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On Measurement of Control in Corporate Structures

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Abstract

Various methods to measure power control of firms in corporate shareholding structures are introduced. This paper is a study of some game-theoretical approaches for measuring direct and indirect control in complex corporate networks. We concentrate on the comparison of methods that use power indices to evaluate the control-power of firms involved in complex corporate networks. More precisely, we only thoroughly analyze the Karos and Peters and the Mercik and Lobos approaches. In particular, we consider the rankings of firms given by the considered methods and the meaning of the values assigned by the power indices to the stock companies presented in corporate networks. Some new results have been obtained. Specifically, taking into account a theoretical example of a corporate shareholding structure, we observe the different rankings of investors and stock companies given by the Φ index introduced by Karos and Peters in 2015 and the implicit index introduced by Mercik and Lobos in 2016. Then, some brief considerations about the reasonable requirements for indirect control measurement are provided, and some ideas of modifying the implicit index are undertaken. The paper also provides a short review of the literature of the game-theoretical approaches to measure control power in corporate networks.

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Acknowledgements

Research is financed by the statutory funds (no. 11/11.200.322) of the AGH University of Science and Technology and by statutory funds of WSB University in Wroclaw. The authors would also like to thank the comments and suggestions of Gianfranco Gambarelli and Cesarino Bertini. Moreover, authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and helpful comments and suggestions.

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Correspondence to Izabella Stach .

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Mercik, J., Stach, I. (2018). On Measurement of Control in Corporate Structures. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J., Motylska-Kuźma, A. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXI. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11290. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-58464-4_7

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