Dimension IV: Enforcement Procedures of Regional Competition Law in the Narrow Sense

Molestina, Julia

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-58525-2_8

Dimension IV: Enforcement Procedures of Regional Competition Law in the Narrow Sense

Julia Molestina⁴

Chapter
First Online: 07 March 2019

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Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 9))

Abstract

In order to draw conclusions on the vertical allocation of competences, the enforcement in the narrow sense of regional competition law is of vital importance. Enforcement is a multi-layered process, which at each stage might attribute competition law competences to different entities.

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Notes

1.
Under the three examined Regional Trade Agreements enforcement of national competition law (in the WAEMU the legislative competence on competition law related matters is concentrated on the community level) takes place without any involvement of the regional entity. Enforcement is a merely national process, shaped by national procedural provisions. Consequently, this study only focuses on the enforcement of regional competition law.
2.
Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 J. Corp. L. 503, 506ff. (2006).
3.
Kovacic/Hollman/Grant, How does your competition agency measure up?, 7 Eur. Comp. J. 25, 26ff. (2011); ICN, Seminar on Competition Agency Effectiveness, 2009, p. 10.
4.
This is in particular relevant in order to increase public support for an agency’s functions, Kovacic/Hollman/Grant, How does your competition agency measure up?, 7 Eur. Comp. J. 25, 31 (2011).
5.
De León, An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy, 2009, p. 384.
6.
With regard to the procedural powers of the WAEMU Commission, Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA is largely modelled after the European Regulation 17/62/CE.
7.
Articles 3, 7 and Chapter I of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
8.
Articles 4, 5 and Chapter II of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
9.
Article 6 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
10.
Regulation n° 02/2002/CM/UEMOA, relatif aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles à l’intérieur de l’UEMOA, 23 May 2002; Regulation n° 04/2002/CM/UEMOA, relatif aux aides d’Etat à l’intérieur de l’UEMOA et aux modalities d’application de l’article 88 (c) du Traité, 23 May 2002.
11.
Décision n° 06/2004/COM/UEMOA portant Decision de ne pas soulever d’objections à l’égard des lois portant diverses dispositions relatives au regime juridique et fiscal unique et harmonise applicable dans la République du Bénin et dans la République Togolaise dans le cadre de la réalisation du projet GAZODUC de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 23 December 2004 (Actually this case concerned a notification of a state aid according to Article 5 of Regulation 04/2002/CM/UEMOA) and Décision n° 002/2005/COM/UEMOA portant attestation negative à l’égard des accords créant des entreprises communes dans le cadre de la réalisation, de l’exploitation du GAZODUC de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et de la vente du gaz naturel sur les marchés du Bénin et du Togo, 21 January 2005. For more information on the details of the latter case, see also Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 172ff.
12.
Décision n° 009/2008/COM/UEMOA portant attestation negative à l’egard du Projet de Concentration entre les Sociétés UNILEVER-CI, SIFCA, COSMIVOIRE, PALMCI, NAUVU, PHCI, SHCI et, SANIA, 22 October 2008.
13.
Décision n° 06/2004/COM/UEMOA portant Decision de ne pas soulever d’objections à l’égard des lois portant diverses dispositions relatives au regime juridique et fiscal unique et harmonise applicable dans la République du Bénin et dans la République Togolaise dans le cadre de la réalisation du projet GAZODUC de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 23 December 2004.
14.
Regulation 17/62 was criticized for not adequately contributing to an increase in legal certainty and for on the other hand creating administrative inefficiencies with regard to the workload of the Commission. The practice of non-binding comfort letters did not create legal certainty and even agreements with little or no effect on competition were still illegal; see Wißmann, Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Law and the New Policy on Cartels, 23/2 W. Comp. 123, 130 (2000); Venit, The Modernization and Decentralization of Enforcement under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 40 C. M. L. Rev. 545, 550 (2003).
15.
Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law, 2000, p. 21.
16.
Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law, 2000, p. 20.
17.
Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 175.
18.
The Commission was unable to deal rapidly and efficiently with the enormous amount of notifications. The granting of comfort letters was unable to compensate for a Commission’s decision for the lack of bindingness and the relatively little reasoning, as well as their low degree of publicity; see Montag, The Case for a Reform of Regulation 17/62, 22 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 819, 826ff. (1998); see also Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competition Law by National Anti-Trust Authorities, 17 ECLR 88 (1996).
19.
For a final analysis of the inclusion of a prior notification requirement in regional competition law in developing countries, see Part III, Dimension IV: Sect. 12.4.1.2.
20.
Articles 8 to 14 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
21.
Article 12 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
22.
Article 3(1) of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA: “Les structures nationales de concurrence assurent une mission générale d’enquête, sur initiative nationale ou sur mandate esprès de la Commission, conformément aux pouvoirs et aux procedures d’investigation prévus par le droit communautaire et les droits nationaux. A ce titre, elles mènent une activité permanente de surveillance du marché afin de déceler les dysfonctionnements lies aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles.”
23.
Article 10 and Articles 18ff. of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
24.
Article 13 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
25.
Article 3(1) of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA; Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 220.
26.
Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 221.
27.
On the functions of the Department of the regional market, trade, competition and cooperation in WAEMU <http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/UEMOA/Commission%20de%20L_UEMOA/commissaires_dmrc.aspx> accessed 11 November 2018.
28.
Article 10 of Decision 608.
29.
Article 10 of Decision 608.
30.
Informe de la Cuarta Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/IV/INFORME, 1 August 2003, pp. 3ff.
31.
Art. 93 Agreement of Cartagena: “Corresponderá a la Secretaría General velar por la aplicación de dichas normas en los casos particulares que se denuncien”.
32.
Informe de la Cuarta Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/IV/INFORME, 1 August 2003, p. 3.
33.
Informe de la Cuarta Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/IV/INFORME, 1 August 2003, p. 3.
34.
Article 13 of Decision 608.
35.
Stucchi López Raygada, La Integración en la Comunidad Andina y su Sistema de Protección y Promoción de la Libre Competencia, 2 Rev. Comp. Propriedad Intelectual 71, 91 (2006).
36.
“Gaceta Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena”.
37.
Article 13 of Decision 608.
38.
Article 14 of Decision 608.
39.
Article 6 of Decision 608.
40.
In the CARICOM, one has to carefully differentiate between the preliminary assessment phase, the investigation phase conducted by the Investigating Panel and the enquiry conducted by the Adjudicating Panel of the CARICOM Competition Commission.
41.
Article 174 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
42.
Article 175(2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
43.
Article 175(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
44.
CARICOM Secretariat, Competition Policy and Law in the CSME, 2010, p. 17.
45.
This statement was made by the current chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission, Kusha Haraksingh, in an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 26 October 2012.
46.
CARICOM Secretariat, Competition Policy and Law in the CSME, 2010, p. 20.
47.
The negative clearance ruling has in many instances been criticized for being very resource consuming, see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 161, 180. The future experiences of the CARICOM Competition Commission will show how often member states will actually use Article 180 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
48.
Article 174(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, see also below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.1.2.
49.
Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 161, 179.
50.
See above Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.2.
51.
Article 174(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
52.
Article 175(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
53.
Article 175(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
54.
Article 175(3) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
55.
For example Article 48(1) of the Fair Trading Act of Trinidad and Tobago: “Where an inquiry or investigation by the Commission involves anti-competitive conduct in another Member State, which has the effect of lessening competition in Trinidad and Tobago, the Commission shall (…) refer the matter to the Community Competition Commission.” See also Article 54(1) of the CARICOM Model Law on Competition: “Where the Commission seeks to determine whether conduct by an enterprise in another Member State prejudices trade and prevents, restricts or distorts competition in (…), the Commission shall refer the matter to the Community Competition Commission”.
56.
On Jamaica see Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 161, 194.
57.
“By Article 176 of the Treaty it was agreed that where the Commission has reason to believe that business conduct by an enterprise in the CSME prejudices trade and prevents, restricts or distorts competition within the CSME and has cross-border effects, the Commission shall request the national competition authority to undertake a preliminary examination, as a result of which it may be determined that the Commission has jurisdiction to conduct an investigation.” (emphasis added), CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
58.
Article 176(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
59.
Article 176(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
60.
Article 175(1) and (2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
61.
Article 175(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
62.
Beckford already raised this question prior to the Trinidad Limited Cement v Caricom Competition Commission Judgement of the Caribbean Court of Justice; see Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 7. However, the problem only arises in situations, in which member state is trying to circumvent the conduct of an investigation contrary to the request of another member state or the COTED, in which it might have been overruled.
63.
The CARICOM Competition Commission is divided in an investigative and adjudicating panel. See below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.2.
64.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [17].
65.
Ibid.
66.
For clarification purposes, the judgement of the Caribbean Court of Justice is already briefly dealt with at this point of the study. The details of the arguments by the parties and the Caribbean Court of Justice, if not analysed directly at this point, can be found in the according chapter of the study. References to the according chapters will be indicated in the footnotes.
67.
Guyana had already in a prior case before the Caribbean Court of Justice made allegations against Trinidad Cement Limited arguing that it had abused its dominant position in the regional cement market through price discrimination in terms of Article 179(1) lit. g) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 2 of 2009, CCJ 5 (OJ), [17]; Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [47].
68.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [31].
69.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [32].
70.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [34].
71.
Ibid.
72.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [2].
73.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [25].
74.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [26].
75.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [31] (emphasis added).
76.
Ibid.
77.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [36, 37].
78.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [10ff.].
79.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [13].
80.
Article II.1 of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Suriname and the Caribbean Community establishing the Seat and the Office of the Competition Commission, 2007; Article II.1 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the Competition Commission, 2007. Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [11].
81.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [14ff.].
82.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [14].
83.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [17].
84.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [17]. For more information on the judicial review of determinations of the CARICOM Competition Commission, see below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.3.2.
85.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [45].
86.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [46]. These provisions deal with the requirements for a request for an investigation and set out the procedure for an investigation by the Commission.
87.
Ibid.
88.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [47].
89.
Ibid.
90.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [47].
91.
This point of criticism was not raised by the Caribbean Court of Justice.
92.
See in this regard Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.2.
93.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [48].
94.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [48].
95.
Ibid.
96.
Beckford, Effecting cooperation to resolve cross-border anti-competitive conduct affecting CARICOM, XV Competition Matters – Fair Trading Commission 6, 7 (2011).
97.
The Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission judgement of the Caribbean Court also comments on decisions of the European Court of Justice that had been referred to by the Trinidad Cement Limited Group. However, the Court explicitly highlights the danger of using precedents from the European Court, because between the CARICOM and European competition regimes existed “considerable dis-similarities that flow from the significant differences in the wording, nature and effect of underlying legal instruments and the overarching governing system of law”. Furthermore, the CCJ determines that the two cited European cases did not apply to the actual case, because the CARICOM Competition Commission had not exercised investigative powers to the prejudice of the Trinidad Cement Limited Group; see Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [27, 28].
98.
Articles 3 and 5 of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA; Article 28(1) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
99.
Article 5(2) of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA. There are four different procedures regarding state aids: procedure regarding notification of state aids, Articles 5 to 12 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA, procedure regarding illegal aids, Articles 13 to 17 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA, procedure regarding abusive aids, Article 18 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA and procedure regarding existing aid, Articles 19 to 21 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA.
100.
Article 5(1) of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA. For more details on the procedures with regard to state aids, see Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 129ff.
101.
Article 3(1) of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA.
102.
Article 3 and Article 5(4) of Directive no. 02/2002/CM/UEMOA.
103.
Article 18(2) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
104.
Article 18(6) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
105.
Article 28(2) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
106.
Article 18(1) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
107.
Article 18(3) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
108.
Article 18(5) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA. A formal inquiry is consecutive, not alternative, to an informal inquiry, see Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 162.
109.
Article 18(6) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
110.
Bakhoum, A Developing-Country Perspective on “Global Competition”, 28 October 2011, Chicago, p. 12.
111.
More details on the procedural powers of Commission in WAEMU, see Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 159ff.
112.
See Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.1.1.
113.
Article 15 of Decision 608.
114.
Article 18 of Decision 608.
115.
Article 15 of Decision 608.
116.
Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 27. <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/DTrabajo/SGdt396.doc> accessed 11 November 2018.
117.
Article 17 of Decision 608.
118.
Article 18 of Decision 608.
119.
Stucchi López Raygada, La Integración en la Comunidad Andina y su Sistema de Protección y Promoción de la Libre Competencia, 2 Rev. Comp. Propriedad Intelectual 71, 93 (2006).
120.
Article 16 lit. a) to c) of Decision 608. Regional procedural rules allow for the requirement of natural or judicial persons to exhibit all relevant documents, including accounting and corporate books, receipts for payments, commercial transactions and correspondence, magnetic data carriers and the necessary programs to read them, also including information regarding the firm’s organization, trade partners, stock options and the structure of the property of the firm. Article 16 of Decision 608 also provides for interrogations of economic agents or their employees, representatives etc., as well as for inspections with or without prior notification and examination of books, registers and other documents. The investigating entity is also entitled to make photocopies or take pictures.
121.
The list in Article 16 of Decision 608 corresponds to the competences of the Peruvian competition authority, the INDECOPI as set out in Article 2 of Legislative Decree N° 807.
122.
Novak Talavera, in: Fondo Editorial, Derecho Comunitario Andino, 2003, pp. 57, 68ff.
123.
Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 15 <http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/DTrabajo/SGdt396.doc> accessed 11 November 2018.
124.
Article 19 of Decision 608.
125.
Article 20 of Decision 608.
126.
Rule 4(2) of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
127.
Rule 8 of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
128.
Rule 11 of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
129.
Rule 10(2) of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
130.
See above Trinidad Cement Limited v Caricom Competition Commission, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.1.1.
131.
Rule 12 of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
132.
Part VII “Deliberation and Determination” of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
133.
Article 174(2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
134.
Rule 6(1) of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
135.
Ibid.
136.
Rule 9(2) of the CARICOM Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2011.
137.
Article 170(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
138.
Menns/Eversley, The Appropriate Design of the CARICOM Competition Commission, 20 May 2011, Amsterdam, p. 25. In the European Union the European Competition Network (ECN) constitutes a formalized cooperation and enforcement mechanism.
139.
One also distinguishes between non-contradictory (Article 15 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA) and contradictory procedures (Article 16 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA) in the WAEMU.
140.
Articles 3, 6 and 7 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
141.
Article 4 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
142.
Article 22 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
143.
Article 23 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
144.
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. 50.
145.
For more information on the Advisory Committee on Competition in the WAEMU, see below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.2.1.1.
146.
Article 21 and 22 of Decision 608. More information on the Andean Committee for the Defence of Free Competition see below Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.2.1.2.
147.
This consultation procedure has been named the “co-decision” phase by Stucchi López Raygada, La Integración en la Comunidad Andina y su Sistema de Protección y Promoción de la Libre Competencia, 2 Rev. Comp. Propriedad Intelectual 71, 96 (2006).
148.
This study refrains from explaining each possible measure separately, because their specific requirements are irrelevant for the allocation of competences between the national and the regional level.
149.
Article 34 of Decision 608.
150.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ).
151.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [48].
152.
Articles 22 and 23 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
153.
Article 28(4) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
154.
Article 22(4) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
155.
Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA provides for rules on state aids. As the WAEMU decision in this context is directed at member states and can either clear or prohibit a state aid, questions of civil or criminal law liability, which are relevant for anticompetitive practices by legal or natural persons, do not arise. Yet, if a member state does not comply with a decision, the WAEMU Commission has several instruments at hand to enforce it, see Article 24 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA. A drastic measure at hand is for example the suspension of financial aid granted by the Union to the member state, Article 24(1) alt. 4 of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA or the Commission can fine the undertaking, which has been benefiting from the state aid, Article 24(2) of Regulation no. 04/2002/CM/UEMOA.
156.
Article 5(4) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA. On the European system on interim measures, see mainly Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003, Ortiz Blanco, EC Competition Procedure, 2006, pp. 529ff.
157.
Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 101/65, 27 April 2004, pp. 65–77, para. 80; Ortiz Blanco, EC Competition Procedure, 2006, p. 531.
158.
Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 171.
159.
Article 35 of Decision 608.
160.
Secretaria General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 40.
161.
Article 35 of Decision 608.
162.
Secretaria General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 41.
163.
CARICOM Secretariat, The CARICOM Competition Commission, 2008, p. 11.
164.
Beckford, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 185, 192.
165.
Article 174(6) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas: “The Member States shall enact legislation to ensure that determinations of the Commission are enforceable in their jurisdictions.”
166.
Beckford, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 185, 192.
167.
Drexl, in: Drexl (Ed.), The Future of Transnational Antitrust, 2003, pp. 311, 333; see also ECJ, Judgement of the Court of 20 September 2001, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, Case C-453/99, [2001] ECR I-6297, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.
168.
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions of 24 October 2014, 2013/0185 (COD), signed into law on 26 November 2014 and adopted on 10 November 2014.
169.
For more information see also Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 246ff.
170.
Bakhoum, Delimitation and Exercise of Competence between the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and its Member States in Competition Policy, 29/4 W. Comp. 653, 675 (2006).
171.
Ibid.
172.
Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003, 4 J. Eur. Comp. L. Practice 293, 297 (2013).
173.
Articles 1, 3 and 6 of Regulation no. 1/2003. See also Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation no. 1/2003, which deal with cooperation between national courts and the Commission during the enforcement of European competition law.
174.
Proceso 3-AI-96.
175.
Proceso 3-AI-96, p. 14: “En otras palabras que sus efectos ‘generan derechos y obligaciones para los particulares al igual que ocurre en las normas de los ordenamientos estatales’, permitiendo la posibilidad de que aquellos puedan exigir directamente su observancia ante sus respectivos tribunales (emphasis added).(…) R. Lecourt, Ex Presidente del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas definió este principio, diciendo que ‘es el derecho de cualquier persona de pedir al Juez la aplicación de los Tratados, los Reglamentos, las Directivas o las Decisiones comunitarias, es la obligación del Juez de hacer uso de esa norma cualquiera que sea la legislación del País al que pertenece. Es el respeto de ese derecho y de esa obligación no sólo en las relaciones de los particulares entre sí, sino también en las relaciones entre los particulares y el Estado miembro del que son ciudadanos.’ Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo, Obra “El Juez Nacional como Juez Comunitario”, pág. 53. Entre el principio de la aplicabilidad directa y del efecto directo existe una conexión estrecha: la norma comunitaria andina al ser directamente aplicable en los Países Miembros tiene como efecto inmediato que los ciudadanos de la Subregión se sientan protegidos con y en los derechos que esas normas les confieran. Es la forma legal de abrirles la posibilidad de exigir su cumplimiento ante las justicias nacionales.”
176.
Proceso 3-AI-96, p. 14.
177.
See for example Article 101(2) TFEU. Temple Lang states in this context with regard to the competition actions under the former Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty: “Articles 85 and 86 are directly applicable and create rights and duties on which national courts must act. Logically, this must mean that firms and individuals injured as a result of infringements of articles 85 and 86 have a right to sue, and not merely that agreements which are contrary to those articles are invalid and unenforceable. Moreover, articles 85 and 86 in their entirety are directly applicable, not merely article 85(2).” Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States’ Courts, 7 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 389, 403 (1983).
178.
See also Tribunal de la Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Sentencia 1-AN-97, pp. 6f.: “El carácter obligatorio del acto administrativo contenido en la Resolución 397, que señalaba como restricción al comercio la prohibición de importación de café tostado de Colombia por razones de broca de café y la denegación de los permisos fitosanitarios de importación respectivos, creó por sí mismo, sin necesidad de apoyo en otra actuación administrativa la obligación de acatamiento derivado no solamente de su contenido intrínseco sino también de la fuerza que le confiere la obligación fundamental impuesta a los Países Miembros por el artículo 5° del Tratado de Creación del Tribunal, en el sentido de no ‘adoptar, ni emplear medida alguna que sea contraria’ al ordenamiento jurídico andino o que ‘de algún modo obstaculice su aplicación’.
179.
Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007.
180.
Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 14.
181.
Böttcher, Kartell- und Lauterkeitsrecht in den Ländern der Andengemeinschaft, 2004, pp. 64, 66.
182.
Perilla Castro, Propuestas para la Protección de la Libre Competencia ante los Jueces Civiles, 21 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 78, 84 (2006). See also Cortázar, Curso de Derecho de la Competencia, 2011, pp. 139ff.; Miranda Londoño, La Indemnización de los Perjuicios causados por las Prácticas Restrictivas de la Competencia, 7/7 Rev. Der. Comp. 15, 26ff. (2011).
183.
One explanation for the “decentralized” enforcement of civil and criminal law actions in case of competition law breaches in Colombia could be found in the U.S. American model. The U.S., in its function as trading partner, is considered of paramount economic importance and granted technical assistance with regard to competition law enforcement in Colombia; see Cortázar, Curso de Derecho de la Competencia, 2011, p. 141.
184.
Article 4 of Law 472 of 1998, which provides that one of the “collective rights” eligible for vindication in a collective legal action is the right to free economic competition, OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition Law and Policy, OECD 2016, p. 80.
185.
Perilla Castro, Propuestas para la Protección de la Libre Competencia ante los Jueces Civiles, 21 Boletín Latinoamericano de Comp. 78, 78 (2006); OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition Law and Policy, OECD 2016, p. 80.
186.
Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas: “Desirous of restructuring the Organs and Institutions of the Caribbean Community and Common Market and redefining their functional relationships so as to enhance the participation of their peoples, and in particular the social partners, in the integration movement”.
187.
Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. AR 1 of 2008, CCJ 1 (OJ), [13ff.]; Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [20].
188.
Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. AR 1 of 2008, CCJ 1 (OJ), [13].
189.
See also the obligation for member states to render the CARICOM Competition Commission’s determinations enforceable, Article 174(6) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
190.
The debate on private enforcement in the European Union has been resolved by the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions of 24 October 2014, OJ L 349, 5 December 2014, pp. 1–19. Regarding the now out-dated debate on the use of European competition provisions as a defence (as a “shield”) or proactively (as a “sword”) to claim damages or injunctive relief in national courts, see Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States’ Courts, 7 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 389, 403ff. (1983); Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?, 26/3 W. Comp. 473–488 (2003).
191.
The transformation into domestic law prevails irrespective the application of direct or indirect enactment of international law. Moreover, with the exception of Suriname and Haiti, all Member States of the CARICOM adhere to the dualist doctrine; see Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean, 2008, pp. 44, 215ff.
192.
Article 174(6) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
193.
Davies/Das, Private Enforcement of Commission Commitment Decisions, 29 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 917, 927ff. (2005).
194.
A fortiori, this must also apply to the nationals of the Member States, to whose court access is sought.
195.
Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competition Law by National Anti-Trust Authorities, 17 ECLR 88, 89 (1996).
196.
Beckford in this context refers to the Jamaican case Olint Corp Ltd. v National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd., Supreme Court Civil Appeal No. 40/2008 from the 12, 13, 14 May & 18 July 2008, [65], in which Judge Morisson, J.A. states: “While it is obviously correct that the only reference to an injunction in the Act is Section 47 (1)(b) which gives the court the power to grant an injunction at the instance of the Fair Trading Commission, in respect of uncompetitive conduct in breach of certain provisions of the Act, it does not necessarily follow from this in my view that a citizen whose statutory rights have been infringed is precluded from seeking injunctive relief under the court’s general equitable jurisdiction in a proper case (See Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll (1967) Ch 302 per Ungoed Thomas J at page 346: “I see no reason why the court should refuse to protect a right by injunction, merely because it is a statutory right.”).” See Beckford, Enforcement of Competition Law in CARICOM, 35/2 W.I.L.J. 109, 117f. (2010).
197.
See below on the judicial control in the CARICOM, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.3.2.
198.
Beckford, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 185, 194.
199.
ECJ, Judgement of the Court of 19 November 1991, Francovich v Italian Republic, C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR 1991 I-05357, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
200.
Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA of 2009, CCJ 5 (OJ), [27f.].
201.
Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA of 2009, CCJ 5 (OJ), [28].
202.
Statement made by Kusha Haraksingh, current chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission, made during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on 29 October 2012.
203.
In contrast, with regard to the European Union, see the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions of 24 October 2014, 2013/0185 (COD), signed into law on 26 November 2014 and adopted on 10 November 2014.
204.
Article 15 of Regulation no. 1/2003/EU.
205.
In the WAEMU, this precondition is based on the exclusive enforcement competence of the WAEMU Commission, Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000/CJ/UEMOA, 27 June 2000, “Demande d’avis de la Commission de l’UEMOA relative à l’interprétation des articles 88, 89 et 90 du Traité relatifs aux règles de concurrences dans l’Union”, Article 22 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA. In the AndeanC, Decision 608 is held to establish a centralized system of administration and application of rules on the protection and promotion of free competition, Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 14.
206.
On the discussion with regard to the functions of private and public antitrust enforcement in Europe see: European Commission, Green Paper on Damages Actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, COM(2005)672, 19 December 2005; see also Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003, 4 J. Eur. Comp. L. Practice 293 (2013); Wils, The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32/1 W. Comp. 3–26 (2009); Wils, Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?, 26/3 W. Comp. 473–488 (2003).
207.
Article 176(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
208.
For more details see Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 268.
209.
Annual Reports of the Commission on the functioning and evolution of the Union (2000–2011) <http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/UEMOA/Commission%20de%20L_UEMOA/RapportsCommissiondelUEMOA.aspx> accessed 11 November 2018.
210.
See in this regard in particular the reports from 2009–2011, Rapport Annuel de la Commission sur le fonctionnement et l’évolution de l’Union 2009, p. 29 <http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Commission_de_L_UEMOA/Activites/Rapport2009Com.pdf> accessed 11 November 2018; Rapport Annuel de la Commission sur le fonctionnement et l’évolution de l’Union 2010, pp. 21f. <http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Commission_de_L_UEMOA/Activites/Rapport2010com.pdf> accessed 11 November 2018; Rapport Annuel de la Commission sur le fonctionnement et l’évolution de l’Union 2011, pp. 20f. <http://www.uemoa.int/Documents/Commission_de_L_UEMOA/Activites/Rapport2011Com.pdf> accessed 11 November 2018.
211.
See Article 29 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
212.
See Annual Reports of the Commission on the functioning and evolution of the Union (2000–2011) <http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/UEMOA/Commission%20de%20L_UEMOA/RapportsCommissiondelUEMOA.aspx> accessed 11 November 2018.
213.
For more information, see Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 270ff.
214.
Article 36 of Decision 608 sets out that national regulatory policy may not hinder or distort competition in the common market. The Dictamen no. 01-2007 of the Secretariat General specifies that only national policies with an effect on cross-border trade, as set out in Article 5 of Decision 608, fall within the scope of application of Article 36 of Decision 608. See above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.1.5.2.
215.
For more information on “soft” harmonization through non-binding guidelines, see above Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.3.
216.
Secretaria General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, p. 3.
217.
See for example Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, el ABC de la competencia, 2004.
218.
Comision de la Union Europea and Secretaria General de la Comunidad Andina, “Proyecto Competencia”, Armonizacion de las Reglas de Competencia en la Region Andina, (ASR/B7-3100/IB/98/0099), Informe de Actividades Periodo: Febrero de 2003 a Abril de 2003, 9 May 2003.
219.
This statement was made by a representative of a national competition law authority in the AndeanC, who was referring to a brochure published by the AndeanC and the European Commission “el ABC de la competencia” in the framework of the “Proyecto Competencia” in 2004. The representative of the national competition authority made this statement during an interview conducted with the author in January/February 2012.
220.
Section 5(2) of the Fair Competition Act:

It shall be the duty of the Commissioner-

(a) to make available

(i) to persons engaged in business, general information with respect to their rights and obligations under this Act;

(ii) for the guidance of consumers, general information with respect to the rights and obligations of persons under this Act affecting the interests of consumers;

(b) to undertake studies and publish reports and information regarding matters affecting the interest of consumers;

(c) to co-operate with and assist any association or body of persons in developing and promoting the observance of standards of conduct for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of this Act.
221.
Section 5(1) lit. a) and b) of the Fair Competition Act:

The Fair Trading Commission shall

(a) be responsible for the promotion and maintenance of fair competition;

(b) carry out, on its own initiative or at the request of any person that has an interest in the matter, such investigations or inquiries in relation to the conduct of trade

(i) as will enable it to prevent the use of trading practices in contravention of this Act;

(ii) as it may consider necessary or desirable in connection with any matters falling within the provisions of this Act.
222.
See for example the workshop entitled “Competition Law & Policy”, 30 and 31 March 2011, organized by the Fair Trading Commission of Barbados for business people, administrators and legal professionals; for more information see <http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=206&Itemid=96> accessed 11 November 2018.
223.
Competition advocacy aimed at the private sector.
224.
Competition advocacy aimed at the public sector.
225.
Similarly Cortázar, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 133, 150ff.
226.
Article 175 and Article 176 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
227.
Statement of the Kusha Haraksingh, Chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission in an interview with the author conducted on 29 October 2012 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.
228.
Generally one could define inter-governmental cooperation mechanisms as “cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the participation of private actors and/or international organizations, in a forum other than a traditional international organization (process informality), and/or as between actors other than traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) (actor informality), and/or which does not result in a formal treaty or legally enforceable commitment (output informality)”; see Pauwelyn, in: Pauwelyn/Wessel/Wouters, Informal International Lawmaking, 2012, pp. 13, 22.
229.
With regard to the ECN, Cengiz states that it is marked by a high degree of formalism, that it includes compulsory information obligation for national competition authorities and that despite being designed as a policy-enforcement network, it has acted as policy-making network. On the other hand, he describes that communication between members of the ECN takes place on an informal basis. Cengiz, The European Competition Network, 2009, pp. 8ff. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11067/MWP_2009_05.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 11 November 2018.
230.
Reglement de L’Exécution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
231.
Art. 28(3) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA and Article 3 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
232.
Article 3 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
233.
Article 30 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
234.
Article 11 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
235.
Articles 12, 13 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
236.
Articles 15, 16 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
237.
Article 16 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
238.
Article 22 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
239.
Article 13(2) of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
240.
See Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, p. 226.
241.
Article 14 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence.
242.
Article 28(4) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
243.
Article 28(4) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
244.
Article 28(7) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
245.
The case is not published.
246.
The national authority dealt with the case in the period from 14 June 2006 until 7 July 2008, when it rejected the complaint based on its lacking competence.
247.
Lettre n° 4004/DC/DMRC/DCONC of 20 April 2010.
248.
Regarding the European Competition Network, see Cseres, Questions of Legitimacy in the Europeanization of Competition Law Procedures of the EU Member States, 7 February 2013, p. 24 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213192> accessed 11 November 2018.
249.
Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
250.
Further obligations and rights of the Committee are included in the Articles 13, 20, 22, 26, 27 and Chapter VI of Decision 608.
251.
Art. 3 of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
252.
One has to highlight that so far also representatives from the Secretariat General have participated in each Reunion of the Committee. According to Article 7 of the Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, the Committee can agree upon the participation of specialists or other observers and attribute them with the right to vote.
253.
Article 22 of Decision 608. The importance of this requirement was emphasized by the Colombian State in the Second Reunion of the Governmental Experts on Competition Law, Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, 16 and 17 February 2000, p. 10.
254.
Article 8 of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
255.
Article 8 lit. a) of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005. It is to be noted that all sessions of the Andean Committee for the Defence of Competition were convened by the General Secretary, although not envisaged for ordinary sessions. However, one should not overestimate this fact, because the Secretariat General in interviews with the author stated that its convocation also relied on national initiatives. Thus the Secretariat General in fact did not take a proactive role in the meetings of the Andean Committee.
256.
Article 8 lit. b) Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
257.
Article 8 lit. b) Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
258.
Article 13 of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005. It is to be noted that the Internal Rules for the Andean Committee were adopted in 2005, before Venezuela left the AndeanC. However, the majority vote based on three member states envisaged in Article 13 was not changed after the withdrawal of Venezuela.
259.
Resolución 892 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Solicitud de la Confederación Nacional de Palmicultores y Empresas de Palma Aceitera del Perú y de las empresas Industrial del Espino S.A., Industrial Alpamayo S.A., Alicorp S.A. y Ucisa S.A. “…sobre aplicación de medidas para corregir perjuicios causados por prácticas restrictivas a la libre competencia”, presentada al amparo de la Decisión 285, 14 January 2005.
260.
Resolución 910 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Recurso de Reconsideración contra la Resolución 892 presentado por la Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite de Colombia (Fedepalma) y las empresas Acegrasas S.A. y C.I. Grandinos S.A. EMA, 12 April 2005.
261.
Resolución 984 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Investigación iniciada mediante Resolución 892, al amparo de la Decisión 285, relativa a la solicitud de la Confederación Nacional de Palmicultores y Empresas de Palma Aceitera del Perú, y de las empresas Industrial del Espino S.A., Industrial Alpamayo S.A., Alicorp S.A. y Ucisa S.A. para la “…aplicación de medidas para corregir perjuicios causados por prácticas restrictivas a la libre competencia”, 15 December 2005.
262.
Resolución 1040 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Recurso de Reconsideración contra la Resolución 984 presentado por el Gobierno de Colombia, la Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite de Colombia (Fedepalma) y la empresa Acegrasas S.A., 25 July 2006.
263.
“Fondo de Estabilización de Precios para el Palmiste, Aceite de Palma y sus Fracciones”.
264.
Mechanisms for the stabilization of prices are contained in the Decree 2354 of 1996.
265.
Anexo IV de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, “Informe del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia sobre la Investigación iniciada mediante Resolución 892”, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
266.
Resolución 984 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, Investigación iniciada mediante Resolución 892, al amparo de la Decisión 285, relativa a la solicitud de la Confederación Nacional de Palmicultores y Empresas de Palma Aceitera del Perú, y de las empresas Industrial del Espino S.A., Industrial Alpamayo S.A., Alicorp S.A. y Ucisa S.A. para la “aplicación de medidas para corregir perjuicios causados por prácticas restrictivas a la libre competencia”, 15 December 2005, p. 3; Anexo IV de la de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, “Informe del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia sobre la Investigación iniciada mediante Resolución 892”, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
267.
The sanctioning of this case still followed Decision 285. The Secretariat General granted Peru the right to limit the import of palm oil originating from Colombia for one year. The sanctioning mechanisms under Decision 285 constituted a major point of criticism. First, temporary blockage of imports, resembling a model of anti-dumping duties, had the effect of limiting intra-regional trade. Second, it did not guarantee compliance by Colombian oil producers, because they were actually not directly sanctioned for their behaviour. See Botta, The Role of Competition Policy in the Latin American Regional Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Caricom, Andean Community and Mercosur, 21–22 October 2011, St. Gallen, pp. 21f.
268.
Anexo IV de la de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, “Informe del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia sobre la Investigación iniciada mediante Resolución 892”, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005, p. 18.
269.
Prior to the creation of the Andean Committee for the Defence of Free Competition in 2005, four Reunions of Governmental Experts in the field of free competition took place: SG/REG.LC/I/Informe/Rev.1, 29 October 1998; SG/REG.LC/II/INFORME, 16 and 17 February 2000; SG/REG.LC/III/INFORME 24 and 25 October 2011; SG/REG.LC/IV/INFORME, 1 August 2003.
270.
Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/II/INFORME, 16 and 17 February 2000, pp. 7ff. Other interesting points of discussion were the scope of Article 5 of Decision 608 and the “ex-officio” powers of the Secretariat General to initiate an investigation.
271.
Informe de la Segunda Reunion de Expertos Gubernamentales en Materia de Libre Competencia, SG/REG.LC/II/INFORME, 16 and 17 February 2000, pp. 3ff.
272.
Acta de la Primera Reunión Extraordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/I-EX/ACTA, 30 November 2010.
273.
Statements of representatives from the Colombian Superintendence of Commerce made in an interview with the author conducted in Bogota, Colombia on 1 February 2012.
274.
Statements of representatives from the Colombian Superintendence of Commerce made during an interview with the author in Bogota, Colombia on 1 February 2012.
275.
Acta de la Primera Reunión Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/I/ACTA/Rev.1, 13 September 2005, p. 3. However, in this case the Venezuelan representative was not a member of the Venezuelan competition authority and thus did not comply with Article 38 of Decision 608, see Anexo 2.a “Informe I Seminario Subregional de Reflexión” of European Commission, “Proyecto Competencia”, Armonización de las Reglas de Competencia en la Region Andina, (ASR/B7-3100/IB/98/0099), 3–5 March 2003, p. 8: “cabe anotar que no pudo realizarse la revision de la propuesta de norma comunitaria por (…) no haberse podido reunir a las expertos gubernamentales en la materia responsables de realizar la negociación correspondiente.” “Los participantes al evento (…) no estaban facultados por sus países para negociar la norma comunitaria en materia de competencia.” See also De León, An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy, 2009, p. 82. According to De León development of antitrust rules were hindered by a formalistic interpretation of Andean rules by the Secretariat General, which emerged from its internal bureaucracy.
276.
Dictamen N° 01-2007, Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina.
277.
Dictamen N° 01-2007, Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, p. 8.
278.
Ibid.
279.
Dictamen N° 01-2007, Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, p. 11.
280.
Ibid.
281.
Ibid.
282.
Ibid.
283.
Ibid.
284.
Secretaria General de la Comunidad Andina, Guía Práctica para la aplicación de la Decisión 608 “Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina”, 2007, pp. 43f.
285.
For example, the Peruvian INDECOPI engages in bilateral competition law cooperation with the competition authorities from Chile, El Salvador, Panama or Colombia. Statements made by Miguel Ángel Luque Oyarce, president of the Indecopi, in an interview with the author in Lima, Peru on 19 January 2012.
286.
In 2010 the Advisory Committee on Competition for example participated in the following cases: “OMA-SENISOT”, “FARINE au Mali”, “Textile au Mali”, “Canal Overseas”, “Affaire STAF contre SONAPOST”, “Affaire ASKY”, “Affaire CAMEG” (the opinions are not published).
287.
While in the AndeanC at least three of the four member states have to be present, in the WAEMU half of the members have to attend a hearing. Decisions of the Advisory Committee on Competition are taken by a majority vote. As regards the Andean Committee of Defence of Competition, Article 13 of the Internal Regulations clarifies that in the context of a regional competition law procedure (Article 21 of Decision 608) a recommendation of the Committee requires a majority vote by at least three of its members. However, members that do not agree have the possibility to publish and express their diverging opinion separately. Other decisions by the Andean Committee have to be taken unanimously by all attending members.
288.
Article 3 of Internal Procedures of the Advisory Committee on Competition Regulation of Execution n° 007/2005/COM/UEMOA portant Reglement interieur du Comite Consultatif de la Concurrence (WAEMU); Article 4 of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
289.
See above on regional competition law enforcement procedures, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.
290.
At least, vertical information-sharing between regional and national authorities is enhanced. Horizontal information-sharing might be enhanced in the long run.
291.
Proyecto de Ley de Promoción y Defensa de la Competencia Económica. Discussed in Congress, 28 August 2002, 1 and 2 and 30 October 2002. The project was however rejected in Congress. It was only in 2011 when Ecuador implemented a domestic competition law.
292.
Colombia and Peru reformed their competition laws in 2009 and 2008. In Bolivia the former sectorial SIRESE law was replaced in 2008/2009. Ecuador was in the legislation process of a competition law, which entered into force in 2011. See above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.2.
293.
Regarding the relevance of the creation of a common market for a regional competition law system, see below Part III, Sect. 11.3.1.
294.
Article 4 lit. d) and e) of Reglamento Interno del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Annexo II de la Acta de la Segunda Reunion Ordinaria del Comité Andino de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, SG/R.CDC/II/ACTA, 3 October 2005.
295.
It is probable that Colombia was aiming at the rejection of the Secretariat General’s Resolutions 892 and 910 for the lack of specific provisions on confidential information.
296.
Article 28(7) of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
297.
Cengiz, Multi-level Governance in Competition Policy, 35 Eur. L.Rev. 660, 663 (2010).
298.
Jenny/Horna, in: Brusick/Alvarez/Cernat, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2005, pp. 281, 289.
299.
Ibid.
300.
Cengiz, The European Competition Network, 2009, pp. 9f. <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11067/MWP_2009_05.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 11 November 2018.
301.
Article 15(2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
302.
O’Keefe, Latin American and Caribbean Trade Agreements, 2009, pp. 366f.; see also Chapter VII of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas on disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors.
303.
Article 182 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
304.
Article 176(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
305.
Article 175(2) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
306.
Article 183 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
307.
The COTED is currently discussing the introduction of a regional merger regulation.
308.
Article 15(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
309.
Article 15(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
310.
Article 27(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
311.
Article 29 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
312.
Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM Single Market and Economy Genesis and Prognosis, 2007, pp. 91, 94.
313.
Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 10.
314.
Article 29(4) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
315.
Article 27(3) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
316.
See Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. AR 3 of 2008, CCJ 2 (OJ), [15]: “It is not clear what prompted COTED’s decision as no reasons were provided”.
317.
See statements made by Maxine McClean, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Barbados and Chair of COTED at the opening of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the COTED in Georgetown, Guyana: “The agenda before us is a long and serious one. Alarmingly, it is one that we have seen before, (…) we cannot continue to take decisions simply for the record and not take steps to implement them”. See also statements made by Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guyana at the same meeting: “Our agenda is populated with some critical institutional and infrastructural issues, some of which have been with the COTED for over a decade. While we must exercise great care to fashion efficient and acceptable arrangements, we have to be cognizant of the increasingly competitive global environment we are operating in and the demand on the Community from within and without to act with utmost urgency.” CARICOM Press Release 185/2011, 19 May 2011, “Effectiveness of COTED, CARICOM on the line – COTED chair”.
318.
Stewart, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 161, 173.
319.
Statement made by Gayla St. Clair Poyles, Chief Economist at the Ministry of Trade, Trinidad and Tobago, during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on 30 October 2012.
320.
See Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009, CCJ 4 (OJ). In this case a private enterprise challenged a decision of COTED to suspend the CET before the Caribbean Court of Justice.
321.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009, CCJ 4 (OJ), [41].
322.
Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 18.
323.
Statement made by Kusha Haraksingh, current Chairman of the CARICOM Competition Commission, during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on 29 October 2012.
324.
Article 15 and Article 29(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
325.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ).
326.
For example in Jamaica, the government finally granted the acquisition of Claro by Digicel, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.3.1.
327.
See for example the current situation in Suriname, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.3.2.
328.
See for example the “Report on the Audit of the Supply Capacity and Demand for Cement in the Region” of 10 October 2008. This report was a working document at the 26th COTED meeting in Georgetown on 24–25 November 2008. See Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. AR 3 of 2008, CCJ 2 (OJ), [12].
329.
This competition-law-related competence of COTED is in line with other competences that it is vested with. The COTED can suspend the application of the Common External Tariff, Articles 82, 83 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas or it can suspend the community origin treatment to any description of imports, Article 164(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
330.
Article 176(5) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
331.
Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 8.
332.
Statements made by Kusha Haraksingh during an interview with the author in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, on 29 October 2012. In this context he stated as an example that he did not have to report to the COTED in the appointment of juridical staff of the CARICOM Competition Commission.
333.
Member states or the COTED have the right to request an investigation from the CARICOM Competition Commission, Article 175(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, and the ex officio competence of the Commission is limited by the requirement to conduct a preliminary examination from a national competition authority, Article 176(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
334.
Article 10(1) lit. b), Article 13 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
335.
Statement made by Joel Richards, representative of the Barbados Manufacturer Association, during an interview with the author in Bridgetown, Barbados, on 25 October 2012.
336.
Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic Of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 2 of 2009, CCJ 5 (OJ), [17].
337.
Malleson, Promoting Judicial Independence in the International Courts, 58 I.C.L.Q. 671, 684 (2009).
338.
Malleson, Promoting Judicial Independence in the International Courts, 58 I.C.L.Q. 671, 681 (2009).
339.
This argument was made by Stewart. Jenny/Horna, in: Brusick/Alvarez/Cernat, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, 2005, pp. 281, 307.
340.
Pollard, The CARICOM System, 2003, p. 436.
341.
Pollard, The CARICOM System, 2003, p. 460.
342.
Trinidad Cement Limited v Caricom Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ).
343.
Article 176(1) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
344.
De León, Latin American Competition Law and Policy, 2001, p. 218.
345.
Article 44 of Decision 425. Generally the complaining procedure is called “Recurso de Reconsideración”, Article 37 of Decision 425.
346.
Article 41 of Decision 425.
347.
Article 41 of Decision 425.
348.
Article 43 of Decision 425. See below on Actions for annulment, Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.3.2.4.
349.
Art. 20 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
350.
CARICOM Secretariat, The CARICOM Competition Commission, 2008, p. 10. Actually such complaints constitute purely national procedures, because they are directed against national enforcement measures.
351.
Saldías, Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration, 2007, p. 9 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092797> accessed 11 November 2018. See generally on the impact of the Court of Justice of the European Union on integration in the European Union: Burley/Mattli, A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Int. Organization 41 (1993); Weiler, The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, Comparative Political Studies 510 (1994).
352.
See in this context on the general legal principles governing the allocation of competences in RTAs, Part II, Dimension V: Chap. 9.
353.
Saldías, Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration, 2007, p. 4 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092797> accessed 11 November 2018.
354.
Ibid.
355.
In the CARICOM some member states still appeal to the Privy Council as court of last instance.
356.
WAEMU: Article 2 of Protocole Additionnel n°1 relatif au organe de contrôle de l’UEMOA Additional Protocole no. 1. AndeanC: Article 6(1) of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. CARICOM: Article IV(11) of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice.
357.
WAEMU: Article 3 Règlement n° 1/96/CM portant Règlement des procédures de la Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA, 5 July 1996. AndeanC: Article 6(2) of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. CARICOM: Article V(12) of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice.
358.
AndeanC: Article 7 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement; Article 7 of Decision 500, Statute of the Court, 22 June 2001.
359.
Current court members were appointed under the act no. 03/2007/CCGE/UEMOA portant renouvellement de mandat, nomination et fin de mandats de membres de la cour de justice de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) on 20 January 2007.
360.
For more information on the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission (RJLSC) in the CARICOM, see above Part II, Dimension III: Sect. 7.1.1.2.
361.
Pollard, The CARICOM System, 2003, p. 436.
362.
Malleson, Promoting Judicial Independence in the International Courts, 58 I.C.L.Q. 671, 677 (2009).
363.
See above Part II, Dimension II: Sect. 6.2.1.
364.
Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean, 2008, p. 310. The Privy Council took a very restrictive view towards its appellate jurisdiction. It remains open, if the Caribbean Court of Justice will follow this restrictive approach. Generally, Article XXV of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice says: “In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court is a superior Court of record with such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by this Agreement or by the Constitution or any other law of a Contracting Party.”
365.
Its appellate jurisdiction is incorporated in the Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 2005 (Amendments in 2006) <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/court-instruments/rules-of-the-court/the-appellate-jurisdiction-rules> accessed 11 November 2018.
366.
The Heads of Government approved the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice in 1999. It was signed by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago on 14 February 2001. Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines singed the Agreement on 15 February 2003. The Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice came into force on 23 July 2003, and the Caribbean Court of Justice was inaugurated on 16 April 2005 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. Haiti, the Bahamas and Montserrat have not signed the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. For more details on the history of the Caribbean Court of Justice <http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/ccj-concept-to-reality> accessed 11 November 2018.
367.
Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean, 2008, p. 307.
368.
Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean, 2008, p. 307.
369.
Belle Antoine, Commonwealth Caribbean, 2008, p. 307; Malleson, Promoting Judicial Independence in the International Courts, 58 I.C.L.Q. 671, 684 (2009).
370.
Annual report regarding the judicial activity of the Court of Justice 2016, p. 81 <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/ra_jur_2016_en_web.pdf> accessed 30 August 2017.
371.
Saldías, Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration, 2007, p. 9 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092797> accessed 11 November 2018.
372.
Weiler, The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, Comparative Political Studies 510, 518 (1994).
373.
Saldías, Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration, 2007, p. 5 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092797> accessed 11 November 2018.
374.
Judgment of the Court of 30 June 1966, Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.), [1966] ECR 235, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38.
375.
Judgment of the Court of 23 April 1991, Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, [1993] ECR I-01979, ECLI:EU:C:1991:161.
376.
See above Part II, Dimension III: Chap. 7.
377.
See above Part I, Sect. 2.2.2.
378.
See above Part I, Sect. 2.2.3.2.
379.
La Conférence des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), Protocole Additionnel n°1 relatif au organe de contrôle de l’UEMOA.
380.
Le Conseil des Ministres de l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), Règlement n° 1/96/CM portant Règlement des procédures de la Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA, 5 July 1996.
381.
Article 15 Section 6 of Regulation no. 01/96/CM/UEMA regarding the procedures of the Court of Justice of WAEMU.
382.
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, pp. 63f.; Compagnie Air France v. Syndicat des Agents de Voyage et de Tourisme du Sénégal, Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA, Arrêt n° 1/2005, 12 January 2005.
383.
In interviews with the author, the following reasons for the national awareness regarding regional intellectual property provisions were given: The national legislators were involved in the regional legislation process, national and regional intellectual property rules are almost completely harmonized, intellectual property is a highly technical matter and member states in the AndeanC perceive the protection of intellectual property rights as a very important and sensitive matter. However even in the case of IP matters, the judges needed persuasion to refer IP cases to the regional court, see Helfer/Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors, 41 N.Y.U. Journal of Int’l. L. & Pol. 871, 923 (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334733> accessed 11 November 2018.
384.
Helfer/Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors, 41 N.Y.U. Journal of Int’l. L. & Pol. 871, 912 (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334733> accessed 11 November 2018.
385.
Tribunal de la Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 130-IP-2007, 17 October 2007.
386.
Tribunal de la Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 14-IP-2007, 21 March 2007.
387.
Tribunal de la Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 130-IP-2007, 17 October 2007, pp. 8f.; Tribunal de la Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 14-IP-2007, 21 March 2007, pp. 7f.: “el término ‘Juez Nacional’ debe interpretarse incluyendo a los organismos que cumplen funciones judiciales, siempre que cumplan las condiciones mínimas señaladas por la ley interna; para de esta manera tenerlos como legitimados para solicitar la interpretación prejudicial, cuando en el ejercicio de dichas funciones conozcan de un proceso en el que deba aplicarse o se controvierta algunas de las normas que integran el Derecho Comunitario Andino.”
388.
Cases see <http://www.tribunalandino.org.ec/sitetjca/index.php>; Intellectual Property Subjects form about 86% of all Preliminary Rulings in the period from 1987 to 2007 according to Helfer/Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors, 41 N.Y.U. Journal of Int’l. L. & Pol. 871, 894 (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334733> accessed 11 November 2018.
389.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002.
390.
The case took place under the former system of sectorial regulation in Bolivia under the SIRESE law. More on the Bolivian competition law system see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.2.2.2.
391.
The Tribunal was also asked to interpret Articles 4 lit. a) and 5 lit. a) and d) of Decision 285; Articles 17 and 18 of Decision 439; Articles 28, 29, 34 of Decision 462; Articles 4, 5, 6 of Resolution 432.
392.
Helfer/Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors, 41 N.Y.U. Journal of Int’l. L. & Pol. 871, 897 (2009).
393.
Helfer/Alter, The Andean Tribunal of Justice and its Interlocutors, 41 N.Y.U. Journal of Int’l. L. & Pol. 871, 871ff. (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334733> accessed 11 November 2018.
394.
Ibid., p. 898.
395.
Ibid., p. 899.
396.
Ibid., p. 887.
397.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002, p. 5.
398.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002, pp. 12f.
399.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002, p. 13.
400.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002, pp. 13, 14.
401.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 87-IP-2002, 16 October 2002, p. 14.
402.
“Programa de Liberación de la Comunidad Andina”, Article 72 of the Agreement of Cartagena: “El Programa de Liberación de bienes tiene por objeto eliminar los gravámenes y las restricciones de todo orden que incidan sobre la importación de productos originarios del territorio de cualquier País Miembro”; Saldías, Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration, 2007, p. 13 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092797> accessed 11 November 2018.
403.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 1-IP-90, 19 September 1990, p. 8: “Interpretación prejudicial de los Artículos 45 y 54 del Acuerdo de Cartagena”. “Los Países Miembros son autónomos para decidir sobre gravámenes y restricciones en relación con productos reservados o exceptuados”.
404.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 1-IP-90, 19 September 1990, “Interpretación prejudicial de los Artículos 45 y 54 del Acuerdo de Cartagena, p. 8: “No debe olvidarse, finalmente, que las normas que limitan la libertad deben ser interpretadas restrictivamente, como excepción que son a la regla general, según un principio de interpretación universalmente aceptado”.
405.
According to Article XIV and Article XII lit. c) of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice “the national court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, refer the question to the Court for determination before delivering judgment”. See also Rule 11(2)(1) of the Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules, 2006: “Where a national court is seized of an issue whose resolution involves a question concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, the court concerned shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, refer the question to the Court for determination before delivering judgment.”
406.
Article XIV of Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice; Rule 11(2)(1) of the Caribbean Court of Justice (Original Jurisdiction) Rules, 2006.
407.
The Court of Justice of the European Union can nevertheless give advisory opinions on the compatibility of international agreements with European law, Article 218(11) TFEU.
408.
Regarding more detail on the Advisory Opinion no. 003/2000 of the Court of Justice of WAEMU, see above Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.1.5.1.
409.
Article 27 of the Regulation no. 10/96, 10 May 1996.
410.
For more information, see <http://www.ecowas.int> and <http://www.ohada.org>.
411.
Different views on the hierarchical organization of ECOWAS and WAEMU competition law provisions include the opinion that the WAEMU should be considered as a member state of ECOWAS, on the one hand, and to look at every member state individually, on the other hand, in order to achieve far-reaching convergence and/or to install consultative mechanisms to resolve eventual conflicts. See Bakhoum, Perspectives Africaines d’une Politique de la Concurrence dans l’Espace OHADA, XXV R.I.D.E. 351, 370ff. (2011); Fau-Nougaret, La concurrence des organisations régionales en Afrique, 2012, pp. 296ff.; Ngom, Intégration Régionale et Politique de la Concurrence dans l’Espace CEDEAO, XXV R.I.D.E. 333, 342ff. (2011); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. 20.
412.
Article XIII of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice.
413.
Article 15(2) of Regulation no. 1/96/CM.
414.
ARRÊT N° 1, Société des Ciments du Togo c/ Commission de l’UEMOA, 20 June 2001. For a summary see <http://www.izf.net/upload/Documentation/Rapports/CourJusticeUEMOA/Recueil1996_2001.pdf> pp. 133–160.
415.
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. 63; Demba, L’Activité de la Cour de la Justice de l’UEMOA, Rev. de la Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques (2006).
416.
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policies of WAEMU, Benin and Senegal, 2008, p. 63.
417.
Demba, L’Activité de la Cour de la Justice de l’UEMOA, Rev. de la Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques (2006).
418.
WAEMU Commission decision no. 007/2010/COM/UEMOA inviting the State of Senegal to withdraw its modified provision NS03-072 and to withdraw any enforcement measures taken in this regard of 4 June 2010.
419.
WAEMU Commission decision no. 009/2008/COM/UEMOA granting a negative clearance regarding the planned concentration between Unilever-Ci, Sifca, Cosmivoire, Palmci, Nauvu, PHCI, SHCI and Sania of 22 October 2008.
420.
Regarding WAEMU Commission decision no. 007/2010/COM/UEMOA inviting the State of Senegal to withdraw its modified provision NS03-072 and to withdraw any enforcement measures taken in this regard of 4 June 2010, the WAEMU Court of Justice allowed Senegal to withdraw the complaint on 21 February 2017. Regarding WAEMU Commission decision no. 009/2008/COM/UEMOA granting a negative clearance regarding the planned concentration between Unilever-Ci, Sifca, Cosmivoire, Palmci, Nauvu, PHCI, SHCI and Sania of 22 October 2008, the WAEMU Court of Justice issued an interim injunction decision no. 01/2012 on 2 March 2012.
421.
Article 31 of Regulation no. 03/2002/CM/UEMOA.
422.
Bakhoum, L’articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, 2007, pp. 178f.
423.
Article 17 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
424.
Article 19 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
425.
Vigil Toledo, La Estructura Jurídica y el Futuro de la Comunidad Andina, 2011, p. 97.
426.
Tangarife Torres, Derecho de la Integración en la Comunidad Andina, 2002, p. 225.
427.
Articles 21 and 22 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
428.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Procesos Acumulados 01-AN-2006, 02-AN-2006 y 01-AN-2007, “Acción de nulidad incoada por la sociedad C.I. Grandinos S.A. contra la Resolución N° 984 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina; acción de nulidad incoada por la Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite (FEDEPALMA) contra las Resoluciones n° 984, 910 y 892 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina; acción de nulidad incoada por la República de Colombia contra las Resoluciones N° 984 y 1040 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina”.
429.
On the Resolutions 892, 910, 984 and 1040 of the Secretariat General, see above Part II, Dimension IV: Section “Resolutions Concerning the National Confederation of Palm-Growers and Palm Oil Enterprises (Peru) vs. Fund for Price Stabilisation for Palm-Oil and Its Fractions (Colombia)”.
430.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Procesos Acumulados 01-AN-2006, 02-AN-2006 y 01-AN-2007, “Acción de nulidad incoada por la sociedad C.I. Grandinos S.A. contra la Resolución N° 984 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina; acción de nulidad incoada por la Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite (FEDEPALMA) contra las Resoluciones n° 984, 910 y 892 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina; y, acción de nulidad incoada por la República de Colombia contra las Resoluciones N° 984 y 1040 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina”, pp. 35, 36.
431.
Ibid.
432.
Ibid.
433.
Article 222 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas; Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [2].
434.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ).
435.
Ibid., [16].
436.
Ibid., [17].
437.
Ibid., [17].
438.
Beckford, The Appropriate Design and Enforcement of Competition Law and Policy in Countries at Different Stages of Market Development, 26–28 May 2010, Brasilia, p. 11.
439.
Articles 23, 25, 31 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
440.
Articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
441.
Articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
442.
All cases of non-compliance submitted by natural or legal persons before the Andean Tribunal have referred to non-compliance of member states with the liberalization programme and with the application of intellectual property rights, mainly regarding pharmaceuticals patents, see Vigil Toledo, La Estructura Jurídica y el Futuro de la Comunidad Andina, 2011, p. 112.
443.
Dictamen N° 01-2007; see above on Article 5 of Decision 608, Part II, Dimension I: Sect. 5.1.5.2; see also on Dictamen N° 03-2009 in this chapter.
444.
Dictamen N° 03-2009 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, “Conforme al artículo 25 del Tratado de Creación del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina”, 8 June 2009.
445.
One has to recall that Decision 616 provided for special implementation requirements of Decision 608 for Ecuador.
446.
Dictamen N° 03-2009 de la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina, “Conforme al artículo 25 del Tratado de Creación del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina”, 8 June 2009, p. 3.
447.
Technically, Colombia could have also initiated an action of non-compliance on its own directly against Ecuador according to Article 24 of the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement.
448.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 75-AI-2001, 29 May 2002.
449.
See for example Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. ART 3 of 2008, CCJ 2 (OJ), [22ff.]; Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009, CCJ 4 (OJ), [15ff.].
450.
Pollard, in: Hall/Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM: Policy Options for International Engagement, 2010, pp. 467, 475.
451.
Ibid.
452.
CARICOM Secretariat, Caribbean Court of Justice, 2005, p. 7; Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009, CCJ 4 (OJ), [16].
453.
Trinidad Cement Limited showed that a decision to suspend or lower the Common External Tariff on cement had a prejudicial impact on it, Trinidad Cement Limited v The Caribbean Community, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2009, CCJ 4 (OJ), [18]. In the Trinidad Cement Limited TCL Guyana Incorporated v The State of the Co-operative Republic Of Guyana, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 2 of 2009, CCJ 5 (OJ), [27], the CCJ required that “[a] party will have to demonstrate that the provision alleged to be breached was intended to benefit that person, that such breach is serious, that there is substantial loss and that there is a causal link between the breach by the State and the loss or damage to that person.”, [28]: “The threshold for eligibility for damages is therefore a high one”.
454.
Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina, Proceso 70-RO-2003, “Recurso por omisión interpuesto por la República del Perú contra la Secretaría General de la Comunidad Andina por no haber emitido pronunciamiento sobre el recurso de reconsideración de la Resolucion 576 solicitado por el Gobierno peruano”, 22 October 2003, p. 5.
455.
Ibid., p. 6.
456.
Ibid., p. 4.
457.
CARICOM Secretariat, The CARICOM Competition Commission, 2008, p. 10.
458.
For more details on the ambiguities arising out of Article 176(6) of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, see above Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.1.1.2.
459.
Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission, Caribbean Court of Justice Application No. OA 1 of 2012, CCJ 4 (OJ), [7].
460.
This is the case in the CARICOM.
461.
In the WAEMU, national courts were more willing to refer competition law cases to the regional Court of Justice than in the AndeanC.
462.
This was discussed in the AndeanC, see above Part II, Dimension IV: Sect. 8.3.2.2.
463.
This is the case in the WAEMU.
464.
For example requirements such as the infringement of a subjective right or special leave.
465.
This is the case in the AndeanC.
466.
This is the case in the CARICOM.

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Julia Molestina

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Molestina, J. (2019). Dimension IV: Enforcement Procedures of Regional Competition Law in the Narrow Sense. In: Regional Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 9. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58525-2_8

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