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Judicial Disobedience and the ECtHR: The Italian Case

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Book cover Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 285))

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Abstract

In this chapter I shall explore the techniques employed by the Italian Constitutional Court to disobey the case law of the ECtHR. When looking at these cases my argument is that they should be seen as a natural consequence of the constitutional openness of the Italian Constitutional Court’s case law, rather than as a symptom of constitutional closure. This chapter is structured as follows: in a first moment I shall present the constitutional background and recall the essence of the so called ‘twin judgments’ (348 and 349/2007) of the Italian Constitutional Court. In a second moment, I shall analyse the most important techniques of disobedience devised by the Italian Constitutional Court. Finally, I shall present some final remarks, trying to contextualise these national episodes of resistance in a broader comparative context.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 166/2017. All decisions of the Corte can be found at: <www.cortecostituzionale.it>.

  2. 2.

    Stefanetti and Others v Italy Appl Nos 21838/10 et al (ECtHR, 15 April 2014).

  3. 3.

    For a broader approach see G Martinico, ‘Italy: Between Constitutional Openness and Resistance’, in S Lambrecht/P Lemmens/P Popelier (eds), Criticism of the European Court of Human Rights. Shifting the Convention System: Counter-dynamics at the National and EU Level (2016), pp 177–197 where I also refer to the Lautsi saga, for instance (Lautsi v Italy Appl No 30814/06 (ECtHR, 18 March 2011)).

  4. 4.

    Legge n 848 ‘Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali’ of 4 August 1955, Gazzetta Ufficiale No 221 of 24 September 1955.

  5. 5.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 10/1993 where the Consulta described the Convention as an ‘atypical source of law’.

  6. 6.

    See Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 388/1999.

  7. 7.

    Legge costituzionale n 3 ‘Modifiche al titolo V della parte seconda della Costituzione’ of 18 October 2001, Gazzetta Ufficiale No 248 of 24 October 2001.

  8. 8.

    F Biondi Dal Monte/F Fontanelli, ‘The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System’ (2008) 7 German Law Journal 889–931; O Pollicino, ‘Italy – Constitutional Court at the crossroads between constitutional parochialism and co-operative constitutionalism. Judgments No. 348 and 349 of 22 and 24 October 2007’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 363–382.

  9. 9.

    Technically this translation is not correct, since in Italy by ‘giudici comuni’ we mean both the administrative and ‘ordinary’ judges (criminal and private law judges). For the purpose of this work, however, I am going to use ‘ordinary’ as the translation of ‘comuni’, by referring to administrative judges as well.

  10. 10.

    See: Court of Pistoia on 23 March 2007; Court of Genoa, Decision of 23 November 2000; Court of Appeal of Florence Decisions Nos 570/2005 and 1403/2006, and the State Council (Consiglio di Stato), I Section, Decision No 1926/2002. See Biondi Dal Monte/Fontanelli (fn 8), p 891: ‘Some judges had already started applying this method, which comes from the judicial practice of disapplying the internal statutory norm conflicting with Community law. In some recent occasions, even the Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione) and the Supreme Administrative Court (Consiglio di Stato) had endorsed the use of disapplication in cases of conflict with ECHR law’.

  11. 11.

    Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato / Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.

  12. 12.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision Nos 348/2007 and 349/2007. Decision No 348/2007 concerned the issue of compensation for expropriation of private property which was not equivalent to its market value. Decision No 349/2007 concerned a similar claim but this time the issue was about the compensation for occupation.

  13. 13.

    Biondi Dal Monte/Fontanelli (fn 8), p 897: ‘Scholars have minted the wording “interposed provision” to individualize the cases in which a constitutional standard can be invoked only indirectly in a constitutional judicial proceeding, because different primary provisions are inserted between the constitutional standard and the reported provisions (suspected of being unconstitutional)’. See also C Lavagna, Problemi di giustizia costituzionale sotto il profilo della ‘manifesta infondatezza’ (1957), p 28; M Siclari, Le norme interposte nel giudizio di costituzionalità (1992).

  14. 14.

    Among others, see Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 311/2009 (about the vexata quaestio of interpretative laws and the alleged violation of the right to a fair trial. The Italian Constitutional Court dismissed the case as groundless), No 317/2009 (on convictions in absentia and violation of the right to a fair trial. On that occasion the Italian Constitutional Court declared Article 175(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional), Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 80/2011 (this decision concerned the constitutionality of Law No 1423/56 (‘Preventive measures against persons representing a danger to public safety and public morality’) and Order No 575/65 (‘Provisions against Italian and foreign mafia-related criminal organisations’) permitting ‘proceedings relating to measures involving a deprivation of freedom to be conducted in public’. The Italian Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint).

  15. 15.

    Pollicino (fn 8), pp 374, 376, referring to Decision No 348/2007, para 6.1. See also D Tega, I diritti in crisi (2012), pp 51 et seq.

  16. 16.

    I Carlotto, ‘I giudici comuni e gli obblighi internazionali dopo le sentenze n. 348 e n. 349 del 2007 della Corte costituzionale: un’analisi sul seguito giurisprudenziale’ (2010); E Lamarque, ‘Il vincolo alle leggi statali e regionali derivante dagli obblighi internazionali nella giurisprudenza comune’ (2010), both available at <www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it>.

  17. 17.

    Tribunale di Livorno, Sezione Lavoro, Order of 28 October 2008; see Carlotto (fn 16).

  18. 18.

    This is perhaps the case of Consiglio di Stato, judgment No 1220 of 2 March 2010. On this decision see: G Colavitti/C Pagotto, ‘Il Consiglio di Stato applica direttamente le norme CEDU grazie al Trattato di Lisbona: l’inizio di un nuovo percorso?’ (2010) available at <www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it>.

  19. 19.

    See Corte dei Conti, Sezione giurisdizionale Puglia, No 672 of 20 June 2011; No 443 of 10 April 2012; No 1783 of 28 December 2012 and No 147 of 4 February 2013; see I Carlotto, ‘I giudici italiani e il divieto di applicazione diretta della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona’ in L Cappuccio/E Lamarque (eds), Dove va il sistema italiano accentrato di controllo di costituzionalità (2013), pp 231–240; Tribunale di Ravenna, 16 January 2008; on this see Carlotto (fn 16).

  20. 20.

    See Carlotto (fn 16); Lamarque (fn 16).

  21. 21.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 80/2011. On this, see A Ruggeri, ‘La Corte fa il punto sul rilievo interno della CEDU e della Carta di Nizza-Strasburgo (a prima lettura di Corte cost n 80 del 2011)’ (2011), available at <http://www.forumcostituzionale.it>.

  22. 22.

    Article 11 of the Italian Constitution reads as follows: ‘Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends’.

  23. 23.

    Case C-571/10 Kamberaj ECLI:EU:C:2012:233, para 62; see G Bianco/G Martinico, ‘Dialogue or Disobedience? On the domestic effects of the ECHR in light of the Kamberaj decision’ (2014) 20 European Public Law 435–450.

  24. 24.

    See fn 11.

  25. 25.

    Biondi Dal Monte/Fontanelli (fn 8), p 915.

  26. 26.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 230/2012; on this, see A Ruggeri, ‘Penelope alla Consulta: tesse e sfila la tela dei suoi rapporti con la Corte EDU, con significativi richiami ai tratti identificativi della struttura dell’ordine interno e distintivi rispetto alla struttura dell’ordine convenzionale (‘a prima lettura’ di Corte cost n 230 del 2012)’ (2012), available at <http://www.diritticomparati.it>.

  27. 27.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 264/2012. This case concerned an occurred legislative intervention chancing the calculation of pensions for Italians who had worked in Switzerland. The Italian Constitutional Court dismissed the case as groundless. See also Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 172/2008 and Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 10/2014.

  28. 28.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 264/2012, paras 4.2 and 5.4.

  29. 29.

    Maggio and Others v Italy Appl No 46286/09 (ECtHR, 31 May 2011).

  30. 30.

    F Gallo, ‘Rapporti fra Corte costituzionale e Corte EDU’ (2012) available at <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it>.

  31. 31.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 2 (translation by the author).

  32. 32.

    On provisions (disposizioni) and norms (norme) in the Italian legal scholarship see: V Crisafulli, ‘Disposizione e norma. Diritto costituzionale’, in Enciclopedia di diritto, XIII (1964) Rome, pp 195 et seq.

  33. 33.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 3 (translation by the author).

  34. 34.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 3 (translation by the author), referring to JP Costa, ‘Il ragionamento giuridico della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo’ (2000) 13 Rivista internazionale dei diritti dell’uomo 434–440, at 440.

  35. 35.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 5 (translation by the author).

  36. 36.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 5 (translation by the author).

  37. 37.

    ‘“Reverse accession” (in Italian accessione invertita or occupazione appropriativa) refers to the operation in reverse of the normal rule that buildings accede to the land. In administrative law, reverse accession occurs, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, where the State occupies land without completing normal compulsory purchase procedures. The land, previously under private ownership, accedes to the buildings and any servitudes or burdens on the land cease to exist’ (translator’s note in the English translation of the Italian Constitutional Court’s Order No 349/2007); see also: F Saitta, ‘Expropriation in Public Interest. Annual Report 2011. Italy’ (2012) Ius Publicum Network Review, available at <http://www.ius-publicum.com>.

  38. 38.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 129/08.

  39. 39.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 113/11.

  40. 40.

    On this, see G Repetto, The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR in Domestic and European Law. An Italian Perspective (2013).

  41. 41.

    Welch v United Kingdom Appl No 17440/90 (ECtHR, 9 February 1995).

  42. 42.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos 301/2009 and 97/2009 (see further below).

  43. 43.

    For instance, Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos 10/2000 and 11/2000.

  44. 44.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos 10/2000 and 11/2000.

  45. 45.

    Cordova v Italy (No 1) Appl No 40877/98 (ECtHR, 30 January 2003), para 63.

  46. 46.

    CGIL and Cofferati v Italy Appl No 46967/07 (ECtHR, 24 February 2009), against Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 305/2007.

  47. 47.

    C Fasone, ‘The European Court of Human Rights finds Italy in violation of Article 6, s 1 ECHR’ (Right to a fair trial), available at <http://www3.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/italy006_2009.html#1>.

  48. 48.

    Scoppola v Italy (No 2) Appl No 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009). On Scoppola saga see E Lamarque/F Viganò, ‘Sulle ricadute interne della sentenza Scoppola. Ovvero: sul gioco di squadra tra Cassazione e Corte costituzionale nell’adeguamento del nostro ordinamento alle sentenze di Strasburgo (Nota a C cost n 210/2013)’ (2014) Diritto penale contemporaneo, available at <http://www.ristretti.it>.

  49. 49.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 236/2011, paras 11 and 13.

  50. 50.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 113/2011.

  51. 51.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 123/2017, paras 15 and 17.

  52. 52.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos 19 and 93/2018. On these see C Nardocci, ‘Esecuzione delle sentenze CEDU e intangibilità del giudicato amministrativo e civile’ (2018) federalismi.it. Rivista di diritto pubblico italiano, comparato, europeo 1–39, at 37.

  53. 53.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 68/2017.

  54. 54.

    Grande Stevens and Others v Italy Appl Nos 18640/10 et al (ECtHR, 4 March 2014).

  55. 55.

    See text accompanying fn 30.

  56. 56.

    For instance, see: Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 311/2009.

  57. 57.

    Agrati and Others v Italy Appl Nos 43549/08, 6107/09, 5087/09 (ECtHR, 7 June 2011), para 79.

  58. 58.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 257/2011. It was a case on calculation of pensions and on that occasion the Italian Constitutional Court dismissed the case as groundless.

  59. 59.

    See Gallo (fn 30), p 23 (translation by the author). On this, as Repetto wrote: ‘Perhaps the problem could be found in the continuing uncertainty that characterises both Courts on the width and the way to use the margin of appreciation. On this subject, the Corte costituzionale is constantly in search of a conceptual continuity that is, however, sometimes more declared than demonstrated, while the Strasbourg Court has established a line of defense of its external guarantor role: this approach has certainly guaranteed the success of the Court as long as it could rely on a low level of integration with the states party to the Convention, but that should be revised, as it is increasingly required to provide interpretations that have to be transposed by internal courts’, G Repetto, ‘The issue of the non-retrospectiveness between Italian Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) available at: <https://diritti-cedu.unipg.it>.

  60. 60.

    Maggio and Others v Italy Appl No 46286/09 (ECtHR, 31 May 2011).

  61. 61.

    Stefanetti and Others v Italy Appl Nos 21838/10 et al (ECtHR, 15 April 2014).

  62. 62.

    See Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 166/2017, paras 6 and 7.

  63. 63.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 166/2017, para 17.

  64. 64.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 12/2018. On this decision see A Pugiotto, ‘Retroattività legislativa e materia civile: Corte costituzionale e Corte EDU parlano la stessa lingua?’ (2018) Osservatorio costituzionale AIC 174–182.

  65. 65.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 278/2013.

  66. 66.

    Godelli v Italy Appl No 33783/09 (ECtHR, 25 September 2012).

  67. 67.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 278/2013.

  68. 68.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 162/2014.

  69. 69.

    A Ruggeri, ‘La Consulta apre alla eterologa ma chiude, dopo averlo preannunziato, al “dialogo” con la Corte EDU (a prima lettura di Corte cost n 162 del 2014)’ (2014) Forum costituzionale, available at <www.forumcostituzionale.it>.

  70. 70.

    SH and Others v Austria [GC] Appl No 57813/00 (ECtHR, 3 November 2011).

  71. 71.

    See Lamarque/Viganò (fn 48).

  72. 72.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 286/16.

  73. 73.

    Cusan and Fazzo v Italy Appl No 77/07 (ECtHR, 7 January 2014).

  74. 74.

    Tyrer v UK Appl No 5856/72 (ECtHR, 25 April 1978). For an analysis of this concept in comparison with that of ‘living originalism’—to borrow the formula employed by JM Balkin, Living Originalism (2011), see E Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (2014), p 106.

  75. 75.

    In Letsas’ words: ‘In the hands of the European Court of Human Rights, the idea of a living instrument has three main features. First, the Court will take into consideration “present-day standards” as an important factor in interpreting the Convention … Second, the present-day standards that the Court takes into consideration must somehow be common or shared amongst contracting states […] Third, the Court will not assign decisive importance to what the respondent state (be it its authorities or public opinion) considers to be an acceptable standard in the case at hand’, G Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’, in A Føllesdal/B Peters/G Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (2013), pp 106–141, at 108–109.

  76. 76.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions Nos 176/1988 and 586/1988.

  77. 77.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 61/2006.

  78. 78.

    Cusan and Fazzo v Italy Appl No 77/07 (ECtHR, 7 January 2014), para 67.

  79. 79.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 61/2006.

  80. 80.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 145/2007 (translation by the author).

  81. 81.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 286/2016.

  82. 82.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 49/2015.

  83. 83.

    Varvara v Italy Appl No 17475/09 (ECtHR, 29 October 2013).

  84. 84.

    See Article 44(2) of decree of the President of the Republic 380/2001 (‘Consolidated text of legislative and regulatory provisions in the area of construction’).

  85. 85.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 49/2015, para 7.

  86. 86.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 49/2015.

  87. 87.

    D Tega, ‘The Italian Way: A Blend of Cooperation and Hubris’ (2017) 77 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 685–713, at 698–699.

  88. 88.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 84/2016.

  89. 89.

    Parrillo v Italy Appl No 46470/11 (ECtHR, 27 August 2015).

  90. 90.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 24/2019, Decision No 25/2019 and Decision 26/2019.

  91. 91.

    GIEM Srl and Others v Italy [GC] Appl Nos 1828/06 et al (ECtHR, 28 June 2018), para 252.

  92. 92.

    GIEM Srl and Others v Italy [GC] Appl Nos 1828/06 et al (ECtHR, 28 June 2018), partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 40 fn 133.

  93. 93.

    GIEM Srl and Others v Italy [GC] Appl Nos 1828/06 et al (ECtHR, 28 June 2018), paras 259–261. See also M Bignami, ‘Da Strasburgo via libera alla confisca urbanistica senza condanna’ (2018), available at <http://www.questionegiustizia.it>, and A Scarcella, ‘La confisca urbanistica dopo la sentenza della Corte EDU del 28 giugno 2018 nel caso GIEM e altri c. Italia’ (2018), available at <https://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it>.

  94. 94.

    See Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) Appl Nos 40660/08 and 60641/08 (ECtHR, 7 February 2012), para 78. On Von Hannover and other cases see Heiko Sauer, Chap. 3, in this volume.

  95. 95.

    A Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication (2009), pp 118 et seq.

  96. 96.

    J Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (1992); A Pizzorno, Le classi sociali (1959); C Crouch/A Pizzorno, Conflitti in Europa (1977); R Dahrendorf, ‘Toward a Theory of Social Conflict’ (1958) 2 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 170–183.

  97. 97.

    G Itzcovich, Teorie e ideologie del diritto comunitarie (2006), p 217.

  98. 98.

    V Barsotti et al, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (2016), p 214.

  99. 99.

    M Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea (1995), p 110.

  100. 100.

    At the beginning, the Constitutional Court asserted the counter-limits worked as conditions for evaluating the legitimacy of the limitations of sovereignty accepted by the Italian adhesion to the European venture. Cartabia (fn 99).

  101. 101.

    On this see, among others, F Fontanelli, ‘I know it’s wrong but I just can’t do right: First impressions on judgment no. 238 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ (2014), available at <http://verfassungsblog.de>.

  102. 102.

    Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p 99.

  103. 103.

    Russian Constitutional Court, Decision No 21-P/2015 of 14 July 2015. M Smirnova, ‘Russian Constitutional Court Affirms Russian Constitution’s Supremacy over ECtHR Decisions’ (2015), available at <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org>.

  104. 104.

    Case C-105/14 Taricco and Others ECLI:EU:C:2015:555.

  105. 105.

    S Peers, ‘The Italian Job: the CJEU strengthens criminal law protection of the EU’s finances’ (2015) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it>.

  106. 106.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 24/2017.

  107. 107.

    Case C-42/17, MAS and MB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, operative part of the judgment.

  108. 108.

    See C Murphy, ‘Human Rights Law and the Challenges of Explicit Judicial Dialogue’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/12 (2012); N Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ (2011) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 505–512. More recently see also S Lambrecht, ‘Bringing Rights More Home: Can a Home-grown UK Bill of Rights Lessen the Influence of the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal 407–436.

  109. 109.

    R v Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, especially para 11. On the impact of the Convention on the activity of some national Supreme Courts see E Bjorge, ‘National supreme courts and the development of ECHR rights’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 5–31.

  110. 110.

    Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, especially para 48.

  111. 111.

    Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 183/1973, Frontini (1974) 11 Common Market Law Review 372; see also Italian Constitutional Court, Decision No 170/1984, Granital (1984) 21 Common Market Law Review 756.

  112. 112.

    Starting with the famous Solange I: Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 29 May 1974, BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271.

  113. 113.

    See Murphy (fn 108), p 25.

  114. 114.

    For an interesting tripartition on how to interpret the formula ‘take into account’ see H Fenwick, ‘What’s Wrong with s 2 of the Human Rights Act?’ (2012) available at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org>.

  115. 115.

    Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 14 October 2004, 2BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307 (‘Görgülü’).

  116. 116.

    See P Cede, ‘Report on Austria and Germany’ in G Martinico/O Pollicino (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (2010) pp 57–80, at 63: ‘In this case, even though the Convention has constitutional rank, the contrary rule of constitutional law would have to prevail by virtue of its lex specialis character’.

  117. 117.

    As N Krisch says in ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 183–216.

  118. 118.

    Austrian Constitutional Court, VfSlg 11500/1987.

  119. 119.

    K Brownlee, ‘Civil Disobedience’, in N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016, available at <http://plato.stanford.edu>. The author of course refers to Rawls, Arendt and Singer. H Arendt, Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence, Thoughts on Politics and Revolution (1972); J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); J Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996), J Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); P Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (1973).

  120. 120.

    That is why elsewhere I proposed to term this kind of disobedience ‘functional disobedience’, G Martinico, ‘Corti costituzionali (o supreme) e “disobbedienza funzionale”. Critica, dialogo e conflitti nel rapporto fra diritto interno e diritto delle Convenzioni (CEDU e Convenzione americana sui diritti umani)’ (2015) Diritto penale contemporaneo, available at: <http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it>. On functional disobedience see: AP Brief/RT Buttram/JM Dukerich, ‘Collective Corruption in the Corporate World: Towards a Process Model’, in ME Turner (ed), Groups at Work: Theory and Research (2001), p 471.

  121. 121.

    This leads us back to the concept of ‘civil disobedience’: HD Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (2002); see Arendt, (fn 119), pp 201 et seq; according to Rawls: ‘It expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct’. See Rawls (fn 119), p 322.

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    Giuseppe Martinico

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    Marten Breuer

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Martinico, G. (2019). Judicial Disobedience and the ECtHR: The Italian Case. In: Breuer, M. (eds) Principled Resistance to ECtHR Judgments - A New Paradigm?. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 285. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58986-1_5

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