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Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 10))

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Abstract

The Information Communication Technology (ICT) sector has changed our lives in more profound ways than we can imagine. Against the fascinating backdrop of digitalization, this book seeks to answer one fundamental question: How should competition authorities assess mergers in the ICT sector to promote competition in innovation?

A closer look at the question reveals that it is far more complex and difficult to answer for the ICT, telecommunications, and multisided platform (MSP) economy vis-à-vis the other traditional sectors of the economy. This has led many scholars to rethink and question whether the current merger control framework is suitable for the converged ICT sector, oftentimes also referred to as the new economy. Considering the complexity of the subject, this book further divides the fundamental question—‘design of an effective merger control framework for the ICT sector’—into a number of sub-questions. To answer them, the book is divided into four parts. The first part of this book deals with merger review, whereas the second part concerns merger remedies. During the course of my research, I found that big data and the MSPs add an even more complex dimension to merger control. They raise some peculiar challenges—such as the ‘economics of free’—which put the very basic principles of neo-classical economics to question. Moreover, just as the currency of the real world seems to progress from coins to bitcoins, the personal data of the platform users has emerged as the new currency of the data-led economy. Packaging, one of the four Ps in marketing, is key to sell the product in the real economy. In the virtual world this ‘P’ gets replaced by ‘D’ that is the ‘design’. The design of the MSPs has a psychological dimension as well, considering that they keep the users hooked on to the website, spend longer time periods, and in the process share more information about themselves. Considering this special nature of the MSPs, big data mergers are dealt with as a separate chapter in Part III of the book. Part IV comprising of Chap. 18 presents the key findings of the book and offers a roadmap for further research on the subject.

The work will be highly beneficial for the competition law scholars, as the book is an updated edition on the latest practices in the sector (until 31 December 2018). Substantially speaking, the book well highlights the substantial aspects and principals of merger control in the ICT sector by the EU, the UK, the USA, and the Chinese competition authorities. The book also has a normative dimension as it seeks to assist the competition agencies in evaluating mergers and designing remedies in the innovation-led ICT sector. The research seeks to develop a framework against the backdrop of which the competition authorities can evaluate whether the various available remedies can perform the balancing act of preventing anticompetitive conduct while preserving merger-specific efficiencies. The research seeks to fill the existing literature gap by providing an overview of various available remedies and the set of factors that need to be taken into account while selecting suitable remedies for the innovation-led ICT, MSPs, and the telecommunications sector.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Robert Frost, ‘Mending Wall’ (1914), available at <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44266/mending-wall> accessed 06 January 2019.

  2. 2.

    Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (first published 1927, Harper & Row 1942) 84.

  3. 3.

    Ex-ante measure to maintain competition refers to the merger control, whereas ex-post measure refers to provisions relating to cartels and abuse of dominance.

  4. 4.

    D Daniel Sokol and William Blumenthal, ‘Merger Control: key international norms and differences’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 320; Donald O Parsons and Edward John Ray, ‘The United States Steel Consolidation: The Creation of Market Control’ (1975) 18 Journal of Law and Economics 181.

  5. 5.

    For a discussion on convergence, network effects and other industry-specific features, see Chap. 3 Salient Features of the ICT Sector.

  6. 6.

    Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (first published 1927, Harper & Row 1942).

  7. 7.

    Peter Angelov, Stephanie Rosenkranz and Hans Schenk, ‘Competitive Effects of Merger Remedies in Europe’s High-Tech Industry’ (October 2012) Discussion Paper Series 12-16, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, 23 <http://ideas.repec.org/p/use/tkiwps/1216.html> accessed 06 January 2019.

  8. 8.

    See Chap. 3 Salient Features of the ICT Sector.

  9. 9.

    Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in Software Markets’ in Jeffrey A Eisenach and Thomas M Lenard (eds), Competition, Innovation and Microsoft Monopoly (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999) <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/software.pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.

  10. 10.

    Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, ‘Assessing the Effects of Intellectual Property Rights in Network Standards’ in Josef Drexl(ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008) 80.

  11. 11.

    Carl Shapiro, ‘Competition Policy in the Information Economy’ in Einar Hope (ed), Competition Policy Analysis (Routledge 2000) 124.

  12. 12.

    Marc G Schildkraut, ‘Oracle: The Future of Unilateral Effect’ 19 Antitrust Magazine (2005)20, 21.

  13. 13.

    Frédéric Jenny, ‘Design and Implementation of Merger Remedies in High-Technology Industries’ in François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski (eds), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2004) 168–170.

  14. 14.

    For a detailed discussion, see Chaps. 9–13 in Part II of this book.

  15. 15.

    OECD Study, ‘Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition Law Enforcement’ (OECD 2014) 5 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf> accessed 06 January 2019.

  16. 16.

    D Daniel Sokol and William Blumenthal, ‘Merger Control: key international norms and differences’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 342.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., pp. 342–43.

  18. 18.

    Many practitioners have speculated that in the wake of the Brexit – exit of Britain from the European Union – British competition law will in the future tend to substantially diverge from the EU competition law, which was until recently harmonised with the EU competition law. This also means that many big mergers that were under the ‘one-stop principle’ notified only to the European Commission, may now be subject to notification to both the European Commission and the UK Competition and Markets Authority. See Peter Willis and Richard Eccles, ‘Brexit: Competition law implications’ (24 June 2016) < http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/uk/competition-law-implications-of-a-brexit> accessed 06 January 2019.

  19. 19.

    Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? –Some Reflections of an Economist in the Normative Foundations of Competition Law’ in Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot and Joël Monéger (eds) Economic Theory and Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009) 105–12.

  20. 20.

    Stephan Davies and Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU: Assessing the Consequences for Competition (Edward Elgar 2007).

  21. 21.

    The academic and professional background of the author in law, economics and corporate strategy, is expected, to be particularly useful in navigating across the disciplines.

  22. 22.

    This book incorporates all the key developments until December 2018. Wherever issues emerge beyond the scope of this book, references to relevant websites, articles and case laws are provided.

  23. 23.

    Robert Pitofsky, ‘The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review’ (The Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference, New York, 17 February 2000) < https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2000/02/nature-and-limits-restructuring-merger-review> accessed 06 January 2019; Albert Foer, ‘Towards Guidelines for Merger Remedies’ (2011) 52 Case Western Reserve Law Review 211.

  24. 24.

    Gilles Le Blanc and Howard Shelanski, ‘Telecommunications Mergers in the EU and US: A Comparative Institutional Analysis’ in François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski(eds), Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2004) 195.

  25. 25.

    Ibid., pp. 194–96.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., p. 196.

  27. 27.

    NACE (Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne), based on the classification of UN Statistical Commission(UNSTAT) is a six-digit European Industry standard classification system. The use of the NACE is mandatory within the European statistical system and it is a subject of legislation at the European level. See NACE Rev.2: Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Union <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF> accessed 06 January 2019.

  28. 28.

    DG Competition employs the same system for classification of merger cases in its database.

  29. 29.

    United States v. Oracle Corporation, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098(N.D. Cal. 2004).

  30. 30.

    T-Mobile/Orange (Case COMP/ M.5650) [2010] OJ C108/4.

  31. 31.

    Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus (Case M.7018) [2015] OJ C086/7.

  32. 32.

    Google/Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M. 6381) [2012] OJ C075/01; Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. a…, (Feb. 2012), available at<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigations> accessed 06 January 2019; Announcement No. 25, 2012 of the Ministry of Commerce-Announcement of Approval with Additional Restrictive Conditions of the Acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google (31 May 2012).

  33. 33.

    United States v. Google Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688, Proposed Final Judgment at IV (B) (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2011), available athttp://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f269600/269632.pdf accessed 06 January 2019.

  34. 34.

    Google/DoubleClick (Case COMP/M.4731) [2008] OJ C184/10; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Closes Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 20, 2007), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/12/federal-trade-commission-closes-googledoubleclick-investigation> accessed 06 January 2019.

  35. 35.

    Office of Fair Trading, Completed Acquisition by Motorola Mobility (Google, Inc.) of Waze Mobile Ltd., ME/6167/13 (17 December 2013).

  36. 36.

    NXP Semiconductors/Freescale Semiconductor (Case M.7585) [2015] OJ C375/2.

  37. 37.

    Liberty Global/Corelio/W&W/De Vijver Media (Case COMP/ M.7194) [2015] OJ C 175/11.

  38. 38.

    United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 - RJL, Modified Final Judgment (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2011) available at < https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/492176/download> accessed 06 January 2019; Comcast/ NBC Universal (Case COMP/ M.5779) [2010] OJ C 157/12.

  39. 39.

    Cisco/Tandberg (Case COMP/M.5669) [2010] OJ C036/09.

  40. 40.

    ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/ Gemalto/ JV (Case COMP/M.6564) [2012] OJ C368/9.

  41. 41.

    Intel/McAfee (Case COMP/M.5984) [2011] OJ C98/01.

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Tyagi, K. (2019). Introduction. In: Promoting Competition in Innovation Through Merger Control in the ICT Sector. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58784-3_1

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