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The International Law of Atrocity Crime Prevention

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The UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 274))

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Abstract

Having found that the acts or omissions of states in the Security Council may well be subject to international law, the issue is whether rules exist that would obligate the Security Council members to respond to situations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Since 2005, when the concept was endorsed at the UN World Summit, this question is inevitably linked to the notion of a responsibility to protect.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See on this point already Part 1.3.3 above.

  2. 2.

    According to Article II of the Genocide Convention, “genocide” means, for the purposes of the convention, “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

  3. 3.

    Schabas labels them as mere “laconic references”, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 579.

  4. 4.

    See UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at para. 304. Article I of the Genocide Convention, by contrast, is addressed only in passing when Ruhashyankiko notes that the words “whether committed in time of war or in time of peace” are also found in article I (b) of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, ibid . at para. 392.

  5. 5.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 448-479; still in the second edition of this book, Article VIII of the Genocide Convention as “the only substantive guidance within the Convention for the role of prevention” takes up the major part of the Chapter on genocide prevention, see id., Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 533-578.

  6. 6.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 427.

  7. 7.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at para. 111 (mentioning Article VIII of the Genocide Convention only as confirmation, to some extent, of the duty to prevent genocide on the interstate level which he finds in Article I of the Genocide Convention); International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 161-165, 428-438 (noting explicitly that Article I of the Genocide Convention established a duty to prevent which had its own scope, extending beyond reference to the competent organs of the UN as provided for in Article VIII, ibid . at para. 427). But see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 533-578 (analysing Article VIII as the only provision in the convention that provides substantive guidance on prevention).

  8. 8.

    See Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Application, 20 March 1993, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13275.pdf>, Annex 1 at para. 103: “Article I of the Genocide Convention provides that the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Bosnia and Herzegovina claims that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has breached its solemn obligations under Article I. The Respondent has planned, prepared, conspired, promoted, encouraged, aided and abetted and committed genocide against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Respondent has refused to prevent or to punish those who are responsible for such acts. By performing such unlawful and criminal activities, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has incurred an international legal responsibility and is bound to cease and desist from such activities immediately and to pay Bosnia and Herzegovina reparations for the damage and prejudice suffered.”.

  9. 9.

    See Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 March 1993, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13275.pdf>, Annex 2.

  10. 10.

    See Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 July 1993, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10845.pdf> at 52, request no. 5.

  11. 11.

    International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf>; International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf>; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 595, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7349.pdf>; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf>.

  12. 12.

    See especially International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 162.

  13. 13.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf> at para. 52(A)(1); reaffirmed in: International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 61(1).

  14. 14.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 471, operative Clause No. 5.

  15. 15.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 61.

  16. 16.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf> at para. 45; see also International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 46.

  17. 17.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf> at para. 52(A)(1); reaffirmed in: International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 61(1).

  18. 18.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf> at para. 52(A)(2); reaffirmed in: International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 61(2).

  19. 19.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 430 and generally at paras. 425-432.

  20. 20.

    Ibid ., at para. 430 and generally at paras. 430-431.

  21. 21.

    Ibid ., at para. 430 and generally at paras. 430-432. Similarly, the judges Shi and Koroma found a “duty of a State to do what it properly can, within its means and the law, to try to prevent genocide when there is a serious danger of its occurrence of which the State is or should be aware”, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Shi and Koroma JJ., Joint Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13695.pdf> 279 at para. 5.

  22. 22.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 430; cf. also Gattini for the critical remark that the Court suggested that “various parameters” operated in appraising the conduct of a state but ultimately only mentioned one, namely the capacity to influence, Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 701.

  23. 23.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 430.

  24. 24.

    Ibid .

  25. 25.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Kreća J. ad hoc, Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13709.pdf> 457 at paras. 113-122.

  26. 26.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 430 and generally at paras. 425-427; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Shi and Koroma JJ., Joint Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13695.pdf> 279 at para. 5; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Ranjeva J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13693.pdf> 276 at paras. 1-3; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Tomka J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13699.pdf> 310 at para. 66; International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Skotnikov J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf> 366 at 379.

  27. 27.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, Tarassov J., declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7307.pdf> 27 at 27-28 (submitting that the duty to prevent was obviously limited to measures within the “real power” of the respective party) and International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7305.pdf> at para. 52(A)(2) (Judge Tarassov dissenting).

  28. 28.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Ranjeva J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13693.pdf> 276 at paras. 3-4.

  29. 29.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at para. 115 (expressing at the same time sympathy for this idea and rejecting as “nonsense” the proposition that the duty to prevent genocide was strictly limited to situations arising on the territory of the respective state party, as he held that states parties to the convention were at least obligated to concern themselves with the prevention of genocide outside of their territory where they were involved in a conflict, ibid . at paras. 114-115).

  30. 30.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at paras. 108 and 115.

  31. 31.

    Tomka J. accepted that there was an “unequivocal duty [of a state party] to prevent the commission of genocide within its territory”, but voiced “serious doubts” that Article I of the Genocide Convention could “be interpreted as requiring a State to act outside of its territory in order to prevent or suppress the acts of genocide”, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Tomka J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13699.pdf> 310 at para. 66. Accordingly, he demanded that “the dictum of the Court that ‘the obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention’ has to be interpreted in a reasonable way”, ibid . at para. 65. A State could only be required to prevent genocide outside its own territory “to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction outside its territory, or exercises control over certain persons in their activities abroad”, ibid . at para. 67. Skotnikov J. criticized the “extraordinarily expansive” treatment by the majority of the duty to prevent and suggested that a State only “fails its duty to prevent under the Genocide Convention if genocide is committed within the territory where it exercises its jurisdiction or which is under its control”, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Skotnikov J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf> 366 at 377-379. In his view, it is this element of control that is essential and should not be replaced with “a highly subjective notion of influence”, ibid . at 379. Within these territorial limits, Skotnikov J. notably qualifies the duty to prevent genocide as one of result rather than of conduct, ibid .

  32. 32.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 428 and International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Skotnikov J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf> 366 at 379.

  33. 33.

    For reference to the Court’s provisional measures order of April 1993, see Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 701 (noting that the Court had already recognized a positive obligation to prevent genocide at that time); Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, “Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory about Group Deprivations” (2002-2004) 17 Nat’l Black L. J. 133 at 190-191. Bruno Simma, who subsequently became a member of the International Court of Justice in 2003 and was part of the majority carrying the judgment on the merits of the case, interpreted the 1996 judgment on preliminary objections as evidence that “[i]n the face of genocide, the right of states, or collectivities of states, to counter breaches of human rights most likely becomes an obligation”, see Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1 at 2.

  34. 34.

    See International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at paras. 108-115. In academic literature, Lauterpacht’s view was namely taken up by William A. Schabas in his comprehensive monograph on genocide in international law, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 493-495; see also Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 236-248 (elaborating in detail on the contents and methodology of Lauterpacht’s separate opinion); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Les ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires dans l’affaire relative à l’application de la Convention pour la prévention et la repression du crime de génocide” (1993) 39 Annuaire français de droit international 514 (citing the separate opinion by Lauterpacht J. as support for the view that the duty to prevent imposed an obligation on states to do everything in their power to prevent genocide wherever it may occur, ibid . at 533-534).

  35. 35.

    Cf. Joshua M. Kagan, “The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility” (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 461 at 484 (suggesting that state practice and scholarly opinion justified the assumption of an obligation to act, at the very least, through legislative and adjudicative means).

  36. 36.

    See e.g. Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, “Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory about Group Deprivations” (2002-2004) 17 Nat’l Black L. J. 133 at 188, 190 (noting that the Genocide Convention established an obligation erga omnes to prevent and to punish genocide, and quoting the first order of the ICJ on provisional measures for the finding that both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia had “a clear obligation to do all in their power to prevent the commission of any such acts in the future” [my emphasis]).

  37. 37.

    See e.g. Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects” (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1 at 2 (concluding from the 1996 judgment on preliminary objections in the Bosnian Genocide Case that “[i]n the face of genocide, the right of states, or collectivities of states, to counter breaches of human rights most likely becomes an obligation”); Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) at 96 (quoting the ICJ’s 1996 judgment on the preliminary objections in the Bosnian Genocide Case for the proposition that “the rights and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes” and that “the obligation each State thus has to prevent and punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the Convention”).

  38. 38.

    See only David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303 at 304-305 and n. 20 (suggesting that “international lawyers generally assume that the legal obligation to prevent genocide has no wider extension than genocide within a state’s own territory” and regarding accordingly as unfounded the fears of the Clinton administration that applying the label “genocide” to the crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994 would have meant that it was legally obliged to do something about these crimes). Commenting on the case of Darfur, Luban himself found “no suggestion that states must act on their own to suppress genocide in other states”. While Luban noted the possibility under Article VIII of the Convention that its states parties, “may call on the UN Security Council to take actions for prevention and suppression of genocide”, ibid . [my emphasis], he neither discussed the potential that such recourse to the Security Council could be mandatory for states becoming aware of a threat of genocide nor did he go on to enquire as to whether the Security Council may then, for its part, be obligated to take action, see David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303-305 n. 20.

  39. 39.

    See Joshua M. Kagan, “The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility” (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 461 at 462, 488 (calling for an interpretation of the Convention as imparting “a duty upon its state-parties to act, and to use force if necessary, to stop acts of genocide”, in order to effectively prevent acts of genocide); Joseph Betz, “America’s 2003 War of Aggression Against Iraq” (2004) 9 NEXUS 145 at 151 (suggesting that the respective failure of the UN, the US and other nations to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo had been contrary to their obligations under the Genocide Convention). But see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 495, 498 (finding the question of a duty of military intervention to be largely unanswered, with state practice since the mid-1950s suggesting that military intervention might be rightful yet not obligatory); Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 256-257 (suggesting that a strong argument could be made on the basis of Article I of the Genocide Convention for the existence of a duty of military intervention, but acknowledging that this idea was “to say the least, a radical concept unlikely to gain any serious acceptance at this time” and observing that practice of intervention had been mixed and military action in humanitarian crises been seen “almost always […] as a right rather than a duty”).

  40. 40.

    See Brian D. Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) at 272.

  41. 41.

    Kagan, for instance, found “a strong international consensus that state-parties are not without obligation”, but also a need for further clarification of this obligation, see Joshua M. Kagan, “The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility” (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 461 at 488. Fausto Pocar, the then Vice-President and later President of the ICTY, has inferred from the character of the Genocide Convention as both customary international law and jus cogens that “states without exception are obliged to prevent genocide and punish perpetrators of genocidal acts, both in peace and war”, but admitted that “there are legal issues requiring clarification”, see Fausto Pocar, Lecture Commentary, in Holly Burkhalter, “Preventing Genocide and Crimes against Humanity” (2004) 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 41 at 46-47.

  42. 42.

    See Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 236-241, 251-252.

  43. 43.

    William A. Schabas, for instance, hailed the ICJ’s findings on the duty to prevent genocide as “a legal watershed”, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 525. Schabas welcomed the pronouncements on the duty to prevent as a “powerful message with tremendous implications” and “the most important and positive contribution” of the judgment, see William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 102, 114. For him, the Court’s finding that any state party to the Genocide Convention bears an obligation to prevent genocide is a “fascinating conclusion [that] seems pregnant with potential for the promotion of human rights and the prevention of atrocities”, ibid . at 115 and id., Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 523. See also Karin Oellers-Frahm, “IGH: Bosnien-Herzegowina gegen Jugoslawien” (2007) 4 Vereinte Nationen 163 at 167 (identifying the ICJ’s findings on the scope of the duty to prevent genocide as one aspect deserving of particular mention and welcoming as one of the most significant and most fundamental statements in the judgment the notion that every contracting party, and implicitly probably also any other state and all international organizations, are under an obligation to prevent genocide).

  44. 44.

    See e.g. William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 520-525; Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 450-451 (considering the duty to prevent genocide to be “an undisputed obligation of international law” and finding a “key legal lesson” of the ICJ’s decision in the Bosnian Genocide Case in the holding that “the prevention of genocide is a [justiciable] legal obligation that one State effectively owes to the citizens of another State, outside its own territory”); Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 252-255 (endorsing Arbour’s opinion and quoting her for the view that the responsibility to protect, read in conjunction with the Genocide Convention, implies the legal liability of states that do not use their “tools of authority” to stop genocide).

  45. 45.

    See especially Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 698-700 (still subscribing to the underlying notion “that all states had, at least in abstracto, a duty to prevent [genocide]”, ibid . at 713). Gattini observes, however, that the conceptualization of this duty by the Court was “remarkably progressive” and “stretched the interpretation of Article I to its maximum extent” in that it denied any territorial limits, moved away from “the traditional concept of ‘jurisdiction’” and replaced it with “the new and much vaguer one of ‘capacity to effectively influence’”, ibid ., at 698-700. He also criticized the Court for having failed to provide any guidance on the contents of the duty to prevent genocide, that is the means by which to discharge this positive obligation, ibid . at 698, 705, 713.

  46. 46.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 491 (noting that the text of the Genocide Convention nowhere recognized a duty of intervention borne either by individual states or by the international community and that the drafting history revealed scarce attention to the matter).

  47. 47.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 520-525, 533; William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 114-116. Schabas explicitly acknowledges in the preface to the second edition that his thinking has evolved on some issues covered in his work and that “[y]ears of case law, discussion and reflection have generated […] new insights”, see id., Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at xiii.

  48. 48.

    See William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 115; id., Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 523-524 (referring namely to the role which Belgium, France and the United States played when genocide unfolded in Rwanda in 1994); see also Frank Meyer, “Die Verantwortlichkeit von Vertragsstaaten nach der Völkermordkonvention: Besprechung zum Urteil des Internationalen Gerichtshofs vom 26. Februar 2007 in der Sache ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’” (2007) 5 HRR-Strafrecht 218 at 230 (commenting on the low prerequisites for a finding of a violation of the duty to prevent in the ICJ’s 2007 judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case, and concluding that the international community will be compelled to consider this duty also with regard to the conflict in Darfur).

  49. 49.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 524, 533 (asserting that the conventional duty to prevent genocide is “essentially the same” as the responsibility to protect which is set out in the World Summit Outcome document and derived from customary international law); id., “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 115 (noting that the ICJ’s 2007 judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case reinforces the concept of a responsibility to protect as set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and even elevates the duty to protect to a treaty obligation that is actionable before the Court); Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 450-451 (arguing that the obligation under Article I of the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish genocide constitutes the “legal core of the responsibility to protect”).

  50. 50.

    See Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 453-455.

  51. 51.

    See also Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in: Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 303 (acknowledging that “the treaty obligations to prevent and combat genocide seem to be extraterritorial”, but finding with a reference to the ICJ’s 2007 judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case that “the precise extension has as yet been defined only in a sketchy manner”); id., “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 11; Sabine von Schorlemer, “Anhörung zum Thema ‘Internationale Staatenverantwortung’ (‘Responsibility to Protect’)”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag, <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at paras. 1(a) and (b), 5(b) (informing the members of the German Bundestag that international law comprised a universal duty to prevent genocide under Article I of the Genocide Convention and customary law, but that the question of whether third states were under a duty to take action to prevent genocide had not yet been answered conclusively).

  52. 52.

    See especially International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at paras 109-110 (making literal, systematic and purposive arguments and referring to subsequent state practice and a “preliminary scrutiny of the travaux préparatoires” concerning an extraterritorial extension of the duty to prevent genocide under Article I of the Genocide Convention); see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chap. 10 (devoting an entire chapter to the preventive dimension of the Genocide Convention and analysing in some detail the Convention as well as relevant precedents in state and jurisprudential practice on a duty to prevent).

  53. 53.

    See Frank Meyer, “Die Verantwortlichkeit von Vertragsstaaten nach der Völkermordkonvention: Besprechung zum Urteil des Internationalen Gerichtshofs vom 26. Februar 2007 in der Sache ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’” (2007) 5 HRR-Strafrecht 218 at 218-219, 220-222, 225-226 (repeatedly referring to the duty to prevent genocide under Article I, but focussing then on specific issues such as its subjective element, the requirement of a causal connection between the omission to act and the commission of a genocide, and the implications which the duty to prevent genocide may have in terms of a duty of the contracting parties not to commit genocide themselves); Karin Oellers-Frahm, “IGH: Bosnien-Herzegowina gegen Jugoslawien” (2007) 4 Vereinte Nationen 163 at 167 (welcoming the Court’s findings on the duty to prevent genocide as one of the most significant and most fundamental statements in the judgment without however engaging in a critical appraisal). Even in Schabas’s review of the decision on the merits, the duty to prevent is, despite its prominence in the title and the introduction of the article, ultimately discussed in the space of little more than one page, see William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 114-116.

  54. 54.

    David Luban, for instance, denied the duty of third states to intervene and prevent a potential genocide in Darfur in a paper in which he primarily discussed the definition of “genocide” and its application to the Darfur context, see David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303. Maurizio Ragazzi referred to the duty to prevent genocide in his monograph on obligations erga omnes, proceeding from the ICJ’s finding in the 1996 judgment on preliminary objections that this duty was not territorially limited, see Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) at 95-97, 153. Nagan and Rodin also mentioned the duty to prevent in the context of obligations erga omnes arising out of the Genocide Convention, quoting the ICJ’s 1993 orders on provisional measures in the Bosnian Genocide Case, see Winston P. Nagan & Vivile F. Rodin, “Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory about Group Deprivations” (2002-2004) 17 Nat’l Black L. J. 133 at 187-191; notably, not only did they not inquire any further into the existence and scope of a duty to prevent, but also they did not even mention any obligations arising from Article I in their own outline of the contents of the Genocide Convention, cf. ibid . at 184.

  55. 55.

    Cf. e.g. the footnote analysis, based on a couple of systematic observations and a reference to the first edition of Schabas’s Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes by David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303 at 305 n. 20; Joseph Betz, while suggesting that the Genocide Convention would have required the UN, the US and other states to intervene in Kosovo and Rwanda, was primarily concerned in his discussion of the 2003 war against Iraq with the permissive dimension of humanitarian intervention, cf. Joseph Betz, “America’s 2003 War of Aggression Against Iraq” (2004) 9 NEXUS 145 at 150-152.

  56. 56.

    Cf. e.g. the expert statement made by Sabine von Schorlemer for the public hearing on the “Responsibility to Protect” which was held by the Committee of the German Bundestag on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid on 11 February 2009, see Sabine von Schorlemer, “Anhörung zum Thema ‘Internationale Staatenverantwortung’ (‘Responsibility to Protect’)”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag, <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at 3 (referring to Ragazzi, alongside Joshua M. Kagan, on the one hand and to Luban on the other).

  57. 57.

    Cf. William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 520-533 (endorsing the Court’s conclusions on the merits stage while retaining major parts of his earlier analysis of subsequent practice from the first edition of his monograph).

  58. 58.

    For references to the decisions of the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide Case, see the examples in note 44 above. David Luban, in his footnote denying the existence under Article I of the Genocide Convention of a duty to prevent genocide extraterritorially, still cited the first version of Schabas’s monograph Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, see David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303 at 305 n. 20.

  59. 59.

    See e.g. the analysis of the due diligence notion and the parameters proposed in the ICJ’s judgment on the merits of the Bosnian Genocide Case by Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 453-455.

  60. 60.

    See Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 698.

  61. 61.

    Cf. only the hypothesis of the present work or the above-mentioned application of the due diligence concept of Article I Genocide Convention to the members of the Security Council by Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 453-455.

  62. 62.

    For Weckel, the declarations and separate opinions which have been added to the judgment attest to the thorough debates which the judges had on the different issues of the case before them and endow the large majorities which the Court eventually reached with special authority, yet he also notes that the Court remained divided and that it is therefore important that doctrine continue the debate, Philippe Weckel, “L’Arrêt sur le génocide: le souffle de l’Avis de 1951 n’a pas transporté la Cour” (2007) 111 RGDIP 305 at 305.

  63. 63.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 471, operative clause No. 5 (with Judges Skotnikov and Tomka as well as Judge ad hoc Kreća dissenting).

  64. 64.

    Ibid ., at para. 434.

  65. 65.

    Ibid ., at para. 435.

  66. 66.

    Ibid ., at para. 438.

  67. 67.

    Cf. the critical appraisal by Gattini that most arguments submitted by the Court appear to have been “rather conveniently tailored to the case at hand”, Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 705, and that the Court even felt it necessary to rely specifically on an even stricter obligation to prevent that Serbia had pursuant to the two provisional orders of 1993, ibid . at 703.

  68. 68.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Skotnikov J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13705.pdf> 366 at 379 (criticizing the concept of a duty to prevent as proposed by the majority of the Court as “politically appealing, but legally vague, indeed, hardly measurable at all in legal terms”). The Judges Shi and Koroma also expressed serious misgivings about the methodology applied by the Court in deciding the case at hand, criticizing specifically that the majority had not identified any “clear missed moment of opportunity to act” but established various hypotheses rather than identifying clearly the opportunities which Serbia’s organs had had to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Shi and Koroma JJ., Joint Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13695.pdf> 279 at para. 6.

  69. 69.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 160-165.

  70. 70.

    See especially the reference to the travaux préparatoires in International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, Kreća J. ad hoc, Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13709.pdf> 457 at paras. 114-16, 120.

  71. 71.

    Cf. also Philippe Weckel, “L’Arrêt sur le génocide: le souffle de l’Avis de 1951 n’a pas transporté la Cour” (2007) 111 RGDIP 305 at 305.

  72. 72.

    Controversies over the range of UN organs that qualify as competent organs within the meaning of this provision exist only beyond the Security Council and the General Assembly. For Nehemiah Robinson, a historical interpretation indicates that these two as well as, in the case of trust territories, the Trusteeship Council, had authority but not, in the absence of a delegation of powers by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), see Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 98. William A. Schabas, by contrast, lists a wide range of principal and subsidiary UN organs that were involved in the international reaction to the Rwandan genocide and could be called upon besides the General Assembly and the Security Council, including ECOSOC’s Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, both of which have meanwhile been abolished and replaced by the Human Rights Council, as well as the ICJ, the Secretariat, and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 539-577.

  73. 73.

    See US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “The Crisis in Darfur”: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 September 2004, online: US Department of State, Archive: Information released online from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009 <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm>.

  74. 74.

    For a rather cautious assessment of Powell’s statement see Jamal Jafari, “‘Never Again,’ Again: Darfur, the Genocide Convention, and the Duty to Prevent Genocide” (2004) 12:1 Human Rights Brief 8 at 10 (noting that “in the end, the declaration shifted a great degree of the responsibility for preventing genocide from individual states to the UN”).

  75. 75.

    Cf. William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 553-554 (noting that “Powell’s statement appears to be the only formal invocation of Article VIII of the Convention since its adoption”).

  76. 76.

    See Part 4.1.2.1 below.

  77. 77.

    See Parts 4.1.2.2-4.1.2.5 below.

  78. 78.

    See only William A. Schabas, “Genocide”, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 401 at para. 13 (calling the provision “unnecessary, of course”).

  79. 79.

    The relevance of this entitlement is, however, ab initio limited to organs other than the Security Council, which may receive communications from states generally, and not only from UN members, see UN Security Council, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7 (21 December 1982), Rule 6: “The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter”; see by contrast Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/520/Rev.17 (2007), Article 13(e); Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/5715/Rev.2 (1992), Rules 9(2)(e) and 12(1) (reserving the right to propose items for the agenda of the ECOSOC to those states that are members of the United Nations); see on the whole issue Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 95-96. Even with respect to these other organs, this function of Article VIII would meanwhile be almost devoid of any scope of application in practice, as the UN are approaching universal membership, cf. William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 539.

  80. 80.

    See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, “Genocide”, in: Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume II (1995), 541 at 542; see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 538-539.

  81. 81.

    See only Pieter N. Drost, for whom Article VIII of the Genocide Convention is without consequence and hence “senseless”, Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 133-134 (noting that the members of the United Nations are empowered to call upon its organs already under the Charter, and that the international character of the crime of genocide is recognized by ratification of the convention regardless of Article VIII); cf. also UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at para. 304 (finding that Article VIII of the Genocide Convention adds nothing to the Charter) and almost verbatim UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, B. Whitaker, Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (2 July 1985) at para. 66.

  82. 82.

    See Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 94-96.

  83. 83.

    UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at para. 304 [emphasis added]; see verbatim UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, B. Whitaker, Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (2 July 1985) at para. 66.

  84. 84.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 426-427.

  85. 85.

    The Court in fact appears to accept the proposition that Article VIII “may be seen as completing the system by supporting both prevention and suppression, in this case at the political level rather than as a matter of legal responsibility”, ibid ., at para. 159.

  86. 86.

    Article VIII Genocide Convention [my emphasis].

  87. 87.

    Genocide Convention, preambular para. 3.

  88. 88.

    See in further detail Part 4.1.3.4 below.

  89. 89.

    For a concise summary of the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, cf. UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at paras. 29-41. A more detailed review of the negotiations has been prepared by Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 17-28 and William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 59-90. For details of the first phase of the process, from 2 November 1946 until 20 January 1948, prior to renewed ECOSOC consideration of the matter and the establishment of its Ad Hoc Committee, see also United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Historical Summary (2 November 1946 – 20 January 1948), UN Doc. E/621 (26 January 1948).

  90. 90.

    See Draft resolution relating to the crime of genocide, proposed by the delegations of Cuba, India and Panama, UN Doc. A/BUR/50 (2 November 1946), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 3; cf. also UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at para. 29; Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 17.

  91. 91.

    See Draft resolution relating to the crime of genocide, proposed by the delegations of Cuba, India and Panama, UN Doc. A/BUR/50 (2 November 1946), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 3 at para. 3.

  92. 92.

    Ibid ., at para. 4.

  93. 93.

    Ibid .

  94. 94.

    UN General Assembly, The Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 96(I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th Plen. Mtg. (11 December 1946). For further insights into the process that led to the adoption of Resolution 96(I), see Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 17 (with references to the relevant UN records).

  95. 95.

    See UN General Assembly, The Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 96(I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th Plen. Mtg. (11 December 1946) at op. para. 4.

  96. 96.

    Ibid ., at op. para. 1.

  97. 97.

    Ibid ., at preambular para. 3.

  98. 98.

    Ibid ., at op. para. 2.

  99. 99.

    See UN General Assembly, The Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 96(I), UN GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th Plen. Mtg. (11 December 1946) at op. para. 3.

  100. 100.

    See UN ECOSOC, Crime of Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 47 (IV) (28 March 1947), UN Doc. E/325 (22 April 1947) 5.

  101. 101.

    See on the history of this first draft Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 18-20; UN ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Nicodème Ruhashyankiko, Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (4 July 1978) at paras. 30-35.

  102. 102.

    See UN ECOSOC, Crime of Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 47 (IV) (28 March 1947), UN Doc. E/325 (22 April 1947) 5 at op. para. (b) (requesting reference to the member governments for comments); UN ECOSOC, Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 77 (V) (6 August 1947), UN Doc. E/573 (2 September 1947) 21 at op. para. 4 (requesting transmittal of the draft, together with comments that had been received from the General Assembly in time, to the General Assembly).

  103. 103.

    For the Secretariat Draft and the Secretariat’s comments thereon, see UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947).

  104. 104.

    A compilation of the replies that had been received by the Secretariat by 20 January 1948 can be found in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 529. Comments that were submitted after this date are reproduced in United Nations, Economic and Social Council: Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/623/Add.2 (19 April 1948); United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948); and United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.4 (20 July 1948).

  105. 105.

    See UN General Assembly, Draft convention on genocide, GA Res. 180(II), UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 123th Plen. Mtg. (21 November 1947) at op. para. 2; see also Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 21-22.

  106. 106.

    It must be noted here, however, that the immediate response by governments to the draft was meagre. By 20 January 1948, only seven replies (from Denmark, France, Haiti, India, the Philippines, the US and Venezuela) had reached the Secretariat, see United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948); cf. also UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/A.25/2 (1 April 1948) (noting that “relatively few Governments have presented their comments on the question of genocide”). Five more comments were received after this date and are reproduced in United Nations, Economic and Social Council: Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/623/Add.2 (19 April 1948: UK and Norway); United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948: Netherlands); and United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.4 (20 July 1948: Luxemburg and Siam).

  107. 107.

    See UN ECOSOC, Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 117 (VI) (3 March 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Resolutions of the Economic and Social Council during its sixth session from 2 February to 11 March 1948, UN Doc. E/777 (12 March 1948) 19 at op. para. 3(b) (instructing the newly established committee to “take into consideration in the preparation of the draft Convention, the draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General, the comments of the Member Governments on this draft Convention, and other drafts on the matter submitted by any Member Government”); see also UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 4 (noting that the committee had originally decided to take the Secretariat Draft as the basis upon which to draft the convention, but had reversed this decision to “take into account in its work” all of the drafts before it, i. e. the Secretariat Draft but also the US draft (see United States, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2)) and the French draft (see France, Draft convention on genocide, reproduced in United Nations, reproduced in United Nations, Genocide – France: Draft Convention on Genocide, UN Doc. E/623/Add.1 (5 February 1948)), without using any of them specifically as the basis of its consultations, see UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 4. The Dutch representative had even gone further and recommended that the US draft, rather than the draft convention drawn up by the Secretariat, be taken as a basis of the deliberations, see Netherlands, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (15 April 1948), reproduced in: United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948), at para. 10(I)(4): “The text of the draft treaty does not in all respects seem quite satisfactory. It might be desirable for the commission, created for this purpose, to take the American draft as basis for its discussions instead of the draft of the Secretariat”. Beside the US and French drafts, a document was submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics containing ten “Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide”, see United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948).

  108. 108.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) at 16. For France, the Secretariat Draft even was “not so much a convention as a maximum programme from which future experts may draw the material for a convention”, see Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (7 October 1947), reproduced in: United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 529 at 532. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary-General Laugier advised the members of the Ad Hoc Committee during the opening of the committee’s first meeting that they would have “to make the necessary choice in order to create an instrument which would be both complete and acceptable to all”, see UN Assistant Secretary-General Laugier, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1st Mtg., 7 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1, 1 at 2.

  109. 109.

    See UN ECOSOC, Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 117 (VI) (3 March 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Resolutions of the Economic and Social Council during its sixth session from 2 February to 11 March 1948, UN Doc, E/777 (12 March 1948) 19 at op. paras. 2-3 (pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee were China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Venezuela).

  110. 110.

    UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Akzoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948). The text of the draft convention can also be found in UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/AC.25/12 (19 May 1948).

  111. 111.

    UN ECOSOC, 218th Mtg., UN Doc. E/SR.218 (26 August 1948) and UN ECOSOC, 219th Mtg., UN Doc. E/SR.219 (26 August 1948).

  112. 112.

    See UN ECOSOC, Genocide, ECOSOC Res. 153 (VII) (26 August 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Resolutions of the Economic and Social Council during its seventh session from 19 July to 29 August 1948, UN Doc, E/777 (12 March 1948) 27; cf. also Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 25.

  113. 113.

    See Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 25.

  114. 114.

    UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 63rd to 66th Mtg., UN Docs. A/C.6/SR.63 – A/C.6/SR.66.

  115. 115.

    UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th to 69th, 71st to 87th and 91st to 110th Mtg. (see UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, UN Docs. A/C.6/SR.67 – A/C.6/SR.69, A/C.6/SR.71 – A/C.6/SR.87 and A/C.6/SR.91 – A/C.6/SR.110).

  116. 116.

    UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text of articles I to VI as adopted by the Sixth Committee (up to 9 November 1948), UN Doc. A/C.6/256 (9 November 1948); UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide - Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text as adopted by the Sixth Committee for articles VII to XIII of the draft Convention (E/794), UN Doc. A/C.6/269 (15 November 1948); UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text as adopted by the Sixth Committee for articles XIV to XIX of the draft Convention (E/794), UN Doc. A/C.6/270 (17 November 1948).

  117. 117.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 104th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.104 (13 November 1948) (deciding on the appointment of a drafting committee consisting of nine members: Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 105th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.104 (13 November 1948) (extending membership in the drafting committee to include Australia, Brazil, Czechoslovakia and Iran); cf. also the report of the drafting committee on its work, UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council (E/794). Report of Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/288 (23 November 1948).

  118. 118.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council (E/794). Draft resolutions proposed by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/289 (23 November 1948).

  119. 119.

    UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 128th to 134th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128 - A/C.6/SR.134.

  120. 120.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council. Report of the Sixth Committee, UN Doc. A/760 (3 December 1948).

  121. 121.

    UN General Assembly, 3rd Sess., 178th Mtg., UN Doc. A/PV.178 (9 December 1948); UN General Assembly, 3rd Sess., 179th Mtg., UN Doc. A/PV.179 (9 December 1948); for further details on the amendments proposed by the USSR and another amendment proposed but later withdrawn by Venezuela, see Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 27.

  122. 122.

    UN General Assembly, Adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and Text of the Convention, GA Res. 260 A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg. (9 December 1948).

  123. 123.

    See generally on Article XII of the Secretariat Draft William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 534-535.

  124. 124.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) 5 at 9.

  125. 125.

    Ibid ., at 45-46.

  126. 126.

    See e.g. the Haitian comment, which endorsed draft article XII with one amendment in the first paragraph, adding a right also for the groups affected by genocide to call upon the UN organs, but otherwise unchanged, Haiti, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (12 September 1947), reproduced in: United Nations, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/401 (27 September 1947) 1 at 2-3; see also the rather positive attitude by Siam, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (25 May 1948), in: Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. A/401/Add.4 (20 July 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 639 at 640 (simply proposing that the “right accorded by this draft article to the High Contracting Parties should also be extended to the Secretary-General”).

  127. 127.

    See namely Venezuela, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (12 September 1947), reproduced in: Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/401/Add.1 (1 October 1947) 1 at 2-3 (considering article XII of the Secretariat Draft as one of those articles in the draft that could require the states parties to surrender part of their sovereignty and that risked causing international friction); Netherlands, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (15 April 1948), reproduced in: United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 635 at 638 (calling for closer scrutiny of the first paragraph and finding “so little meaning [in the second paragraph] that it could be eliminated”). The US suggested as a “more satisfactory” alternative article X of its own draft, which read: “The High Contracting Parties, who are also members of the United Nations, agree to concert their action as such members to assure that the United Nations takes such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide”, see United States, Comment on Article XII of the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 549; United States, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2), Article X.

  128. 128.

    Cf. the aforementioned statements by Venezuela and the Netherlands respectively, supra note 127.

  129. 129.

    See Netherlands, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (15 April 1948), reproduced in: United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948) at 638.

  130. 130.

    Cf. the aforementioned statement by Venezuela, supra note 127.

  131. 131.

    On the reactions to Article XII of the Secretariat Draft and the debates leading up to the adoption of Article VIII Genocide Convention see generally William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 535-538.

  132. 132.

    See US, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2), Article X.

  133. 133.

    See USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), Principle X: “The convention should provide that the signatories to the convention must report to the Security Council all cases of genocide and all cases of a breach of the obligations imposed by the convention, so that the necessary measures may be taken in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.”; see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 535. The Secretariat submitted in its note to the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee the more general idea that the states parties “should call upon the organs of the United Nations”, see UN Secretariat, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Relations between the Convention on Genocide on the one hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the other. Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1 (12 April 1948).

  134. 134.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 535. The USSR itself rather emphasized the contribution that a rule of compulsory notification would make to ensuring preventive action, cf. USSR, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 409. Indeed the Soviet delegation generally demonstrated a relatively strong focus on preventive mechanisms throughout the drafting process, beginning with several of the “basic principles of a convention on genocide” which it submitted at the outset, see especially USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), principles IV(2) (on the punishment of preparatory acts), VI (on the prohibition of hate propaganda) and VIII(a) (on the disbanding of organizations aiming at genocide); cf. also for the negotiations on these elements Part 4.1.3.5.3.2 below. In one of the debates, the US delegate implied that the USSR had no actual intention of ratifying the convention and was only creating difficulties for others, see US, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 86th Mtg., 28 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.86, 237 – an assumption that proved wrong, since the USSR ratified the convention in 1954, 34 years ahead of the US, see on this point already William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 592, n. 387. The reason stated by the USSR for designating the Security Council as the organ to be notified of cases of genocide was that it “was the only body competent to take immediate steps against the crime, so that action could be taken under Article [sic] 6 of the Charter”, see Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 64th Mtg., 1 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.64, 14.

  135. 135.

    See especially Poland, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 13 April 1948, ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8 (17 April 1948) 16 at 16-18; see also France, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 17 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, 19 (agreeing to the principle as long as it was clear that the Security Council was not compelled to take up all cases of violations of the convention); cf. also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 536.

  136. 136.

    See e.g. United States, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 13 April 1948, ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8 (17 April 1948) 27 at 27 (warning that it would provide “an argument in favour of devious ways to refer to the Security Council cases which should have been brought before the international court”); see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 536.

  137. 137.

    During the ninth meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the principle of obligatory notification was discarded by four to three votes, see ECOSOC Ad hoc Committee: Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, 9th Mtg., 14 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.9 (21 April 1948) at 5. During the twentieth meeting, the USSR representative proposed again an amendment that would have emphasized the obligation for the contracting parties to report to the Security Council all acts of genocide or violations of the convention. The proposal was rejected by five votes to two, see ECOSOC Ad hoc Committee: Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting, 20th Mtg., 26 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.20 (4 May 1948) at 4. For further information on different failed attempts to establish a principle of compulsory notification as well as on the arguments submitted in the debate, see also UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Akzoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 34-36 and already UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Special Rapporteur Azkoul, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Draft Report, E/AC.25/W.1/Add.4 (30 April 1948) at 1-2; cf. also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 536 and n. 57, 59.

  138. 138.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/AC.25/12 (19 May 1948), Article VIII; see also UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Akzoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 34-35.

  139. 139.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Akzoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 35-36, reproducing the statement made by the USSR delegate at the twenty-forth meeting of the committee, cf. USSR, Declaration explaining its vote on draft article VIII in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, in UN ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Record of the twenty-fourth meeting, 28 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24 (12 May 1948) at 11-12.

  140. 140.

    See USSR, Declaration explaining its vote on draft article VIII in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, in UN ECOSOC, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Record of the twenty-fourth meeting, 28 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.24 (12 May 1948) at 11-12, reproduced also in UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Akzoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 36.

  141. 141.

    See US, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 411 at 411.

  142. 142.

    Ibid .

  143. 143.

    See especially the very straightforward proposals by the UK, Further amendments to the Draft Convention (E/794), in: Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/236 (16 October 1948) at 1 (“Delete. Note: These matters are already provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.”) and by Belgium, Amendments to the Draft Convention, in UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention (E/794) and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/217 (5 October 1948) at 2 (“Delete. Note: Redundant. What is permitted under the Charter should not be permitted in different terms in a Convention.”); cf. also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 536. See also Belgium, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 410; UK, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 412; US, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 411; Greece, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 409; France, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 409 at 409-410; Siam, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 413; but see Egypt, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 411.

  144. 144.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 101st Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101 (11 November 1948) at 417; cf. also the set of drafts adopted by the Sixth Committee as of 15 November 1948, Genocide Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text as adopted by the Sixth Committee for articles VII to XIII of the draft Convention (E/794), UN Doc. A/C.6/269 (15 November 1948) at 1; William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 537 and n. 68; Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 71; Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 90.

  145. 145.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 105th Mtg., 13 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105 at 454-457. For a summary of the debates and votes in the Sixth Committee see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 536-538.

  146. 146.

    See Amendment to Article X of the draft convention (E/794), in: Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention (E/794) and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/265 (13 November 1948); cf. also Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 71.

  147. 147.

    See e.g. United Kingdom, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 105th Mtg., 13 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.105, 457; see also Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 106; Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 91.

  148. 148.

    Cf. UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council (E/794). Draft resolutions proposed by the Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/289 (23 November 1948), Article VIII, and UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text as adopted by the Sixth Committee for articles VII to XIII of the draft Convention (E/794), UN Doc. A/C.6/269 (15 November 1948), Article X(2); see also Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 106; Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 91.

  149. 149.

    See United Kingdom, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 105th Mtg., 13 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 457 at 457; see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 538.

  150. 150.

    Cf. e.g. the explanation by the Greek delegate that the amendment proposed by the USSR would not have been compatible with the UN Charter, since it would have made it obligatory to report cases of genocide to the Security Council, even though the UN Charter provided for recourse also to the General Assembly, see Greece, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 413.

  151. 151.

    See especially USSR, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 17 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, 21 (emphasizing that “[r]eporting cases of genocide to the Council did not prejudge the action it might take”, but that the Council would remain free to deal with cases referred to it “as it deemed appropriate”). See also UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 35 (noting that “[i]t was argued in favour of compulsion that the gravity of genocide justified compulsory reference to the Security Council which organ would be free to assess the importance of the cases submitted to it and to take the necessary steps for the prevention and suppression of genocide”). Cf. already the very cautious wording of the note by the Secretariat to the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, in which it suggested as a means of prevention by political means a provision that “the States parties to the convention should call upon the organs of the United Nations in order that they might prevent the Commission of genocide”, see UN Secretariat, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Relations between the Convention on Genocide on the one hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the other. Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1 (12 April 1948) at 8 [my emphasis].

  152. 152.

    See France, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 17 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, 19 (declaring its willingness to accept the principle of compulsory notification proposed by the USSR, making clear at the same time that, while the states parties to the Genocide Convention would be obliged to report cases of genocide to the Council, it would be for the Security Council to decide whether or not it would address all violations of the convention); see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 535.

  153. 153.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 535.

  154. 154.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 35.

  155. 155.

    Ibid .

  156. 156.

    Ibid .

  157. 157.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) 5, Article XII(1).

  158. 158.

    Cf. UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948), Annex, Article VIII: “[…] may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter of the United Nations for the prevention and suppression of genocide” [my emphasis]; Australia, Amendment to Article X of the draft convention (E/794), in: Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention (E/794) and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/265 (13 November 1948): “[…] may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter of the United Nations” [my emphasis].

  159. 159.

    The obviously limited and low value of Article VIII in the eyes of its drafters as indicated by its temporary deletion is a common theme in academic commentary on the Genocide Convention, see Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 89-90; Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 105; William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 538.

  160. 160.

    See also Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 15-16 (concluding that Article VIII of the final text had “lost all meaning” so that it was in fact “senseless”).

  161. 161.

    See US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “The Crisis in Darfur”: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 September 2004, online: US Department of State, Archive: Information released online from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009 <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm>; cf. also text accompanying note 73 above.

  162. 162.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 553-554.

  163. 163.

    See Part 4.1.3.6 below.

  164. 164.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 426-427; see already Part 4.1.1.1 above.

  165. 165.

    Cf. the review of scholarly opinion in Part 4.1.1.2 above.

  166. 166.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 430 and generally at paras. 153-165, 183-184, 425-438; cf. also Part 4.1.1.1 above.

  167. 167.

    Ibid ., at para. 162.

  168. 168.

    Ibid ., at para. 183 (affirming that the obligations arising from Article I “apply to a State wherever it may be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligations in question”); International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 595, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7349.pdf> at paras. 30-31 (dismissing the preliminary objection that, since the territory on which the genocide had been committed had been part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had not been under the jurisdiction of Yugoslavia at the relevant time); cf. also already International Court of Justice, Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 325, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7311.pdf> at para. 46 (noting that the Court had in its previous order on provisional measures specifically indicated “appropriate measures to be taken by Yugoslavia in the circumstances of the case, where the risk was of genocide not on Yugoslav territory but in Bosnia-Herzegovina”).

  169. 169.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 162.

  170. 170.

    Ibid ., at paras. 425-427.

  171. 171.

    Ibid ., at para. 427.

  172. 172.

    Cf. notably the opinions by Judges Tomka and Skotnikov in Part 4.1.1.1 above.

  173. 173.

    See the review of scholarly opinion in Part 4.1.1.2 above.

  174. 174.

    See Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 78-80.

  175. 175.

    Ibid ., at 121-122. It should be noted that Drost overall adopts a very narrow view in which prevention appears to be pursued only through the enactment of domestic measures aimed at ensuring punishment, ibid . (“The general duty to prevent and repress genocide contained in the combined Articles of the Convention obliges the Parties to take what measures they see fit for the punishment of the crime committed within their respective territories.”).

  176. 176.

    Ibid ., at 120-122. This understanding is in line with the title of Drost’s work which attests to a pure criminal law approach to the convention.

  177. 177.

    See Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 32, 57.

  178. 178.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at paras. 110-113.

  179. 179.

    Ibid ., at para. 113.

  180. 180.

    Ibid ., at paras. 111, 115; Lauterpacht J. admitted, however, that the actual practice by states parties to the Convention, with the limited reaction to a number of genocides since the Second World War, might call for a narrower reading of the provision and therefore voted against the request by Bosnia and Herzegovina to find “[t]hat all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention are obliged by Article 1 thereof ‘to prevent’ the commission of acts of genocide against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, ibid . at paras. 108, 115.

  181. 181.

    See Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 258-259 (noting the need to “stra[y] deeply into the intricacies of legal construction”).

  182. 182.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 162.

  183. 183.

    Ibid .

  184. 184.

    Ibid ., at paras. 162, 183.

  185. 185.

    Ibid ., at para. 162 and generally at paras. 162-164.

  186. 186.

    Cf. also Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 259 (submitting that “it is quite difficult to infer any conclusion on the scope and content of the duty to prevent genocide unless one strays deeply into the intricacies of legal construction”).

  187. 187.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 161-162.

  188. 188.

    See already William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 520.

  189. 189.

    See Part 4.1.2 above; the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide Case, while mentioning Article VIII of the Genocide Convention as a particular case of prevention locates it “at the political level rather than as a matter of legal responsibility”, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 159, 427.

  190. 190.

    Article XIII(2) Genocide Convention.

  191. 191.

    Article X Genocide Convention.

  192. 192.

    Article XVI Genocide Convention.

  193. 193.

    See Ben Saul, “The Implementation of the Genocide Convention at the National Level”, in Paola Gaeta, ed., The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 58 at 61-62.

  194. 194.

    Ibid ., at 76-77 (mentioning moreover the possibility of legislation outlawing “properly structured preparatory offences” as well as legislative measures to educate communities about genocide and build “inter-ethnic or communal harmony”); on attempts made during the drafting process to introduce provisions for the punishment of hate speech and the disbanding of organizations see also Part 4.1.3.5.3.2 below.

  195. 195.

    Cf. Ben Saul, “The Implementation of the Genocide Convention at the National Level”, in Paola Gaeta, ed., The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 58 at 78.

  196. 196.

    On the comparatively unspecific scope of Article V of the Genocide Convention and its linkage with the other norms of the convention cf. also ibid ., at 62.

  197. 197.

    Article XII Genocide Convention. The majority decision on the preliminary objections in the Bosnian Genocide Case, by contrast, argued that Article VI of the convention was the only provision referring to territorial jurisdiction and concluded accordingly that the duty to prevent genocide was not territorially limited, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 595, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7349.pdf> at para. 31.

  198. 198.

    Article VI Genocide Convention.

  199. 199.

    See Vanessa Thalmann, “National Criminal Jurisdiction over Genocide”, in Paola Gaeta, ed., The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 231 at 237.

  200. 200.

    Cf. also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at para. 109, who acknowledges that most of the Convention’s provisions “are taken up with aspects of prevention and punishment of genocide within the national legal sphere” which “strongly suggests that the Convention does no more than establish for the Contracting States duties that are to be implemented by legislative action within their domestic legal spheres”. In the final analysis, however, Lauterpacht J. rejects at least an “absolutely territorial view of the duty to prevent”, arguing that it “would make no sense since this would mean that a party, though obliged to prevent genocide within its own territory, is not obliged to prevent it in territory which it invades and occupies”, ibid . at para. 114.

  201. 201.

    See Genocide Convention, Preamble.

  202. 202.

    See International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf> at 23.

  203. 203.

    Ibid ., at 23-24.

  204. 204.

    Ibid ., at 23.

  205. 205.

    Ibid .

  206. 206.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 161-162.

  207. 207.

    See Joshua M. Kagan, “The Obligation to Use Force to Stop Acts of Genocide: An Overview of Legal Precedents, Customary Norms, and State Responsibility” (2005-2006) 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 461 at 483-484.

  208. 208.

    Ibid ., at 484; aside from the reference to the practice of states parties, Kagan sustains his claim on the basis of “the weight of scholarly opinion”, ibid .

  209. 209.

    See International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf> at 23 (quoted above, see text accompanying note 205).

  210. 210.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at paras. 110-112 (it should be noted again, however, that Lauterpacht J. eventually stopped short of asserting that this obligation extended not only to a party’s own territory as well as to territories under its occupation, but to genocide “wherever it may occur”, ibid . at paras. 113-115).

  211. 211.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 163-165 (alluding firstly to the fact that relevant resolutions of the General Assembly exposed a “duality of responsibilities” on the part of both individuals and states and, secondly, to amendments that had been made to strengthen Article I during the drafting process of the Genocide Convention).

  212. 212.

    See Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 259.

  213. 213.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) at preambular para. 3 (“They pledge themselves to prevent and to repress such acts wherever they may occur.”).

  214. 214.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee, Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/AC.25/12 (19 May 1948) at preambular para 5.

  215. 215.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 67th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67 (5 October 1948); UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 68th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (6 October 1948).

  216. 216.

    See Amendments to the draft convention (E/794), UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/215/Rev.1 (9 October 1948) at para. 8. See also in detail on the discussions concerning Article VIII of the draft convention and the issue of obligatory notification Part 4.1.2.3.2 above.

  217. 217.

    Cf. e.g. USSR, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 8th Mtg., 17 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.8, 20.

  218. 218.

    The majority on the merits of the Bosnian Genocide Case relied heavily on the evolution of the undertaking to prevent during the drafting process and specifically mentioned these two amendments as support for its finding that “the Contracting Parties have a direct obligation to prevent genocide”, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 162-165.

  219. 219.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947), at preambular para. 3 (“They pledge themselves to prevent and to repress such acts wherever they may occur.”).

  220. 220.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee, Draft Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/AC.25/12 (19 May 1948) at preambular para 5 (“[The High Contracting Parties] hereby agree to prevent and punish the crime as hereinafter provided”).

  221. 221.

    Cf. United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948) (citing comments on the preamble only by the US and Venezuela, without any reference being made to its last clause); United Nations, Economic and Social Council: Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/623/Add.2 (19 April 1948) (indicating no reference to the preamble by either the UK or Norway); United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948) (containing the Dutch comment on the preamble, which does not relate to this part however); United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.4 (20 July 1948) (showing no reference by Luxemburg or Siam to the preamble). Again, it should be recalled that overall few substantive comments were submitted on the Secretariat Draft, see already supra note 106.

  222. 222.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948), Annex, Article I; see also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 164.

  223. 223.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948), Annex, preambular para. 5.

  224. 224.

    See Belgium, Amendments to the Draft Convention, in UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention (E/794) and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/217 (5 October 1948) at 1; cf. also the slightly different version of the proposal in the oral presentation by the Belgian representative during the sixty-seventh meeting of the Sixth Committee, see Belgium, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 38 at 38 (“The High Contracting Parties hereby undertake to prevent and repress the crime of genocide as defined in the present Convention.”).

  225. 225.

    See Netherlands, Proposed text for Article 1 of the draft Convention (E/794), in UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention (E/794) and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/220 (5 October 1948); Netherlands, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, 44 at 44-45; see also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 164.

  226. 226.

    See Denmark, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, 47 at 47.

  227. 227.

    See Netherlands, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, 49 at 49-50; see also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 164.

  228. 228.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 68th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 (6 October 1948) at 51, 53; cf. also UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Text of articles I to VI as adopted by the Sixth Committee (up to 9 November 1948), UN Doc. A/C.6/256 (9 November 1948), Article I (“The High Contracting Parties confirm that genocide is a crime under international law, whether committed in time of peace or of war, which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”); see also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 164.

  229. 229.

    See Belgium, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 38 at 38.

  230. 230.

    See Belgium, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 44 at 44.

  231. 231.

    See Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 40 at 40.

  232. 232.

    See Argentina, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 41 at 41.

  233. 233.

    See Denmark, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, 47 at 47; cf. also International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at para. 164.

  234. 234.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 6-10.

  235. 235.

    Cf. Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1960) at 55 (noting the different propositions that were made by states as regards the meaning and proper place of article I).

  236. 236.

    See France, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 66th Mtg., 4 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66, 35 at 35.

  237. 237.

    See Syria, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68, 46 at 46-47.

  238. 238.

    According to Pieter N. Drost, Article I was ultimately retained mainly to settle the issue of whether genocide was a crime under international law or not, which was controversial due to different understandings of the force of General Assembly Resolution 96(I), see Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 76-78.

  239. 239.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. A/362 (25 August 1947) 3, Preamble at para. 3 [my emphasis].

  240. 240.

    See Belgium, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 67th Mtg., 5 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.67, 38 at 38.

  241. 241.

    See General Assembly Sixth Committee, 68th Mtg., 6 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.68 at 53; see also Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233, n. 144.

  242. 242.

    See US, Comment on the Preamble of the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 534 at 535. Accordingly, the US proposed in its own draft convention a preamble according to which the parties would have agreed to prevent and repress genocide “as hereinafter provided”, see United States, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 557.

  243. 243.

    See Pieter N. Drost, Genocide: United Nations Legislation on International Criminal Law (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1959) at 122.

  244. 244.

    For this contextual finding, see Part 4.1.3.3 above.

  245. 245.

    Cf. Draft resolution relating to the crime of genocide, proposed by the delegations of Cuba, India and Panama, UN Doc. A/BUR/50 at para. 3; cf. on this already above, text accompanying note 91; cf. also the amendment proposed by Chile to the draft resolution on the crime of genocide, UN Doc. A/C.6/94, which would have invited member states “to take the necessary steps to prevent and punish this crime within the scope of their internal legislation, in the same way as piracy, traffic in women, children and slaves, and others” (para. 2) and which would have recommended international cooperation between states “with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide” (para. 3), but again primarily contained a declaration to the effect that genocide was a crime under international law whose authors had to be punished (para. 1).

  246. 246.

    The one exception is Article VIII of the Genocide Convention, but see on the very specific background and meaning of this norm already Part 4.1.2 above.

  247. 247.

    See Draft resolution relating to the crime of genocide, proposed by the delegations of Cuba, India and Panama, UN Doc. A/BUR/50 at para. 4.

  248. 248.

    See e.g. the statement made by the UK representative during the twenty-fourth meeting of the Sixth Committee with regard to the resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly on the crime of genocide, stressing the need for speedy punishment of genocide but making no mention of issues of prevention, UK, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 24th Mtg., 29 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/96, 35, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 21 at 21; see especially also the draft convention prepared by France, which is a pure project of criminal law, exclusively concerned with the punishment of genocide without making any reference to issues of prevention, see France, Draft convention on genocide, reproduced in United Nations, Genocide – France: Draft Convention on Genocide, UN Doc. E/623/Add.1 (5 February 1948) (containing hence no provision similar to the last clause of the preamble or Article XII of the Secretariat Draft).

  249. 249.

    See UN General Assembly, Draft Convention on Genocide, GA Res. 180(II), UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 123rd Plen. Mtg. (21 November 1947).

  250. 250.

    Cf. UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Terms of reference given to the Council by General Assembly resolution 180(II) – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/622 (3 February 1948), Part II at para. (II)(1) (noting the questions of which human groups protection should be extended to, of the forms of genocide to be recognized, of whether the Convention should aim at the punishment of rulers only or also of officials and private individuals, and of whether international tribunals should be given jurisdiction to address acts of genocide); UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/A.25/2 (1 April 1948), Section II at paras. (I)(1) to (5) (adding as a fifth question the relationship between the Genocide Convention to be drafted by the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee and the draft code of offences against peace and security which was to be developed by the ILC according to GA resolution 174(II), see Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/A.25/2 (1 April 1948), Section II, at para. (I)(5)).

  251. 251.

    See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force 8 August 1945); see also Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 389.

  252. 252.

    See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 5 U.N.T.S. 251 (entered into force 8 August 1945), Annex, Article 6.

  253. 253.

    See Antonio Cassese & Paola Gaeta, “Genocide” in Antonio Cassese & Paola Gaeta, eds., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 109 at 109.

  254. 254.

    See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 127; cf. also Antonio Cassese & Paola Gaeta, “Genocide” in Antonio Cassese & Paola Gaeta, eds., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 109 at 109.

  255. 255.

    See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 7.

  256. 256.

    See Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 249-250.

  257. 257.

    See Theodor Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 87.

  258. 258.

    See Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 119-126.

  259. 259.

    Pro e.g. Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson & Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 205; contra e.g. Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 204 (submitting that the acts covered by the Genocide Convention could also be treated as crimes against humanity, but that “there was a compelling reason to distinguish between the two offences” which was however “wholly unrelated to any legal considerations”, namely the desire to emphasize the special gravity of this crime).

  260. 260.

    See e.g. the statement by the Cuban representative in the Sixth Committee explaining the reasons for the resolution proposed jointly by his delegation and those of India and Panama, according to which the purpose was precisely to avoid application of the nullum crimen principle in cases of genocide, see Cuba, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 22nd Mtg., 22 November 1946, UN Doc. A/C.6/84, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 8 at 8; Cuba reiterated this point in the fortieth meeting of the Sixth Committee regarding the draft convention that had been presented by then, noting that “ex post facto penal laws were not regarded with favour” and that in the absence of more precise statements on the crime of genocide, courts might be hesitant to convict perpetrators, see Cuba, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 40th Mtg., 2 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.40, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 392.

  261. 261.

    Cf. e.g. Norway, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 41st Mtg., 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.41, reprinted in : Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 395 at 395 (noting that a primary objective of the convention would be the punishment of acts that are committed in an official capacity, and that “serious political crimes should be punished by an international criminal court, and not by national courts”). Cf. also the third central question submitted by the Secretary-General for consideration by ECOSOC and its Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Terms of reference given to the Council by General Assembly resolution 180(II)). Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/622 (3 February 1948), Part II at para. (II)(1); UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/A.25/2 (1 April 1948), Section II at para. (I)(3).

  262. 262.

    See e.g. Denmark, Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 218th Mtg., 26 August 1948, UN Doc. E/SR.218, 717 at 717 (referring to the “chief aim” which was “to prevent the recurrence of the terrible human suffering and humiliation that had prompted the United Nations to take up the problem”); Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 63rd Mtg., 30 September 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, 9 at 10 (criticizing that the ECOSOC draft failed “its essential objective, namely, the prevention of genocide”); cf. also Peru, Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 218th Mtg., 26 August 1948, UN Doc. E/SR.218, 718 at 718 (reiterating that “[t]he crime of genocide should be prevented not merely punished”).

  263. 263.

    On the preventive function of penal legislation, see e.g. the Secretariat comment on Article XII of its draft, which begins with the acknowledgments that “[a]ll criminal law has a preventive effect” and that “[t]he fact that there is law tends to deter and prevent action by persons who might be tempted to commit a crime”, but goes on to recognize that, according to past experience, the preventive effect of the threat of criminal law is limited, drawing the conclusion that international preventive action is required “either before the harm is done or before it has assumed wide proportions”, see UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) at 45.

  264. 264.

    See Netherlands, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 24th Mtg., 29 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/96, reprinted in : Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 19 at 20.

  265. 265.

    See Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 63rd Mtg., 30 September 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, 9 at 10 (criticizing the draft submitted by ECOSOC for containing no provision that was designed to prevent genocide, but for dealing “only with punishment of the crime”, even though “[t]he first duty of penal legislation [..] was to prevent the crime before punishing it”, and turning then to proposals to “consider as crimes actions which preceded and prepared for genocide”).

  266. 266.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. A/362 (25 August 1947) 3, Article II(II)(2) Secretariat Draft.

  267. 267.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. A/362 (25 August 1947) 3, Article III Secretariat Draft.

  268. 268.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. A/362 (25 August 1947) 3, Article XI Secretariat Draft.

  269. 269.

    Cf. for instance the statement by Poland’s Manfred Lachs in the Sixth Committee’s discussions on the proposed General Assembly resolution on genocide, calling namely for rules directed against those “preparing the way for the crime by means of hate propaganda”, Poland, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 24th Mtg., 29 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/96, reprinted in : Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 21 at 22; see also Poland’s strong criticism of the draft convention in the final debate of the General Assembly for the lack of provisions for “adequate prevention of the crime of genocide”, such as namely the prohibition of hate propaganda and organizations aiming for genocide as well as sanctions against preparatory acts, Poland, Statement in the UN General Assembly, 3rd Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/PV.179 (9 December 1948), 839 at 841. In the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee, the USSR proposed that an additional paragraph on public propaganda inciting hatred be inserted in the enumeration of acts punishable under the convention, see UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 40. This proposal corresponds with the principles submitted by the USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), principle VI. For a provision on the disbanding of organizations which is similar to Article XI of the Secretariat Draft see also Article IX of the US draft convention: United States, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 557. See also on the disbanding of organizations USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), principle VIII(a). In the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee, Poland proposed an article that would have read: “The High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to disband any group or organisation which have participated in any act of genocide”, see UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 40.

  270. 270.

    See Article III (c) Genocide Convention.

  271. 271.

    A separate provision on hate propaganda, going beyond the criminalization of actual incitement to genocide, had from the outset been opposed by the United States with reference to the right of free speech, see United States, Comment on Article III of the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 529 at 540. In the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee, the Soviet proposal to insert into the draft convention a paragraph dealing with incitement to hatred was rejected by five votes to two, see UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 23. The Polish proposal of adopting a separate article on the disbanding of organizations that have participated in genocide was rejected in the Ad Hoc Committee by four votes to three, as was, by three votes to two with two abstentions, a subsequent proposal to reconsider the issue, see UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 40. The reason stated by the majority for their rejection was that they regarded the issue of disbanding organizations as one to be dealt with by the domestic authorities, ibid .

  272. 272.

    See e.g. the note prepared by the Secretariat for the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, delineating the tasks of the committee on the one hand and those of the International Law Commission, charged with formulating the principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal and preparing a draft code on offences against peace and security, on the other. In this note, the Secretariat underlines as one distinctive criterion of the convention that it “will be concerned not only with the punishment of genocide but also with its prevention”, see UN Secretariat, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Relations between the Convention on Genocide on the one hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the other. Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/AC.25/3 (2 April 1948) II(III). It suggests two categories of means which the Ad Hoc Committee could consider in implementing this part of its mandate, beginning namely with “making certain acts punishable which do not themselves constitute genocide”, including preparatory acts and hate propaganda. As a second option only, and in far more cautious terms, it proposes the adoption of preventive action in “other forms than penal measures”, namely “international prevention of a political nature”: the states could provide, the Secretariat notes, “that the States parties to the convention should inform the organs of the United Nations in order that they might prevent the Commission of genocide,” [my emphasis], see on the whole UN Secretariat, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Relations between the Convention on Genocide on the one hand and the Formulation of the Nurnberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on the other. Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. E/AC.25/3 (2 April 1948), Chapter II(III). In the interstate negotiations, Poland on numerous occasions called for a more preventive approach, and then suggested specifically the prohibition of preparatory acts and of hate propaganda as well as the disbanding of genocidal organizations, see e.g. Poland, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 41st Mtg., 3 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.41, reprinted in : Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 395 at 396 (reiterating that repressive action would come too late and calling therefore for a provision outlawing hate propaganda); Poland, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 133rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133, 706 at 706 (referring to the prohibition of preparatory acts and hate propaganda as well as to the disbanding of organizations, and subsequently very generally to the need “to take appropriate preventive measures” for which the draft convention, in the view of the Polish delegation, did not provide the necessary guarantees). See also Czechoslovakia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 66th Mtg., 4 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66, 29 at 30 (finding it “necessary to contemplate effective preventive measures; for example, the prohibition of preparations, attempts, incitement and particularly propaganda”); Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 63rd Mtg., 30 September 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, 9 at 10 (calling the prevention of a crime the “first duty of penal legislation”, criticizing the rejection in ECOSOC of proposals that would have declared preparatory acts to be crimes under the convention, and ultimately demanding, for the lack of preventive mechanisms in the ECOSOC draft, that a new draft be prepared in the Sixth Committee); Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 84th Mtg., 26 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.84, 216 at 216 (on the prohibition of propaganda as one way of preventing genocide). Cf. also Egypt, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 65th Mtg., 2 October 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65, 25 at 25 (responding to the alleged lack of preventive mechanisms which had been criticized by Yugoslavia two meetings earlier by arguing that the provisions on the punishment of incitement to genocide and attempt to commit genocide at least partly implemented the call for prevention). Cf. also the basic principles submitted by the USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), which demanded “decisive measures to prevent such crimes” at the outset (principle I), then primarily called for the punishment of preparatory acts (principle IV) and hate propaganda (principle VI), the disbanding of organizations aiming at incitement of hatred or genocide (principle VIII), but finally also included the concept of compulsory notification of the Security Council (principle X).

  273. 273.

    Cf. Part 4.1.2 above; cf. e.g. also the US draft convention, in which articles IX on the disbanding of organizations and article X on concerted action within the UN were the only provisions with a specifically preventive dimension: United States, Draft convention on the prevention and repression of genocide (30 September 1947), reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), Annex, Section 1(2).

  274. 274.

    See UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, UN Doc. A/362 (25 August 1947) 3, Article XII Secretariat Draft. As the Secretariat’s comments make clear, Article XII was specifically inserted to bind the states parties “to do everything in their power” to support preventive action by the United Nations, see UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947).

  275. 275.

    See USSR, Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (5 April 1948), reproduced in United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Basic Principles of a Convention on Genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 5 April 1948), UN Doc. E/AC.25/7 (7 April 1948), principle x; see on this proposal and its subsequent history also Part 4.1.2.3.2 above.

  276. 276.

    See already supra, note 106. Amongst the few replies that were received by the Secretariat initially were moreover some which contained no substantive comments on the draft convention, see e.g. India, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (12 September 1947), UN Doc. A/401 (27 September 1947) 1 at 1 (announcing that it had no comments to offer on the draft convention); Luxemburg, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat, 28 April 1948, UN Doc. E/623/Add.4 (20 July 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 639 (having “no comments to present at this stage”); the Philippines, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (9 September 1947), reproduced in: Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/401/Add.1 (1 October 1947) 1 (reserving the views of the Philippine delegation for the forthcoming General Assembly session); the UK, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (6 April 1948), UN Doc. E/623/Add.2 (19 April 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 633 (merely reaffirming the views expressed in its statements submitted in previous General Assembly and ECOSOC debates while renouncing any detailed comments on the draft convention). In the subsequent consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee, the Secretariat Draft, which had been regarded as a maximum programme and even been criticized as an unsatisfactory basis from the outset, was then only taken into account together with other drafts, see already above, notes 107 to 108 and accompanying text.

  277. 277.

    Cf. e.g. the comment submitted by Norway, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (9 April 1948), UN Doc. E/623/Add.2 (19 April 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 633 (addressing several aspects of the system for prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators as proposed by the Secretariat but omitting any reference to prevention). Notably, the major issues which the Secretary-General proposed for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee did not relate to prevention either, see UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Ad Hoc Committee’s Terms of Reference – Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/A.25/2 (1 April 1948), Section II(I).

  278. 278.

    Cf. e.g. Siam, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (25 May 1948), in: Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. A/401/Add.4 (20 July 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 639 at 640 (commenting on Article XII only that “[t]he right accorded by this draft article to the High Contracting Parties should also be extended to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”); Netherlands, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (15 April 1948), reproduced in: United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments of Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat (Document E/447), UN Doc. E/623/Add.3 (22 April 1948) at 638 (stating that draft article II(2) had “so little real meaning that it could be eliminated”); Haiti, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (12 September 1947), reproduced in: United Nations, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/401 (27 September 1947) 1 at 2 (endorsing the proposal by Pella and Lemkin that reporting relevant cases to the competent organs of the United Nations should be made a duty of the Secretary-General, which was borne out of the concern that governments themselves might be hesitant to take the initiative, see UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 1947) at 46); US, Comment on Article XII of the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 549 (understanding article XII of the Secretariat Draft as referring to “the competence of the United Nations to take measures for the suppression or prevention of crimes falling within the scope of the Convention” and suggesting that an agreement by the signatories to concert their action as UN members in order to assure that the UN takes appropriate action, as suggested in article X of the US draft, would be “a more satisfactory wording”). See on the whole also Part 4.1.2.3.2 above.

  279. 279.

    Venezuela, for instance, emphasized the need to respect state sovereignty and identified article XII of the Secretariat Draft as one of the norms that could cause friction and eventually even endanger international peace, see Venezuela, Comment on the draft convention prepared by the Secretariat (12 September 1947), reproduced in: Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide: Communications Received by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/401/Add.1 (1 October 1947) 1 at 2-3. Similarly, the UK dismissed the proposed article XII as unrealistic, since “the only real sanction against genocide was war”, see UK, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 42nd Mtg., 6 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.42, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 403 at 403-404.

  280. 280.

    See on this point already Part 4.1.2.3.2 above.

  281. 281.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 35. Part of the argument was that “a serious case of genocide […] would certainly be submitted” and that it was hence unnecessary to make notification mandatory, UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 35. This submission was later repeated by the French representative in the Sixth Committee, see France, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 101st Mtg., 11 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.101, 414.

  282. 282.

    See Mexico, Statement in the General Assembly, 123rd Mtg., 21 November 1947, UN Doc. A/PV.123, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 453 at 455.

  283. 283.

    Ibid ., at 454.

  284. 284.

    See Saudi-Arabia, Draft protocol for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, UN Doc. A/C.6/86, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 6, Article II (“International Action”).

  285. 285.

    See France, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 39th Mtg., 29 September 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.39, 387, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 387.

  286. 286.

    See United Kingdom, Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 140th Mtg., 13 February 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/140, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 593 at 593-594.

  287. 287.

    See United Kingdom, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 59th Mtg., 20 November 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.59, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 426 at 427.

  288. 288.

    See Egypt, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 40th Mtg., 2 October 1947, UN Doc. A/C.6/40, reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 392.

  289. 289.

    See France, Statement in the General Assembly, 179th Mtg., 9 December 1948, UN Doc. A/PV.178, 825 at 825-826.

  290. 290.

    See Poland, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 133rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133, 706. It should be noted that Poland in fact had not even demanded a broad duty to prevent genocide wherever it may occur, such as is currently under consideration, but had intended to achieve prevention through the prohibition of hate speech and the disbanding of genocidal organizations, ibid .

  291. 291.

    See Yugoslavia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 63rd Mtg., 30 September 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63, 9 at 10.

  292. 292.

    See Czechoslovakia, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 133rd Mtg., 2 December 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.133, 707 at 710.

  293. 293.

    See USSR, Statement in the General Assembly, 178th Mtg., 9 December 1948, UN Doc. A/PV.178, 811 at 813.

  294. 294.

    See United States, Comment on Article III of the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat, reproduced in United Nations, Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention Prepared by the Secretariat – Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations, UN Doc. E/623 (30 January 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 529 at 540.

  295. 295.

    See UN ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Rapporteur Karim Azkoul, Report of the Committee and Draft Convention Drawn Up by the Committee, UN Doc. E/794 (24 May 1948) at 32-33.

  296. 296.

    See Venezuela, Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 218th Mtg., 26 August 1948, UN Doc. E/SR.218, 704 at 704-705.

  297. 297.

    Ibid ., at 704.

  298. 298.

    See Poland, Statement in the UN General Assembly, 3rd Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/PV.179 (9 December 1948) 839 at 842-843.

  299. 299.

    See already UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Terms of reference given to the Council by General Assembly resolution 180(II). Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. E/622 (3 February 1948), reproduced in: Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention: the travaux préparatoires, Vol. I (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 572 at 574 (stipulating that ECOSOC should “endeavour to take into account the positions of all the governments, so that the largest possible number may feel able to accede to the convention”); see also UN Assistant Secretary-General Laugier, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1st Mtg., 7 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1, 1 at 2 (noting that "the Committee would have to make the necessary choice [amongst the elements contained in the Secretariat Draft] in order to create an instrument which would be both complete and acceptable to all"); Venezuela, Statement in the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 1st Mtg., 7 April 1948, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.1, 4 at 5 (submitting to the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide during its first meeting that its “first duty was to draw up a draft convention, cautiously and with an eye to facts, so as to ensure that the draft should be approved by all the members of the United Nations”); United States, Statement in the General Assembly Sixth Committee, 128th Mtg., 29 November 1948, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.128, 661 at 662 (noting that it was necessary to reconcile pursuit of a complete convention based on just principles with the concern for the greatest possible number of ratifications); Venezuela, Statement in the Economic and Social Council, 218th Mtg., 26 August 1948, UN Doc. E/SR.218, 704 at 704.

  300. 300.

    See already Part 4.1.3.5.2 above.

  301. 301.

    See Article XII Genocide Convention.

  302. 302.

    See United Kingdom, Further amendments to the Draft Convention (E/794), in UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/236 (16 October 1948).

  303. 303.

    See Ukrainian SSR, Amendment to the United Kingdom proposal for the addition to the Draft Convention on Genocide of a new article extending the application of the Convention to territories in regard to which any State performs the functions of the governing and administrative authority, in UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, Genocide: Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. A/C.6/264 (12 November 1948).

  304. 304.

    See UN General Assembly Sixth Committee, 3rd Sess., 107th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.107 (15 November 1948) at 477.

  305. 305.

    Thus, the principle of state sovereignty may have undergone an evolution whereas other factors that played a role at the time of the adoption of the Genocide Convention, such as namely the issue of colonial rule, have ceased to be relevant.

  306. 306.

    See Orna Ben-Naftali, “The Obligations to Prevent and Punish Genocide” in Paola Gaeta, ed., The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 27 at 33-35 (noting a number of humanitarian disasters that could have qualified as genocide during the Cold War and referring to several cases in which the General Assembly resolved or at least was requested to resolve that genocide had been committed, but finding that neither the Genocide Convention nor the prohibition of genocide under customary international law had been invoked for the prevention of these crimes).

  307. 307.

    See Susan C. Breau, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations and Collective Responsibility (London: Cameron May, 2005) at 179, 182-186 (referring to the sanctions adopted by the Security Council in response to the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and the apartheid regime in South Africa).

  308. 308.

    See Katarina Månsson, “UN Peace Operations and Security Council Resolutions: A Tool for Measuring the Status of International Human Rights Law?” (2008) 26:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 79 at 85.

  309. 309.

    See William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 525-526, 530.

  310. 310.

    The precedential value that the cases of East Pakistan, Uganda and Cambodia may or may not have had for such a right has been analysed elsewhere, see e.g. Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian intervention: an inquiry into law and morality, 3rd ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2005) at 228-238 (Uganda), 242-253 (East Pakistan); Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) at 41.

  311. 311.

    Cf. International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1972) at 57 (“In our view there is a strong prima facie case that the crime of genocide was committed against the group comprising the Hindu population of East Bengal”); Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) at 76-80 and 173 (labelling the massacres in East Pakistan “one of the major genocides of the twentieth century”); see also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 55 and n. 55-56.

  312. 312.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 54-55.

  313. 313.

    Ibid .

  314. 314.

    Ibid ., at 55.

  315. 315.

    See International Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971 (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1972) at 26-27; also quoted in International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 55.

  316. 316.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 55.

  317. 317.

    Ibid .

  318. 318.

    Ibid .

  319. 319.

    Ibid ., at 55-56.

  320. 320.

    See India, Statement in the Security Council, 1606th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1606(OR) (4 December 1971), 14 at para. 167.

  321. 321.

    See India, Statement in the Security Council, 1606th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1606(OR) (4 December 1971), 32 at para. 363.

  322. 322.

    Cf. the meeting records of the Security Council, 1567 Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1567(OR) (26 May 1971) to 1605 Mtg. UN Doc. S/PV.1605(OR) (2 December 1971).

  323. 323.

    See Letter dated 4 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Somalia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/10411 (4 December 1971) and the meeting record of the Security Council of the same day, UN Security Council, 1606th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1606(OR) (4 December 1971); see also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 55.

  324. 324.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 56 and n. 67, noting support for the Indian case only from the Soviet Union, some Eastern-bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland), a few Soviet allies (Cuba and Mongolia) as well as Bhutan.

  325. 325.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 56.

  326. 326.

    See UN Security Council, 1606th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1606(OR) (4 December 1971) at para. 371; UN Security Council, 1607th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.1607(OR) (5 December 1971) at para. 240.

  327. 327.

    See UN Security Council, Resolution 303 (1971), UN SCOR, 1608th Mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/303 (1971) (6 December 1971).

  328. 328.

    See UN General Assembly, 26th Sess., 2003rd Mtg., UN Doc. A/PV.2003 (7 December 1971) at para. 490.

  329. 329.

    See UN General Assembly, Question considered by the Security Council at its 1606th, 1607th and 1608th meetings on 4, 5 and 6 December 1971, GA Res. 2793 (XXVI), UN GAOR, 26th Sess., 2003rd Plen Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/2793 (XXVI) (7 December 1971) at op. para. 1 (“call[ing] upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders”); see also International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 56 (noting that there were “virtually no Pakistani forces in India” and that the resolution was hence “effectively, a call for Indian troops to leave East Pakistan”).

  330. 330.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 61.

  331. 331.

    Ibid .

  332. 332.

    Ibid .

  333. 333.

    Ibid .

  334. 334.

    See in greater detail ibid ., at 61-63.

  335. 335.

    Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on (Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 62.

  336. 336.

    See Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (Harper Perennial: London, 2007) at 93-95.

  337. 337.

    Cf. for this figure Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012) at 41.

  338. 338.

    See Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (Harper Perennial: London, 2007) at 119.

  339. 339.

    Ibid .

  340. 340.

    See Amnesty International, Political Killing by Governments (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983) at 42; also cited in International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 57.

  341. 341.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 57-58.

  342. 342.

    See e.g. Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (Harper Perennial: London, 2007), chap. 6.

  343. 343.

    The label “crime of crimes” figures, for instance, most prominently in the title of William A. Schabas’s monograph on the international law on genocide, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

  344. 344.

    On the distinction that needs to be made between what is sometimes labelled “genocide” in colloquial language on the one hand and the technical definition of the term in international law see already David Luban, “Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN Report” (2006-2007) 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 303 at 307-309, 319-320 (underlining that genocide did not generally cover “the crime against humanity of mass extermination”).

  345. 345.

    See Article II(a) and (c) Genocide Convention.

  346. 346.

    See the chapeau of Article II Genocide Convention.

  347. 347.

    See Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force 29 April 2005), Article 9.

  348. 348.

    The genocidal nature of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge was cited specifically by states supporting the Vietnamese intervention in the General Assembly debate, see International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 60.

  349. 349.

    See Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria and Zambia, Draft resolution, UN Doc. S/13027 (15 January 1979) at para. 2

  350. 350.

    See UN Security Council, 2112th Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.2112(OR) (15 January 1979) at para. 4.

  351. 351.

    Cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 60-61.

  352. 352.

    See UN General Assembly, The situation in Kampuchea, GA Res. 34/22, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., 67th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/34/22 (14 November 1979) at para. 67

  353. 353.

    A similar conclusion has been reached by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, for whom the limited international reaction to cases of genocide since 1948 may rather have represented a practice that permitted inactivity, see International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at para. 115.

  354. 354.

    For Schabas, the notion of international intervention to halt humanitarian disasters indeed started to win acceptance in the late 1980s, see William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 526.

  355. 355.

    Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention (I)]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention (II)]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention (III)]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention (IV)].

  356. 356.

    Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non- international armed conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol II]; Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the adoption of an additional distinctive emblem (Protocol III), 2404 U.N.T.S. 1, 8 December 2005 (entered into force 14 January2007) [Additional Protocol III].

  357. 357.

    See Christopher Greenwood, “Historical Development and Legal Basis”, in: Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed.(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) at para. 118.

  358. 358.

    Ibid ., at para. 211.

  359. 359.

    See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002), Article 8(2)(a) and Article 8(2)(c) (adopting almost verbatim the minimum guarantees of common Article 3); on the four categories of war crimes under Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute and their drafting history, see William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 195-199.

  360. 360.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at XI and at para. 2.26.

  361. 361.

    See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1 [emphasis added].

  362. 362.

    Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1.

  363. 363.

    See e.g. Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55; Christiane Bourloyannis, “The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law” (1991-1992) 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 335 at 338.

  364. 364.

    For the application of the obligation to ensure respect also in non-international armed conflicts, see e.g. Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 17 (arguing that even Additional Protocol II is covered by the obligation to respect and ensure respect, despite the fact that it contains no similar provision, since it merely develops and supplements common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions which as such comes within the purview of common Article 1); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 68-69; Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 372; but see also Birgit Kessler, “The Duty to ‘Ensure Respect’ Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts” (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 498 at 507-516 (advocating certain modifications for the application of Article 1 in non-international armed conflicts).

  365. 365.

    For the term “state-compliance approach” (as opposed to what he calls “individual-compliance” approach), see Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 127. The prevalence of this approach has been acknowledged by both its supporters and opponents, see especially Focarelli, who, while himself dissenting in substance, acknowledges that the approach according to which “contracting states have also undertaken to adopt measures necessary to ensure respect for the Conventions against other contracting states which fail to comply with them […] no doubt reflects the prevailing view today”, ibid . [emphasis in the original]; Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 106 (finding third-party obligations under Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to be largely accepted). Already in 1984, Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes had suggested that, since the publication of the commentaries by J. Pictet, the undertaking to ensure respect had been interpreted to mean that each state, whether or not party to a conflict, had an obligation to take all appropriate means so that rules of humanitarian law be respected by all, especially by other states, see Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26, noting however also that discussion of the phrase had been a rare feature in doctrine at that time, ibid . at 17. Sixteen years later, the same authors reasserted that scholarly opinions supported an interpretation of common Article 1 requiring all states “whether or not parties to a conflict, not only to take active part in ensuring compliance with rules of international law by all concerned, but also to react against violations of that law”, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69-70. Brehm notes, clear as regards the numerical relations but somewhat ambiguous as regards the legal proposition, that “the vast majority of doctrinal literature supports the view that there has indeed been a development towards such an obligation”, see Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 371 [emphasis added].

  366. 366.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 26.

  367. 367.

    See Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 56.

  368. 368.

    Ibid ., at 73-74.

  369. 369.

    See e.g. explicitly Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 375.

  370. 370.

    See e.g. Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 24 (“Sur chaque Etat pèse donc […] l’obligation d’agir par tout moyen approprié afin que ces règles soient observées par tous, et en particulier par les autres Etats”); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69 (reaffirming their earlier position and asserting with confidence that “‘[t]o ensure respect’ means that States, whether engaged in a conflict or not, must take all possible steps to ensure that the rules are respected by all, and in particular by parties to conflict”); Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 374 (alluding to the ICJ’s pronouncement on Article I of the Genocide Convention and suggesting an understanding of the obligation as one to “take all possible steps to put an end to and prevent violations of humanitarian law committed by others”).

  371. 371.

    See Yves Sandoz, “‘Droit’ or ‘devoir d’ingérence’ and the right to assistance: the issues involved” (1992) 228 International Review of the Red Cross 215 at 219; for the French-language version see Yves Sandoz, “Droit ou devoir d’ingérence, droit à l’assistance: de quoi parle-t-on?” (1992) 795 Revue Internationale de La Croix-Rouge 225 at 229 (suggesting that “the obligation for all States party to the Geneva Convention to ‘ensure respect for’ these Conventions [established] at least an obligation to remain vigilant”).

  372. 372.

    See e.g. Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 254-255 (finding that Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions as interpreted by the ICRC and many other commentators obligates states, whether or not they are involved in the conflict, to at least consider seriously what action they might take to prevent or stop violations of international humanitarian law by third states). Kalshoven ascribes this formulation of the duty to ensure respect for the conventions also to Yves Sandoz, Member of the ICRC Executive Board and Director of the Department for Principles, Law and Relations with the Movement, see Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 59-60 (relating that, when asked whether he considered Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as imposing an obligation on governments to ensure respect for the conventions by third states, Sandoz had affirmed a legal duty, circumscribing it however merely as an obligation “to consider seriously whether there is something they might do in respect of the situation”).

  373. 373.

    See e.g. Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 375-379 (on the legality of state-authorised conventional arms transfers); Christiane Bourloyannis, “The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law” (1991-1992) 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 335 at 338, 342-343 (on Security Council action for the implementation of international humanitarian law); Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 106-110 (on protection obligations of peacekeepers for civilians).

  374. 374.

    See Birgit Kessler, “The Duty to ‘Ensure Respect’ Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts” (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 498-499 (specifically examining four categories of means that may be available to ensure third-state respect for the conventions: “(1) repressive action against any violation of the Conventions, (2) help by one State to enable another State to fulfill its duties under the Convention, (3) control, and (4) prevention”). Yves Sandoz has specifically ruled out that unilateral humanitarian intervention could be required by Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, see Yves Sandoz, “‘Droit’ or ‘devoir d’ingérence’ and the right to assistance: the issues involved” (1992) 228 International Review of the Red Cross 215 at 219; for the French-language version see Yves Sandoz, “Droit ou devoir d’ingérence, droit à l’assistance: de quoi parle-t-on?” (1992) 795 Revue Internationale de La Croix-Rouge 225 at 229.

  375. 375.

    See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “De la ‘responsabilité de protéger’ ou d’une nouvelle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie” (2006) 110 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 11 at 13-16 (suggesting that the concept of a responsibility to protect as it had been agreed at the 2005 World Summit added nothing new to the acquis of international law but merely assembled a series of well-established notions, such as that of the obligation to respect and ensure respect); Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 108 (noting the “close correlation” between Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions and R2P).

  376. 376.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 60-61.

  377. 377.

    Ibid ., at 60, quoting Sommaruga with the words: “No legal obligation but a moral one – and that is even more important.”

  378. 378.

    See Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 171.

  379. 379.

    See International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf> at para. 220.

  380. 380.

    Ibid .

  381. 381.

    See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69-70.

  382. 382.

    See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136, Kooijmans J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1683.pdf> 219 at para. 49.

  383. 383.

    See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> at para. 345, op. para (3) (the only dissenting opinion being that of Judge ad hoc Kateka chosen by Uganda).

  384. 384.

    See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168, Simma J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10467.pdf> 334 at paras. 33-34 (citing the ICJ’s advisory opinion in the Israeli Wall Case and quoting in particular the ICRC Commentary on common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions).

  385. 385.

    International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I. C. J. Rep. 136, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> para. 158; cf. already Part 1.4.1.3 above.

  386. 386.

    See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I. C. J. Rep. 136, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> at paras. 159 and 163, operative subparagraph 3(D).

  387. 387.

    Ibid ., at para. 163.

  388. 388.

    Similar thoughts were indeed voiced by Focarelli at the beginning of his extensive discussion of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions in 2010, when he observed that “[i]t would seem that the interpretation of common Article 1 is well settled and needs no further inquiry”, see Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 128.

  389. 389.

    Bourloyannis considered the possibility “that the Security Council is a means of fulfilling the obligation embodied in Common Article 1 to ensure that the Geneva Conventions are respected when the Council calls for respect by the parties to the conflict”, with the parties acting in this case through the Council, see Christiane Bourloyannis, “The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law” (1991-1992) 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 335 at 342-343. She did not, however, further proceed with this argument in the direction of discussing a duty of Security Council members under Article 1 to employ the machinery at the disposal of the body, i. e. with a view to the enlarged capacity of states parties to ensure respect for the conventions once they are Security Council members. Rather, Bourloyannis drew a distinction between individual state obligations and duties of the United Nations so as to dispel the idea that action of the Security Council could relieve the parties of their obligations to do themselves what is in their power to ensure respect for the conventions, cf. ibid ., at 343.

  390. 390.

    See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136, Kooijmans J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1683.pdf> 219 at paras. 47, 50.

  391. 391.

    Ibid ., at paras. 47-48.

  392. 392.

    Ibid ., at para. 50.

  393. 393.

    See e.g. Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26 (suggesting that ever since the publication of the Pictet commentaries on the Geneva Conventions, the obligation “to ensure respect” had been interpreted as requiring the contracting parties to employ all means to ensure that humanitarian law was respected by all, including in particular other states). Fifteen years later, the same authors indicated, however, that this opinion had been written “at a time when Article 1 was seen rather as a sort of stylistic clause devoid of real legal weight”, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 68 n. 4. See generally on this also the observation by Brehm that Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes had “[u]ndoubtedly been inspired by the ICRC’s Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions”, Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 369.

  394. 394.

    See especially Christiane Bourloyannis, “The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law” (1991-1992) 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 335 at 338 and n. 12; see also Azzam, who quotes the 1958 Commentary, according to which “the Contracting Parties […] should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally” as a “clear” and “definitive” interpretation of Article 1, Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 58 (it should be noted, however, that Azzam subsequently also refers to the case law of the International Court of Justice as well as to the views and actions of states as expressed namely at the Teheran Conference and in resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, ibid ., at 61-64); Sandoz adduces no secondary sources but merely refers to Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions for his proposition that contracting states have “at least an obligation to remain vigilant”, while citing Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes for the negative circumscription of this obligation as imposing no obligation of unilateral forceful intervention, see Yves Sandoz, “‘Droit’ or ‘devoir d’ingérence’ and the right to assistance: the issues involved” (1992) 228 International Review of the Red Cross 215 at 219 and n. 10-11; for the French-language version see Yves Sandoz, “Droit ou devoir d’ingérence, droit à l’assistance: de quoi parle-t-on?” (1992) 795 Revue Internationale de La Croix-Rouge 225 at 229 and n. 10-11.

  395. 395.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 24, n. 13, and 26 (developments in state practice, including Resolution XXIII of the 1968 Teheran Conference on Human Rights and in Article I of the 1977 Addition Protocol, are cited as a further reinforcement of this view, ibid . 26-29); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69, n. 5 (citing the 1958 Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention as reference for the finding that the need to ensure “universal compliance” had already been envisaged during the drafting process); but see Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 14 (suggesting that this concern for “universal” application must, in its historical context, be understood as referring to “all concerned” or “the whole population” rather than being concerned with third states).

  396. 396.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 32 (on the commentary to Article 1 of Geneva Convention I).

  397. 397.

    Ibid ., at 35, 37.

  398. 398.

    Ibid ., at 32-33.

  399. 399.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 26.

  400. 400.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 32.

  401. 401.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume II: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960) at 25-26; Jean S. Pictet, ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume III: La Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) at 21 (“Le système de protection prévu exige en effet, pour être efficace, que les Etats Parties à la Convention ne se bornent pas à l’appliquer, mais encore fassent tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour en assurer le respect universel”; for the English version of the commentary, see online: International Committee of the Red Cross, <http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t=com>, at 18: “The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that it is respected universally”); Jean S. Pictet, ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume IV: La Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1956) at 24 (“Le système de protection prévu par la Convention exige en effet, pour être efficace, que les Parties contractantes ne se bornent pas à appliquer elles-mêmes la Convention, mais qu’elles fassent également tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour que les principes humanitaires qui sont à la base des Conventions soient universellement appliqués”; for the English version of the commentary, see online: International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=380&t=com> at 21: “The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally”).

  402. 402.

    Especially the historical interpretation of common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions by Frits Kalshoven has been recognized as convincing even by authors who part company with him in the final conclusion on whether these norms extend to an obligation for signatories to ensure respect for the conventions also by third states, see e.g. Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 369-370.

  403. 403.

    See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 1.

  404. 404.

    Cf. already Part 4.1.3.2 above.

  405. 405.

    See e.g. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69, 71-72; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Responsibility to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity” in Rüdiger Wolfrum & Chie Kojima, eds., Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (Heidelberg: Springer 2010) 93 at 104-105; Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55; see also generally the critique of this view by Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 137.

  406. 406.

    The inverse conclusion would, by contrast not be compelling: a “state-compliance” understanding of the undertaking “to ensure respect” is possible, though in this case not demanded by the context, also if the commitment to respect the convention is read to apply only to state organs; ensuring respect could still incorporate both of the aspects not covered by the first limb then: action to stop entities within the jurisdiction of a state from committing violations of the convention, and action to induce third states into compliance, cf. e.g. Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 24.

  407. 407.

    See Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 137: “The term ‘respect’ is thus deemed to refer to obligations of states both to respect (themselves) and ensure respect (within their jurisdiction) for the Conventions, while the expression ‘ensure respect’ is reserved for measures taken against other contracting states failing to comply with the Conventions. What is striking is that the term ‘respect’ is also given an ‘ensure-respect’ meaning, while the term ‘ensure respect’ is given a radically different meaning.”

  408. 408.

    Focarelli indeed finds this reading unsupported by the drafting history of Article 1, ibid .

  409. 409.

    See Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 59.

  410. 410.

    Azzam, it may be recalled at this point, eventually reaches the conclusion that Article 1 institutes a duty to ensure that third states abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law that furthermore qualifies as an obligation of result, ibid ., at 73-74.

  411. 411.

    Ibid ., at 59.

  412. 412.

    Cf. Geneva Convention I, Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Article 129; Geneva Convention IV, Article 146.

  413. 413.

    Cf. Geneva Convention I, Article 52; Geneva Convention II, Article 53; Geneva Convention III, Article 132; Geneva Convention IV, Article 149.

  414. 414.

    Cf. Geneva Convention I, Article 51; Geneva Convention II, Article 52; Geneva Convention III, Article 131; Geneva Convention IV, Article 148; see on the whole argument Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 59-60.

  415. 415.

    See Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. II: The Law of Armed Conflict (London: Stevens & Sons, 1968) at 458; this evaluation is taken up by Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 60.

  416. 416.

    Cf. Geneva Convention I, Articles 8-11; Geneva Convention II, Articles 8-11; Geneva Convention III, Articles 8-11; Geneva Convention IV, Articles 9-12; Additional Protocol I, Article 5.

  417. 417.

    Cf. Part 4.1.3.5, especially at 4.1.3.5.3.1 and 4.1.3.5.3.2 above.

  418. 418.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 41(1).

  419. 419.

    But see also Part 4.4.4 below on the doubtful status of Article 41(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility under customary international law.

  420. 420.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 377.

  421. 421.

    Article 52(3) Geneva Convention I; Article 53(3) Geneva Convention II; Article 132(3) Geneva Convention III; Article 149(3) Geneva Convention IV; see also Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 379.

  422. 422.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 86-87.

  423. 423.

    For a detailed account of the history of the system of Protecting Powers, see e.g. Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 86-93 (pointing specifically to the use of the protecting powers system during the First World War); Hans Joachim Heintze, “Protecting Power”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 2-8 (noting that the role of protecting powers during times of armed conflict was developed in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871).

  424. 424.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 86.

  425. 425.

    See Fateh Azzam, “The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law” (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 55 at 59.

  426. 426.

    Ibid .

  427. 427.

    See Article 11(1) Geneva Convention I; Article 11(1) Geneva Convention II; Article 11(1) Geneva Convention III; Article 12(1) Geneva Convention IV.

  428. 428.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at128; see also Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume II: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960) at 79-80; Jean S. Pictet, ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume III: La Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) at 134 (for the English version of the commentary, see online: International Committee of the Red Cross, <http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t=com>, at 124-125); Jean S. Pictet, ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume IV: La Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1956) at 123-124 (for the English version of the commentary, see online: International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.icrc.org/dih.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=380&t=com> at 114-115).

  429. 429.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 102.

  430. 430.

    See Hans-Peter Gasser & Daniel Thürer, “Humanitarian Law, International”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 1, 3.

  431. 431.

    See Christopher Greenwood, “Historical Development and Legal Basis”, in: Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) at para. 132.

  432. 432.

    Ibid ., at para. 118.

  433. 433.

    Cf. also David Aronofsky, “The International Legal Responsibility to Protect Against Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Why National Sovereignty Does Not Pre-clude Its Exercise” (2007) 13 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 317 at 317-318 (going so far as to claim that military intervention may be necessary to prevent the rights granted under the Geneva Conventions from becoming meaningless).

  434. 434.

    See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> at para. 79.

  435. 435.

    Ibid .; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I. C. J. Rep. 136, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> at para. 157.

  436. 436.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 32.

  437. 437.

    See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 85.

  438. 438.

    See e.g. Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 6-28; Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 129-133; but see also Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 360-370 (acknowledging the validity and persuasiveness of Kalshoven’s analysis of the drafting history even though she ultimately subscribes to the “state-compliance” view).

  439. 439.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 6-28.

  440. 440.

    Kalshoven’s analysis provided notably an important basis for Judge Kooijmans’s critique of the majority decision on Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Israeli Wall Case, see International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136, Kooijmans J., Separate Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1683.pdf> 219 at para. 47. See also Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at n. 31; Maya Brehm, “The Arms Trade and States’ Duty to Ensure Respect for Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” (2008) 12:3 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 359 at 369-370.

  441. 441.

    Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 August 1864 (entered into force 22 June 1865), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 204.

  442. 442.

    Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 6 July 1906 (entered into force 9 August 1907), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 224.

  443. 443.

    Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 27 July 1929 (entered into force 19 June 1931), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 247; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (entered into force 19 June 1931), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 261.

  444. 444.

    See generally on the genealogy of common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 6-10; Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 130-131.

  445. 445.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 25. For the text of these conventions see Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) at 203-205, 223-229 and online at International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, online: International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView>.

  446. 446.

    The text of the convention is reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) at 247-256 and online at International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, online: International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView>.

  447. 447.

    See Article 82 of the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (entered into force 19 June 1931), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 261 and online at International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, online: International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView>.

  448. 448.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 6-10.

  449. 449.

    See Article 2 of the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899 (entered into force 4 September 1900), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 57; Article 2 of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 57.

  450. 450.

    See Article 24 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 6 July 1906 (entered into force 9 August 1907), reproduced in Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973) 223.

  451. 451.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 7 (noting also that the 1864 Geneva Convention had not contained a provision on its applicability in such conflicts yet, ibid . at 7 and n. 13).

  452. 452.

    Ibid ., at 7 and n. 14.

  453. 453.

    For the different stages of the drafting process and the modifications made to the earlier drafts see ibid ., at 7-8; see also Carlo Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) 21:1 European Journal of International Law 125 at 130.

  454. 454.

    See in more detail on this Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 7-9.

  455. 455.

    Ibid ., at 7.

  456. 456.

    Ibid ., at 8-9.

  457. 457.

    See La Convention de Genève du 27 juillet 1929, Commentaire par Paul des Gouttes (1930) at 186, quoted in Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at n. 17; see also Frits Kalshoven, ibid . at 8-10.

  458. 458.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 9-10.

  459. 459.

    See Conference of Geneva of 1929, First Committee, 14th Sess. (16 July 1929), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique convoquée par le Conseil Fédéral Suisse pour la révision de la Convention du 6 juillet 1906 pour l’amélioration du sort des blessés et malades dans les armées en campagne et pour l’élaboration d’une Convention relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre et réunie a Genève du 1er au 27 juillet 1929 (Genève: Imprimerie du Journal de Genève, 1930) 307 at 329.

  460. 460.

    See Conference of Geneva of 1929, First Committee, 14th Sess. (16 July 1929), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique convoquée par le Conseil Fédéral Suisse pour la révision de la Convention du 6 juillet 1906 pour l’amélioration du sort des blessés et malades dans les armées en campagne et pour l’élaboration d’une Convention relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre et réunie a Genève du 1er au 27 juillet 1929 (Genève: Imprimerie du Journal de Genève, 1930) 307 at 329.

  461. 461.

    See Conference of Geneva of 1929, First Committee, 13th Sess. (16 July 1929), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique convoquée par le Conseil Fédéral Suisse pour la révision de la Convention du 6 juillet 1906 pour l’amélioration du sort des blessés et malades dans les armées en campagne et pour l’élaboration d’une Convention relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre et réunie a Genève du 1er au 27 juillet 1929 (Genève: Imprimerie du Journal de Genève, 1930) 299 at 300.

  462. 462.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 9-10.

  463. 463.

    Kalshoven thus levels criticism at the ICRC commentaries for having divorced the undertaking to respect from its qualifier “in all circumstances”, thereby splitting Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions into three fragments, ibid ., at 30, 35.

  464. 464.

    See Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952) at 25 (suggesting that “[b]y undertaking at the very outset to respect the clauses of the Convention, the Contracting Parties draw attention to the special character of that instrument”).

  465. 465.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 16.

  466. 466.

    Ibid ., at 11.

  467. 467.

    Cf. ibid ., at 16.

  468. 468.

    Ibid ., at 15-16, 27.

  469. 469.

    See on this “sudden appearance” ibid ., at 13.

  470. 470.

    Ibid ., at 13 and n. 32.

  471. 471.

    Quoted ibid ., at 14, n. 35.

  472. 472.

    Cf. Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. Volume II: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960) at 25-26 (“The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally”); id., ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume III: La Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958) at 21 (“Le système de protection prévu exige en effet, pour être efficace, que les Etats Parties à la Convention ne se bornent pas à l’appliquer, mais encore fassent tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour en assurer le respect universel”); and, almost verbatim, id., ed., Les Conventions de Genève de 12 août 1949: Commentaire. Volume IV: La Convention de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1956) at 24.

  473. 473.

    See e.g. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 69, who sustain their interpretation that States not involved in a conflict are still obligated to take all possible steps to induce parties to the conflict into compliance by observing that “the negotiators at least bore in mind the need for the parties to the Conventions to do everything they could to ensure universal compliance with the humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions”.

  474. 474.

    See on this possible interpretation and counter-arguments Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 14.

  475. 475.

    Ibid .

  476. 476.

    Ibid ., at 13-14.

  477. 477.

    Ibid ., at 11-12.

  478. 478.

    Quoted ibid ., at 14, n. 36.

  479. 479.

    Ibid ., at 14.

  480. 480.

    Ibid ., at 15.

  481. 481.

    Ibid ., at 16.

  482. 482.

    Ibid ., at 15.

  483. 483.

    No reason was given for this amendment, and no earlier documents that could have been illuminative have been found, ibid ., at 16 n. 39.

  484. 484.

    Cf. International Committee of the Red Cross, Projets de Conventions revisées ou nouvelles protégeants les victimes de la guerre: Textes approuvées et amendés par la XVII e Conférence Internationale de la Croix-Rouge (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1948) at 9, 31, 51, 116.

  485. 485.

    Cf. Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Joint Committee, 1st Sess. (26 April 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 9; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 19-20.

  486. 486.

    See Conference of Geneva of 1949, Joint Committee, 7th Sess. (17 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 26; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  487. 487.

    See Conference of Geneva of 1949, Joint Committee, 7th Sess. (17 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 26.

  488. 488.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  489. 489.

    Cf. Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see on the following and the entire discussion concerning draft article 1 in the Special Committee also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21-23.

  490. 490.

    See Italy, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  491. 491.

    Cf. Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  492. 492.

    See Norway, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; US, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  493. 493.

    See France, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 22 and n. 61.

  494. 494.

    See International Committee of the Red Cross, Claude Pilloud, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21.

  495. 495.

    Cf. Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 21-22.

  496. 496.

    See France, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 28th Sess. (24 June 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 79 at 80.

  497. 497.

    See Monaco, Statement in the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 24th Sess. (15 June 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 75 at 76.

  498. 498.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 22-23.

  499. 499.

    See Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Special Committee of the Joint Committee, 9th Sess. (25 May 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 51.

  500. 500.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 22.

  501. 501.

    Cf. Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Joint Committee, 8th Sess. (29 June 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 27; Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, 18th Plenary Sess. (28 July 1949), Actes de la Conférence Diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. II Section B (Berne: Département Politique Fédéral) 313 at 320; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 22 and n. 63.

  502. 502.

    See International Committee of the Red Cross, Remarks and proposals submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross: Document for the consideration of Governments invited by the Swiss Federal Council to attend the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva (April 21, 1949) (Geneva: 1949), online: Library of Congress <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Remarks-proposals.pdf> at 8; see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 18.

  503. 503.

    See International Committee of the Red Cross, Remarks and proposals submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross: Document for the consideration of Governments invited by the Swiss Federal Council to attend the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva (April 21, 1949) (Geneva: 1949), online: Library of Congress <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Remarks-proposals.pdf> at 8; cf. also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 19.

  504. 504.

    On the treatment of the preambles at the Geneva Conference, see in detail Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 23-27.

  505. 505.

    Ibid ., at 28.

  506. 506.

    See especially Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41; Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41.

  507. 507.

    In this sense, see especially Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 509 and generally chap. 41; for the contrary conclusion, see Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 54.

  508. 508.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 512.

  509. 509.

    Cf. ibid .

  510. 510.

    Ibid .

  511. 511.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27.

  512. 512.

    Ibid .; cf. also Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 36 (noting that bilateral or even multilateral measures taken by states become rarely ever known).

  513. 513.

    See generally for pronouncements of the ICRC position Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 49-58.

  514. 514.

    See e.g. the appeal made by the ICRC in 1979 with a view to the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, in which it noted that “the ultimate responsibility for respecting and applying the provisions of humanitarian law lies […] with the parties to the conflict and with all States which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions and have thereby committed themselves to respect and to ensure respect for these Conventions in all circumstances”, see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Conflit d’Afrique Australe: Appel du CICR”, (1979) 716 Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 87 at 91-92 [emphasis in the original; translation from the original French in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 52]. The ICRC notably asked not only all states parties to the Geneva Conventions, but also specifically the members of the UN Security Council to firmly support its appeal to the conflict parties in order for the suffering to end and for the victims to receive the protection to which they were entitled, ibid . In 1984, the ICRC referred to the undertaking to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in connection with the Iran-Iraq War in a speech to the permanent representatives of states in Geneva, noting that “[t]he states signatory to the Geneva Conventions […] have undertaken to ensure that countries at war respect these Conventions”, see International Committee of the Red Cross, The ICRC appeals to governments: its work halted in Iran, Press Release No. 1498, 23 November 1984, quoted in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 55. Strongest language was finally employed in a letter by the ICRC Director of Principles, Law and Relations within the Movement addressed to two members of the UK parliament, which stipulated that it was “a legal obligation” for “States party to the Geneva Conventions [to] take all possible steps to ensure respect for international humanitarian law […] because, in becoming party to the Geneva Conventions, those States have undertaken not only to respect the said Conventions themselves, but also to ensure respect for them by other States in all circumstances. This is the tenor of Article 1 common to the four Conventions [and] a matter of direct responsibility for the States. The ICRC therefore cannot but encourage them to make every effort to ensure that international humanitarian law is duly respected” [my emphasis], see International Committee of the Red Cross, Letter dated 18 October 1989 from the ICRC Director of Principles, Law and Relations within the Movement to two UK Members of Parliament, quoted in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 56.

  515. 515.

    In 1983, for instance, the ICRC called upon the states parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions to make every effort, pursuant to the obligation under Article 1 not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Conventions, to see that international humanitarian law was applied and the violations which affected tens of thousands of victims in the Iran-Iraq War ended, and suggested that all means provided for in the Geneva Conventions to ensure respect for them had to be employed, see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Conflit entre l’Irak et l’Iran: Appel du CICR”, (1983) 742 Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 226 at 228; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 53. Also see the letter to the UK members of parliament supra, note 514.

  516. 516.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 511; cf. also Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27-28 (noting that little is known about the way in which the states answered these appeals, stressing, however, also that these responses were without doubt covert).

  517. 517.

    For Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, the ICRC interpretation of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is indeed a proper reflection of the majority opinion in diplomatic circles, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 70: “In diplomatic circles, common Article 1 has come to be seen by many as implying a universal obligation for States and international organizations (be they regional or universal) to ensure that this body of law is implemented wherever a humanitarian problem arises”.

  518. 518.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 59.

  519. 519.

    See the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his 1988 report on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel that “[t]he Security Council should consider making a solemn appeal to all the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention that have diplomatic relations with Israel, drawing their attention to their obligation under article 1 of the Convention to ‘ … ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’ and urging them to use all the means at their disposal to persuade the Government of Israel to change its position as regards the applicability of the Convention”, see UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), UN Doc. S/19443 (21 January 1988) at para. 27. Furthermore, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights repeatedly called upon states parties to the fourth Geneva Convention to act in accordance with Article 1 of the convention and ensure that Israel respected its provisions, cf. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 26-27 (with references in n. 22-24). See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 881 (1987) on the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1984-1986), 1 July 1987, online: Council of Europe <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16292&lang=en> at para. 21 (recalling that “the member states of the Council of Europe, as parties to the [1949] Geneva Conventions, have a particular responsibility and must exert their influence to ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law at all times and in all circumstances”), and Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 984 (1992) on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 30 June 1992, online: Council of Europe <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=16395&lang=en> at para. 13 (iii) (inviting the governments of its member states “to launch an appeal to the conflicting parties to respect the four Geneva conventions of 1949 which provide protection to wounded military personnel, to prisoners of war and to civilian persons in time of war”). See on these and other relevant declarations by UN organs not comprised of states as well as by other international organizations Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 26-37.

  520. 520.

    See e.g. the judgment of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Kupreškić case of 14 January 2000, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić, Vladimir Šantić, also known as “VLADO”, IT-95-16-T, Judgment (14 January 2000), online: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf> at para. 519 (noting the erga omnes character of most norms of international humanitarian law and the “entitlement” which all states therefore had to demand respect for them); see also the resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at its Berlin Session in 1999, noting on the one hand a legal obligation for “[e]very state and every non-State entity participating in an armed conflict […] to respect international humanitarian law” and on the other hand an entitlement of “any other state […] to demand respect for this body of law”, see Institut de Droit International, L’application du droit international humanitaire et des droits fondamentaux de l’homme dans les conflits armés auxquels prennent part des entités non étatiques, 25 August 1999, online: Institut de Droit International <http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1999_ber_03_fr.PDF> (for the official French text of the resolution) and <http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1999_ber_03_en.PDF> (for an English translation), at para. V and VII (confirming the right of other states “to take diplomatic, economic and other measures towards any party to the armed conflict which has violated its obligations, provided such measures are permitted under international law”).

  521. 521.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 13-15.

  522. 522.

    See e.g. the decision of a Canadian Federal Court Trial Division in the Sinnappu case of 14 February 1997, dismissing an application for judicial review of the orders to remove two Tamils to Sri Lanka, Senar Sinnappu, Thilagawathy Sinnappu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.), [1997] 2 F.C. 791, online: Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada <http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/1997/1997fca0001.html> (“Since Canada has no involvement whatsoever in that dispute [i. e., the internal armed conflict in Sri Lanka], common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949 does not impose upon our country an obligation to ensure that the parties to that conflict respect common Article 3"). In the US, in 1985, an immigration court in Texas had found that the fourth Geneva Convention provided “a potential basis for relief from deportation”, cf. US, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Harlingen, Texas, Case No. A26 949 415: In the Matter of Jesus del Carmen Medina, in Deportation Proceedings, Decision, 25 July 1985. This finding was reversed, however, by the US Board of Immigration Appeals on the basis, inter alia, that it was unclear “what obligations, if any, Article 1 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention] was intended to impose with respect to violations of the Convention by other States”, cf. US, Board of Immigration Appeals, Case No. A26 949 415 – Harlingen, In re. Jesus del Carmen Medina, in Deportation Proceedings: Certification, Decision, 7 October 1988 (unpublished, quoted in Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 4-5). See on these judgments also in further detail Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 13-14.

  523. 523.

    Not surprisingly then, both of the judgments cited supra, note 522, note as a fallback argument that Article 1 of the relevant Geneva Convention would have no effect on the application of domestic immigration law. Another US decision which the ICRC lists relies even more strongly on the perception that Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions was no self-executing provision and provided no “intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement”, cf. US, District Court for the Northern District of California, Baptist Churches case, Judgment, 24 March 1989, at para. 12, quoted in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 15.

  524. 524.

    International Conference on Human Rights, Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 25th Plen. Mtg., 12 May 1968, in Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (New York: United Nations, 1968), online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/fatchr/Final_Act_of_TehranConf.pdf> at 18; for details on the 1968 Teheran Conference on Human Rights as well as on the drafting history and the impact of Resolution XXIII, see also Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 42-45.

  525. 525.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26 and n. 14.

  526. 526.

    See International Conference on Human Rights, Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 25th Plen. Mtg., 12 May 1968, in Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (New York: United Nations, 1968), online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/fatchr/Final_Act_of_TehranConf.pdf> at 18, preamble, at para. 9.

  527. 527.

    See e.g. Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26.

  528. 528.

    Ibid . [my translation].

  529. 529.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 44.

  530. 530.

    I acknowledge the additional argument submitted by Kalshoven that, since the 1968 Teheran Conference had been concerned with human rights, the delegates may not have been experts in the law of armed conflict and might hence not even have been aware of the issues of interpretation surrounding Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, ibid . Yet counting only those expressions of states’ views that are made by officials who are specialized or at least knowledgeable in the respective area of law would greatly impede the ascertainment of rules of international law and finds no basis in general international law. Kalshoven’s observations are most important in that they caution against reading into the resolutions of the Teheran Conference any solutions to problems that may not even have been known to their drafters. At the same time, when representatives of states express their views on the contents of specific legal regimes, such as in this case on the Geneva Conventions, a presumed lack of expertise as such should not be viewed as detrimental to their value as subsequent understandings.

  531. 531.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 44.

  532. 532.

    Ibid ., at 43; in Kalshoven’s view, Resolution XXIII rather provides “a useful reminder that states not directly involved in an armed conflict are nonetheless entitled to ‘take steps to ensure’ that their colleagues respect the rules they voluntarily accepted as law” [emphasis added].

  533. 533.

    See on the Zarqa incident and the argument built thereon in the present context Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27. The abducted jets were eventually destroyed by the hijackers, see Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), at 108. The hostages taken by the militants were released in exchange for Palestinian dissidents in British custody, see BBC, “On this day: 12 September. 1970: Hijacked jets destroyed by guerrillas”, online: BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/12/newsid_2514000/2514929.stm>. Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes assume that the Swiss request had prompted some reaction, but they were “obviously” unable to confirm this, see Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27.

  534. 534.

    See Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department Pierre Graber, Statement in the Swiss Federal Council, 8 October 1970, (1971) 27 Annuaire suisse de droit international 189 at 189; see also Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27.

  535. 535.

    See Additional Protocol I, Article 1(1). Additional Protocol III of 2005 contains the same provision, see Additional Protocol III, Article 1(1).

  536. 536.

    See the authorities cited supra in note 364.

  537. 537.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26.

  538. 538.

    See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 35-36.

  539. 539.

    See Frits Kalshoven, “The undertaking to respect and ensure respect in all circumstances: from tiny seed to ripening fruit” (1999) 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 3 at 45-48.

  540. 540.

    Ibid ., at 47.

  541. 541.

    Ibid ., at 45-46 and n. 112, 114.

  542. 542.

    Ibid ., at 46-47.

  543. 543.

    Quoted ibid ., at 46-47.

  544. 544.

    Ibid ., at 47.

  545. 545.

    In Kalshoven’s words, the Diplomatic Conference “plainly failed utterly in fulfilling the expectation that it might shed light on the interpretation of [the terms of Article 1 of 1949]”, ibid .

  546. 546.

    Kalshoven speaks of a “merely technical” reaffirmation, ibid ., at 52; cf. also ibid . at 48.

  547. 547.

    See Oman, Statement in the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/SPC/35/SR.27 (11 November 1980), quoted in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 17.

  548. 548.

    See e.g. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 32/91 A, UN GAOR, 32nd Sess., 101st Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/32/91A (13 December 1977) at op. para. 4 (“Urges once more all States parties to that [fourth Geneva] Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel”); UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 33/113 A, UN GAOR, 33rd Sess., 87th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/33/113A (18 December 1978) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 34/90 B, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., 99th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/34/90B (12 December 1979) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 34/90 B, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., 99th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/34/90C (12 December 1979) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 35/122 A, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., 92nd Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/35/122A (11 December 1980) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 35/122 B, UN GAOR, 35th Sess., 92nd Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/35/122B (11 December 1980) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 36/147 A, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/36/147A (16 December 1981) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 36/147 B, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/36/147B (16 December 1981) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 37/88 A, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/37/100A (10 December 1982) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 37/88 B, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/37/88B (10 December 1982) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 38/79 B, UN GAOR, 38th Sess., 98th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/38/79B (15 December 1983) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 38/79 C, UN GAOR, 38th Sess., 98th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/38/79C (15 December 1983) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 39/95 B, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/39/95B (14 December 1984) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 39/95 C, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., 100th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/39/95C (14 December 1984) at op. para. 5; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 40/161B, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., 118th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/40/161B (16 December 1985) at op. para. 4; UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 40/161 C, UN GAOR, 40th Sess., 118th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/40/161 C (16 December 1985) at op. para. 5 (each with almost identical wording); UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 43/21, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., 45th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/43/21 (3 November 1988) at op. para. 5 (“Calls upon the High Contracting Parties to the [fourth Geneva] Convention to take appropriate measures to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for the Convention in all circumstances, in conformity with their obligation under article 1 thereof”). Cf. also Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), c. 41 at para. 22 and n. 18.

  549. 549.

    See UN Security Council, Resolution 681 (1990), UN SCOR, 2970th Mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/681 (1990) (20 December 1990) at op. paras. 5-6 (“Calls upon the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for its obligations under the Convention in accordance with article 1 thereof” and “Requests the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to develop further the idea, expressed in his report, of convening a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the said Convention to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention […]”); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), c. 41 at para. 21.

  550. 550.

    Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Declaration, 5 December 2001, online: United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/8FC4F064B9BE5BAD85256C1400722951> at para. 4 (“The participating High Contracting Parties call upon all parties, directly involved in the conflict [over the occupied Palestinian territories] or not, to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances […]”); also quoted by Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at para. 45.

  551. 551.

    See UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, GA Res. 43/21, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., 45th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/43/21 (3 November 1988) at op. para. 5 (quoted in note 548 above).

  552. 552.

    See UN General Assembly, UN GAOR, 43rd Sess., 45th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/43/PV.45 (8 November 1988) at 91.

  553. 553.

    See the references to diplomatic relations and communications e.g. in the Report of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel of 21 January 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), UN Doc. S/19443 (21 January 1988) at para. 27 (“The Security Council should consider making a solemn appeal to all the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention that have diplomatic relations with Israel […] urging them to use all the means at their disposal to persuade the Government of Israel […]”) [my emphasis]; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 984 (1992) on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 30 June 1992, online: Council of Europe <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=16395&lang=en> at para. 13 (iii) (inviting the governments of its member states “to launch an appeal to the conflicting parties to respect the four Geneva conventions of 1949 which provide protection to wounded military personnel, to prisoners of war and to civilian persons in time of war”). Also, interestingly, the ICRC had expressly acknowledged that “[t]he means used to meet these legal and political responsibilities [to ensure respect for international humanitarian law in accordance with Article 1 of the convention] are naturally a matter to be decided upon by States” at the 2001 Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 5 December 2001, which adopted the abovementioned declaration concerning efforts to ensure respect by Israel for humanitarian law, see note 550 above.

  554. 554.

    For my analysis of such subsequent practice, cf. Chapters 5 and 6 below.

  555. 555.

    Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978). As of September 2015, the protocol had 174 states parties.

  556. 556.

    See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests” (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 67 at 78.

  557. 557.

    See Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 1033.

  558. 558.

    Ibid ., at 1032.

  559. 559.

    Ibid .

  560. 560.

    Cf. ibid .

  561. 561.

    Cf. ibid ., at 1035.

  562. 562.

    Cf. ibid ., at 1032.

  563. 563.

    See Part 3.5 above.

  564. 564.

    See Parts 3.5 and 3.7 above.

  565. 565.

    See France, Statement at the public sitting of the International Court of Justice, 23 April 1948, in International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Part II: Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on April 22nd, 23rd and 24th, 1948, the President, M. Guerrero, presiding, Pleadings, online: International Court of Justice < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/11699.pdf> at 75-76.

  566. 566.

    Ibid ., at 76-77.

  567. 567.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Alvarez J., Individual Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1825.pdf> 67 at 71 (finding an abuse of rights in the conduct of those states that vote against the admission of a new member to the United Nations because of additional conditions, which were “mainly guided by considerations of their own policy”, noting however also that, while the Court had to condemn such abuse of rights, the only sanction attaching to it at the present time was “the reprobation of public opinion”); International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Azevedo J., Individual Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1827.pdf> 73 at 79-81 (raising the concept of “abus de droit” or “détournement de pouvoir”, but eventually discarding it as a merely theoretical matter since the members were not bound to state the reasons for their votes which made it difficult to control whether there had been a misuse of rights).

  568. 568.

    See Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 7-8 (suggesting as an example the negative vote of a Security Council member on the establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate a border violation, which he considers an abuse of rights unless it is motivated by the desire to implement the purposes and principles of the United Nations).

  569. 569.

    See Brian D. Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) at 275.

  570. 570.

    Ibid ., at 275-276, 328 (identifying similar obligations also under the customary legal duty to prevent and punish genocide and the “general principle of moral law requiring all states to take some reasonable action within their abilities to prevent or thwart massive and flagrant violations of essential human rights”).

  571. 571.

    See Matthias Herdegen, Völkerrecht, 13th ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 2014), § 40 at para. 16.

  572. 572.

    Ibid . For Herdegen, this concept of the Security Council and its members as trustees is brought to the fore namely by the concept of a “collective responsibility to protect”, ibid ., § 41 at para. 28.

  573. 573.

    See Anne Peters, “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 27-30.

  574. 574.

    See Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 79-81. In practice, Martenczuk submits, there is hardly a chance of establishing a violation of this duty in a specific situation. In line with the above considerations, however, the reference to difficulties of establishing a violation in practice or the availability of judicial control has no effect on the existence of a duty as such, see Part 3.2.2 above.

  575. 575.

    See Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 97-99. Contra a legal duty of the Security Council to take Chapter VII action when faced with threats to the peace or breaches of the peace, including such posed by massive human rights violations, also Charlotte Kreuter-Kirchhof, “Völkerrechtliche Schutzverantwortung bei elementaren Menschenrechtsverletzungen: Die Responsibility to Protect als Verantwortungsstruktur”, (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 338 at 360-361 (advocating a middle way, however, as she asserts not a “duty”, but a “responsibility” of the Security Council to intervene for the protection of imperilled populations from grave human rights violations).

  576. 576.

    For Martenczuk, the argument indeed ends here with the finding that Article 24(2)(1) UN Charter provides no basis for the proposition that the Security Council members are bound by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, see Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80.

  577. 577.

    See Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4 [my translation].

  578. 578.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at para. 4; Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4. On the relationship between the responsibilities of the Security Council and the duties of its member states cf. already Part 3.1 above.

  579. 579.

    Cf. on this teleological interpretation of the Charter provisions on the Security Council already Part 3.5.3 above.

  580. 580.

    Article 24(1) UN Charter; see e.g. William R. Pace and Nicole Deller, who rely on the provision in Article 24 UN Charter that the Security Council acts on behalf of the UN members to propose that “a failure to protect at-risk populations goes against the intent of the UN Charter”, see William R. Pace & Nicole Deller, “Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect” (2005) 36:4 World Order 15 at 30.

  581. 581.

    See Brian D. Lepard, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Legal Approach Based on Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002) at 276.

  582. 582.

    Ibid .

  583. 583.

    Cf. on the purposeful design of the Security Council as an effective decision-maker for the maintenance of international peace and security already Part 3.5.3 above.

  584. 584.

    See Part 3.5.3 above. Cf. also Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 280 (considering the last part of Article 24(1) UN Charter as “legally irrelevant” and even “incorrect”).

  585. 585.

    US President Harry Truman himself acknowledged in his statement at the final plenary session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization that “we all have to recognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny ourselves the licence to do always as we please”, quoted in High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, UN GAOR, 59th Sess., UN Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 2004) 8 at 13.

  586. 586.

    Cf. Jost Delbrück, “Article 24" in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 11. Cf. on this “strictly legalist perspective” also Anne Peters, “Article 24" in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 761 at para. 45 and n. 75.

  587. 587.

    In this regard, I ultimately endorse the view that has been suggested by Martenczuk, pursuant to which duties of individual members may be derived from Article 2(2) UN Charter rather than Article 24 UN Charter, see Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80.

  588. 588.

    Article 2(2) UN Charter.

  589. 589.

    See Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para. 16.

  590. 590.

    See Article 31(1) VCLT. See on the principle of good faith in the interpretation of treaties already Parts 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 above; specifically for Article 2(2) UN Charter, see Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 18-20. See generally on the different forms in which the good faith principle takes shape ibid ., at para. 17 (noting, aside from its role in the law of treaties, the concepts of estoppel and acquiescence as well as the ban on the abuse of rights).

  591. 591.

    On the abuse of rights concept as an element or application of the good faith principle, see e.g. Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 121; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 16-17; Alexandre Kiss, “Abuse of Rights” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at para. 22.

  592. 592.

    On the different constellations to which the notion of an “abuse of rights” may refer in international law see Alexandre Kiss, “Abuse of Rights” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 4-6 (identifying three constellations, namely the exercise by a state of its rights in a way which impedes another state in the exercise of its own rights and which, as a consequence, causes injury to that state, the above-mentioned intentional use of a right for an end other than that for which it has been created, again with the consequence that injury is caused, and, finally, the arbitrary exercise of rights by one state which causes injury to other states).

  593. 593.

    Cf. already Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 5-8; cf. also the individual opinions by Alvarez and Azevedo JJ. in the Conditions of Admission case, supra, at note 567; see also Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 21, 23-24; cf. also generally on the abuse of rights in international institutions Alexandre Kiss, “Abuse of Rights” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 22-23.

  594. 594.

    See Alexandre Kiss, “Abuse of Rights” in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 4-6 (identifying as the third constellation of an abuse of rights the arbitrary exercise of rights by one state which causes injury to other states).

  595. 595.

    See Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at paras. 10-11; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 10-11.

  596. 596.

    See Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at paras. 10-11; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras.10-11.

  597. 597.

    See Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at paras. 10-14; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 10-14 (alluding to “the members’ loyalty towards the community objectives agreed upon” and subscribing to the view that “the legal principle of good faith constitutes the enzyme in the organism of the institution, without which it would not be viable”).

  598. 598.

    See Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 11; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para.11.

  599. 599.

    See on this Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at paras. 20 and 22-23; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 21, 23-24.

  600. 600.

    On the interpretation of the good faith principle in Article 2(2) UN Charter, see generally Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at paras. 2-21; see also Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80 (subscribing to an affirmative view on a distinct good faith duty not to defeat the purposes of the United Nations).

  601. 601.

    Cf. Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para. 5.

  602. 602.

    Article 2(2) UN Charter.

  603. 603.

    Cf. Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para. 6 (noting that the legal effect of this clause is disputed).

  604. 604.

    See Part 4.3.2 above.

  605. 605.

    See on the negotiations concerning the good faith principle Elisabeth Zoller, “Article 2 Paragraphe 2" in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article (Paris: Economica, 2005) at para. 1; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para. 1.

  606. 606.

    See United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 65 at 71.

  607. 607.

    See Colombia, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 71 at 72.

  608. 608.

    See e.g. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 75 at 75; United States of America, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 74 at 74; Australia, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 76 at 76-77; see generally the report by Rapporteur Zeineddine of Syria, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 73 at 73-74.

  609. 609.

    See Australia, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 76 at 77.

  610. 610.

    See Rapporteur Zeineddine, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 73 at 73.

  611. 611.

    See United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, UN Doc. 784 (5 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 331 at 333.

  612. 612.

    See Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 75.

  613. 613.

    See United States of America, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 74.

  614. 614.

    See Australia, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) at 78-79; United States of America, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 74 at 74-75

  615. 615.

    See Belgium, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 74; United States of America, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 74 at 74-75 (“[..] now we realize that this is a customary phrase, which, to our friends of the Latin countries especially, conveys the meaning that we are all to observe these obligations, not merely the letter of them, but the spirit of them, and that these words do convey an assurance without which the principle would seem unsatisfactory to these friends of ours […]”).

  616. 616.

    See United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 65 at 80.

  617. 617.

    See Colombia, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 71 at 71.

  618. 618.

    Ibid ., at 72.

  619. 619.

    Ibid .

  620. 620.

    See Panama, Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission I, UN Doc. 1123 (20 June 1945), reproduced in: United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 78 at 78-79.

  621. 621.

    See Jörg P. Müller & Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 23; Robert Kolb, “Article 2(2)” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 166 at para. 24.

  622. 622.

    See UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/2625(XXV) (24 October 1970), Annex.

  623. 623.

    Ibid .

  624. 624.

    See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at para. 2.24.

  625. 625.

    Cf. e.g. Max Matthews, “Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur” (2008) 31 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 137 at 152; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 191; cf. generally on the debate already Part 1.3.3 above.

  626. 626.

    This point has been made e.g. by Christian Schaller, “Die völkerrechtliche Dimension der ‘Responsibility to Protect’” (2008) 46 SWP-Aktuell, online: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik <http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2008A46_slr_ks.pdf> at 1, 6; id., “Ausschuss für Menschenrechte und humanitäre Hilfe, Öffentliche Anhörung, 11. Februar 2009. ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Schutzverantwortung”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at 4 (noting that some parts of R2P are already firmly entrenched in public international law whereas other components have not yet found the required support in the international community of states).

  627. 627.

    See her comment on the permissibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention, in which she touches upon the question of duties as a preliminary issue: Alicia L. Bannon, “The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1157 at 1162. As the permissibility of unilateral intervention is the ultimate object of Bannon’s inquiry, she stops short of dwelling deeper into the origin, contents and other potential consequences of the duty to protect.

  628. 628.

    Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at xx.

  629. 629.

    Ibid ., at 251-252. At the same time, Wills stops short of proposing a legal duty of the Security Council to take an intervention decision, acknowledging that while the endorsement of a collective international R2P by the General Assembly and the Security Council increases the pressure on the Council “to consider some sort of response to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes […] it cannot take away the political element that underlies any Security Council decision”, ibid . at 253-254.

  630. 630.

    See Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99 at 99-110, 115-116, 120 (indicating divergences between the approaches and formulation by the ICISS, the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel, Secretary-General Annan and the 2005 World Summit).

  631. 631.

    Ibid ., at 120.

  632. 632.

    See William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 2:2 Genocide Studies and Prevention 101 at 102; id., Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 532-533.

  633. 633.

    See e.g. Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 449-450; see also Sabine von Schorlemer, “Anhörung zum Thema ‘Internationale Staatenverantwortung’ (‘Responsibility to Protect’)”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag, <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at para. 5(b).

  634. 634.

    See Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 449-451.

  635. 635.

    Cf. Parts 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 below.

  636. 636.

    See e.g. Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99 at 120; Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 103-104; Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in: Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 312-314; id., “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 23-24; Edward C. Luck, “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect”, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008, online: The Stanley Foundation <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/luckpab808.pdf> at 5; Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267 at 282-283; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 191 at 207.

  637. 637.

    See e.g. Arbour, noting a legal duty to prevent genocide that originates from the norms of the Genocide Convention as well as from corresponding customary international law, Louise Arbour, “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 449-450; see also William A. Schabas, Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 533 (suggesting that the customary duty as it has been formulated in the World Summit Outcome document is “essentially the same” as the - conventional - duty to prevent genocide that has been affirmed by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide Case).

  638. 638.

    See e.g. Mark Toufayan, “The World Court’s Distress When Facing Genocide: A Critical Commentary on the Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))” (2004-2005) 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 233 at 252-255 and n. 108.

  639. 639.

    See on this “modern view” of custom ibid ., at 252-254 and n. 109 (as well as the authorities cited therein).

  640. 640.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 26-29.

  641. 641.

    Cf. e.g. ibid ., at 27-29.

  642. 642.

    Ibid ., at 29.

  643. 643.

    Ibid .

  644. 644.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Rule 144.

  645. 645.

    See International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf> at para. 220; see also above, note 379 and accompanying text.

  646. 646.

    See Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 29 [my translation from the French original].

  647. 647.

    See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> at para. 79; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> at para. 157.

  648. 648.

    See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> at para. 79; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136, Advisory Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> at para. 157.

  649. 649.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 512 (with reference to the specific chapters on the individual rules).

  650. 650.

    Ibid .

  651. 651.

    Cf. Part 4.2.1.6.1 above.

  652. 652.

    See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 511 (naming the UK and the US, with references to their statements in Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume II: Practice, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 41 at paras. 19-20).

  653. 653.

    But see Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 509 for a clear statement under customary international law.

  654. 654.

    The authors themselves are aware of this but argue that the strength of the few precedents which they were able to identify was sufficient, given that they had not been contested and the primary means to induce third states into lawful conduct was discreet diplomatic correspondence, see Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances’” in Christophe Swinarski, ed., Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17 at 27, 29.

  655. 655.

    See International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf> at para. 220.

  656. 656.

    See e.g. Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99 at 120 (“Under current international law, their [i. e. the States’] obligations encompass at best the duties identified by the ILC in Article 41 of the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility”); Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in: Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 312-314; Edward C. Luck, “The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect”, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008, online: The Stanley Foundation <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/luckpab808.pdf> at 5 (acknowledging, however, that the ILC itself left open whether Article 41 of the 2001 Draft Articles reflected already existing international law or a progressive development); Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267 at 282-283 (concluding, however, that the existence of an obligation of states to cooperate in order to stop war crimes and crimes against humanity remains contested and would “represent an extremely progressive and wide interpretation of international law”); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Force: Building Legality” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 191 at 207.

  657. 657.

    For this definition of the type of breaches to which Article 41 of the 2001 ILC Draft refers see ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 40(1). In Article 40(2) ILC Draft, “serious breach” is defined as one that “involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.”

  658. 658.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 41(2).

  659. 659.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 41(1).

  660. 660.

    See e.g. ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 40 at para. 4.

  661. 661.

    See especially M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between States’ Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed., The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 131 at 131 (including not only genocide but also crimes against humanity and war crimes in his list of international crimes that have achieved jus cogens status); see also Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 267 at 282-283 (asserting that the prohibition of war crimes and crimes against humanity had jus cogens status); cf. also Jochen A. Frowein, “Ius Cogens”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at para. 8 (observing that the principles of humanitarian law were often cited in the jus cogens context, and suggesting that “[i]t would seem correct to assume that all basic values of the international legal order may give rise to rules of ius cogens which thereby protect the community as a whole”).

  662. 662.

    Gattini suggests, in a similar vein, that the obligations under Article 41(2) ILC Draft 2001 might apply once a genocide has started, see Andrea Gattini, “Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation Thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment” (2007) 18:4 E.J.I.L. 695 at 704.

  663. 663.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 41, Commentary, at para. 3.

  664. 664.

    Ibid .

  665. 665.

    See Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 99 at 115-116, 120.

  666. 666.

    See on this lack of precision already Charlotte Kreuter-Kirchhof, “Völkerrechtliche Schutzverantwortung bei elementaren Menschenrechtsverletzungen: Die Responsibility to Protect als Verantwortungsstruktur”, (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 338 at 359.

  667. 667.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 41, Commentary, at para. 3.

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Kolb, A.S. (2018). The International Law of Atrocity Crime Prevention. In: The UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 274. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3_4

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