

  36. 36.

    The term “natural monopoly” is used to refer to an industry in which multifirm production is more costly than production by a monopoly (see Baumol, 67 AER 809, 810 [1977]); this usually happens when the fixed costs of production are high, while the marginal costs (producing one more item) are low. As noted by Drexl, “CMOs incur large fixed costs caused by the machinery of collecting and distributing income and the need to build up monitoring systems, while the marginal costs of managing the rights of an additional rightholder are relatively low”, see Drexl, in: Purnhagen/Rott (eds.), Liber Amicorum Micklitz, 459, 464; see also Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 325 (2013); Handtke/Towse, 38 IIC 937, 939 (2007).

  37. 37.

    Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 325–326 (2013); Guibault/van Gompel, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 135, 138.

  38. 38.

    Markets for CRM in most states (including the EU members) are characterized by monopolistic structures, see Drexl, in: Purnhagen/Rott (eds.), Liber Amicorum Micklitz, 459, 464–465. A notable exception is the U.S. market, where meanwhile four CMOs operate in the field of copyright in musical works (see below Sect. 6 D I 1); however, one has to remember that this is the largest national market in the world, where the critical mass of rightholders necessary to run a CMO is more likely to be achieved by several competing entities.

  39. 39.

    See below Sect. 6 B II 1 regarding the Online Music Recommendation of the European Commission, the approach of which seems to have been generally upheld in the CRM Directive.

  40. 40.

    Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 326 (2013) note that a policy of introducing more competition in the market cannot act against the economic features of a natural monopoly, and that the Commission’s approach may well yield a result contrary to its vision, namely a single CMO administering all music online rights within the EU; they also note that, while it is possible to introduce more competition in the market for CRM services to rightholders, this aim can barely be achieved in the market for the licensing to users. The vision of the Commission also somewhat contradicts even the newer case law of the ECJ, which finds a monopoly of one CMO over the management of copyright in relation to a category of protected works in the territory of the Member state to be a suitable model enabling the effective management of rights and an effective supervision of their respect, see ECJ Case C-351/12, Judgment of February 27, 2014—OSA, para. 72 (one should however note that the ECJ hereby referred to the EU law “as it stands at present” and that the CRM Directive was not yet in force at that moment—thus, the ECJ seems to have left itself enough flexibility to rule in a different way in the future, see Peifer, ZUM 2014, 453, 458; Heine, GRUR-Prax. 2014, 133), on this judgment see also Drexl, in: Purnhagen/Rott (eds.), Liber Amicorum Micklitz, 459–487.

  41. 41.

    Meanwhile, there is a legal definition of the CMO in Art. 3(a) CRM Directive, stating that CMO means “any organization, which is (1) authorized by law or by way of assignment, license or any other contractual arrangement (2) to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and (3) which is either owned/controlled by its members or organized on a not-for-profit basis”.

  42. 42.

    See European Commission, Decision of October 29, 1981, Case IV/29.839, OJ L 370/49, December 28, 1981—GVL; Decision of June 2, 1971, Case IV/26.760, OJ L 134/15, June 20, 1971—GEMA I; see also Guibault/van Gompel, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 135, 140; Guibault, in: Stamatoudi/Torremans, EU Copyright Law, pp. 720–721; Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 1158–1160.

  43. 43.

    ECJ Case C-127-73, Judgment of March 27, 1974—BRT v. SABAM.

  44. 44.

    Id., para. 12.

  45. 45.

    European Commission, Decision of August 6, 2002, Case COMP/C2/37.219—Banghalter and Homem Christo v. SACEM (also known as Daft Punk decision).

  46. 46.

    European Commission, Decision of June 2, 1971, Case IV/26.760, OJ L 134/15, June 20, 1971—GEMA I; see also Holzmüller, ZUM 2014, 468; Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 1158–1159.

  47. 47.

    For example, in Banghalter and Homem Christo v. SACEM the Commission allowed CMOs, in order to avoid abuse of a dominant position, to make the individual management of certain rights subject to consent by the CRM’s administrative council, which has to argue well when refusing such consent, see European Commission, Decision of August 6, 2002, Case COMP/C2/37.219—Banghalter and Homem Christo v. SACEM, p. 10; see also Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 339 (2013); Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, p. 1159.

  48. 48.

    Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 339–340 (2013).

  49. 49.

    See above Sect. 6 A I.

  50. 50.

    See also von Lewinski, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 12–14 (January-March 2004); Geiger, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin 1, 9–12 (January-March 2007); who also take the view that mandatory CRM is permissible under European Law.

  51. 51.

    On this right see Chap. 4 footnote 2.

  52. 52.

    Ficsor, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 29, 46.

  53. 53.

    ECJ Case C-351/12, Judgment of February 27, 2014—OSA, para. 72; on this judgment see also footnote 40.

  54. 54.

    Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 328 (2013).

  55. 55.

    With regard to non-discrimination, Art. 102(c) TFEU holds that an abuse of dominant position may consist in “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage”; elaborating on this provision, the ECJ held in Kanal 5 and TV4 v. STIM that a CMO is likely to exploit in an abusive manner its dominant position if it applies “dissimilar conditions to equivalent services and if it places them as a result at a competitive disadvantage, unless such a practice may be objectively justified”, see ECJ Case C-52/07, Judgment of December 11, 2008—Kanal 5 and TV4 v. STIM, paras. 42–48. Furthermore, the ECJ ruled that charging users with royalties appreciably higher than those charged in other Member States—the rates being compared on a consistent basis—may constitute unfair trading condition, unless the CMO is able to justify such a difference by reference to objective and relevant dissimilarities between the CRM in the involved Member States, see ECJ Case C-395/87, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Tournier, headnote 6; Cases C-110/88, C-241/88, C-242/88, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Lucazeau, headnote 3; Case C-351/12, Judgment of February 27, 2014—OSA, para. 87. Furthermore, the ECJ expressly endorsed national treatment with regard to users from the EU by ruling as prohibited “any concerted practice by national copyright management societies of the Member States having as its object or effect the refusal by each society to grant direct access to its repertoire to users established in another Member State”, see ECJ Case C-395/87, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Tournier, headnote 4; Cases C-110/88, C-241/88, C-242/88, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Lucazeau, headnote 2.

  56. 56.

    See Art. 16(2) sentence 2 CRM Directive in conjunction with Recital 32 CRM Directive.

  57. 57.

    Art. 16(2) sentence 4 CRM Directive; see also Guibault, in: Stamatoudi/Torremans, EU Copyright Law, p. 750 who also finds the notion of “economic value in trade” to be of a clarifying nature with respect to the term “objective criteria”.

  58. 58.

    In particular, in Kanal 5 and TV4 v. STIM the ECJ held that “royalties, which represent the consideration paid for the use of musical works protected by copyright for the purposes of television broadcast, must, in particular, be analysed with respect to the value of that use in trade”, concluding that “in so far as such royalties are calculated on the basis of the revenue of the television broadcasting societies, they are, in principle, reasonable in relation to the economic value of the service provided by STIM”, adding, however, that the part of remuneration which is based upon the revenue of the user shall be proportionate overall to the quantity of musical works used and that no other method shall exist that enables more precise identification of the use without resulting in a disproportionate increase in the costs of management and supervision, see ECJ Case C-52/07, Judgment of December 11, 2008—Kanal 5 and TV4 v. STIM, paras. 36–37, 41; see also Guibault, in: Stamatoudi/Torremans, EU Copyright Law, pp. 750–751. In the latest case law the ECJ stressed that “an abuse might lie in the imposition of a price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided”, see ECJ Case C-351/12, Judgment of February 27, 2014—OSA, para. 88.

  59. 59.

    See ECJ Case C-395/87, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Tournier, headnotes 4–5, paras. 19–26, 31, 33; Cases C-110/88, C-241/88, C-242/88, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Lucazeau, headnote 2, paras. 13–20.

  60. 60.

    As mentioned above (see Sect. 6 A II 1 a), the ECJ confirmed in CISAC that the need for a local monitoring and enforcement system may explain the parallel behavior of CMOs, leading to the conclusion that “national territorial restrictions” are not a result of prohibited concertation, see ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, paras. 134–182.

  61. 61.

    ECJ Case C-395/87, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Tournier, headnote 3, paras. 19–26; Cases C-110/88, C-241/88, C-242/88, Judgment of July 13, 1989—Lucazeau, headnote 1, paras. 13–20.

  62. 62.

    See ECJ Case T-422/08, Judgment of April 12, 2013—CISAC, paras. 134–182.

  63. 63.

    European Commission, Case COMP/C2/38.014, Decision of October 8, 2002—IFPI "Simulcasting"; for a detailed description see above Sect. 6 A II 2; some scholars derive from this decision that “the tariff that covers the royalty proper be separated from the fee meant to cover the administration costs”, see Guibault, in: Stamatoudi/Torremans, EU Copyright Law, p. 746.

  64. 64.

    European Commission, Press Release IP/04/586, Brussels, May 3, 2004; for a detailed description see above Sect. 6 A II 2.

  65. 65.

    Prior to that, the Commission, in its Communication of 2004, spoke out for establishing a legislative framework for good governance of CMOs and held that a one-stop shop that CMOs at that time were providing for “constitutes a significant advantage for rightholders and users alike and should not be jeopardized”, see Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee “The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market”, Brussels, April 16, 2004, COM(2004) 261 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0261&from=EN, pp. 9, 17–19.

  66. 66.

    European Commission Staff Working Document “Study on a community initiative on the cross-border collective management of copyright”, Brussels, July 7, 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/management/study-collectivemgmt_en.pdf.

  67. 67.

    European Commission Recommendation of October 18, 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (2005/737/EC), OJ L 276/54, October 21, 2005.

  68. 68.

    See above Sect. 6 A II 2.

  69. 69.

    Para. 5(a) Online Music Recommendation.

  70. 70.

    Para. 5(b) Online Music Recommendation.

  71. 71.

    Para. 5(c) Online Music Recommendation.

  72. 72.

    Para. 5(d) Online Music Recommendation.

  73. 73.

    In his speech on occasion of the adoption of the Online Music Recommendation, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Charlie McCreevy i.a. said the following: “I have, therefore, decided that, in the first instance, the market should be given a chance to develop in the right direction. I have proposed to my colleagues in the College, a recommendation which will set out a set of ground rules by which we believe the system should operate. I hope that this soft-law instrument will be adopted in the next few days and that it will deliver results. If it does not, and I will be monitoring matters very carefully indeed, we will have to consider whether a more binding legislative approach might be called for”; see European Commission, SPEECH/05/588, October 7, 2005; see also Drexl, in: Hilty/Geiger (eds.), Impulse für eine europäische Harmonisierung des Urheberrechts, 369, 370.

  74. 74.

    The major publishers over the past decade were Universal Music Publishing Group, Warner/Chappell Music, Sony/ATV Music Publishing and EMI Music Publishing; hereby EMI Music Publishing has, since 2012, been owned by a consortium led by Sony/ATV Music Publishing (see Sisario, EMI Is Sold for $4.1 Billion in Combined Deals, Consolidating the Music Industry, The New York Times of November 11, 2011, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/media/emi-is-sold-for-4-1-billion-consolidating-the-music-industry.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1365256532-ZPTirKfBwt1JFT+j75xJnw&_r=0); in recent years, BMG Rights Management emerged as another major publisher.

  75. 75.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 168–185; on the U.S. performing rights organizations see also below Sect. 6 D I 1.

  76. 76.

    For further detail concerning the system of subpublishers of major publishers see Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 39–43, 198.

  77. 77.

    Regularly through terminating their agreements with subpublishers; doing it this way helped major publishers circumvent the longer cancellation periods of some CMOs, see Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 220–223.

  78. 78.

    While major publishers were able to pull mechanical rights from European CMOs since these rights in Anglo-American countries are regularly not subject to CRM, their ability to pull performing rights from CMOs is limited (on limitations in the U.S. in this respect see also below Sect. 6 D I 2 c). Performing rights therefore continued to be available to European CMOs through RRAs with Anglo-American CMOs. Since CMOs however could not license most online services without mechanical rights, they were forced either to abstain from licensing or to take part in the central European licensing initiatives of major publishers (with a few exceptions: for example, the German CMO GEMA that co-founded the central licensing initiatives of EMI Music Publishing and Sony/ATV Music Publishing was able to retain the right to independently license the repertoire of these publishers for the German territory, see GEMA Geschäftsbericht 2008, available at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Gema/geschaeftsbericht_2008.pdf, pp. 21–22; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 137–138, 143–144; furthermore, although not taking part in the central licensing initiative of Warner/Chappell Music, GEMA is reported to be able to license its repertoire for the German territory on a case-by-case basis after consultation with this publisher, see Müller, ZUM 2011, 13, 16; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 143).

  79. 79.

    As just mentioned above in footnote 78, this was made subject to exceptions, e.g. with German GEMA still being able to license repertoire of Warner/Chappell Music for the German territory in certain cases.

  80. 80.

    Direct European Administration and Licensing.

  81. 81.

    See SACEM, Universal Music Publishing Group and SACEM Announce Name of Pan-European Licensing Model, as well as a Variety of Pan-European Deals with Major Internet Companies, Press Release of January 20, 2009, available at: http://www.sacem.fr/cms/site/en/home/about-sacem/documentation/2009-press-releases/universal-music-publishing-group-and-sacem-announce-name-of-pan-european-licensing-model-as-well-as-a-variety-of-pan-european-deals-with-major-internet-companies; the particularity of DEAL is that the pan-European licensing is also made for the French repertoire of Universal Music Publishing Group.

  82. 82.

    Pan European Digital Licensing.

  83. 83.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 142.

  84. 84.

    See Warner/Chappell Music, PEDL – Pan European Digital Licensing, available at: http://www.warnerchappell.com/pedl/pedl.jsp.

  85. 85.

    For a further description of the functioning of such licensing initiatives see Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 136–140, 143–144, 267–269.

  86. 86.

    Central European Licensing and Administration Services.

  87. 87.

    Paneuropean Central Online Licensing.

  88. 88.

    See GEMA, Sony/ATV launches joint venture with PRS for Music and GEMA, Press Release of September 25, 2014, available at: https://www.gema.de/en/aktuelles/sonyatv_launches_joint_venture_with_prs_for_music_and_gema-1/.

  89. 89.

    Anglo-American Rights European Service Agency.

  90. 90.

    In particular, so did the independent music publishers Peermusic (entrusting its Anglo-American catalog to British PRS for Music and its Hispanic catalog to Spanish SGAE for pan-European licensing, see Peermusic, Peermusic, MCPS-PRS, SGAE Forge Euro Alliance, Press Release of January 31, 2008, available at: http://www.peermusic.com/peermusic/index.cfm/peermusic-news/2008/peermusic-mcpsprs-sgae-forge-euro-alliance/) and Imagem (entrusting its Anglo-American catalog to British PRS for Music and Dutch BUMA/STEMRA, see PRS for Music, Imagem Appoint BUMA-STEMRA and PRS for Music to Manage European Online Rights, Press Release of August 9, 2011, available at: http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/Pages/IMAGEMAPPOINTBUMASTEMRAAND.aspx).

  91. 91.

    Independent Music Publishers European Licensing.

  92. 92.

    As of December 1, 2015, this initiative was joined by 34 independent music publishers.

  93. 93.

    See European Parliament, Resolution of March 13, 2007 on the Commission Recommendation of October 18, 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (2005/737/EC) (2006/2008(INI)), P6_TA(2007)0064, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0064+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; Resolution of September 25, 2008 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services, P6_TA(2008)0462, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0462+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

  94. 94.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 111 for comprehensive references to critique by CMOs, user associations and authors.

  95. 95.

    See Opinion of the Max Planck Institute, GRUR Int. 2006, 222–225; Drexl, in: Torremans (ed.), Copyright Law, 255–281; Drexl, in: Hilty/Geiger (eds.), Impulse für eine europäische Harmonisierung des Urheberrechts, 369–430; Drexl, in: Gerlach/Evers (eds.), 50 Jahre GVL, 11, 14; Hilty, in: Leistner (ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des geistigen Eigentums, 123, 126; Schierholz, in: Walter/von Lewinski, pp. 1180–1189; Poll, ZUM 2008, 500, 503–505; Kohn on Music Licensing, p. 840 (sarcastically noticing, that “[w]hat was once a 27-stop shop, with the hope of becoming a one-stop shop, in now at least a 30-stop shop!”).

  96. 96.

    Which are (as the Directive itself) yet to be implemented by Member States by April 10, 2016, see Art. 43(1) CRM Directive.

  97. 97.

    The term “passport entity” was used by the Commission when describing the chosen legislative approach of “The European Licensing Passport” in the Impact Assessment of the CRM Directive Proposal (see European Commission Staff Working Document “Impact Assessment Accompanying the document ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market’”, Brussels, July 11, 2012, SWD(2012) 204 final, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0204, p. 43), although the use of the word “passport” seems to be somewhat irritating as the CRM Directive does not provide that concerned CMOs have to apply for such a passport, imposing on Member States only the obligation of monitoring but not that of admission.

  98. 98.

    Art. 24 CRM Directive.

  99. 99.

    Arts. 25 and 26 CRM Directive.

  100. 100.

    Art. 27 CRM Directive.

  101. 101.

    Art. 28 CRM Directive.

  102. 102.

    Art. 29(1) CRM Directive; for the “national treatment” (or the “own repertoire treatment”) see Art. 30(3) and (4) CRM Directive.

  103. 103.

    Art. 30(1) CRM Directive.

  104. 104.

    Art. 31 CRM Directive.

  105. 105.

    See also Müller, in: Hoeren/Sieber/Holznagel, Multimedia-Recht, Teil 7.5, para. 73, speaking of three or four CMOs.

  106. 106.

    In the terminology of the CRM Directive these agencies seem to fall under the definition of “independent management entities” (Art. 3(b) CRM Directive) that, according to Art. 2(4) CRM Directive, are partially subject to the “good governance” regime applicable to CMOs, with notable exceptions such as the principle of non-discrimination and objectivity of licensing terms of Art. 16(2) CRM Directive (not included in the list of provisions applicable to “independent management entities” according to Art. 2(2) CRM Directive).

  107. 107.

    Art. 2(3) CRM Directive states that the “relevant provisions” of the Directive apply to “entities directly or indirectly owned or controlled, wholly or in part, by a collective management organization, provided that such entities carry out an activity which, if carried out by the CMO, would be subject to these provisions”. On the German implementation of this provision see below Sect. 6 C II 1 b bb.

  108. 108.

    See Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 347 (2013).

  109. 109.

    See the definition of “online rights in musical works” provided for in Art. 3(n) CRM Directive.

  110. 110.

    This is suggested by Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 343 (2013).

  111. 111.

    See European Commission, “Proposed Directive on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing – frequently asked questions”, MEMO/12/545, Brussels, July 11, 2012, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-545_en.htm?locale=EN; see also Quintais, 35 EIPR 65, 67, footnote 40 (2013).

  112. 112.

    See below Sects. 11 B III and 14 B I 1 c.

  113. 113.

    Prior to that, there was only selective regulation through the 1933 Performing Rights Licensing Act obliging CMOs licensing performing rights in musical works to seek prior authorization from the notorious Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda—not surprisingly, this law as it stood then was declared largely inapplicable after 1945, see BGH Case I ZR 143/52, Judgment of November 30, 1954, 15 BGHZ 338—GEMA.

  114. 114.

    Bundestags-Drucksache IV/271, pp. 9–10.

  115. 115.

    For further details see Goldmann, Die kollektive Wahrnehmung musikalischer Rechte in den USA und Deutschland, pp. 206–220; Heine, Wahrnehmung von Online-Musikrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften im Binnenmarkt, pp. 79–80.

  116. 116.

    See Heine, Wahrnehmung von Online-Musikrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften im Binnenmarkt, pp. 80–82.

  117. 117.

    See Regierungsentwurf of October 30, 2015, available at: http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/RegE_VG_Richtlinie_Umsetzungsgesetz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1, p. 2.

  118. 118.

    See above Sect. 6 B.

  119. 119.

    See footnote 41.

  120. 120.

    Regierungsentwurf of October 30, 2015 (supra note 117), p. 87.

  121. 121.

    Secs. 75(1) and 78 VGG (formerly Secs. 2 and 18(1) UrhWG).

  122. 122.

    Sec. 79 VGG (formerly Sec. 3(1) UrhWG); see also Reinbothe, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 215, 226.

  123. 123.

    See C3S, Aktueller Stand, available at: https://www.c3s.cc/ueber-c3s/konzept/aktueller-stand/; Müller, in: Hoeren/Sieber/Holznagel, Multimedia-Recht, Teil 7.5, para. 156.

  124. 124.

    For such a prevailing interpretation of Sec. 9 VGG see Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 9 VGG note 25; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 12; Gerlach, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 15; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 6; Heine, Wahrnehmung von Online-Musikrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften im Binnenmarkt, p. 74; Goldmann, Die kollektive Wahrnehmung musikalischer Rechte in den USA und Deutschland, pp. 185–186; Mauhs, Der Wahrnehmungsvertrag, pp. 36–37; for a different interpretation see Bundestags-Drucksache IV/271, p. 15; Melichar, Die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften, p. 35.

  125. 125.

    Reinbothe, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 215, 227; Bundestags-Drucksache IV/271, p. 16.

  126. 126.

    Bundestags-Drucksache IV/271, pp. 15–16.

  127. 127.

    See Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 9 VGG notes 26–29; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 13; Gerlach, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 16; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 8, each with further references.

  128. 128.

    Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 9 VGG note 26; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 13; Gerlach, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 16; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 9.

  129. 129.

    See BGH GRUR 2002, 961, 962—Mischtonmeister; Referentenentwurf of June 9, 2015, available at: http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/Gesetze/RefE_Richtlinie_Umsetzungsgesetz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 88; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 9 VGG note 27; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 13; Zeisberg, in: Dreyer/Kotthoff/Meckel, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 52.

  130. 130.

    Gerlach, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 16; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 9.

  131. 131.

    See Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 9, with further references.

  132. 132.

    See above Sect. 6 B I 2.

  133. 133.

    See Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 13; Gerlach, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 6 UrhWG note 16.

  134. 134.

    See below Sect. 6 C II 1 b cc.

  135. 135.

    KG GRUR-RR 2010, 320, 321; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 27 VGG note 4.

  136. 136.

    Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 27 VGG note 8; Heine, Wahrnehmung von Online-Musikrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften im Binnenmarkt, p. 75; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 7 UrhWG note 1.

  137. 137.

    Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 27 VGG note 9; Vogel, GRUR 1993, 513, 522.

  138. 138.

    See also above Sect. 4 B I 2.

  139. 139.

    See DPA, 81 UFITA 348, 360–363 (1978); Vogel, GRUR 1993, 513, 522; on the decision of KG in Musikverlegeranteil, which generally questioned GEMA’s practice of primarily applying its standard distribution keys, see above Sect. 4 B I 2.

  140. 140.

    See above Sect. 6 B I 3.

  141. 141.

    Referentenentwurf of June 9, 2015 (supra note 129), pp. 98–99; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 11 UrhWG note 5.

  142. 142.

    See above Sect. 6 B I 3.

  143. 143.

    Art. 16(2) sentence 4 CRM Directive; see above Sect. 6 B I 3.

  144. 144.

    Sec. 39(1) VGG (formerly Sec. 13(3) sentences 1 and 2 UrhWG); see also Reinbothe, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 215, 234.

  145. 145.

    Sec. 39(2) VGG (formerly Sec. 13(3) sentence 3 UrhWG).

  146. 146.

    Art 16(2) sentence 4 CRM Directive; see above Sect. 6 B I 3.

  147. 147.

    Sec. 39(3) VGG (formerly Sec. 13(3) sentence 4 UrhWG).

  148. 148.

    Sec. 38 sentence 2 VGG (formerly Sec. 13(1) sentence 2 UrhWG).

  149. 149.

    Sec. 35 VGG (formerly Sec. 12 UrhWG).

  150. 150.

    Ibid.

  151. 151.

    BGH GRUR 1974, 35, 37—Musikautomat; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 12 UrhWG note 4; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 12 UrhWG note 1.

  152. 152.

    OLG Munich ZUM 2003, 319, 323—Gesamtvertrag GVL; Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 35 VGG note 10; Reinbothe, in: Schricker/Loewenheim, Sec. 12 UrhWG note 4; Nordemann/Wirtz, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 12 UrhWG note 1.

  153. 153.

    See above Sect. 6 B I 4.

  154. 154.

    See above Sect. 6 B I 5.

  155. 155.

    See Secs. 128(1)-(2) VGG (formerly Secs. 16(1)-(2) UrhWG).

  156. 156.

    See above Sect. 6 B II 2.

  157. 157.

    See Secs. 60(1) and 9 sentence 2 VGG.

  158. 158.

    See Secs. 60(2) sentence 1 and 34(1) sentence 1 VGG.

  159. 159.

    See Secs. 60(2) sentence 1 and 35 VGG.

  160. 160.

    See Secs. 60(2) sentence 1 and 37 VGG.

  161. 161.

    See Secs. 60(2) sentence 1 and 38 VGG.

  162. 162.

    See Secs. 60(2) sentence 2 and 39 VGG.

  163. 163.

    Regierungsentwurf of October 30, 2015 (supra note 117), p. 76.

  164. 164.

    See above Sect. 6 C I 2 a.

  165. 165.

    Art. 1(h) GEMA Rights Management Agreement, in: Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, pp. 183, 184.

  166. 166.

    See Arts. 1(b) and 10(2) GEMA Rights Management Agreement, in: Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, pp. 183, 184, 190.

  167. 167.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 98.

  168. 168.

    See above Sect. 6 A II 1 a.

  169. 169.

    For a general overview of the new licensing approaches in the RRAs between European CMOs see Müller, ZUM 2011, 13, 14–15. A more detailed discussion is hereby not possible in the absence of the publication of these RRAs (similarly von Albrecht, ZUM 2011, 706, 708).

  170. 170.

    GEMA Tariff “Royalty Rates Schedule VR-OD 7”, effective as of January 1, 2013, available in English at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_VRA/tarif_vr_od7e.pdf.

  171. 171.

    See GEMA Tariffs “Royalty Rates Schedule VR-OD 8” (available in English at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_VRA/tarif_vr_od8e.pdf) and “Royalty Rates Schedule VR-OD 9” (available in English at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_VRA/tarif_vr_od9e.pdf), both effective as of January 1, 2013.

  172. 172.

    GEMA Tariff “Royalty Rates Schedule VR-OD 8” (supra note 171).

  173. 173.

    GEMA Tariff “Royalty Rates Schedule VR-OD 9” (supra note 171).

  174. 174.

    For proper qualification of personalized webcasting under German law see Sect. 3 C I 4.

  175. 175.

    GEMA Tariff Radio/Webradio “S-VR/Hf-Pr”, effective as of January 1, 2012, available in German at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_sonstige/gema_tarif_radio.pdf.

  176. 176.

    GEMA Tariff Premium-Radio “S-VR/PHf-Pr”, effective as of January 1, 2009, available in German at: https://www.gema.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Musiknutzer/Tarife/Tarife_sonstige/tarif_premium_radio.pdf.

  177. 177.

    See GEMA Tariff Radio/Webradio “S-VR/Hf-Pr” (supra note 175) and GEMA Tariff Premium-Radio “S-VR/PHf-Pr” (supra note 176).

  178. 178.

    See above Sect. 6 B II 1.

  179. 179.

    For a detailed discussion of the Sec. 115 CA compulsory license see above Sect. 5 D I 1.

  180. 180.

    See GEMA Geschäftsbericht 2008 (supra note 78), pp. 21–22; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 137–138, 143–144; see also above Sect. 6 B II 1 and footnote 78.

  181. 181.

    See Müller, ZUM 2011, 13, 16; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 143; see also above Sect. 6 B II 1 and footnote 78.

  182. 182.

    See above Sect. 6 B II 1.

  183. 183.

    These are DEAL and PEDL initiatives, see above Sect. 6 B II 1.

  184. 184.

    See above Sect. 6 B II 1; similarly Poll, ZUM 2008, 500, 506.

  185. 185.

    Maier-Hauff, ZUM 2013, 182, 183.

  186. 186.

    See the definition of Sec. 3(1) VGG.

  187. 187.

    See above Sect. 6 C I.

  188. 188.

    See the description of facts in LG Munich ZUM 2009, 788, 789—MyVideo and by Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 310–311; similarly Müller, ZUM 2009, 121, 127; Himmelmann, in: Kreile/Becker/Riesenhuber, Recht und Praxis der GEMA, Chapter 18, paras. 26a–26b.

  189. 189.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 309–331; Hoeren/Altemark, GRUR 2010, 16, 21; Ventroni, MMR 2008, 273, 274; Alich, GRUR Int. 2008, 996, 1002–1003; in this direction also Hilty, in: Leistner (ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des geistigen Eigentums, 123, 138; Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 346 (2013).

  190. 190.

    Art. 2(3) CRM Directive.

  191. 191.

    Sec. 3(1) VGG.

  192. 192.

    Sec. 3(2) VGG.

  193. 193.

    Sec. 90 VGG.

  194. 194.

    See above the description of the relevant German copyright contract provisions in Sect. 4 A; see also Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 329–330 (2013).

  195. 195.

    LG Munich ZUM 2009, 788—MyVideo; OLG Munich ZUM 2010, 709 (confirming the ruling of LG Munich); see also Drexl/Nérisson/Trumpke/Hilty, 44 IIC 322, 329–330 (2013).

  196. 196.

    LG Munich ZUM 2009, 788, 793—MyVideo; OLG Munich ZUM 2010, 709, 712.

  197. 197.

    Schulze, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 31 UrhG note 29; Schulze, ZUM 2011, 2, 9; Wandtke/Grunert, in: Wandtke/Bullinger, Sec. 31 UrhG note 18; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, pp. 234–243; Jani, ZUM 2009, 722; Müller, ZUM 2011, 13; Melichar, ZUM 2010, 713; Spohn/Hullen, GRUR 2010, 1053, 1056–1057.

  198. 198.

    Dreier, in: Dreier/Schulze, Sec. 19a UrhG note 1; Dustmann, in: Fromm/Nordemann, Sec. 16 UrhG note 26; Schaefer, ZUM 2010, 150; Ullrich, ZUM 2010, 311; Czychowski/Nordemann, GRUR-RR 2012, 233, 234; Grewenig, ZUM 2011, 27, 30; partially agreeing Hilty, in: Leistner (ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des geistigen Eigentums, 123, 157–159.

  199. 199.

    Discussed above, see Sect. 5 C I 1.

  200. 200.

    Discussed above, see Sects. 6 C I 3 a–b.

  201. 201.

    Schaefer, ZUM 2010, 150, 152–154.

  202. 202.

    Hilty, in: Leistner (ed.), Europäische Perspektiven des geistigen Eigentums, 123, 157–159.

  203. 203.

    See above Sect. 5 D I 1 d.

  204. 204.

    See below Sects. 9 B II, 10 A II, 10 B II, 11 B III, 13 and 14 B I 1 c.

  205. 205.

    See Czychowski/Nordemann, GRUR-RR 2012, 233, 234.

  206. 206.

    See above Sect. 5 C II 1.

  207. 207.

    Dünnwald/Gerlach, Sec. 78 UrhG note 49; see also Art. 1(1)(2)(a)(aa) of the GVL Representation Agreement for Performing Artists (available at: https://www.gvl.de/gesamtpaket-vertragsabschluss-kuenstler [in German] and https://www.gvl.de/en/artists-representation-agreements-documents-package [in English]); Art. 1(7)(f) of the GVL Representation Agreement for Phonogram Producers (available at: https://www.gvl.de/wahrnehmungsvertrag-tontraegerhersteller [in German] and https://www.gvl.de/en/agreement-assignment-and-administration-rights-producers-sound-recordings [in English]).

  208. 208.

    See GVL Tariff 15 Webcasting, published in German Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) No. 124 of August 19, 2008, p. 3022; also available in English at: https://www.gvl.de/en/tariff-exploitation-commercially-published-sound-recordings-webcasting.

  209. 209.

    See above Sects. 3 C I 4 and 3 C II.

  210. 210.

    However, as noted above in Sect. 6 C II 1 a bb, GEMA rates are less flexible, as far as subscription forms of interactive streaming and personalized webcasting are concerned—here no different treatment is applied.

  211. 211.

    See above Sect. 6 A II 2.

  212. 212.

    See above Sect. 6 C II 1 b cc.

  213. 213.

    See below Sect. 6 D II 2 b.

  214. 214.

    Also known as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.

  215. 215.

    American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, founded in 1914.

  216. 216.

    Broadcast Music, Inc., founded in 1939.

  217. 217.

    The ASCAP Consent Decree was first entered in 1941, see U.S. v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (hereinafter First ASCAP Consent Decree), and subsequently amended in 1950, see U.S. v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (hereinafter Amended Final Judgment or AFJ), in 1960, see U.S. v. ASCAP, 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,612 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (hereinafter Modification of the Amended Final Judgment) and in 2001, see U.S. v. ASCAP, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 73,474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (hereinafter Second Amended Final Judgment or AFJ2).

    The BMI Consent Decree was first entered in 1941, see U.S. v. BMI, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 56,096 (E.D.Wis. 1941) (hereinafter First BMI Consent Decree) and subsequently amended in 1966, see U.S. v. BMI, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (hereinafter Amended BMI Consent Decree), and in 1994, see U.S. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (hereinafter Amended BMI Consent Decree, modified 1994). The consolidated version considering all these amendments will hereinafter be referred to as the BMI Consent Decree.

  218. 218.

    See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 340, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), quoting different estimations of ASCAP’s market share at 47% and at 45.6%, and BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105 at 18 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), quoting that “ASCAP and BMI have roughly the same overall market share”; see also EU Commission Case No. COMP/M.4404, Decision of May 22, 2007—Universal/BMG Music Publishing, para. 165 (“approximately 49% of the US authors are members of ASCAP and 49% are members of BMI”). For somewhat different, but generally comparable, figures see Duvall, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 267, 269 (2008) and Cardi, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 835, 844 (2007), claiming that ASCAP controls 54% and BMI 43% of the market.

  219. 219.

    Used to stand for Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, nowadays simply SESAC, founded in 1930. The market share of SESAC was quoted in the U.S. case law to be around 10%, see In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) with further references.

  220. 220.

    Global Music Rights, founded in 2013. The market share of this newly formed entity, which was able to secure the repertoire of some “star” rightholders, is yet to be estimated.

  221. 221.

    See above Sect. 5 D I 1 e aa.

  222. 222.

    For a detailed discussion of these statutory licensing regimes see Sects. 5 D II 1–2.

  223. 223.

    See also above Sect. 5 D II 1 d dd.

  224. 224.

    For a discussion of relevant consent decrees and antitrust case law see Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.19; Lunney, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 339, 342–370; Seyfert, Copyright and Anti-Trust Law, pp. 6, 20; Goldmann, Die kollektive Wahrnehmung musikalischer Rechte in den USA und Deutschland, pp. 125–181; Goldmann, GRUR Int. 2001, 420.

  225. 225.

    See AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. XI(A); Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. V(A).

  226. 226.

    See Goldmann, GRUR Int. 2001, 420, 423.

  227. 227.

    See Sec. 114(g)(2) CA.

  228. 228.

    See 37 CFR 370.5(d).

  229. 229.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. IV(B).

  230. 230.

    Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. IV(A); see also Sobel, 3 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 1, 6 (1983); Goldmann, Die kollektive Wahrnehmung musikalischer Rechte in den USA und Deutschland, p. 161.

  231. 231.

    See Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-Musikrechten in Europa, p. 177.

  232. 232.

    Sec. 114(e)(1) CA.

  233. 233.

    S. Rep. No. 104-128, 28 (1995).

  234. 234.

    See Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788 at 2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace: A Report of the Register of Copyrights, February 2015, available at: http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf, p. 39.

  235. 235.

    For a summary of these rates see U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace (supra note 234), p. 160 with further references.

  236. 236.

    In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927 at 5 and 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2015).

  237. 237.

    BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788 at 2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), at 3–4.

  238. 238.

    See also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace (supra note 234), p. 40.

  239. 239.

    For details see Lunney, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 339, 355–358.

  240. 240.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. XI(1).

  241. 241.

    Ibid.

  242. 242.

    Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. VII(A).

  243. 243.

    See Public Comment of the Future of Music Coalition on Consent Decree Review, August 6, 2014, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307749.pdf; see also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace (supra note 234), p. 152.

    For 50/50 author-publisher splits see ASCAP Articles of Association, as amended through May 2002, available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/members/governing-documents/articles-of-association.pdf, Art. XVII(1)(c); BMI Royalty Policy Manual, last updated on April 9, 2015, available at: http://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/general_information.

    For the strict policy of direct payments to authors see ASCAP Articles of Association, Art. XX(4), named “Assignment of Royalties and Rights of Members Generally Prohibited; Exceptions”, which reads as follows: “The royalties, or the right to participate in the royalties, and the rights of the members in the Society, shall not be sold or otherwise disposed of by any member and shall not be the subject of sale or other disposition by voluntary action, operation of law, legal proceedings or otherwise, and no member shall sell, otherwise dispose of, hypothecate or create a lien upon any royalties accruing, or that may thereafter accrue to such member, by virtue of such member’s membership, or any of the rights, privileges, benefits, royalties or emoluments to which such member may be entitled by virtue of such member’s membership except as the Board of Directors may from time to time provide by regulation, provided, however, that a writer member may assign all royalties, or the right to participate in all royalties, to a corporation in which the writer member owns ninety-five percent (95%) or more of the stock.”

    On non-consideration by ASCAP of arrangements regarding recoupment of advances see also Public Comments of ASCAP Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (August 6, 2014), available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/advocacy-legislation/public-comments-of-ascap-in-response-to-doj-consent-decree-review-request.pdf, p. 7.

  244. 244.

    See above Sect. 5 D II 1 d ee.

  245. 245.

    See above Sect. 5 D II 2 b.

  246. 246.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. VI.

  247. 247.

    Id., Art. IV(C).

  248. 248.

    See fragmented obligations in Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. VIII(B) against broadcasters and Art. IX(C) against other music users, as well as Amended BMI Consent Decree, modified 1994 (supra note 217), Art. XIV(A).

  249. 249.

    See e.g. BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

  250. 250.

    Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. VIII(A).

  251. 251.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Arts. II(E), II(J), II(K) and II (S).

  252. 252.

    Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. VIII(B).

  253. 253.

    Amended BMI Consent Decree (supra note 217), Art. IX(C).

  254. 254.

    U.S. v. BMI, 275 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2001).

  255. 255.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. IX(A); Amended BMI Consent Decree, modified 1994 (supra note 217), Art. XIV(A).

  256. 256.

    AFJ2 (supra note 217), Art. IX(A); Amended BMI Consent Decree, modified 1994 (supra note 217), Art. XIV(A); see also BMI v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012).

  257. 257.

    See ASCAP v. Showtime/Movie Channel, 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1990); U.S. v. BMI, 316 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2003); U.S. v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2010); ASCAP v. MobiTV, Inc., 681 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2012); In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Lunney, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 339, 359; U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace (supra note 234), p. 41.

  258. 258.

    See above Sect. 6 D I 2 c.

  259. 259.

    See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 357–361 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), confirmed in Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2015); however, this differs from another rate-setting decision for BMI that did not oppose the mentioned agreements as benchmarks, see BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). See also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and the Music Marketplace (supra note 234), p. 40.

  260. 260.

    See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 329, 332–333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

  261. 261.

    See above Sect. 5 D II 1 d.

  262. 262.

    See above Sect. 3 D I 2.

  263. 263.

    Art. 1(c) ASCAP Membership Agreement for Writers, available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/join/ascap-writer-agreement.pdf; Art. 1(c) ASCAP Membership Agreement for Publishers, available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/join/ascap-publisher-agreement.pdf.

  264. 264.

    Art. 4(a) BMI Writer Agreement, available at: http://www.bmi.com/forms/affilation/bmi_writer_kit.pdf; Art. 3(A) BMI Publisher Agreement, available at: http://www.bmi.com/forms/affilation/bmi_publisher_kit.pdf.

  265. 265.

    See Heker (ed.), GEMA Jahrbuch 2014/2015, p. 195.

  266. 266.

    See Sec. 3(a) ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Interactive Services, Release 21, available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/licensing/report-forms/web-mobile/ascap%20experimental%20license%20agreement%20for%20interactive%20services%20%20release%2021.pdf.

  267. 267.

    See Sec. 3(a) ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Non-Interactive Services, Release 5.2, available at: http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/licensing/report-forms/web-mobile/ascap%20experimental%20license%20agreement%20for%20noninteractive%20services%20%20release%2052.pdf.

  268. 268.

    See Sec. 8 ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Interactive Services (supra note 266); Sec. 8 ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Non-Interactive Services (supra note 267).

  269. 269.

    For rate schedules see ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Interactive Services (supra note 266) and ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Non-Interactive Services (supra note 267).

  270. 270.

    See BMI, Digital Licensing: Music Service, available at: http://www.bmi.com/digital_licensing/entry/music_service.

  271. 271.

    BMI v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105 at 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), although this increase occurred in the light of direct licenses negotiated by Pandora with major publishers, which was not deemed permissible by the Second Circuit decision for ASCAP in a similarly situated case, see Pandora Media, Inc. v. ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2015), confirming In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 357–361 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

  272. 272.

    See SESAC Internet Performance License 2015, available at: http://www.sesac.com/pdf/internet_2015.pdf, and SESAC Internet Performance License 2014-2015, available at: http://www.sesac.com/pdf/internet_2015-14.pdf.

  273. 273.

    Lunney, in: Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 339, 344.

  274. 274.

    See above Sect. 5 D I 1.

  275. 275.

    See above Sect. 6 D I 1.

  276. 276.

    See above Sects. 5 D I 1 b and 5 D I 1 d.

  277. 277.

    See above Sect. 5 D I 1 d.

  278. 278.

    Ibid.

  279. 279.

    See above Sects. 5 D II 1–2.

  280. 280.

    See above Sect. 6 C II 2; see also below Sect. 9 B II 2 c.

  281. 281.

    See Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music Business, pp. 153–154.

  282. 282.

    See Passman, All You Need to Know About the Music Business, pp. 156–157; Singleton, This was Sony Music’s contract with Spotify, The Verge of May 19, 2015, available at: http://www.theverge.com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-music-spotify-contract (analyzing the leaked contract of Sony Music and Spotify).

  283. 283.

    See Singleton, The Verge of May 19, 2015 (supra note 282).

  284. 284.

    For further discussion see below Sect. 9 B II 2 a.

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Malevanny, N. (2019). CRM in the Field of OMD. In: Online Music Distribution - How Much Exclusivity Is Needed?. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 12. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59699-9_6

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