Abstract
Based on a comparison and analysis of regional competition law enforcement in the WAEMU, the AndeanC and the CARICOM, one can identify certain “competition constraints” that impact regional competition law enforcement. In accordance with the slogan “one size does not fit all”, the experiences described in this study demonstrate that these competition constraints do not constitute parameters that will never change, but constitute interrelated and dynamic factors that cause different outcomes in different RTAs. As an attempt to summarize the results of the previous analysis, eleven broad policy recommendations regarding the degree of centralization or decentralization of regional competition law enforcement can be formulated.
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Notes
- 1.
Drexl develops several principles of orientation for the design of a regional enforcement system, Drexl, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 231–252. See also on competition constraints mentioned by Bakhoum/Molestina, in: Drexl/Bakhoum/Fox/Gal/Gerber, Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, 2012, pp. 89, 108ff.
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Molestina, J. (2019). Guidelines on the Institutional Design of Regional Competition Law Enforcement. In: Regional Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 9. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58525-2_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58525-2_14
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