Can a Digitised Version Obtain Copyright Protection Within the EU?

Mendis, Sunimal

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-59454-4_7

Sunimal Mendis⁴

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 11))

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Abstract

This chapter examines the ability of a digitised version of a rare document recording public domain textual content to qualify for copyright protection within the EU legal framework. It provides a brief overview of the digitisation process, particularly focusing on the nature and extent of human involvement in the creation of a digitised version. It analyses the ability of a digitised version to fulfil the harmonised EU standard of originality (i.e., author’s own intellectual creation standard), as that standard has been interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the national courts of the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France. It further explores the possibility for a digitised version to qualify for copyright protection under the traditional standards of originality that prevail(ed) in these jurisdictions prior to the introduction of the harmonised EU standard.

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Notes

1.
According to Lee, “scanning involves conversion of specifically image-based analogue material into digital form. Digitisation, on the other hand, means the conversion of any analogue material to electronic storage, including sound and video. In other words, all scanning is digitisation, but not all digitisation is scanning”. Stuart D Lee, Digital Imaging: A Practical Handbook (1st Ed, Neal-Schuman Publishers 2001) 36.
2.
“Flatbed scanners have become the most commonplace method for capturing images or text. Their name comes from the fact that the scanner is literally a flat glass bed, quite similar to a copy machine, on which the image is placed face down and covered. The scanner then passes light-sensitive sensors over the illuminated page, breaking it into groups of pixel-sized boxes.” Alan Morrison, Michael Popham and Karen Wikander, Creating and Documenting Electronic Texts: A Guide to Good Practice (AHDS 1999) <https://ota.ox.ac.uk/documents/creating/cdet/chap3.html#2> accessed 31 January 2019.
3.
Morrison, Popham, and Wikander note that, the flatbed scanner requires that the document must be placed completely flat on the scanning bed. In the digitisation of books this poses a problem because, the way in which a book is bound does not allow it to be placed completely flat upon the scanning bed and the only way to accomplish this would be to bend the spine of the book to breaking-point. They point out that the problem is exacerbated when dealing with texts with very fragile pages such as early printed books and manuscripts, as the inversion and pressure can cause the pages to flake away or rip, and that a solution to this problem is to digitise such material with a stand-alone digital camera. ibid.
4.
It is noted that most of these digitisation initiatives also have the objective of preserving these rare documents for posterity in digital format. This also requires that the digitised version represents an exact and faithful digital reproduction of the rare document.
5.
As defined by Gervais, “a creative choice is one made by the author that is not dictated by the function of the work, the method of technique used or by applicable standards or relevant good practice (…) a conscious human choice must have been made, even though it may be irrational”. Thus, the degree of freedom allowed for the exercise of independent human choice within the digitisation process becomes a relevant consideration in the determination of the originality of a digitised version and thereby its possibility of qualifying for copyright protection. Daniel Gervais, ‘Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law’ [2002] 49 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 949, 976–977. See also André Lucas, Agnès Lucas-Schloetter and Carine Bernault, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique (5th edn, Lexis Nexis 2017) 121, “La forme dans laquelle doit s’incarner l’œuvre de l’esprit ne lui permet pas d’accéder à la protection du droit d’auteur si elle est purement fonctionnelle”. (“The intellectual work will not qualify for authors’ rights protection if it is in a form that is purely functional”.) (Translated into English by the author). In Germany, works that are produced under fully automated processes without the presence of human intervention is excluded from copyright protection. Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 11. Similarly, in France, the conception of a work as an extension of its author’s personality implies that subject-matter created through fully automated processes, without human intervention would not qualify for copyright protection. On the other hand, in the UK [s 9(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 (UK)] and Ireland [s 21(f) Copyright and Related Rights Act n°28 of 2000 (Ireland)] computer generated works can qualify for copyright protection in which case the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken will be designated as its author. S178 of the CDPA defines computer generated works as, works that are generated by a computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work. However, as will be discussed below, it is unlikely that a digitised version of a rare document would qualify as a computer generated work under this definition, as the process used for the digitisation of rare documents is usually not fully automated, and involves a certain degree of human involvement.
6.
Cornell University Library/Research Department, ‘Moving Theory into Practice: Digital Imaging Tutorial’ <http://preservationtutorial.library.cornell.edu/contents.html> accessed 31 January 2019.
7.
Charged Coupled Device.
8.
Contact Image Sensor.
9.
Photomultiplier Tube.
10.
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor.
11.
Chris Woodford, ‘Digital Cameras’, Explain That Stuff (2016) <www.explainthatstuff.com/digitalcameras.html> accessed 31 January 2019.
12.
National Mission for Manuscripts ‘Guidelines for Digitisation of Manuscripts’ <https://fr.scribd.com/document/376803180/Guidelines-for-Digitization-of-Manuscripts> accessed 31 January 2019.
13.
The zoom-in feature allows users to obtain an enlarged view of the image or particular portions of the image.
14.
‘Page-turner’ refers to the flip animation function that is used by many distributors of digitised products. The flip function allows a user to view multiple digital images in a way that simulates flipping through the pages of a book, thereby bringing the experience of reading a digitised version of a book closer to the actual experience of reading a book in print form.
15.
Thomas Margoni, ‘The Digitisation of Cultural Heritage: Originality, Derivative Works and (Non) Original Photographs’ (IVIR University of Amsterdam 2014) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2573104> accessed 31 January 2019.
16.
ibid 5–6.
17.
ibid.
18.
ibid 6.
19.
National Mission for Manuscripts (n 12).
20.
Morrison, Popham and Wikander (n 2) 3.3.2.
21.
See Dipti S Tripathi ‘Guidelines for Digitisation of Archival Material’ 26–27. <https://namami.gov.in/downloads> accessed 31 January 2019.
22.
Redundancy reduction is often used during ‘lossless’ encoding (which refers to a compression technique in which no information from the original image is lost or removed). It looks for patterns and repetitions that can be expressed more efficiently. See Jisc Digital Media, ‘Digital File Formats: Redundancy and irrelevancy’ <https://edu.hioa.no/ark2200/h18/pensum/jisc/infokit/file_formats/redundancy-and-irrelevancy.html> accessed 31 January 2019.
23.
Irrelevancy reduction aims to remove or alter information that makes little or no difference to the perception of the file content. ibid.
24.
Tripathi (n 21) 30.
25.
“Even when digitisation equipment is assessed (…) it is still necessary to have knowledgeable and experienced staff to evaluate images visually. At this time, it is not possible to rely entirely on the objective test measurements to ensure optimum image quality. It is still necessary to have staff with the visual literacy and technical expertise to do a good job with digitisation and to perform quality control for digital images.” Steven Puglia, Jeffrey Reed and Erin Rhodes, ‘Technical Guidelines for Digitizing Archival Materials for Electronic Access: Creation of Production Master Files-Raster Images.’ <www.archives.gov/files/preservation/technical/guidelines.pdf> accessed 31 January 2019.
26.
See comments made by Kimber Wiegand, Digitisation Specialist in National Endowment for the Humanities, US, Digitizing Illuminated Manuscripts at the Walters Art Museum, Maryland (video) <www.youtube.com/watch?v=umOc5nXmO_U> accessed 31 January 2019.
27.
Thomas Margoni, ‘The Harmonisation of EU Copyright Law: The Originality Standard’ in Mark Perry (ed), Global Governance of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century (Springer International Publishing 2016) 88–90. The need to harmonise intellectual property law to facilitate intra-Community trade is reflected in the 1985 White Paper of the European Commission, which states that, “[d]ifferences in intellectual property laws have a direct and negative impact on intra-Community trade and on the ability of enterprises to treat the common market as a single environment for their economic activities.” Completing the Internal Market: White paper to the Commission from the European Council 1985, COM (85) 310 final 37 para 145.
28.
Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programmes [1991] OJ L122/42.
29.
Directive 2009/24/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programmes [2009] OJ L 111/16 (Computer Programmes Directive).
30.
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29th October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and related rights [1993] OJ L 290/9.
31.
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights [2006] OJ L372/12 (Term Directive).
32.
Article 3(1) of the Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77/20 (Database Directive).
33.
See Article 1(3) of Computer Programmes Directive (n 29); Article 6 of Term Directive (n 31); Article 3(1) of Database Directive ibid.
34.
Margoni (n 27) 91.
35.
For example, Rahmatian argues that the author’s own intellectual creation standard can only apply to subject-matter that is protected by EU Directives and that the development of a rule that is of uniform application would exceed the proper role of the CJEU. Andreas Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” Doctrine Under Pressure’ (2013) 44 IIC 4. Silke von Lewinski, ‘Introduction: The Notion of a Work under EU Law’ (2014) 63 GRUR Int 1098.
36.
See Valérie-Laure Benabou, ‘Jurisprudence Infopaq: Que Reste-T-Il Au Juge National Pour Dire Le Droit D’auteur’ (2009) 37 Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 71; Christian Handig, ‘The Copyright Term “Work” – European Harmonisation at an Unknown Level’ (2009) 40 IIC 665; Stef Van Gompel and Erlend Lavik, ‘Quality, Merit Aesthetics and Purpose: An Inquiry into EU Copyright Law’s Eschewal of Other Criteria than Originality’ (2013) 236 RIDA 100; Estelle Derclaye, ‘Assessing the Impact and Reception of the Court of Justice of the European Union Case Law on UK Copyright Law: What Does The Future Hold?’ (2014) 240 RIDA 5.
37.
Mireille Van Eechoud, ‘Along the Road to Uniformity – Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgements on Copyright Work’ (2012) 3 JIPITEC 60, 70.
38.
The Newspaper Licensing Agency and others v Meltwater Holding BV and others [2010] EWHC 3099 (Decision of the High Court of Justice Chancery Division); Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd [2011] EWPCC 21 (Red Bus case).
39.
BGH 13.11.2013 – I ZR 143/12, GRUR 2014, 175 – Geburtstagszug.
40.
Judgement of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08 and C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631 (Premier League case).
41.
ibid.
42.
Judgement of 1 March 2012, Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK, C-604/10, EU:C:2012:115.
43.
Judgement of 22 December 2010, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, C-393/09, EU:C:2010:816 (BSA case).
44.
Judgement of 1 December 2011, Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798.
45.
Valérie-Laure Benabou, ‘Originalité? Vous Avez Dit Originalités’ (2014) 53 LEGICOM 5, 9–12.
46.
ibid.
47.
ibid 9. “[C]ette définition avait été en quelque sorte oubliée par les Etats membres qui continuait gaiement à appliquer leurs propres critères, présumant une sorte d’euro-compatibilité de leur originalité avec l’originalité communautaire. [T]his definition had been somewhat forgotten by the Member States who continued to apply their own criteria, presuming a sort of Euro-compatibility of their originality standard with the EU originality standard”. (Translated into English by the author).
48.
Margoni (n 27) 101.
49.
Judgement of 16 July 2009, Infopaq, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465, para 30.
50.
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10 (InfoSoc Directive).
51.
(n 49) para 30. See also Stephen Vousden, ‘Infopaq and the Europeanisation of Copyright Law’ (2010) 1 The WIPO Journal 197 who argues that the critical analysis of the reasoning reveals that this reasoning does not rest on international copyright law or EU law but rather the German originality standard of personal intellectual creation.
52.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) 1161 UNTS 3.
53.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol 31; 33 ILM 81 (1994).
54.
Judgement of 16 July 2009, Infopaq, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465, para 34.
55.
ibid, para 35.
56.
ibid, para 37, “[i]n those circumstances, copyright within the meaning of Article 2(a) of [of the InfoSoc Directive] is liable to apply only in relation to a subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation.”
57.
ibid, para 48. The CJEU left it to the referring national court to determine whether the particular text extract which was reproduced contained elements which are the expression of the author’s own intellectual creation to amount to an unauthorised reproduction in part, under Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc Directive.
58.
See Thomas Höppner, ‘Reproduction in Part of Online Articles in the Aftermath of Infopaq (C-5/08): Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Meltwater Holdings BV’ [2011] EIPR 331, 332.
59.
Judgement of 22 December 2010, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, C-393/09, EU:C:2010:816 (BSA case).
60.
Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Infopaq, BSA and the “Europeanisation” of United Kingdom Copyright Law’ [2011] 16 Media & Arts Law Review, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1777027> accessed 31 January 2019.
61.
Judgement of 22 December 2010, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, C-393/09, EU:C:2010:816 (BSA case), para 45 (emphasis added). Griffiths notes that this appears to suggest that the question of whether a particular subject-matter is the author’s own intellectual creation is the sole precondition for a particular subject-matter to be recognised as a copyright work and that if this its correct reading then it goes well beyond the dicta of the Infopaq case. ibid, 8.
62.
ibid, BSA case, para 46.
63.
ibid, para 48.
64.
ibid, para 50.
65.
ibid, para 49.
66.
Jonathan Griffiths, ‘The Role of the Court of Justice in the Development of European Union Copyright Law’ in Irini Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law: A Commentary (Edward Elgar 2014) 1103.
67.
Judgement of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League, C-403/08 and C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631.
68.
ibid, para 98, “[h]owever, sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the [InfoSoc] Directive. That applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.”
69.
ibid, paras 96–99.
70.
Judgement of 1 December 2011, Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798.
71.
Term Directive (n 31).
72.
Judgement of 1 December 2011, Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paras 88–89.
73.
ibid, paras 90–91.
74.
ibid, para 92.
75.
Judgement of 1 March 2012, Football Dataco, C-604/10, EU:C:2012:115.
76.
Database Directive (n 32).
77.
Judgement of 1 March 2012, Football Dataco, C-604/10, EU:C:2012:115, para 37.
78.
ibid, para 38.
79.
ibid, para 39 citing Judgement of 1 December 2011, Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798 and Judgement of 4 October 2011, Football Association Premier League and Others, C-403/08 and C-429/08, EU:C:2011:631 (Premier League case).
80.
ibid, para 42 (emphasis added).
81.
See Griffiths (n 60) 11.
82.
As per the objective notion of originality, a work will be original if it is the independent creation of its author in the sense it is not copied. Thus, under the interpretation of the author’s own intellectual creation standard as an objective test, a work will be considered original if it originates from the author and is not copied. Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 143, are of the view that the harmonised standard of originality reflects an objective approach. “Pour nous, la Cour a creusé le même sillon que la directive de 1991, et c’est bien une définition objective de l’originalité qui est retenue.” (“For us, the [CJEU] has dug the same furrow as the computer programmes Directive, and it is very much an objective definition of originality that has been retained”). (Translated into English by the author). Lucas, et al. further argue that, the personal touch stamp test applied in the Painer case is in perfect harmony with the objective notion of originality as the CJEU considered it as being fulfilled if the author was able to express his creative capacities in the realisation of the work by making free and creative choices. ibid.
83.
As per the subjective notion of originality, a work will be original if it reflects its author’s personality. Thus, under the interpretation of the author’s own intellectual creation standard as a subjective test, a work will be considered original if the author’s personality is reflected in the work. Hence, the ability of the author to exercise his personal creative choices and to thereby imprint his personality upon the work is of critical importance to the subjective test, as it is through the exercise of such personal creative choices that the author is able to imprint his personality on the work. Proponents of the subjective interpretation include Derclaye who opined that the decision of the CJEU in the Infopaq case shows that creativity is the criterion of originality. Estelle Derclaye, ‘Wonderful or Worrisome? The Impact of the ECJ Ruling in Infopaq on UK Copyright Law’ [2010] EIPR 247, 248; Michaux who notes that the CJEU’s application of the author’s own intellectual creation standard in the Infopaq case inclines it towards a subjective notion than an objective notion. Benoît Michaux, ‘L’originalité en droit d’auteur, une notion davantage communautaire après l’arrêt Infopaq’ (2009) 5 Auteurs & Media 473; Pollaud-Dulian who opined that in the Painer decision, the CJEU elaborated the author’s own intellectual creation standard in a way that is closer to the civil law subjective notion. Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 158–159.
84.
For example, while courts in the UK tend to interpret it as an objective test (see The Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater [2010] EWHC 3099, n 38). Courts in France (see TGI Paris, 3eme Ch 1, 21 mai 2015 [Jimmy Hendrix case], n 359) and Cour de Cassation Ch civ, 15 mai 2015, 13-27391 [Glamour case], n 360) and in Belgium have interpreted it as a subjective test (see Belgium Supreme Court decision in M-Design Benelux SPRL [2013] SC C120263 N/1, which overturned the previous Supreme Court decision in Artessuto v B&T Textilia [2012] SC C1101018N to hold that a work would be original if it is the intellectual creation of the author that bears his personal stamp).
85.
Judgement of 1 December 2011, Painer, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798.
86.
Derclaye opined that the ‘personal touch stamp’ requirement is uniformly applicable to all works and not only to photographs. Derclaye (n 36) 10.
87.
It is observed that this formulation is under the sub-standards of ‘intellectual labour’ and ‘freedom of choice’, which Waisman argue are used to facilitate the practical application of ‘intellectual originality standards’, i.e., the creativity standard and the personality standard. Thus, it is possible to argue that the author’s own intellectual creation standard is more on the side of the line of an intellectual originality standard than a sweat of the brow or skill and labour standard. Agustin Waisman, ‘Revisiting Originality’ (2009) 31 EIPR 370, 370–374.
88.
Cf. The interpretation of an intellectual creation given by the CJEU in the SAS case, “It is only through the choice, sequence and combination of those words, figures or mathematical concepts that the author may express his creativity in an original manner and achieve a result, namely the user manual for the computer programme, which is an intellectual creation (see, to that effect, Infopaq International, paragraph 45).” Judgement of 2 May 2012, SAS Institute, C-406/10, EU:C:2012:259.
89.
Michel Vivant and Jean-Michel Bruguière, Le Droit d’auteur et Droits Voisins (3rd Edition, Dalloz 2016) 249.
90.
Judgement of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465.
91.
Bently and Sherman, indicate four characteristics that are required to be fulfilled by a literary, dramatic, or artistic work, to come within copyright protection. These are (1) that the work is recorded in material form; (2) its originality; (3) that the work is sufficiently connected to the UK to qualify for protection under UK law and (4) that the work is not excluded from protection under public policy grounds. However, as (1), (3) and (4) are not relevant to our discussion, we shall not consider those. Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th Edition, Oxford University Press 2014) 91.
92.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK).
93.
ibid, CDPA s 4(2), “photograph means a recording of light or other radiation on any medium on which an image is produced or from which an image may be any means be produced and which is not part of a film”.
94.
Bently and Sherman (n 91) 96–97.
95.
ibid.
96.
Kevin Garnett, Gillian Davies and Gwilym Harbottle, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (15th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 119 citing Ultra Marketing (UK) Ltd v Universal Components Ltd [2004] EWHC 468 (Ch), para 51, where the question of originality was broken down to consist of these two characterisations.

The question is whether his drawing was an original drawing. In the sense that the drawing originated with him, and that he did not copy it from a pre-existing source, it was, in my judgement, original. It is also the product of skill and labour, so that in principle it is entitled to copyright protection as an artistic work.
97.
University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601. (University of London Press case).
98.
ibid 608–609 (emphasis added).
99.
Macmillan And Company Ltd v K and J Cooper (1924) 26 BOMLR 292.
100.
ibid para 19, citing Frederick Emerson v. Chas. Davies (1843) 3 Story Under Section Rep. 708.
101.
Bently and Sherman (n 91) 97.
102.
Derclaye (n 36) 3.
103.
Copinger and Skone James note that it is almost impossible to state in any precise terms the amount of labour, skill and/or judgement that the author of a work must bestow on his creation for the work to acquire copyright. Copinger and Skone James (n 96) 119.
104.
The Law Society of Upper Canada v CCH Canadian Ltd [2004] SCC 13.
105.
ibid para 16.
106.
ibid.
107.
ibid.
108.
Carys J Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a Relational Theory of Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 125–126.
109.
Mark J. Davison, The legal protection of databases (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 144.
110.
Macmillan and Company Ltd v K and J Cooper (1924) 26 BOMLR 292, para 36 per Atkinson J.
111.
See Sam Ricketson, ‘The Concept of Originality in Anglo-Australian Copyright Law’ (1991) 39 Journal, Copyright Society of the USA 265, 280.
112.
Walter and Another v Lane [1900] AC 539.
113.
Contra see Lord Halsbury, ibid 548,

My Lords, if I have not insisted upon the skill and accuracy of those who produce in writing or print spoken words, it is not because I think the less of those qualities, but because, as I have endeavoured to point out, neither the one nor the other are conditions precedent to the right created by the statute. That right, in my view, is given by the statute to the first producer of a book, whether that book be wise or foolish, accurate or inaccurate, of literary merit or of no merit whatever.
114.
ibid 553 per Lord James of Hereford.
115.
ibid 545, per Lord Halsbury:

I should very much regret it if I were compelled to come to the conclusion that the state of the law permitted one man to make profit and to appropriate to himself the labour, skill, and capital of another. And it is not denied that in this case the defendant seeks to appropriate to himself what has been produced by the skill, labour, and capital of others. In the view I take of this case I think the law is strong enough to restrain what to my mind would be a grievous injustice. The law which I think restrains it is to be found in the Copyright Act (…).

See also ibid 552 per Lord Davey, “it is a sound principle that a man shall not avail himself of another’s skill, labour, and expense by copying the written product thereof”.
116.
William Cornish and David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 422. Drassinower opined that Lord Halsbury’s affirmation of the normative significance of the sweat of the author’s brow generates a vision of copyright law as a remedy for the misappropriation of labour. Abraham Drassinower, ‘Sweat of the Brow, Creativity, and Authorship: On Originality in Canadian Copyright Law’ (2003) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 105.
117.
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273.
118.
We avoid the use of the term ‘derivative work’ to identify works that reproduce existing works, because especially in the US, there has been doubt expressed as to whether a digitised version can be identified as a derivative work, or whether it is an independent work that depicts an existing work [see SHL Imaging Inc v Artisan House Inc [2000] 117 F Supp 2d 301 (SDNY).]. This discussion is beyond the scope of this analysis. Therefore, to maintain neutrality, the term ‘derivative work’ is not used. For further discussion see also William Patry, ‘Photographs and Derivative Works’ <http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/02/photographs-and-derivative-works.html> accessed 31 January 2019.
119.
Macmillan and Company Ltd v K and J Cooper (1924) 26 BOMLR 292.
120.
Fredrick Emerson v Chas Davies [1843] 3 Story Under Section Rep 708.
121.
GA Cramp Sons Ltd v Frank Smythson Ltd [1944] AC 329.
122.
ibid 335–336 (emphasis added). It is to be noted that this decision pre-dates the 1996 EU Database Directive (n 32).
123.
ibid 338.
124.
Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2011) 87.
125.
Sawkins v Hyperion [2005] 1 WLR 3281.
126.
ibid para 83 per Jacob LJ.
127.
ibid para 86 (emphasis added).
128.
ibid para 23 per Mummery LJ (emphasis added).
129.
Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 103.
130.
Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217.
131.
Paul Torremans, ‘Legal Issues Pertaining to the Restoration and Reconstitution of Manuscripts, Sheet Music, Paintings and Films for Marketing Purposes’, Copyright Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 31.
132.
ibid.
133.
This case was decided under Israeli Copyright law that at the time was based on the British Copyright Act of 1911. According to Hilty and Nerisson, “Although, throughout the years certain amendments were made to the Israeli Copyright Act (…) most of this legislation remained identical to the British Copyright Act, 1911.” Reto M Hilty and Sylvie Nerisson, Balancing Copyright – A Survey of National Approaches (Springer 2012) 533.
134.
Eisenmann v Qimron, 54[3] PD 817. Unofficial English translation by David Birnhack available at <www.tau.ac.il/law/members/birnhack/DSStransaltion.pdf> accessed 31 January 2019.
135.
ibid para 14.
136.
Hector Lewis MacQueen, ‘Copyright Law and the Dead Sea Scrolls: A British Perspective’ (Social Science Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2430794 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2430794> accessed 31 January 2019.
137.
Ibid 1, citing Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217.
138.
Feist Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co [1991] 499 US 340.
139.
MacQueen (n 136) 1, referring to Carson’s argument that the reconstituted version of the Dead Sea Scrolls would fall outside the scope of copyright protection under US law as it would lack the requisite ‘spark of creativity’ required for a work to qualify for copyright protection following the Feist decision. Cindy Alberts Carson, ‘Raiders of the Lost Scrolls: The Right of Scholarly Access to the Content of Historic Documents’ (1995) 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 298, 325–326.
140.
MacQueen (n 136) 4–12.
141.
Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217.
142.
MacQueen (n 136) 5.
143.
Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217, 259.
144.
ibid.
145.
ibid 260.
146.
LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Limited [1979] RPC 551 (Ch).
147.
Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217, 259, 263 (emphasis added).
148.
ibid 266, citing the dictum of Whitford J, in Rose Plastics GmbH v William Beckett & Co (Plastics) Ltd [1989] FSR 113 (Ch).
149.
Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217, 266.
150.
Bently and Sherman (n 91) 106.
151.
Hugh Laddie and others, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd edn, Butterworths 2000) 206–207.
152.
Paul Torremans (ed), Holyoak and Torremans: Intellectual Property Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 195.
153.
Reject Shop Plc v Robert Manners [1995] FSR 870.
154.
Laddie (n 151) 207.
155.
Copinger and Skone James (n 96) 125.
156.
A colour transparency is defined as, “a positive colour image photographically produced on transparent film or glass and viewed by transmitted light, usually by projection”. ‘Colour transparency’, dictionary.com <www.dictionary.com/browse/color-transparency> accessed 31 January 2019.
157.
Bridgeman Art Library Ltd., v Corel Corporation [1998] 25 F Supp 2d 421 (SDNY) [hereinafter referred to as ‘First hearing’ – ‘Bridgeman I’].
158.
Bridgeman Art Library Ltd., v Corel Corporation [1999] 36 F Supp 2d 191 (SDNY) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Rehearing’ – ‘Bridgeman II’].
159.
Bridgeman claimed that the owners of the physical paintings strictly limit access to these works and that Bridgeman’s transparencies of those works, from which it prepared its digital images and presumably other reproductions, are the only authorised transparencies of some of these works of art and that by inference and logical conclusion, the images in Corel’s CD-ROMs must be copies of Bridgeman’s transparencies because they have not proved a legal source. First hearing – ‘Bridgeman I’ (n 157), 424.
160.
ibid 426, para 6, citing the decision delivered by the Pricy Council in Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217.
161.
ibid citing Melville B Nimmer and Paul E Geller, International Copyright Law and Practice (Matthew Bender & Co 1998), s. 2[3][b] and s. 2[1][b][ii].
162.
ibid.
163.
L Batlin & Son, Inc v Snyder [1976] 536 F2d 486 (Court of Appeals 2d Cir).
164.
ibid 491.
165.
First hearing – Bridgeman I (n 157) para 6.
166.
ibid (emphasis added).
167.
ibid.
168.
ibid citing the US decision in Durham Industries, Inc v Tomy Corp [1980] 630 F2d 905, 910 (2d Cir).
169.
Rehearing – Bridgeman II (n 158) 192.
170.
The District Court received an unsolicited letter from William Patry who argued that the Court had erred on the choice-of-law issue. ibid.
171.
Graves case [1869] LR 4 QB 715.
172.
Rehearing – Bridgeman II (n 158) 197 at para 3.
173.
ibid 198 at para 3.
174.
Nevertheless, the District Court conceded that a copyright may be obtained if the creator employed skill and labour in assembling the photocopied thing, such as in the creation of a montage. ibid.
175.
ibid 198 at para 3 citing Interlego v Tyco [1989] AC 217.
176.
ibid 199 at para 3.
177.
Feist Publications Inc., v Rural Telephone Service Company Inc., [1991] 499 US 340.
178.
Rehearing – Bridgeman II, 197 at para 2. We shall not go into greater details into the application of US law under the Bridgeman II decision, as the study does not concern itself with the US law except as a comparison to the UK law at appropriate points.
179.
Antiquesportfolio.com v Rodney Fitch [2001] FSR 345.
180.
ibid para 28.
181.
ibid para 30 citing EP Skone James and others, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 1999) 3.104.
182.
ibid para 31.
183.
ibid para 35.
184.
ibid.
185.
ibid para 36–38. See also Helen Norman, Intellectual Property Law: Directions (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press 2014) 209–210.
186.
Eleonora Rosati, ‘Originality in US and UK Copyright Experiences as a Springboard for an EU-Wide Reform Debate’ [2010] 5 IIC 524, 539 citing Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law. The British Experience (Cambridge University Press 2008) 46.
187.
Bently and Sherman (n 91) 99.
188.
Derclaye (n 36) 18.
189.
The Newspaper Licensing Agency and others v Meltwater Holding BV and others [2010] EWHC 3099.
190.
Eleonora Rosati, ‘Originality in a Work, or a Work of Originality: The Effects of the Infopaq Decision’ (2011) 58 Journal Copyright Society of the USA 795.
191.
The Newspaper Licensing Agency and others v Meltwater Holding BV and others [2010] EWHC 3099, paras 42–43.
192.
ibid para 83.
193.
ibid para 71 (emphasis added).
194.
Jonathan Griffiths, ‘Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright Revolution’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 767 available at, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291502> accessed 31 January 2019.
195.
The Newspaper Licensing Agency and others v Meltwater Holding BV and others [2011] EWCA Civ 890 (Decision of the Court of Appeal).
196.
ibid para 19. See also Steven James and Ruth Arkley, ‘Euopean Jurisprudence and Its Impact on Copyright Protection’ [2013] E-commerce Law & Policy <https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/impact-on-copyright-protection> accessed 27 May 2017.
197.
Temple Island Collections Ltd v New English Teas Ltd [2011] EWPCC 21 (Red Bus case).
198.
ibid para 18.
199.
O (Peter) v F KG [2006] ECDR 9.
200.
ibid para 19 citing O (Peter) v F KG [2006] ECDR 9, para 2.1.
201.
ibid.
202.
ibid para 22.
203.
ibid para 27.
204.
ibid paras 51–53.
205.
ibid para 29.
206.
ibid para 34.
207.
See also Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright Full Harmonization through Case Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 194; Cornish and Llewelyn (n 116) 460.
208.
Judgment of 1 March 2012, Football Dataco v Yahoo! UK Ltd, C-604/10, EU:C:2012:115. The Football Dataco decision was delivered on 01 March, 2012, the Red Bus decision was delivered on 12 January, 2012. Thus, it preceded the Football Dataco decision by approximately two months.
209.
SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2015] ECDR 17.
210.
ibid para 31. In this case, the Court denied copyright protection to the functionalities of a software programme, holding that the nature of the skill and judgement expended in devising the functionality of a computer programme (which involves making choices) falls on the ideas side of the line. ibid para 46. See also decision of the CJEU delivered consequent to the reference for a preliminary ruling by the High Court of Justice Judgment of 2 May 2012, SAS Institute, C-406/10, EU:C:2012:259.
211.
ibid para 33.
212.
ibid para 37.
213.
Taylor v Maguire [2013] EWHC 3804 (IPEC) (High Court of Justice Chancery Division).
214.
See also Kirsten Toft, ‘Case Comment: Suzy Taylor v Alison Maguire’ (2014) 25 Entertainment Law Review 154.
215.
‘Intellectual Property Office (UK) “Copyright Notice: Digital Images, Photographs and the Internet” 1/2014 (Updated November 2015)’ <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481194/c-notice-201401.pdf> accessed 31 January 2019. Copyright notices are published by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) of the UK to help explain specific areas of copyright law. It is not a conclusive view of the law.
216.
ibid.
217.
Derclaye (n 36) 12.
218.
Griffiths (n 60) 11.
219.
ibid. See contra Derclaye who is of the view that, “the Sawkins case would not be decided differently nowadays. Even if Dr. Sawkins was trying to stick as closely as possible to Lalande’s lost or unfinished works he had choices, exercised them and put his personality in the work”. (n 36) 13.
220.
Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965 BGBl. I S. 1273 (Copyright Act of Germany).
221.
The term Leistungsschutzrecht is translated in different ways, sometimes as a related right and sometimes as an ancillary copyright. However, for this discussion, the term related right is adopted.
222.
Ulrich Löwenheim in Gerhard Schricker and Ulrich Löwenheim (eds), Urheberrecht: Kommentar (4th ed, CH Beck 2010) § 2 para 179.
223.
Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, ‘“Individualität” or Originality? Core Concepts in German Copyright Law’ [2014] 12 GRUR Int. 1100, 1101.
224.
Löwenheim (n 222), § 2 para 9.
225.
ibid para 11.
226.
ibid para 12.
227.
Gernot Schulze in Thomas Dreier, Gernot Schulze and Louisa Specht (eds), Urheberrechtsgesetz: Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz, Kunsturhebergesetz Kommentar (5th Edition, CH Beck 2015) § 2 para 8:

Wo hingegen die Maschine selbständig tätig wird wie zum beispiel bei einem Ubersetzungscomputer oder bei Computerprogrammemen, die ausschliesslich und ohne Einwirkung des Menschen von Datenverarbeitungsanlagen geschaffen werden, fehlt ein personlicher Beitrag des Menschen, so dass kein Schutzfähiges Werk entsteht. (“On the other hand, when the machine operates independently, for example a translation computer or computer programmes which are created exclusively by data processing systems without human intervention, there is no personal contribution from the human being, so that no protective work is created”). (Translated into English by the author).
228.
Löwenheim (n 222) §2 para 12.
229.
ibid.
230.
ibid.
231.
ibid section 2.C.II.2., 101 para 18. “Es muss etwas haben, das über das bloße sinnlich wahrnehmbare Substrat hinausgeht, eine Aussage oder Botschaft, die dem Bereich der Gedanken, des Ästhetischen oder sonstiger menschlicher Regungen und Reaktionsweisen zugehört”. (Translated into English by the author).
232.
Peifer (n 223) 1102.
233.
BGH 12.05.2011 – I ZR 53/10, GRUR 2012, 58 – Seilzirkus.
234.
ibid para 17.
235.
Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 20 citing BGH 09.05.1985 – I ZR 52/83, GRUR 1985, 1041 – Inkasso Programm, 1046.
236.
ibid.
237.
Eugen Ulmer, Urheber- Und Verlagsrecht (3rd edn, Springer Berlin 1980) 131.
238.
See Marjut Salokannel, Ownership of Rights in Audiovisual Productions: A Comparative Study (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 44.
239.
Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 24.
240.
BGH 13.11.2013 – I ZR 143/12, GRUR 2014, 175 – Geburtstagszug. For a summarised English translation of the Federal Supreme Court decision see ‘Case Comment: Birthday Train (Geburtstagszug)’ (2014) 45 IIC 831.
241.
Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 24.
242.
Peifer (n 223) 1103.
243.
Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 29.
244.
LG Köln 12.12.2013, 14 O 613/12 – Rote Couch.
245.
OLG Stuttgart 31.05.2017, 4 U 204/16 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II (Appeal).
246.
ibid 55.
247.
Löwenheim (n 222) § 2 para 184.
248.
ibid.
249.
ibid.
250.
LG Berlin 03.05.2016, 15 O 428/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum I.
251.
An action was also brought against Wikipedia Germany but was dismissed by the Regional Court because Wikipedia Germany was not legally responsible for the images that had been held by Wikimedia Commons.
252.
OLG Düsseldorf 13.02.1996 – 20 U 115/95, GRUR 1997, 49 – Beuys-Fotografien.
253.
ibid 51. However, Talke notes that may be exceptions to the dictum expressed in the Beuys-Fotografien decision, citing the decision of Supreme Court in the Stadtplanwerk case (BGH, 28.05.1998 – I ZR 81/96, GRUR 1998, 916 – Stadtplanwerk) where a city map that was produced based on a previously known design concept, can also be protected by copyright law if, in its elaboration, there is nevertheless sufficient scope for individual formative cartographic services. Armin Talke, ‘Lichtbildschutz Für Digitale Bilder von zweidimensionalen Vorlagen’ (2010) Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 846, 848–49.
254.
Interestingly, Talke makes a distinction in the case of documents that include visual content such as old manuscripts that are embellished with illustrations. He argues that in the digitisation of such material, creative elements may need to be used to specify details and colour schemes, considering the purpose for which the digitised version is to be used and indicates that these creative elements need to be considered in evaluating its protection as a Lichtbildwerke. ibid 849.
255.
As at present, Lichtbilder obtain protection for a period of 50 years as opposed to the 70 year duration of copyright protection granted to Lichtbildwerke. See section 72(3) of German Copyright Act (n 220).
256.
As per decisions delivered in the cases of LG Berlin 03.05.2016, 15O 428/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum I and OLG Stuttgart 31.05.2017, 4 U 204/16 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II (Appeal).
257.
Martin Vogel in Gerhard Schricker and Ulrich Löwenheim (eds), Urheberrecht: Kommentar (4th ed, CH Beck 2010) § 72 para 13.
258.
Thomas Dreier and Louisa Specht, ‘Germany’ in Reto M Hilty and Sylvie Nérisson (eds), Balancing Copyright – A Survey of National Approaches (Springer 2012) 431.
259.
Vogel (n 257) § 72 paras 19–21.
260.
Contact Image Sensor.
261.
Charged Coupled Device.
262.
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor.
263.
Vogel (n 257) § 72 para 21.
264.
ibid 1398 at para 20. “Schutzbegründend ist allein der Einsatz der genannten Techniken durch den jeweiligen Lichtbildner als natürlicher Person, gleich, ob er das Bild einer einfachen oder hochkomplexen, einer automatischen, handbetriebenen oder mit einer digitalen computergesteuerten Kamera herstellt.” (Translated into English by the author).
265.
See also BGH, 03.11.1999 – I ZR 55/97, GRUR 2000, 317 – Werbefotos.
266.
Vogel (n 257) § 72 para 17. “Wohl aber bedarf es notwendigerweise des Einsatzes fotografischer Technik und eines Mindestmaß an geistiger Leistung, die in der oft schwierigen Handhabung der Technik zum Ausdruck kommt.” See also ibid para 18. “Lichtbilder, die – im Gegensatz zu gestalten Lichtbildwerken – lediglich abbildende Fotografien (Gegenstandfotografien) sind, ohne die Qualität einer persönlichen geistigen Schöpfung (…) zu erreichen”.
267.
Talke (n 253) 849.
268.
BGH, 07.12.2000 – I ZR 146/98, GRUR 2001, 755 – Telefonkarte.
269.
ibid 757.
270.
BGH, 08.11.1989 – I ZR 14/88, GRUR 1990, 669 – Bibelreproduktion.
271.
German Copyright Act (n 220).
272.
BGH, 08.11.1989 – I ZR 14/88, GRUR 1990, 669 – Bibelreproduktion, 673.
273.
Vogel (n 257) § 72 para 23.
274.
ibid.
275.
Jörn Heckmann, Die Retrospektive Digitalisierung von Printpublikationen (Peter Lang 2011) 57.
276.
Schulze (n 227) § 72 para 10.
277.
Talke (n 253) 851.
278.
Eric W Steinhauer, ‘Informationskompetenz Und Recht’ in Wilfried Sühl-Strohmenger (ed), Handbuch Informationskompetenz (Walter de Gruyter 2012) 77–78.
279.
Talke (n 253) 851.
280.
LG Berlin 03.05.2016, 15O 428/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum I. In this case, the Museum brought an action against the Wikimedia Foundation who operated the website on which the scanned copies of the photographs were made available.
281.
LG Stuttgart, 27.09.2016 – 17 O 690/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II.
282.
ibid 54.
283.
ibid 51. The Court noted that the effort expended by the photographer was demonstrated in the selection of the correct shooting position, optimum exposure of the photographed object and the choice of a suitable camera.
284.
BGH, 08.11.1989 – I ZR 14/88, GRUR 1990, 669 – Bibelreproduktion.
285.
OLG Stuttgart 31.05.2017, 4 U 204/16 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II (Appeal).
286.
Ibid 55–57.
287.
Talke (n 253) 850.
288.
ibid.
289.
See Vogel (n 257) § 72 para 13.
290.
LG Stuttgart, 27.09.2016 – 17 O 690/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II, 54.
291.
LG Berlin 03.05.2016, 15O 428/15 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum I, 33.
292.
OLG Stuttgart 31.05.2017, 4 U 204/16 – Reiss Engelhorn Museum II (Appeal), 59.
293.
Vogel (n 257) § 72 para 21,

Fotocomposing, Web designing u.a. digital veranderte bilder [..] begrunden kein Recht nach S.72, weil sie nicht auf der Verarbeitung von Lichtreizen sondern der Wiedergabe und/oder Veranderung gespeicherter Bilder mittels elektronische Befehle beruhen und der Umstanden nach S. 2 Abs 1 Nr. 4 oder Nr. 7 geschutzen Zeichnung naher stehen als der fotografischen Abbildung.
294.
BGH 13.11.2013 – I ZR 143/12, GRUR 2014, 175 – Geburtstagszug.
295.
ibid 14–15 at para 30.
296.
Schulze (n 227) § 2 para 23.
297.
ibid.
298.
BGH 13.11.2013 – I ZR 143/12, GRUR 2014, 175 – Geburtstagszug, 15 at para 31.
299.
Schulze (n 227) § 2 paras 22–23.
300.
InfoSoc Directive (n 50) Article 2(a).
301.
ibid Article 2 subsections (b)–(e).
302.
Judgment of 16 July 2009, Infopaq International, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465.
303.
As Pollaud-Dulian notes, “Dès lors, l’œuvre est unie à l’auteur par un lien indissoluble. Dès lors, il n’y a pas que des intérêts patrimoniaux à protéger à propos de l’œuvre, mais aussi la personnalité qui s’y est exprimée”. (“From then on, the work is united to the author by an indissoluble bond. Consequently, it is not only the patrimonial interests in the work that need to be protected, but also the personality that is expressed in it”). (Translated into English by the author). Fréderic Pollaud-Dulian, ‘O.Lalignant, La Véritable Condition d’application Du Droit d’auteur: Originalité Ou Création?’ (2000) 52 Revue internationale de droit comparé 270, 270.
304.
Vivant and Bruguière (n 89) 266.
305.
However, originality is not subject to quantitative or qualitative measurement. The notion of l’unité de l’art means that all works must be protected regardless of their artistic merit. It is noted that the protection of petite monnaie is itself an extension of this theory of l’unité de l’art that prevents a distinction from being made between creations that display a high degree of creativity and those that display a slight degree of creativity. See Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 159.
306.
Benabou (n 47) 8. “[l]a vérité oblige à dire que l’on ne sait pas exactement en quoi consiste l’originalité’.’ (‘The truth obliges us to say that we do not exactly know what originality consists of.”) (Translated into English by the author).
307.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 127.
308.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 157.
309.
ibid 271.
310.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 303) 270–71.
311.
André Lucas and Pierre Sirinelli, ‘L’originalité En Droit D’auteur’ (1993) 23 La Semaine Juridique Edition Générale 10. “L’œuvre originale est celle dans laquelle le créateur a pu déployer le minimum de fantaisie inhérent à toute création littéraire ou artistique. Dès lors qu’il y a place pour l’arbitraire, la protection légale est acquise”. (“An original work is one in which the creator was able to display a minimum of fantasy as is inherent in all literary or artistic creation. Where there is room for arbitrariness, legal protection is acquired”.) (Translated into English by the author). See contra Pollaud-Dulian who notes that arbitrary choices that are not creative will not be sufficient to establish originality if those choices are not creative. (n 53) 163.
312.
Bernard Edelman, La Propriété Littéraire et Artistique (PUF 2008) 16, “la création est le produit d’un travail intellectuel libre, exprimant la personnalité du créateur, et s’incarnant dans une forme original”. (“[c]reation is the product of free intellectual activity, expressing the personality of the creator, and embodying it in an original form”.) (Translated into English by the author).
313.
Vivant and Bruguière (n 89) 268.
314.
ibid.
315.
ibid.
316.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 203.
317.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 131.
318.
Contra Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 271, “Dès lors, il n'y a rien d'absurde ou d'artificiel à déceler l'empreinte de la personnalité d'un auteur dans une oeuvre qui relève des arts appliqués ou de la petite monnaie, que l'ambition soit modeste, que les sujétions soient fortes n'êmpechent pas l'expression de la personnalité dans la création”. (“Henceforth, there is nothing absurd or artificial in detecting the imprint of an author’s personality in a work of applied art or small change, even if the ambition is modest and the constraints are strong these do not impede the expression of personality in the creation”.) (Translated into English by the author).
319.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 131 note 302, citing Cour de Cassation crim, 18 May 1938: Gaz Pal 1938 (2) 311 (“le choix, l’ordre et la méthode sous lesquels leur ensemble est présenté constituent incontestablement un travail de l’esprit de nature à donner naissance à un droit privatif de propriété”) and Cour de Cassation crim, 27 November 1869: DP 1870 (1) 186 (“la protection du droit d’auteur s’étend aux ouvrages dont les éléments, bien qu’empruntés à des publications antérieurs, n’en sont pas moins choisis avec discernment, disposés dans un ordre nouveau, revêtus d’une forme nouvelle et appropriés avec l’intelligence à un usage plus ou moins général”).
320.
ibid Cour de Cassation crim, 27 November 1869: DP 1870 (1) 186.
321.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 271.
322.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 138.
323.
ibid.
324.
Cour de Cassation, Ch civ 1, 16 April 1991, 89-21071 – Isermatic France.
325.
Cour de cassation, Ch civ 1, 17 October 2012, 11-21641 – Codix.
326.
Cour d’Appel de Paris 4eme Ch, 21 March 1989, RIDA 156 (1989) 333 (Harrap France c Masson Editeur).
327.
Daniel J Gervais and Elizabeth F Judge, ‘Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law’ (2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 375, 379.
328.
Cour de Cassation, Ch civ 1, 2 May 1989, 87-17657 – Coprosa. See also Cour d’Appel de Paris, 4eme Ch, 23 September 1992, RIDA 142 (1993) 224 (Michel Lafon c Librarie Arthème Fayard) where the Court of Appeal of Paris upheld the originality of a compilation of stories that had been derived from traditional folklore because although the stories emanated from a common resource, by selecting and narrating them in a manner which is particularly his own, and by arranging them in an order of his choice, the author gave the narrative a particular structure that transformed it into a creative work.
329.
TGI Nanterre, Ch 1 A, 19 January 2005, JurisData 2005-279499 (Sawkins c Société Harmonia Mundi).
330.
Judge and Gervais (n 327) 377.
331.
ibid 379.
332.
Gervais presents this definition in an attempt to formulate a notion of ‘creative choice’ that would meet the requirements of international treaties and comply with the notions of creative choice in US and Canadian law, as well as civil law systems. Daniel J Gervais, ‘Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law’ (2002) 49 Journal Copyright Society of the USA 949, 976–977.
333.
ibid 978.
334.
ibid 979, discussing the notion of ‘creative choice’ (n 332).
335.
Edelman (n 312) 17.
336.
Gervais (n 332) 969, discussing the originality test in French law.
337.
Cour d’appel Paris, 4 March 1987, D 1988, 204, obs Colombet.
338.
Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence, 6 May 2010 – Deux Rougets.
339.
Cour de Cassation, 1er ch Civ, 20 October 2011, 10-21251 – Deux Rougets.
340.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 127, 147.
341.
Desbois notes for example that, a manually carried out reproduction of an artwork could qualify as a derivative work protected under copyright law, if the copyist’s personality is reflected in the reproductive work. Henri Desbois, Le Droit D’auteur En France (3rd Edition Dalloz 1978) 76–77. Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 205–206, confirms this view by stating that a manually executed reproduction of a work of art could itself be protected by copyright as a derivative work based on a relative notion of originality. See also Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 156.
342.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 206.
343.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault (n 5) 156.
344.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 207.
345.
Cour d’appel de Paris, 19 December 1962: D 1963, 609 (Sté des bibliophiles v Crommelynck).
346.
Pollaud-Dulian (n 53) 207.
347.
Cour d’appel de Paris, 4eme Ch, 26 September 2001: 2001 Juris Data 159279 (Réunion des Musées Nationaux v Wofsy) cited in Christophe Caron, ‘Protection des photographies de tableaux par le droit d’auteur’ (2002) 7 La Semaine Juridique Entreprise et Affaires 321.
348.
ibid.
349.
Cour d’Appel de Paris, 15 October 2003 – Mirkine. See also Pierre Greffe, ‘Appréciation de l'originalité d'une photographie de plateau’ (2004) 5 Propriété industrielle 46.
350.
Cour d’appel de Paris, 1èrè Ch, 16 January 2013, 11-18788.
351.
Vivant and Bruiguiére (n 89) 294.
352.
Vivant and Bruiguiére (n 89) 293.
353.
ibid 289, “Sans la moindre équivoque, et malgré le visa du “reflet” de la personnalité, le critère du choix, expressément mis en avant, est privilégié.”
354.
ibid 297.
355.
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Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany
Sunimal Mendis

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Sunimal Mendis
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Mendis, S. (2019). Can a Digitised Version Obtain Copyright Protection Within the EU?. In: A Copyright Gambit. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 11. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59454-4_7

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59454-4_7
Published: 06 July 2019
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