Skip to main content

Resistance in Switzerland: Populist Rather Than Principled

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 285))

  • 549 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the resistance to the ECtHR as it has appeared in Switzerland’s Federal Supreme Court, academia, and politics. It shows that, although harsh criticism has been expressed by judges, academics, and politicians, neither the executive, legislative, or judicial branch nor scholarship has taken a principally adverse attitude towards the ECHR system. However, Switzerland’s national conservative party, the Swiss People’s Party, currently the country’s largest political force, recently attempted to significantly cut back on the ECHR’s influence on the Swiss legal and political order. This proposal, which even could have forced Switzerland to withdraw from the ECHR, was clearly rejected by popular vote. The campaign showed that, while potential for far-reaching backlash against the ECtHR exists in Switzerland, there is an even broader alliance of staunch supporters of the European human rights system.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No 11 and No 14, 4 November 1950, ETS No 5, entry into force 3 September 1953, for Switzerland 28 November 1974 (hereinafter the ‘Convention’).

  2. 2.

    Federal popular initiative ‘Le droit suisse au lieu de juges étrangers (initiative pour l’autodétermination)’ (aboutissement, 6 September 2016, Feuille fédérale 2016 6871).

  3. 3.

    Popular vote of 25 November 2018. See <https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20181125/index.html>.

  4. 4.

    The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the ‘Court’).

  5. 5.

    To avoid ambiguity between the ECtHR and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, we refer to the latter as Tribunal fédéral (its French name).

  6. 6.

    Joint Comment by the Federal Office of Justice and the Directorate of International Law, ‘Rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne au sein de l’ordre juridique Suisse’ (1989) 53 Jurisprudence des autorités administratives de la Confédération (26 April 1989, No 53.54); ATF 122 II 234 of 27 June 1996, consid 4a; 94 I 669 of 22 November 1968, consid 2; 88 I 86 of 23 May 1962, consid 4b; G Biaggini, BV Kommentar (2007) Article 5 MN 28; L Wildhaber/S Breitenmoser, ‘The Relationship between Customary International Law and Municipal Law in Western European Countries’ (1988) 48 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 163–207, at 196–197.

  7. 7.

    ATF 103 V 190 of 19 December 1977, consid 2a; 102 Ia 468 of 6 October 1976, consid 7a (excluding Article 13 ECHR); 111 Ib 68 of 29 May 1985, consid 3; 123 II 402 of 20 August 1997, consid 4b/aa (henceforth including Article 13 ECHR).

  8. 8.

    ATF 142 II 35 of 26 November 2015, consid 3.3; 125 II 417 of 26 July 1999, consid 4c; 94 I 669 of 22 November 1968, consid 6a.

  9. 9.

    Article 190 of the Federal Constitution (‘applicable law’).

  10. 10.

    Articles 139(3), 193(4) and 194(2) of the Federal Constitution (concerning constitutional amendments) prohibit violations of mandatory provisions of international law, indicating an absolute priority of the latter provisions.

  11. 11.

    Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution.

  12. 12.

    ‘Le 4e alinéa impose à la Confédération et aux cantons l’obligation de respecter le droit international. Ce devoir s’adresse à tous les organes de l’Etat et découle du principe qui veut que les normes de droit international l’emportent par principe sur celles de droit interne. Le 4e alinéa n’indique toutefois pas comment résoudre, le cas échéant, un conflit entre une norme de droit international et une norme de droit interne’, message du Conseil fédéral ‘Une nouvelle constitution fédérale’ of 20 November 1996, Feuille fédérale 1997 I 1 et seq, at 136. See also T Tschumi/B Schindler, ‘Art. 5 Abs. 4 BV’ in B Ehrenzeller et al (eds), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St Galler Kommentar, vol 1 (3rd edn 2014), pp 129–142, at MN 74 with further references.

  13. 13.

    U Häfelin et al, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (9th edn 2016), MN 1924.

  14. 14.

    ATF 99 Ib 39 of 2 March 1973, consid 3–4.

  15. 15.

    ATF 99 Ib 39 of 2 March 1973, consid 4; confirmed in ATF 112 II 1 of 9 March 1986, consid 8.

  16. 16.

    ATF 138 II 524 of 19 September 2012, consid 5.3.2.

  17. 17.

    ATF 125 II 417 of 26 July 1999, consid 4d.

  18. 18.

    S Schürer, ‘Hat die PKK-Rechtsprechung die Schubert-Praxis relativiert?’ (2015) 116 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 115–132.

  19. 19.

    Schürer (fn 18), pp 120–121.

  20. 20.

    ATF 139 I 16 of 12 October 2012, consid 5.2–5.3; see below, Sect. II.2.b.

  21. 21.

    Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil National 2009 275 et seq, at 284; see Vote member of the National Council Reimann, ibid at 277.

  22. 22.

    The relevant leading case was Ünal Tekeli v Turkey Appl No 29865/96 (ECtHR, 16 November 2004), where the Court held that the obligation on married women, in the name of family unity, to bear their husband’s surname was not justified, even if they were allowed to put their maiden name in front of it.

  23. 23.

    Burghartz v Switzerland Appl No 16213/90 (ECtHR, 22 February 1994).

  24. 24.

    ATF 136 III 168 of 25 January 2010, consid 3.3–3.4; critically A Zünd, ‘Das Schweizerische Bundesgericht im Dialog mit dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’ (2014) 41 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 21–26, at 22.

  25. 25.

    ATF 136 III 168 of 25 January 2010, consid 3.3.4: ‘[T]he Swiss legislator has intentionally given more weight to the principle of the unity of the family and its name than to the principle of equality as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. This suggests that, in accordance with ATF 99 Ib 39 [of 2 March 1973] concerning Schubert, the Federal Act continues to apply’ (our translation). See also T Altwicker, ‘Switzerland: The Substitute Constitution in Times of Popular Dissent’ in P Popelier/S Lambrecht/K Lemmens (eds), Shifting the Convention System: Counter-Dynamics at the National Level (2016), pp 385–411, at 406.

  26. 26.

    ATF 136 III 168 of 25 January 2010, consid 3.3.4.–3.4.

  27. 27.

    Schürer (fn 18), pp 129–130.

  28. 28.

    After Burghartz v Switzerland Appl No 16213/90 (ECtHR, 22 February 1994).

  29. 29.

    Losonci Rose and Rose v Switzerland Appl No 664/06 (ECtHR, 9 November 2010); see also M Cottier/J Wyttenbach, ‘Family Forms and Parenthood in Switzerland’ in A Büchler/H Keller (eds), Family Forms and Parenthood (2016), pp 457–498, at 484–485.

  30. 30.

    ATF 137 III 316 of 16 November 2010.

  31. 31.

    Howald Moor and Others v Switzerland Appl No 52067/10 (ECtHR, 11 March 2014).

  32. 32.

    ATF 142 I 42 of 11 November 2015.

  33. 33.

    Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the European Community and its Member States on the Free Movement of Persons, 21 June 1999, Recueil systématique du droit fédéral 0.142.112.681.

  34. 34.

    ATF 133 V 367 of 9 March 2007, consid 11.1–11.3 (R Bornatico, (2008) 97 Die Praxis 462–482, translation in German); R Baumann, ‘Die Tragweite der Schubert-Praxis’ (2010) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 1009–1019, at 1012; see also the recent revision judgment ATF 143 I 50 of 20 December 2016, implementing Di Trizio v Switzerland Appl No 7186/09 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016).

  35. 35.

    Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil National 1999 1599 et seq, at 1602 and 2002 789 et seq, at 791 as well as Conseil d’État 1999 657 et seq, at 658 and 2002 251 et seq, at 252. See also Schürer (fn 18), pp 124–126. But cf ATF 133 V 367 of 9 March 2007, consid 11, referring to consid 3.2 and 9.1, where the Tribunal fédéral claimed that the pertinent domestic law provision would have been enacted by the Federal Parliament in awareness of its contradiction with the AFMP.

  36. 36.

    Cf H Seiler, ‘Einfluss des europäischen Rechts und der europäischen Rechtsprechung auf die schweizerische Rechtspflege’ (2014) 150 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 265–368, at 307; Baumann (fn 34), p 1013; F Schöbi, ‘Vorrang der EMRK vor Bundesgesetzen?’ (2010) 28 recht 131–136, at 133–134.

  37. 37.

    Federal popular initiative ‘Internement à vie pour les délinquants sexuels ou violents jugés très dangereux et non amendables’ (entry into force 8 February 2004, Recueil officiel des lois fédérales 2004 2341).

  38. 38.

    Federal popular initiative ‘Pour le renvoi des étrangers criminels (initiative sur le renvoi)’ (entry into force 28 November 2010, Recueil officiel des lois fédérales 2011 1199).

  39. 39.

    Federal popular initiative ‘Contre la construction de minarets’ (entry into force 29 November 2009, Recueil officiel des lois fédérales 2010 2161). In addition, a federal popular initiative ‘Oui à l’interdiction de se dissimuler le visage’, directed against face veils, is pending (message du Conseil fédéral, 15 March 2019, Feuille fédérale 2019 2895).

  40. 40.

    See W Kälin/S Schlegel, Schweizer Recht bricht Völkerrecht? (Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights, April 2014) <http://www.skmr.ch/cms/upload/pdf/140519_Studie_EMRK_def.pdf>, p 5.

  41. 41.

    Federal Council Report ‘La relation entre droit international et droit interne’ of 5 March 2010 (in response to the Postulates 07.3764 CAJ-CS, 16 October 2007, and 08.3765 CIP-NC, 20 November 2008), Feuille fédérale 2010 2067 et seq, at 2124–2126.

  42. 42.

    ATF 139 I 16 of 12 October 2012, consid 5.2–5.3. In ATF 142 II 35 of 26 November 2015, consid 3.2–3.3, concerning a conflict between the AFMP and later constitutional law, the Tribunal fédéral established in an obiter dictum a rule of precedence in favour of the AFMP. It would seem, however, that the PKK judgment was not adduced as a decisive precedent. See the commentary of M Oesch, ‘Urteilsbesprechung’ (2016) 117 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 197–213, at 209–210.

  43. 43.

    See above, fn 2.

  44. 44.

    See below, Sect. V.

  45. 45.

    Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (dec) [GC] Appl No 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001), para 80; Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) Appl No 15318/89 (ECtHR, 23 March 1995), para 75; Fey v Austria Appl No 14396/88 (ECtHR, 24 February 1993), para 1 of concurring opinion of Judge Martens; Marckx v Belgium Appl No 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979), para 58; H Keller/D Kühne, ‘Zur Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte’ (2016) 76 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 245–307, at 293 et seq with further references.

  46. 46.

    Cf V Volpe, ‘Drafting Counter-Majoritarian Democracy. The Venice Commission’s Constitutional Assistance’ (2016) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 811–843, arguing that the Venice Commission encourages a counter-majoritarian model of democracy in recognition of the potential for abuse inherent in popular sovereignty.

  47. 47.

    Articles 82 et seq of the Federal Supreme Court Act.

  48. 48.

    ATF 101 Ia 67 of 19 March 1975, consid 2c.

  49. 49.

    ATF 101 Ia 67 of 19 March 1975, consid 2c.

  50. 50.

    ATF 101 Ia 67 of 19 March 1975, consid 2; 102 Ia 279 of 30 June 1976, consid 2b.

  51. 51.

    See explicitly ATF 128 III 113 of 6 December 2001, consid 3a citing further case law.

  52. 52.

    Article 190 of the Federal Constitution obliges judicial authorities to apply federal acts but not the Federal Constitution. Message du Conseil fédéral ‘La révision totale de l’organisation judiciaire fédérale’ of 28 February 2001, Feuille fédérale 2001 4000 et seq, at 4015; Altwicker (fn 25), pp 402–403; R Kiener, ‘Der Einfluss der EMRK auf die BV 1999’ in T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 53–89, at 78–79; in English see M Hertig Randall, ‘The Swiss Federal Bill of Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Protection: Added Value and Shortcomings’ (2016) 77 Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques 151–177, at 174–175.

  53. 53.

    Message du Conseil fédéral ‘Nouvelle constitution’ (fn 12), p 436; ME Looser, Verfassungsgerichtliche Rechtskontrolle gegenüber schweizerischen Bundesgesetzen (2011) MN 96, 146–147, 176, 179, 316 with further references.

  54. 54.

    Cf Y Hangartner/ME Looser, ‘Art. 190 BV’ in B Ehrenzeller et al (eds), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St Galler Kommentar, vol 1 (3rd edn 2014), pp 3047–3069, at MN 38.

  55. 55.

    See above, Sect. II.1.

  56. 56.

    Article 86(1)(d) of the Federal Supreme Court Act.

  57. 57.

    See H Aemisegger, ‘Die Bedeutung der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts zur EMRK für die Kantone’ in S Besson/EM Belser (eds), La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les cantons (2014), pp 113–132, at 114–115.

  58. 58.

    See also H Keller/A Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in H Keller/A Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights (2008), pp 677–712, at 683 et seq, who, based on an extensive comparative analysis, found that ‘formal distinctions between systemic monism and systemic dualism ex ante do not, in and of themselves, determine the status of the ECHR in national law ex post’. Cf M Breuer, ‘Impact of the Council of Europe on National Legal Systems’ in S Schmahl/M Breuer (eds), The Council of Europe: Its Law and Politics (2017), pp 802–873, at MN 36.69–36.84.

  59. 59.

    Concerning commitment to institutions for medical reasons.

  60. 60.

    Concerning the principle of open public hearing and pronouncement of judgments.

  61. 61.

    Concerning the right to access to a court and the right to legal aid.

  62. 62.

    See message du Conseil fédéral ‘La Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’ of 4 March 1974, Feuille fédérale 1974 I 1020 et seq, at 1027 et seq; A Kley/M Sigrist, ‘Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK – Vorbereitung und Umsetzung des Beitritts vor und nach 1974’ in T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 17–52, at 46 et seq; D Thurnherr, ‘The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland’ in H Keller/A Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights (2008), pp 311–391, at 319–321.

  63. 63.

    Weber v Switzerland Appl No 11034/84 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990), para 38; Belilos v Switzerland Appl No 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988), para 60.

  64. 64.

    E.g. Lüdi v Switzerland Appl No 12433/86 (ECtHR, 15 June 1992); Quaranta v Switzerland Appl No 12744/87 (ECtHR, 24 May 1991); Huber v Switzerland Appl No 12794/87 (ECtHR, 23 October 1990); Weber v Switzerland Appl No 11034/84 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990); Minelli v Switzerland Appl No 8660/79 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983).

  65. 65.

    Kiener (fn 52), pp 62–63.

  66. 66.

    Kiener (fn 52), p 62.

  67. 67.

    Kiener (fn 52), p 64; M Hertig Randall (fn 52), p 161; see message du Conseil fédéral ‘Convention’ (fn 62), pp 1026 et seq.

  68. 68.

    To name the most significant legislative project only, see the ‘Réforme de la justice’ in message du Conseil fédéral ‘Nouvelle constitution’ (fn 12), pp 495 et seq.

  69. 69.

    Aemisegger (fn 57), pp 117–118; M Hertig Randall, ‘Auswirkungen der EMRK auf andere Rechtsgebiete’ in T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 115–172, at 121.

  70. 70.

    Kley/Sigrist (fn 62), pp 46 et seq, esp. 49; Hertig Randall (fn 69), pp 123–124; see also Thurnherr (fn 62), p 319.

  71. 71.

    Belilos v Switzerland Appl No 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988), paras 54–55.

  72. 72.

    Belilos v Switzerland Appl No 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988), paras 58–59; Kley/Sigrist (fn 62), pp 47–48.

  73. 73.

    Hertig Randall (fn 69), pp 123–124; for a brief account in English, see Hertig Randall (fn 67), pp 171–172.

  74. 74.

    See Vote member of the National Council Schwarzenbach, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil National 1974 1461 et seq, at 1471; Kley/Sigrist (fn 62), p 39.

  75. 75.

    See Vote member of the Council of States Danioth, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 556; and, objecting, Vote member of the Council of States Rhinow, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 557.

  76. 76.

    Postulate 88.453, Hans Danioth, of 6 June 1988 asking the ‘Conseil fédéral: a) d’étudier les conséquences de l’arrêt […] sur la garantie de la souveraineté accordée par notre constitution aux cantons […]; b) de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir la souveraineté de notre pays et des cantons à l’égard des autorités européennes […] reformuler de façon inattaquable juridiquement, la réserve […] et de faire les démarches nécessaires pour assurer son application, voire de dénoncer la convention à titre provisionnel’ (reproduced in Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 554–555). See also CH Brunschwiler, ‘Kann die Schweiz beim angestrebten Standard des Verfahrensschutzes nach der EMRK mithalten?’ (1988) 15 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 588–589, at 588, questioning whether Switzerland could remain a Convention State in view of the ever expanding scope of Article 6 ECHR.

  77. 77.

    Vote member of the Council of States Danioth, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 556.

  78. 78.

    Vote member of the Council of States Danioth, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 555; similarly H Seiler, ‘Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte: Hüter der Menschenrechte, Appellationsinstanz oder Verfassungsgeber?’ (2012) 113 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 223–261, at 250–251.

  79. 79.

    See Belilos v Switzerland Appl No 10328/83 (ECtHR, 29 April 1988), paras 72–73.

  80. 80.

    Vote member of the Council of States Danioth, Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 555: ‘At issue was a fine imposed for a contravention […] In what way the imposition of such a fine concerns human rights violations is for me a priori obscure […] Now I ask you: Is, if a trivial fine is imposed […] a human right at stake?’ (our translation).

  81. 81.

    Bulletin officiel de l’Assemblée fédérale, Conseil d’État 1988 554 et seq, at 561.

  82. 82.

    See Article 122 of the Federal Supreme Court Act.

  83. 83.

    Cf M Hertig Randall, ‘Der grundrechtliche Dialog der Gerichte in Europa’ (2014) 41 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 5–18, at 16; M Hertig Randall, ‘Le dialogue entre le juge suisse et le juge européen’ in F Bellanger/J de Werra (eds), Genève au confluent du droit interne et du droit international (2012), pp 19–59, at 38 et seq.

  84. 84.

    VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland Appl No 24699/94 (ECtHR, 28 June 2001).

  85. 85.

    No 2A.526/2001 of 29 April 2002.

  86. 86.

    Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland No 2 [GC] Appl No 32772/02 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009).

  87. 87.

    See for a criticism of the judgment M Hertig Randall/XB Ruedin, ‘L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme à la lumière de l’arrêt Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VGT) c. Suisse du 4 octobre 2007’ [2008] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 651–664.

  88. 88.

    Judgment No 2F_6/2009 of 4 November 2009 (ATF 136 I 158, extracts), consid 3.2.

  89. 89.

    Judgment No 2F_6/2009 of 4 November 2009 (ATF 136 I 158, extracts), consid 3.2.

  90. 90.

    Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [GC] Appl No 41615/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010).

  91. 91.

    ATF 137 III 332 of 26 May 2011, consid 2.3.

  92. 92.

    Cf H Aemisegger, ‘Probleme der Umsetzung der EMRK im schweizerischen Recht’ in T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 201–229, at 219.

  93. 93.

    See Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [GC] Appl No 41615/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010), para 151: ‘Consequently, there would be a violation […] if the decision […] were to be enforced’.

  94. 94.

    Hertig Randall (fn 83), p 40.

  95. 95.

    ATF 137 III 332 of 26 May 2011, consid 2.4.

  96. 96.

    Udeh v Switzerland Appl No 12020/09 (ECtHR, 16 April 2013); wording adopted from the legal summary in the Information Note on the Court’s case law No 162, April 2013.

  97. 97.

    See Federal Office of Justice ‘Rapport d’action, Udeh contre la Suisse, arrêt du 16 avril 2013 (devenu définitif le 9 septembre 2013)’ of 21 February 2014, p 2, (DH) DH-DD(2016)1067.

  98. 98.

    ATF 139 I 325 of 30 August 2013, consid 2.4.

  99. 99.

    Judgment No 2C_609/2008 of 8 January 2009; see also A Tschentscher, ‘Die staatsrechtliche Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts in den Jahren 2013 und 2014 (Grundrechte des Persönlichkeitsschutzes)’ (2014) 150 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 777–845, at 804–805.

  100. 100.

    ATF 139 I 325 of 30 August 2013, consid 2.4.

  101. 101.

    The relevant date is 14 May 2008 (see ATF 139 I 325 of 30 August 2013, consid 2.4). The Court for its part deliberated on 4 December 2012 and 26 March 2013.

  102. 102.

    ATF 139 I 325 of 30 August 2013, consid 2.4.

  103. 103.

    ATF 139 I 325 of 30 August 2013, consid 2.4.

  104. 104.

    No K 110/05 of 5 December 2005, consid 3.4–3.5.

  105. 105.

    Schlumpf v Switzerland Appl No 29002/06 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009), paras 6 et seq.

  106. 106.

    See ATF 114 V 153 of 6 June 1988, consid 4a; 114 V 162 of 16 September 1988, consid 4.

  107. 107.

    Schlumpf v Switzerland Appl No 29002/06 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009), paras 19, 26–27.

  108. 108.

    Schlumpf v Switzerland Appl No 29002/06 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009), paras 51 et seq.

  109. 109.

    Schlumpf v Switzerland Appl No 29002/06 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009), paras 112, 115–116.

  110. 110.

    ATF 137 I 86 of 15 September 2010, consid 7.3.3.3, referring to Articles 19 and 34 ECHR.

  111. 111.

    ATF 137 I 86 of 15 September 2010, consid 7.3.4; see also Hertig Randall (fn 83), p 34.

  112. 112.

    ATF 137 I 86 of 15 September 2010, consid 8.3.

  113. 113.

    ATF 137 I 86 of 15 September 2010, consid 9.2; see also Hertig Randall (fn 83), p 35.

  114. 114.

    See JP Müller, ‘Übertriebene und ungerechtfertigte Kritik des Bundesgerichts am Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’ [2011] Jusletter (21 February 2011) <http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/juslissues/2011/606/_9053.html>, MN 7–8, for a criticism of what is in his view exaggerated criticism of the Court’s judgment.

  115. 115.

    H Seiler, ‘Menschenrechte – Das trojanische Pferd des demokratischen Rechtsstaates’ in JB Zufferey/J Dubey/A Previtali (eds), L’Homme et son droit (2011), pp 511–524, at 515.

  116. 116.

    Seiler (fn 115), p 523 (‘Entgegen einer verbreiteten Meinung ist die aktuelle Menschenrechtspraxis nicht Voraussetzung und vollendete Krönung des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, sondern die Antithese dazu’).

  117. 117.

    B Pfiffner/S Bollinger, ‘Ausweitung konventionsgeschützter Rechte durch den EGMR und Probleme der innerstaatlichen Umsetzung’ [2011] Jusletter (21 November 2011) <http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/juslissues/2011/641/_9731.html>, MN 13–14.

  118. 118.

    For a further discussion of scholarly criticism see below, Sect. IV.

  119. 119.

    Note, however, that it would be wrong to assume that all exponents of the Federal Supreme Court are fundamentally critical of the ECHR. See e.g. the contributions of Heinz Aemisegger and Niccolò Raselli, former Judges at the Federal Supreme Court and strong advocates of the ECHR, cited in the present chapter.

  120. 120.

    Cf Altwicker (fn 25), pp 388 et seq.

  121. 121.

    Seiler (fn 36), pp 310–311.

  122. 122.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, entry into force 27 January 1980, for Switzerland 6 June 1990.

  123. 123.

    See U Meyer, ‘Auswirkungen der EGMR-Rechtsprechung auf das Recht der Sozialen Sicherheit’ [2016] Basler Juristische Mitteilungen 269–283, at 270–271; Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 24 et seq, condemning judgments finding positive obligations wholesale as decisions ultra vires. But cf H Krieger, ‘Positive Verpflichtungen unter der EMRK: Unentbehrliches Element einer gemeineuropäischen Grundrechtsdogmatik, leeres Versprechen oder Grenze der Justiziabilität?’ (2014) 74 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 187–213, at 202 with further references, arguing that the Convention States have, by subsequent practice, approved of positive obligations arising under the Convention.

  124. 124.

    But cf Hertig Randall (fn 69), pp 160 et seq, adopting a more nuanced view.

  125. 125.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 349 (‘Praxis [...] zur staatlichen Schutzpflicht gegen Beeinträchtigungen des Wohlbefindens’).

  126. 126.

    Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland Appl No 14518/89 (ECtHR, 24 June 1993) concerning the untested assumption that women give up work when they bore a child.

  127. 127.

    Di Trizio v Switzerland Appl No 7186/09 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016) concerning the ‘combined method’ to calculate invalidity benefits which in practice discriminates against the great majority of women who wish to reduce their workload in order to take care of their children and their homes.

  128. 128.

    See Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland Appl No 14518/89 (ECtHR, 24 June 1993), para 67.

  129. 129.

    Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland Appl No 14518/89 (ECtHR, 24 June 1993).

  130. 130.

    Di Trizio v Switzerland Appl No 7186/09 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016).

  131. 131.

    Di Trizio v Switzerland Appl No 7186/09 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016), para 9 of joint dissenting opinion of Judges Keller, Spano and Kjølbro; T Gächter/ME Meier, ‘Der Entscheid “Di Trizio”: Wirklich eine Rechtssache für den EGMR?’ [2016] HAVE – Haftung und Versicherung 480–484, at 482–483; Meyer (fn 123), pp 279 et seq; but cf K Pärli, ‘Gemischte Methode der Invaliditätsbemessung verstösst gegen EMRK’ (2016) 60 Revue suisse des assurances sociales et de la prévoyance professionnelle 390–399, at 397–398; S Perrenoud/S Burgat/F Matthey, ‘L’affaire Di Trizio contre la Suisse’ [2016] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 1187–1211, at 1210.

  132. 132.

    Di Trizio v Switzerland Appl No 7186/09 (ECtHR, 2 February 2016), paras 88 et seq, 97; Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland Appl No 14518/89 (ECtHR, 24 June 1993), para 67; see Gächter/Meier (fn 131), p 483.

  133. 133.

    See Meyer (fn 123), pp 279, 282.

  134. 134.

    Glor v Switzerland Appl No 13444/04 (ECtHR, 30 April 2009); see Meyer (fn 123), p 279; Seiler (fn 36), p 309; Seiler (fn 115), pp 516–517.

  135. 135.

    Hertig Randall (fn 69), p 150.

  136. 136.

    Cf Meyer (fn 123), pp 281–282.

  137. 137.

    See also Meyer (fn 123), pp 281–282, referring to Thior v Switzerland (dec) Appl No 10160/07 (ECtHR, 12 March 2013), and Belli and Arquier-Martinez v Switzerland (communicated) Appl No 65550/13 (ECtHR, 22 November 2013 and 31 January 2017).

  138. 138.

    Cf Meyer (fn 123), p 279; F Schürmann, ‘Wichtige Schweizer Fälle in der neueren EGMR-Rechtsprechung’ in S Breitenmoser/B Ehrenzeller (eds), EMRK und die Schweiz (2010), pp 107–123, at 117–119.

  139. 139.

    Cf Gächter/Meier (fn 131), p 482.

  140. 140.

    See Seiler (fn 36), p 309; cf Schürmann (fn 138), p 118; more positive, Aemisegger (fn 92), pp 210, 213.

  141. 141.

    See Seiler (fn 36), p 313 (concerning the ratione materiae of Article 6 ECHR), 318–319 (concerning the principle of nemo tenetur); S Schürer, ‘Die punktuelle Neutralisierung der EMRK in der Praxis des Bundesgerichts’ (2016) 117 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 171–187, at 185–186.

  142. 142.

    Seiler (fn 115), p 515.

  143. 143.

    Seiler (fn 115), p 515.

  144. 144.

    Seiler (fn 36), pp 352 et seq; Seiler (fn 78), pp 244, 255–257, adducing as another example Emonet and Others v Switzerland Appl No 39051/03 (ECtHR, 13 December 2007), para 86.

  145. 145.

    Hertig Randall (fn 69), pp 164 et seq; but cf Seiler (fn 36), pp 355–356, conveying the impression that only the Court’s practice introduced a general principle of proportionality into the Swiss legal order.

  146. 146.

    Articles 5(2) and 36(3) of the Federal Constitution. On the fundamental role of the principle of proportionality in the Swiss and the international legal order, see N Raselli, ‘Die Attacke auf das Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip’ [2015] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 1351–1359, at 1351–1354.

  147. 147.

    See R Kiener/W Kälin, Grundrechte (2nd edn 2013), pp 123 et seq. Also, it is far from undisputed that federal acts should remain barred from judicial review against constitutional fundamental rights on grounds of Article 190 of the Federal Constitution. See Häfelin et al (fn 13), MN 2092a–2092b with references.

  148. 148.

    H Seiler, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Richterrecht und formellem Gesetzgeber’ (2016) 27 LeGes 357–374, at 363 (footnote omitted); Seiler (fn 36), pp 318–319; for more differentiated criticism D Ott, Der Grundsatz ‘nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare’ (2012), pp 119 et seq; S Roth, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen verwaltungsrechtlichen Mitwirkungspflichten und dem Grundsatz “nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare”’ (2011) 129 Revue pénale suisse 296–321, at 310 et seq with further references.

  149. 149.

    Seiler (fn 36), pp 357–358; more moderate Zünd (fn 24), p 25; cf H Keller, ‘Diskussion, Symposium für Jörg Paul Müller’ (2014) 41 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 30–37, at 31.

  150. 150.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 356.

  151. 151.

    See Article 41 ECHR; Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 19 with references.

  152. 152.

    Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 3, suggesting strengthening the Court by a ‘reduction to the essential’.

  153. 153.

    See S Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law – What is Subsidiary about Human Rights?’ (2016) 61 American Journal of Jurisprudence 69–107, at 82–83 (‘remedial subsidiarity’); H Keller/C Marti, ‘Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the Execution of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 829–850, at 834 et seq.

  154. 154.

    Seiler (fn 78), pp 250–251; see also Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 13; G Steinmann, ‘Der Schweizer Praktiker vis-à-vis von EMRK und EGMR’ in S Breitenmoser/B Ehrenzeller (eds), EMRK und die Schweiz (2010), pp 243–270, at 256–257, acknowledging a certain value inherent in procedural guarantees. For a concrete example, see the criticism of the right to reply and comment on all evidence adduced and observations filed (FR v Switzerland Appl No 37292/97 (ECtHR, 28 June 2001), paras 36 et seq; Nideröst-Huber v Switzerland Appl No 18990/91 (ECtHR, 18 February 1997), paras 23 et seq) in P Goldschmid, ‘Auf dem Weg zum endlosen Schriftenwechsel?’ (2002) 138 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 281–284, at 283; Seiler (fn 78), p 252, calling this practice absurd (‘skurril’).

  155. 155.

    Steinmann (fn 154), p 257, criticising that the Court applied substantive and procedural rights as disconnected matters, referring to Hurter v Switzerland Appl No 53146/99 (ECtHR, 15 December 2005), para 41, where the Court found a violation of Article 6 ECHR, though observing ‘aucun lien de causalité entre le préjudice matériel allégué par le requérant et la violation’.

  156. 156.

    But cf D Demko, ‘Das “(Un-)Gerechte” am Fair-Trial-Grundsatz nach Art. 6 Abs. 1 EMRK im Strafverfahren’ in MA Niggli/J Hurtado Pozo/N Queloz (eds), Festschrift für Franz Riklin (2007), pp 351–364, arguing that procedural guarantees are both an end in itself and a means to arrive at a legitimate substantive outcome of the proceedings.

  157. 157.

    Seiler (fn 78), p 251, referring to Lüdi v Switzerland Appl No 12433/86 (ECtHR, 15 June 1992).

  158. 158.

    This idea finds its most popular expression in the famous dictum that ‘justice must not only be done; it must also be seen to be done’, enunciating the belief that public control of proceedings is the best guarantor for lawful proceedings and general trust in the justice system. See e.g. Delcourt v Belgium Appl No 2689/65 (ECtHR, 17 January 1970), para 31, since repeated many times; ATF 119 Ia 99 of 17 March 1993, consid 4; 112 Ia 290 of 4 June 1986, consid 3a; further J Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in JE Fleming (ed), Nomos 50: Getting to the Rule of Law (2011), pp 3–31, at 14 et seq, championing the fundamental importance of formalistic adherence to procedural rules for the rule of law.

  159. 159.

    Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [GC] Appl No 41615/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010).

  160. 160.

    Udeh v Switzerland Appl No 12020/09 (ECtHR, 16 April 2013).

  161. 161.

    E.g. AA v Switzerland Appl No 58802/12 (ECtHR, 7 January 2014); Hasanbasic v Switzerland Appl No 52166/09 (ECtHR, 11 June 2013).

  162. 162.

    See Aemisegger (fn 92), pp 216–217, concerning Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [GC] Appl No 41615/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010).

  163. 163.

    See Aemisegger (fn 92), p 213; Seiler (fn 36), p 323, both pointing to the incompatibility of this practice with Article 35 § 1 ECHR.

  164. 164.

    Article 106(2) of the Federal Supreme Court Act, establishing an ‘obligation to reprimand’ violations of fundamental rights explicitly and in a qualifiedly substantiated and reasoned manner. See H Aemisegger, ‘Zur Umsetzung der EMRK durch das Bundesgericht’ in S Breitenmoser/B Ehrenzeller (eds), EMRK und die Schweiz (2010), pp 43–105, at 63; U Meyer/J Dormann, ‘Art. 106 BGG’ in AM Niggli/P Uebersax/H Wiprächtiger (eds), Basler Kommentar, Bundesgerichtsgesetz (2nd edn 2011), pp 1392–1398, at MN 16.

  165. 165.

    See e.g. Ankerl v Switzerland Appl No 17748/91 (ECtHR, 23 October 1996); H Keller/A Müller, ‘Das Zusammenspiel von Bundesgericht und EGMR analysiert aus dem Blickwinkel der Subsidiarität’ [2012] Justice – Justiz – Giustizia <http://richterzeitung.weblaw.ch/rzissues/2012/1/r1041.html>, MN 34; F Schürmann, ‘Wichtige Schweizer Fälle vor den EMRK-Organen’ in T Jaag/C Kaufmann (eds), 40 Jahre Beitritt der Schweiz zur EMRK (2015), pp 173–200, at 198–199.

  166. 166.

    Aemisegger (fn 92), pp 211–212; Schürmann (fn 165), p 199; Seiler (fn 36), pp 323–324; cf Zünd (fn 24), p 24, discussing a slightly different manifestation of the same problem by reference to Polidario v Switzerland Appl No 33169/10 (ECtHR, 30 July 2013).

  167. 167.

    Cf Aemisegger (fn 92), p 211.

  168. 168.

    Cf Aemisegger (fn 92), p 218, pointing to the individual justice perspective of the Court.

  169. 169.

    See Aemisegger (fn 92), p 219.

  170. 170.

    Seiler (fn 78), p 258, characterising the Court as a ‘court of appeal’.

  171. 171.

    Schürmann (fn 165), pp 194 et seq; Schürmann (fn 138), p 122; cf Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 12; more nuanced Zünd (fn 24), p 25.

  172. 172.

    See Schürmann (fn 138), p 122, himself admitting this difficulty.

  173. 173.

    Schürmann (fn 165), p 196; Seiler (fn 78), p 255; see also Besson (fn 153), pp 80 et seq.

  174. 174.

    Article 1 Protocol No 15 (not yet entered into force) explicitly connects the two doctrines with each other.

  175. 175.

    See OM Arnardóttir, ‘The “procedural turn” under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 9–35, at 23–25, examining the fourth instance doctrine as a case where the Court, based on the margin of appreciation, routinely defers to national authorities; Besson (fn 153), p 80, relating the intensity of the Court’s review to the fourth instance-doctrine; Hertig Randall (fn 69), p 168, observing that the Court’s focus on the individual case corresponds with the principle of subsidiarity.

  176. 176.

    Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 10.

  177. 177.

    Pointing to the expansive evolution of the term ‘family’, Pfiffner/Bollinger (fn 117), MN 10, themselves add a pertinent example.

  178. 178.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 360.

  179. 179.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 361.

  180. 180.

    Using the search term ‘“positive obligation∗” OR “obligation∗ positive∗”’ the Court’s case law database HUDOC (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>) was searched for judgments concerning Switzerland that found a violation of Articles 2–14 ECHR. The results were then manually double-checked to detect false positives. Applying a wide understanding of positive obligations, the following judgments can be considered relevant: El Ghatet v Switzerland Appl No 56971/10 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016); Tarakhel v Switzerland [GC] Appl No 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2014); Howald Moor and Others v Switzerland Appl Nos 52067/10 and 41072/11 (ECtHR, 11 March 2014); Ruiz Rivera v Switzerland Appl No 8300/06 (ECtHR, 18 February 2014); Agraw v Switzerland Appl No 3295/06 (ECtHR, 29 July 2010); Polidario v Switzerland Appl No 33169/10 (ECtHR, 30 July 2013); Mengesha Kimfe v Switzerland Appl No 24404/05 (ECtHR, 29 July 2010); Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland No 2 [GC] Appl No 32772/02 (ECtHR, 30 June 2009); Schlumpf v Switzerland Appl No 29002/06 (ECtHR, 8 January 2009); Carlson v Switzerland Appl No 49492/06 (ECtHR, 6 November 2008); Emonet and Others v Switzerland Appl No 39051/03 (ECtHR, 13 December 2007); Jäggi v Switzerland Appl No 58757/00 (ECtHR, 13 July 2006); Bianchi v Switzerland Appl No 7548/04 (ECtHR, 22 June 2006); Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v Switzerland Appl No 41773/98 (ECtHR, 7 February 2006); VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland Appl No 24699/94 (ECtHR, 28 June 2001).

  181. 181.

    See Seiler (fn 115), pp 520–523, equating an alleged claim for veracity inherent in human rights practice with an Islamic guardian council’s aspirations to enforce the sharia against divergent, democratically adopted decisions.

  182. 182.

    Seiler (fn 36), pp 362–363.

  183. 183.

    L Gonin, Les droits de l’homme en pratique (2013), p 374, appreciating the jugislateur because the ‘juge traditionnel, simple “bouche de la loi” […] n’est pas en mesure d’embrasser la richesse, et la complexité, des droits de l’homme. […] il convient de saluer l’émergence d’un jugislateur redessinant parfois largement l’ordre législatif, constitutionnel’.

  184. 184.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 364.

  185. 185.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 363, citing Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom Appl No 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010), para 120; further Seiler (fn 115), p 516; Gonin (fn 183), p 48, criticising the Court’s reasoning and its ultimate findings as inconsistent.

  186. 186.

    See K Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (2015), p 32, arguing that this was ultimately decisive.

  187. 187.

    Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom Appl No 61498/08 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010), para 120 referring to Soering v the United Kingdom Appl No 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989), para 102, where the Court clearly held: ‘De facto the death penalty no longer exists in time of peace in the Contracting States to the Convention’.

  188. 188.

    ‘[F]urther realisation of human rights’; see Article 31 § 2 VCLT; Stummer v Austria [GC] Appl No 37452/02 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011), para 3 of partly dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens; C Grewe, ‘Vergleich zwischen den Interpretationsmethoden europäischer Verfassungsgerichte und des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte’ (2001) 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 459–473, at 466–467; WA Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights, A Commentary (2015), pp 65–66.

  189. 189.

    But cf Seiler (fn 115), p 517, yet recognising the central importance of Protocol No 13.

  190. 190.

    Cf B Baade, ‘Eine “Charta für Kriminelle”? Zur demokratietheoretischen Kritik am EGMR und dem aktiven Wahlrecht von Strafgefangenen’ (2013) 51 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 339–368, at 342–343; D Nicol, ‘Original Intent and the European Convention on Human Rights’ [2005] Public Law 152–172, at 152, both recognising similar arguments in the British debate. Nicol, 170, finds based on an analysis of the travaux préparatoires no unitary intent of the Convention’s drafters.

  191. 191.

    JF Manning, ‘Textualism and Legislative Intent’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 419–450, at 420.

  192. 192.

    R Jennings/A Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1, pts 2–4 (9th edn 1992), pp 1272 et seq; ME Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2009), Article 31 MN 29. See also C O’Cinneide, ‘Prisoners Votes (Again) and the “Constitutional Illegitimacy” of the ECHR’ (United Kingdom Constitutional Law Association [UKCLA] Blog, 3 June 2012) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/06/03/colm-ocinneide-prisoners-votes-again-and-the-constitutional-illegitimacy-of-the-echr>, observing similarly biased arguments in the UK.

  193. 193.

    On the significance of the passage of time in interpreting treaties Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 13 July 2009 (Judgment), ICJ Reports 2009, paras 64–70; on the relevance of subsequent agreements and practice G Nolte, Special Rapporteur, First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to treaty interpretation, 13 March 2013 (ILC, 65th Sess [2013]), UN Doc A/CN.4/660, paras 29–64; Krieger (fn 123), pp 200–201.

  194. 194.

    Article 31 §§ 1–2; see Villiger (fn 192), Article 31 MN 9–10.

  195. 195.

    Article 31 § 1 VCLT; see Villiger (fn 192), Article 31 MN 6–8.

  196. 196.

    Article 31 § 3 (c) VCLT.

  197. 197.

    Villiger (fn 192), Article 31 MN 25.

  198. 198.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 365.

  199. 199.

    Seiler (fn 36), p 365.

  200. 200.

    Gonin (fn 183), p 376.

  201. 201.

    See e.g. message du Conseil fédéral ‘La ratification du protocole no 15 portant amendement à la convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’ of 6 March 2015, Feuille fédérale 2015 2137 et seq, at 2142; Federal Council Report ‘40 ans d’adhésion de la Suisse à la CEDH: Bilan et perspectives’ of 19 November 2014, Feuille fédérale 2015 353 et seq, at 404–405.

  202. 202.

    Especially the organisation of the 2010 Interlaken Conference. See Federal Council, ‘Protocole no 15’ (fn 201), pp 2138–2139.

  203. 203.

    See most notably Council of States, decision of 13 March 2018 recommending that the people and the Cantons reject the Self-Determination Initiative; Motion 14.4248, Luzi Stamm, of 12 December 2014 (withdrawn); Motion 09.3880, Ulrich Schlüer, of 24 September 2009 (rejected); Postulate Danioth (fn 76) (rejected); on legislative amendments in the wake of Strasbourg judgments G Malinverni, ‘Les modifications législatives consécutives à des jugements de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’ (2016) 27 LeGes 375–392.

  204. 204.

    Subject to a referendum was notably Switzerland’s approval of the reform of the individual complaint procedure by virtue of Protocol No 14; further on the Convention’s democratic legitimisation through the revised Federal Constitution A Reller, ‘Kann der Verfassungsentwurf 1995 die EMRK legitimieren?’ (1996) 97 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 385–406, at 385; H Keller/Y Weber, ‘Folgen für den Grundrechtsschutz und verfassungsrechtliche Gültigkeit der “Selbstbestimmungsinitiative”’ [2016] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 1007–1023, at 1009 with further references.

  205. 205.

    See Malinverni (fn 203), p 390.

  206. 206.

    See B Dutoit et al, ‘Volksinitiativen: Gefahren des Missbrauchs’ (2007) 126 I Revue de droit suisse 429–434; P Tschannen, ‘Wem gehört die Verfassung? Neuer Streit um die Gewaltenteilung’ (2007) 143 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 793–806, 801–805.

  207. 207.

    Cf Hertig Randall (fn 52), p 166.

  208. 208.

    Message du Conseil fédéral ‘relatif à l’initiative populaire “Le droit suisse au lieu de juges étrangers (initiative pour l’autodétermination)”’, of 5 July 2017, Feuille fédérale 2017 5355 et seq.

  209. 209.

    For an instructive analysis with many examples see Altwicker (fn 25), pp 385 et seq.

  210. 210.

    Earlier attempts include Motion Stamm (fn 203) (withdrawn); Interpellation 13.3237, Toni Brunner, of 22 March 2013 (struck out); Parliamentary Initiative 12.435, Luzi Stamm, of 29 May 2012 (rejected); Interpellation 11.4174, Christoph Mörgeli, of 23 December 2011 (struck out); Postulate Danioth (rejected) (fn 76).

  211. 211.

    On proposals of The Liberals, Altwicker (fn 25), pp 395–396. For a critical appraisal, see N Raselli, Ist der sog. Selbstbestimmungsinitiative ein Gegenvorschlag im Sinne eines obligatorischen Referendums für völkerrechtliche Verträge mit verfassungsrechtlichem Charakter gegenüberzustellen? <http://www.unser-recht.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2016-08-Raselli-Gegenvorschlag.pdf>.

  212. 212.

    See H Keller/N Balazs-Hegedüs, ‘Paradigmenwechsel im Verhältnis von Landesrecht und Völkerrecht?’ [2016] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 712–724; H Keller/R Walther, ‘Konsequenzen der “Selbstbestimmungsinitiative” für die Wirtschaft’ [2016] Pratique Juridique Actuelle 867–878; Keller/Weber (fn 204).

  213. 213.

    See JP Müller/D Thürer, ‘Landesrecht vor Völkerrecht? Grenzen einer Systemänderung’ (2015) 134 I Revue de droit suisse 3–20, at 14, assuming that the Convention is the Initiative’s main target.

  214. 214.

    Permanent prohibition of professional or vocational activities with children or dependent persons for persons convicted of harming the sexual integrity of such an individual (federal popular initiative ‘Pour que les pédophiles ne travaillent plus avec des enfants’ [entry into force 18 May 2014, Recueil officiel des lois fédérales 2014 2771]); prohibition of the construction of minarets (fn 39); expulsion of criminal foreigners (fn 38); lifelong internment for extremely dangerous criminals (fn 37).

  215. 215.

    Several recent initiatives tend to disrespect the principle of proportionality which is fundamental in both domestic and international human rights law. See Raselli (fn 146), pp 1354–1358.

  216. 216.

    K Fontana, ‘Die Schweiz als Musterschülerin’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 February 2017.

  217. 217.

    ATF 139 I 16 of 12 October 2012.

  218. 218.

    See ATF 139 I 16 of 12 October 2012, consid 5.

  219. 219.

    ATF 139 I 16 of 12 October 2012, consid 5.2.3.

  220. 220.

    C Blocher, ‘Wir sitzen nicht im gleichen Boot’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 6 March 2013 (‘stiller Staatsstreich’).

  221. 221.

    Union démocratique du centre, Argumentaire: Initiative populaire ‘Le droit suisse au lieu de juges étrangers (initiative pour l’autodétermination)’ (lines of argumentation, 10 March 2015), pp 4–5 (available at <https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/Argumentarium_Selbstbestimmungsinitiative-f-1.pdf>): ‘L’initiative pour l’autodétermination “Le droit suisse au lieu de juges étrangers” pose les principes suivants: […] les décisions du peuple sont appliquées sans discussion et indépendamment du fait qu’elles plaisent ou ne plaisent pas aux “élites” de la Berne fédérale’ (original emphasis). See also JP Müller/G Biaggini, ‘Die Verfassungsidee angesichts der Gefahr eines Demokratieabsolutismus’ (2015) 116 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 235–250, at 244–245.

  222. 222.

    Union démocratique du centre (fn 221), p 4.

  223. 223.

    See Union démocratique du centre, Volksinitiative zur Umsetzung von Volksentscheiden – Schweizer Recht geht fremdem Recht vor (party position paper, August 2013) (on file), p 8.

  224. 224.

    Proposed Article 5(4). The constitutional term ‘mandatory provisions of international law’ has an autonomous meaning going beyond ius cogens and embracing the non-derogable rights of the ECHR and the ICCPR. See M Caroni/M Taylan, ‘Zwingendes Völkerrecht’ [2015] recht 55–66.

  225. 225.

    Proposed Article 56a(1) and (2). Again mandatory provisions of international law should be excluded (para 3).

  226. 226.

    Proposed Article 190.

  227. 227.

    Proposed Article 197 No 12.

  228. 228.

    What this would mean for Switzerland’s Council of Europe membership is another question. See Kälin/Schlegel (fn 40), pp 36–37 with further references.

  229. 229.

    Müller/Thürer (fn 213), p 14, seem to presume that the judicial authorities would have to treat the Convention and its Protocols separately, which would lead to the absurd result that the latter were applicable, while the Convention itself would be inapplicable. N Raselli, ‘EMRK und Minderheitenschutz’ (speech, société pour les minorités en Suisse, 11 May 2016, written version available at <http://gms-minderheiten.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/EMRK_und_Minderheiten.pdf>), p 2, goes further and argues that any doubts as to the democratic legitimacy of the European Convention on Human Rights would be obsolete since the ratification of Protocol No 14 without a request for a referendum.

  230. 230.

    The Federal Constitution had to be approved by the majority of both the People and the Cantons, which means that its democratic legitimacy is stronger than that of a treaty subject to a ‘simple’ popular referendum.

  231. 231.

    See H Keller, ‘Schweizerische Rechtsstaatlichkeit im internationalen Vergleich’ in O Diggelmann/M Hertig Randall/B Schindler (eds), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz (2nd edn, forthcoming), MN 1–7.

  232. 232.

    See H Keller et al, ‘Les prétentions de l’“initiative pour l’autodétermination” à l’épreuve de la réalité’ [2016] Pratique Juridique Actuelle (special issue with preface) (available at <http://tiny.uzh.ch/D2>), p 1.

  233. 233.

    On this, see N Raselli, ‘Mögliche Konsequencen der Selbstbestimmungsinitiative für das Bundesgericht’ (speech, Dialogue CEDH, Bern, 13 June 2016, written version available at <http://www.schutzfaktor-m.ch/sites/default/files/referat_niccoloraselli_moegl_konsequenzen_selbstbestimmungsinitiative_bundesgericht.pdf>).

  234. 234.

    See Keller/Weber (fn 204), p 1023.

  235. 235.

    See above, fn 3.

  236. 236.

    On the significance of the ECHR for the protection of minority rights in Switzerland, see Raselli (fn 229).

  237. 237.

    Cf R Kolb, ‘L’initiative de l’UDC sur “l’autodétermination” (“Juges étrangers”)’ [2016] Swiss Review of International and European Law 567–579, at 571.

  238. 238.

    On this, see Keller (fn 231), MN 2–5.

  239. 239.

    D Möckli/L Raible, ‘Die direkte Demokratie in der Rechtsprechung des EGMR’ in A Good/B Platipodis (eds), Direkte Demokratie, Herausforderungen zwischen Politik und Recht (2013), pp 469–482, at 479.

  240. 240.

    Cf Müller/Thürer (fn 213), p 15; Hertig Randall (fn 52), pp 175–176.

  241. 241.

    A Auer, ‘Abschaffung der Demokratie durch Demokratie’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 April 2015.

  242. 242.

    Cf N Raselli (fn 233), p 7.

  243. 243.

    See the Convention’s preamble.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Helen Keller .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2019 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., to be exercised by Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Heidelberg 2019

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Keller, H., Walther, R. (2019). Resistance in Switzerland: Populist Rather Than Principled. In: Breuer, M. (eds) Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 285. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58986-1_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58986-1_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-58985-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-58986-1

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics