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The Security Council and International Law

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The UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 274))

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Abstract

Any finding of a legal duty for states to use their powers as Security Council members for the prevention of atrocity crimes presupposes that the process within the Council is subject to regulation by law in the first place. The relationship between the Security Council and international law has been debated by legal scholars and the International Court of Justice from two different angles: firstly, with a view to the decisions taken by the organ as such and, secondly, with a focus on the participation of individual states in this collective decision-making process. From the former point of view, the question is whether or not the outcome of the Security Council’s process, i. e. namely its resolutions, can be unlawful.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at para. 4: “[…] The question has been put to us in terms of the conduct of a member of the United Nations in the Security Council or in the General Assembly; the Member is envisaged in its capacity as a member of these organs, that is to say, in the discharge of its duty to contribute to the making of a recommendation by the Security Council or of a decision by the General Assembly on that recommendation. The freedom of that Member in this respect cannot be either more or less than that of the organ as a member of which he is called upon to give his vote. Accordingly, in order to answer the question put with regard to the conduct of a member, we are compelled to begin by deciding what the answer should be in relation to the organ, be it the Security Council or the General Assembly.” For the request for an advisory opinion, which had been submitted to the Court by the General Assembly and which had been phrased as one about the conduct of United Nations members in the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly, and specifically about the conditions on which they were entitled to make dependent their consent to the admission of a new member to the United Nations, see UN General Assembly, Admission of new Members, GA Res. 113(II) B, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 118th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/113(II) B (17 November 1947).

  2. 2.

    See on this issue in detail Part 3.4 below.

  3. 3.

    See Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 79-81 (suggesting that, from the perspective of judicial control, this distinction leads to an effectively unrestricted mandate of the Security Council members, since only a permanent policy of obstruction would amount to a violation of Article 2(2), which, however, could hardly ever be found in any single vote standing on its own). But see Spiropoulos, who had argued that the obligation contained in Article 24(2) UN Charter to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations had to apply not only to the Security Council, but also to its members, since only votes by the Members that were in accordance with these requirements could lead to decisions by the Security Council that were in conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN, see Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4.

  4. 4.

    For proponents of limits originating outside the UN Charter, see notes 17 to 21 and accompanying text below.

  5. 5.

    See especially Ecuador, Commentaires et amendements aux propositions pour la création d’une organisation internationale générale de la conférence de Dumbarton Oaks présentés par la délégation de l’Équateur à la Conférence des Nations Unies pour l’organisation internationale, 1 May 1945, reproduced in United Nations Information Organization, Documents de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur l’organisation internationale San Francisco, 1945, Tome IV: Propositions de Dumbarton Oaks. Commentaires et projets d’amendements de la conférence des Nations Unies sur l’organisation internationale, San Francisco 1945 (London, 1945) 536 at 572 (stressing that, in discharging its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council would neither create new law nor modify the existing law but “observe and apply the principles and rules of existing law”) [my translation]; see on this and other statements already Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 41-42.

  6. 6.

    Cf. only Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1998) at 13 (noting the concerns which many governments entertained with a view to “the (selective) activism the Council [had] practiced since 1990”); id., “Review Essay: Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control” (2000) 11:1 European Journal of International Law 219 at 219 (describing the short period of Security Council activism and the impulse which it exercised on legal scholarship with the metaphor of a whale that “lay quietly somewhere on the high seas for most of its life […,] awoke and turned over once or twice, sending waves to distant shores which, in turn, set in motion the ships and boats and canoes of legal science [which] are still nervously cruising while the whale, as it turned out, did not really leave its place”); David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 1-4.

  7. 7.

    John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1955) at 194-195. This quote is notably still cited in the more recent discourse on the Security Council and the principle of legality, see Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 11.

  8. 8.

    See John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1955) at 195.

  9. 9.

    See Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 294-295 (concluding that, for this purpose, the Security Council was empowered “to enforce a decision which it considered to be just though not in conformity with existing law”).

  10. 10.

    The notion of a “law-free zone” has been applied to the traditional reading of the Security Council’s position under the UN Charter by Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty” (2009) 20:3 E.J.I.L. 513 at 539-540.

  11. 11.

    For the roots of the notion “legibus solutus” in the Eastern Roman Empire and for its application to the Security Council, see Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 23-24. For explicit reference to the notion cf. e.g. also International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “DULE”, IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 2005), online: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm> at para. 28.

  12. 12.

    See David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 3 (with references to publications from that period in fn. 11).

  13. 13.

    Cf. e.g. the chart compiled by Eckart Klein & Stefanie Schmahl, “Die Internationalen und die Supranationalen Organisationen” in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum & Alexander Proelß, eds., Völkerrecht, 6th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013) 237 at para. 145 (indicating 234 vetoes between 1946 and 1990 as opposed to 29 between 1991 and 2012).

  14. 14.

    Cf. e.g. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994); id., “Un contrôle de la légalité des actes du Conseil de sécurité est-il possible” in Société Française pour le Droit International, Colloque de Rennes: Le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies (Paris: Pedone, 1995) 255.

  15. 15.

    See generally on the present state of mind in international scholarship Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 9-10 (suggesting that the question whether the Security Council was completely unbound by international law was one of the past since there was general agreement that the Council did not act in a law-free zone, and stating specifically for Chapter VII that it was seemingly undisputed that the Security Council was subject to legal constraints in its efforts to maintain international peace and security, while the degree of legal determination remained far from being agreed upon). See also explicitly Dire Tladi, “Strict positivism, moral arguments, human rights and the Security Council: South Africa and the Myanmar vote” (2008) 8 African Human Rights Law Journal 23 at 30 (“It seems clear that we have to accept that there are legal limits to the power of the Security Council. The question is as to where those limits lie.”) [references omitted]; cf. also Alexander Orakhelashvili, “The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions” (2005) 16:1 European Journal of International Law 59 at 88 (considering it an “incontrovertible reality […] that the Council is not legibus solutus”). Tellingly, the argument which Gabriël H. Oosthuizen made in 1999 for the proposition that the Security Council was not bound to comply with international law was explicitly thought of by the author as a mere polemic, see Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law” (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 at 549 (“The author has donned the robe of the devil’s advocate for this polemical piece, thus intending to utter half lies, sow doubt and cover up inconsistencies.”).

  16. 16.

    See e.g. International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 64; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “DULE”, IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 2005), online: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm> at para. 28; Nicolas Angelet, “International Law Limits to the Security Council” in Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ed., United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 71; Bardo Fassbender, “Review Essay: Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control” (2000) 11:1 European Journal of International Law 219 at 227; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 304; Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 9, 25; Thomas M. Franck, “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 519 at 520; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 47. Arguments against this proposition have been put forward, although merely for the purpose of an academic polemic, by Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law” (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 at 551-558, 562-563.

  17. 17.

    See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 305-306; Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 27; Nicolas Angelet, “International Law Limits to the Security Council” in Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ed., United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 71 at 75-76. Cf. also Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 46-47; even Oosthuizen admits that jus cogens would have to be accepted as setting legal limits to the Security Council’s powers once the concept was recognized, but, taking again the position of the devil’s advocate, contends that, to date, the concept was too controversial to have a practical impact and to be able to effectively constrain the Council, see Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law” (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 at 558-559.

  18. 18.

    See Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 27-31 (naming specifically the peremptory norms of international humanitarian and human rights law, the states’ right of self-defence and territorial integrity, the self-determination of peoples, as well as, at least in theory, the principle of proportionality and the prohibition of arbitrary action, though he submits that the last two principles provide rather broad limits only which will hardly effectively constrain the Security Council in practice).

  19. 19.

    See Hartmut Henninger, Menschenrechte und Frieden als Rechtsprinzipien des Völkerrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013) at 175-192.

  20. 20.

    See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 305.

  21. 21.

    See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 46-47.

  22. 22.

    See Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Application, 3 March 1992, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/7207.pdf>; id., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 3 March 1992, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/13251.pdf>; id., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Application, 3 March 1992, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7209.pdf>; id., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 3 March 1992, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/13253.pdf>. Cf. also the joint declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom in Statement issued by the Government of the United States on 27 November 1991 regarding the bombing of Pan Am 103, UN Doc. A/46/827-S/23308, Annex.

  23. 23.

    See UN Security Council, Resolution 731 (1992), UN SCOR, 3033rd Mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/731 (21 January 1992) at op. para 3; UN Security Council, Resolution 748 (1992), UN SCOR, 3063rd Mtg., UN Doc. S/Res/748 (31 March 1992) at op. para. 1.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, 23 September 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 (entered into force 26 January 1973), Article 5(2) [Montreal Convention].

  25. 25.

    See International Court of Justice, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, [1992] I.C.J. Reports 114, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7213.pdf>; cf. also on this and the different options which the Court faced in deciding on the Libyan application for provisional measures Thomas M. Franck, “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 519 at 521.

  26. 26.

    See e.g. International Court of Justice, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 3, Oda J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/7089.pdf> 17 at 17 and Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 114, Oda J., Declaration, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7217.pdf> 129 at 129 (accepting the validity of a Security Council resolution “irrespective of the question whether it is consonant with international law derived from other sources”, as long as the Security Council acts “within its terms of reference” under the UN Charter); International Court of Justice, Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 114, El-Kosheri J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/7235.pdf> 199 at paras. 23-33 and Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, [1992] I.C.J. Rep. 3, El-Kosheri J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/88/7107.pdf> 105 at paras. 23-33 (with numerous references to doctrinal and jurisprudential support for this view). See for this overall evaluation already Thomas M. Franck, “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 519 at 522-523 (noting the “delicate balancing” between respect for international law and respect for Security Council resolutions in which the Court had engaged in this case).

  27. 27.

    Cf. e.g. Katarina Månsson, “UN Peace Operations and Security Council Resolutions: A Tool for Measuring the Status of International Human Rights Law?” (2008) 26:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 79 at 81 (noting in the context of Article 39 of the UN Charter the “inherent powers of the UN to address a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression according to existing will and interest” [my emphasis], while acknowledging that the responsibility of the Security Council “is an unexplored and dynamic field of research which deserves further analysis”, ibid .). Similarly, when the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag held a public hearing on the responsibility to protect on 11 February 2009, different legal experts answering the question whether any binding criteria for Security Council involvement existed now or could be expected to develop in the future stressed the political nature of the body and the autonomy of its members in deciding what matters to take up, see Gernot Biehler, “Stellungnahme zur ‘Internationalen Staatenverantwortung’ (‘Responsibility to Protect’, R2P) für die Anhörung am 11. Februar 2009 im Menschenrechtsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at para. 2; Christian Schaller, “Ausschuss für Menschenrechte und humanitäre Hilfe, Öffentliche Anhörung, 11. Februar 2009. ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Völkerrechtliche Aspekte der Schutzverantwortung”, 11 February 2009, online: Deutscher Bundestag <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1366&id=1136> at 5 (observing that norms and values may play a role in shaping the members’ interests, which ultimately, however, remain the sole factor to limit the Council’s scope for action).

  28. 28.

    See e.g. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 277 (“[t]he mechanisms instituted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grant extensive, discretionary powers to an élitist, political organ whose primary responsibility is the maintenance of a political conception of international ordering – i. e. the maintenance of international peace and security”); Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, “The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 269 at 269-270 (“The Security Council is a political organ that produces resolutions having legal consequences. […] Article 39 of the Charter provides the Security Council with a quasi-discretionary power to determine whether a situation constitutes a breach of international peace and security. […] conceptual imprecision provides a broad scope of manœuvre to the Council in assessing whether a situation constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression”; Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law” (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 at 554 (“The provision [of Article 39] has obviously left the SC with mind-boggling powers of appreciation”). While the latter of these comments are concerned specifically with the powers of the Security Council as regards the appreciation of the factual circumstances for Chapter VII action, Jean Spiropoulos acknowledges not only large discretionary powers of the Council, but also specifies that these discretionary powers cover not only the appreciation of the facts before it but also the decision by the Security Council on what action, if any, to take in response, see Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4-5.

  29. 29.

    See Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 15 and 39 (pointing to a need to avoid constant quarrels over the lawfulness of Security Council action for the maintenance of international peace and security).

  30. 30.

    Cf. e.g. Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4-5; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 148 (arguing that the Council is subject to legal constraints while accepting at the same time that it has a certain degree of discretion).

  31. 31.

    See e.g. Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 77-81 (with further references for the view that, in the absence of effective sanctions, the members of the Security Council are legally unbound, ibid ., n. 63).

  32. 32.

    See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 123.

  33. 33.

    Ibid .

  34. 34.

    See Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, “Art. 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar (München: C.H. Beck, 1991) at para. 107.

  35. 35.

    Ibid .

  36. 36.

    Hanns Engelhardt had declared himself unable to find a rule of international law that would effectively constrain the free exercise of the veto right, since, even if there was a norm in international law prohibiting the abusive exercise of the veto right, it would not have the effect of voiding a negative vote cast in contravention of this norm, see Hanns Engelhardt, “Das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen” (1962/1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 at 405. Similarly, other authors have been primarily concerned with the prospects of implementing limits such as the prohibition of abusive votes in practice, see e.g. Felice Morgenstern, “Legality in International Organizations” (1976-1977) 48 British Year Book of International Law 241 at 242 (making reference to the Joint Dissenting Opinion in the Conditions of Admission Case and the good faith limitation on the discretion in deciding on the admission of new members, but noting that “it is not easy to see by reference to what standards, in the present state of international law, the demonstration of an abuse of authority in admission to membership in an organization could be made.”); Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, “Internationale Wirtschaftssanktionen als Problem des Völkerrechts und des Europarechts” (1981) Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 1 at 18 (noting that there were very slim avenues for reviewing and preventing an abuse of the veto right and criticizing therefore the US proposition that a veto cast by the USSR in a decision on economic sanctions against Iran was unlawful and hence irrelevant); see also generally on this strand in doctrine Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 79; Martenczuk himself acknowledges a duty on all UN members pursuant to Article 2(2) of the UN Charter not to act in a way that may defeat the objectives and purposes of the organization, but submits that there is hardly a chance of establishing a violation of this duty with a view to a specific vote and therefore concludes that the decision-making process within the Security Council remains free from restrictions as regards the factual and legal contemplations of the members in individual cases, see Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80-81.

  37. 37.

    See the request for an advisory opinion submitted by the UN General Assembly, Admission of new Members, GA Res. 113(II) B, UN GAOR, 2nd Sess., 118th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/113(II) B (17 November 1947).

  38. 38.

    See especially International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 62-63 (holding that “an indefinite and practically unlimited power of discretion in the imposition of new conditions […] would be inconsistent with the very character of paragraph 1 of Article 4”, which it understands to establish an exhaustive set of conditions for admission). International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at para 20 (granting the organs of the United Nations broad discretion in deciding on the admission of new members to the organization, but stressing that this discretion was not equal to a right to arbitrariness). Cf. similarly International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Zoričić J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1831.pdf> 94 at 97-104 (supporting wide political discretion by the members which must however not be confused with arbitrariness but finds its limits in the duty to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes and in the interests of the United Nations); International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Krylov J., Dissenting Opinion, International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1833.pdf> 107 at 109-111 (concurring with the other dissenting judges in that the conditions enumerated in Article 4(1) UN Charter are not exhaustive and that the members make a discretionary decision on admission, while also noting that “[i]t goes without saying that, in utilizing this right of appreciation in respect of an applicant State, each Member of the Organization must be guided by legal and political considerations which accord with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations and that it must exercise its right in all good faith”, ibid . at 115).

  39. 39.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 60; see also Jörg P. Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1971) at 236-237 and n. 24; Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1977) at 161-164 (relying both on the majority opinion and the joint dissenting opinion by Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read in arriving at the conclusion that the discretionary powers of the UN members in exercising their right to vote is limited by the principle of good faith).

  40. 40.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at paras. 20-21; International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Zoričić J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1831.pdf> 94 at 103-104 (emphasizing at the same time that the good faith principle must positively be proven to have been violated, in default of which it is assumed to have been respected); online: International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Krylov J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1833.pdf> 107 at 115; see also generally Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 78-79.

  41. 41.

    See Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 4-8.

  42. 42.

    See Kurt Herndl, “Reflections on the Role, Functions and Procedures of the Security Council of the United Nations” (1987) 206 Recueil des Cours 289 at 316-317; Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1977) at 159-167; Jörg P. Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1971) at 235-236; cf. also Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 134-136 (who implicitly accepts the ICJ’s finding in the Conditions of Admissions Case that an abuse of rights is conceivable with a view to the Security Council’s discretionary powers); see also generally on the state of doctrine Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 79 (noting that the prevailing opinion in literature acknowledges a discretion of the Security Council within the limits of good faith and the purposes of the UN Charter).

  43. 43.

    See Hanns Engelhardt, “Das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen” (1962/1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 at 402-403; but see Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 81 n. 72 (considering such agreements incompatible with Art. 103 UN Charter).

  44. 44.

    See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 8 (1997): The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997) at para. 12.

  45. 45.

    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Article 2(1): “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”

  46. 46.

    See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 8 (1997): The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (12 December 1997) at paras 7-8.

  47. 47.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami v. France, no. 71412, Ruzhdi Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, no. 78166/01, Decision (2 May 2007, Grand Chamber) at para. 149.

  48. 48.

    See Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at para. 63.

  49. 49.

    See Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 297 (submitting, however, that R2P so far is only an emerging legal norm when it comes to the responsibility of third states and the UN, ibid . at 300-304); see also id., “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 3.

  50. 50.

    See Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at paras. 58-64.

  51. 51.

    Ibid ., at para. 64.

  52. 52.

    Ibid ., at para. 65.

  53. 53.

    See Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 319-322; Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at paras. 66, 252. Peters and Zimmermann part company, however, when it comes to the possibility that a negative vote which contravened any such substantive obligation could be ineffective and hence legally irrelevant: pro Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 318-319; contra Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at para. 252.

  54. 54.

    For the distinction made in this context between “legal arguments” and “practical or pragmatic arguments”, see Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 31-36.

  55. 55.

    See only the dissenting opinion by Judge Schwebel in the Nicaragua case, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14, Schwebel J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6523.pdf> 259 at para. 60 (“Moreover, while the Security Council is invested by the Charter with the authority to determine the existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court in making such a determination. It may arrive at a determination of aggression – or, as more often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression – for political rather than legal reasons. However compelling the facts which could give rise to a determination of aggression, the Security Council acts within its rights when it decides that to make such a determination will set back the cause of peace rather than advance it. In short, the Security Council is a political organ which acts for political reasons. It may take legal considerations into account but, unlike a court, it is not bound to apply them”). On the line of argument according to which “the Security Council is a political organ that cannot be expected to act like a Tribunal nor be shackled in the discharge of its extremely important functions and in the exercise of its wide discretion by legal niceties and technicalities” [emphasis in the original], cf. generally Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 34-35 (dismissing it as “simplistic” and pointing to its rejection by both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).

  56. 56.

    See e.g. the authorities cited in Part 3.2.2 and especially notes 62 and 63 below. On this “second practical or pragmatic argument of the absence of legal controls over Security Council’s action, i. e. that there is no judicial, procedural or institutional means to review the legality of the decisions of the Security Council, which thus remains the sole judge of its own action” cf. generally Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35-36 (dismissing it on the grounds that the absence of review mechanisms “does not render action in violation of the Charter legal” and that, in fact, “both on the political and the judicial levels, ways and means for exercising a measure of scrutiny are not totally absent”).

  57. 57.

    In the debate on the responsibility to protect, for instance, Siobhán Wills stopped short of asserting a legal duty of the Council to authorize intervention, noting that “[a]ny collective decision to intervene […] is at its root a political one”, Siobhán Wills, Protecting civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 253. While she identified far-reaching duties for the individual states to support such intervention, when it comes to the Security Council, she merely noted an increased pressure “to consider some sort of response to genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes“ due to the endorsement of R2P by the General Assembly and the Council itself, which cannot, however “take away the political element that underlies any Security Council decision”, ibid ., at 253-254.

  58. 58.

    Cf. e.g. the very clear acknowledgment of both the political nature of the Security Council and the limitations which are set on its members’ discretion by the provisions of the UN Charter, its purposes and the principles of good faith in both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the Conditions of Admission Case: International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 62-64; International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at paras. 9, 20-21; International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Zoričić J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1831.pdf> 94 at 103-104 (emphasizing at the same time that the good faith principle must positively be proven to have been violated, in default of which it is assumed to have been respected); International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Krylov J., Dissenting Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1833.pdf> 107 at 108-111, 115; see also Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 5; Constantine Antonopoulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 3, 11 (acknowledging as a preliminary matter that decisions taken by the Security Council presuppose political choices between given alternatives and that the approach of the body to a situation depends considerably on the political will of its members, while concluding nonetheless that both the UN and the member states of the Security Council may incur legal responsibility in connection with its acts and omissions); Thomas M. Franck, “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?” (1992) 86 A.J.I.L. 519 at 519-520 (explicitly raising the issue of the limits which may exist to the powers of the Security Council as a political organ).

  59. 59.

    See Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 34.

  60. 60.

    International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 64.

  61. 61.

    Cf. the definition of “treaty” in Article 2(1) VCLT. See on the Security Council as a legal institution already Alain Pellet, “Rapport introductif: peut-on et doit-on contrôler les actions du Conseil de Sécurité” in Société Française pour le Droit International, Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies: 50 e anniversaire des Nations Unies. Colloque de Rennes (Paris: Pedone, 1995) at para. 15.

  62. 62.

    See e.g. Hanns Engelhardt, “Das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen” (1962/1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 at 404-405 (submitting that even if the concept of an abuse of rights was applicable to the voting in the Security Council, it would not effectively limit the free use of the right of veto since there was at present no sanction other than public reprobation); Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, “Art. 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar (München: C.H. Beck, 1991) at para. 107 (considering the fact that, according to the provision of Article 27 of the UN Charter, votes of the Security Council’s members are counted as cast, making the question of substantive legal constraints a purely theoretical controversy); Kirsten Schmalenbach, “Recht und Gerechtigkeit im Völkerrecht” (2005) 60:13 JuristenZeitung 637 at 642-643 (assuming apparently that a failure by the Security Council to act could be in contravention of the UN Charter, but noting the absence of procedures that would allow for direct judicial control and therefore speaking of a political decision-making monopoly of the Council which must be accepted by the UN member states).

  63. 63.

    See especially Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, “Art. 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar (München: C.H. Beck, 1991) at para. 107; cf. also Ernst Ulrich-Petersmann, “Internationale Wirtschaftssanktionen als Problem des Völkerrechts und des Europarechts” (1981) Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 1 at 18 and n. 54 (addressing the hypothesis of an abusive veto in the context of Security Council decisions on economic sanctions, but ultimately contenting himself with the observation that even an unlawful veto would hinder the adoption of a resolution pursuant to Article 27(3) UN Charter).

  64. 64.

    See e.g. Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford: Hart, 2004), ch. 2-3 and 10; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994).

  65. 65.

    Cf. Hanns Engelhardt, “Das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen” (1962/1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 at 403-405; Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, “Art. 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar (München: C.H. Beck, 1991) at para. 107; see also generally Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 79.

  66. 66.

    For a reference to non-justiciable norms of constitutional law in the context of the debate over the role of international law for Security Council action, cf. already Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35.

  67. 67.

    Article 92 UN Charter.

  68. 68.

    On the principle of consent expressed in Article 36 of the ICJ Statute, see Christian Tomuschat, “Article 36” in Zimmermann, Andreas/Tomuschat, Christian/Oellers-Frahm, Karin & Tams, Christian J., eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 19-20.

  69. 69.

    Cf. explicitly in this sense also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 307. Cf. also David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 4-5 (distinguishing the two questions of, firstly, the legal limits to Security Council authority under chapter VII and, secondly, the extent to which the International Court of Justice can determine such limits and review decisions taken by the Council).

  70. 70.

    See especially the discussion of this matter by Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35-36; cf. also the reference to different mechanisms of “indirect control” over the Security Council by Michael Bothe, “Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 67 at 70.

  71. 71.

    In particular, the General Assembly may request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, and the lawfulness of a Security Council resolution may also be an incidental question in contentious cases before the ICJ, see Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35.

  72. 72.

    For example, the ICTY addressed the legality of Security Council action in the Tadić case as it was called upon to pronounce on whether its own establishment had been lawful under the UN Charter, see International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “DULE”, IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 2005), online: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm> at paras. 26-48. See also on these review mechanisms and examples Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35-36.

  73. 73.

    See already Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35.

  74. 74.

    On this “ultimate sanction” for unlawful Security Council resolutions, see Georges Abi-Saab, ibid ., at 35-36 (noting that regional fora and national parliaments may play a role in this context by advising the respective states not to follow a given resolution).

  75. 75.

    Whether such action without Security Council authorization would itself be lawful is highly controversial where individual states or groups of states consider using force. I have discussed this issue of unilateral humanitarian intervention elsewhere, see Andreas S. Kolb, The Responsibility to Protect in International Law: Rights and Obligations to Save Humans from Mass Murder and Ethnic Cleansing in Light of State Practice and Ethical Considerations (Hamburg: Kovač, 2011) at 163-199.

  76. 76.

    For the possibility that a vote that amounts to an abuse of rights could have to be considered null and void see the intervention by France’s Georges Scelle before the ICJ in the oral proceedings on the Conditions of Admission case, see “Exposé de M. le Professeur Georges Scelle (représentant du gouvernement français) aux séances publiques des 22 et 23 avril 1948”, in International Court of Justice, Mémoires, plaidoiries et documents. 1948: Conditions de l’admission d’un état comme membre des Nations Unies (Article 4 de la Charte), Avis consultatif du 28 Mai 1948, 59 at 76. For an argument against the nullity of a vote cast in contravention of the legal limits under which he considers the members of the Security Council see e.g. Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 11-12; see also Hanns Engelhardt, “Das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen” (1962/1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 377 at 405; Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, “Internationale Wirtschaftssanktionen als Problem des Völkerrechts und des Europarechts” (1981) Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 1 at 18; Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read JJ., Dissenting Opinion, International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1829.pdf> 82 at para. 3 (implicitly rejecting this possibility when they note that “there exists no legal machinery to rectify a vote which may be cast contrary to the Charter in the Security Council or the General Assembly”).

  77. 77.

    Amongst the proponents of legal constraints on the Security Council members who nonetheless acknowledge that any legal control of the Security Council members regarding their conduct on the Council will face substantial challenges in practice are Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 13-14, and Georges Scelle, “Exposé de M. le Professeur Georges Scelle (représentant du gouvernement français) aux séances publiques des 22 et 23 avril 1948”, in International Court of Justice, Mémoires, plaidoiries et documents. 1948: Conditions de l’admission d’un état comme membre des Nations Unies (Article 4 de la Charte), Avis consultatif du 28 Mai 1948, 59 at 76-77; International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Azevedo J., Individual Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1827.pdf> 73 at 77-81; see also generally Georges Abi-Saab, “The Security Council Legibus Solutus? On the Legislative Forays of the Council”, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Marcelo G. Kohen, International Law and the Quest for its Implementation: Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 23 at 35 (indicating that even if there were a lack of review mechanisms for Security Council action, this would not absolve the Council from respect for legal rules, just like constitutional law must not be ignored in domestic jurisdictions despite the fact that it is often not justiciable).

  78. 78.

    On this “objective approach”, see Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80-81.

  79. 79.

    For recourse to the ICJ to determine the compatibility or not of a vote with Articles 2(2) and 24(2) of the UN Charter, in advisory proceedings or contentious cases, see also Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 8-10; cf. Constantine Antonopoulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 10 (submitting that “it is a matter of appreciation by a tribunal whether a particular measure [by the Security Council] by its nature and effect would fulfill the obligation of due diligence in particular circumstances”).

  80. 80.

    Cf. on these two approaches Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80-81.

  81. 81.

    On this “subjective approach”, see ibid ., at 80.

  82. 82.

    See Anthony Aust, “The procedure and practice of the Security Council today” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 365 at 366-367.

  83. 83.

    The lack of any obligation to state reasons for a vote is a common aspect in the debate over constraints on the Security Council members, see only International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, Azevedo J., Individual Opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1827.pdf> 73 at 80; Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 13; Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80.

  84. 84.

    See International Court of Justice, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/3/1821.pdf> at 60.

  85. 85.

    See Georges Scelle, “Exposé de M. le Professeur Georges Scelle (représentant du gouvernement français) aux séances publiques des 22 et 23 avril 1948”, in International Court of Justice, Mémoires, plaidoiries et documents. 1948: Conditions de l’admission d’un état comme membre des Nations Unies (Article 4 de la Charte), Avis consultatif du 28 Mai 1948, 59 at 76-77; Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 12-13 (acknowledging the difficulties in establishing an abuse of rights in practice but submitting that often the motivation behind a vote will emerge sufficiently clearly from the debates in the Security Council and may allow for the finding of an abusive vote, while in other cases it may be manifest that a member had not let itself be guided by the objective guidelines for its discretion which are established by the purposes and principles of the United Nations).

  86. 86.

    See Christopher Verlage, for whom the evolution of the responsibility to protect indeed places increased pressure on the Security Council to justify its decisions (“erhöhter Rechtfertigungsdruck”) and even imposes a duty upon permanent members to precisely state reasons for a veto cast (“Begründungspflicht”), Christopher Verlage, Responsibility to Protect (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) at 261-262; Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 323-324 (submitting that the emergence of R2P has arguably already resulted in a procedural obligation of the permanent Security Council members to justify a veto); id., “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 35-38.

  87. 87.

    This possibility has also been raised by Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmaßnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996) at 80.

  88. 88.

    See Part 3.3. below.

  89. 89.

    See Part 3.4. below.

  90. 90.

    See Parts 3.5, 3.6 and Chapter 4 below.

  91. 91.

    Cf. e.g. Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1977) at 159-160 (conceding at the outset of her analysis of the limits which the right to vote finds in the good faith principle that the exercise of this right is a manifestation of the sovereign right of that state to appraise the situations with which it is concerned).

  92. 92.

    Cf. ibid ., at 160.

  93. 93.

    See Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at para. 75.

  94. 94.

    In this interaction between state sovereignty and international law, a state must, however, retain a certain minimal amount of competences below which the notion of sovereignty would be devoid of content. On this “minimal threshold of sovereignty”, the precise scope of which is contestable, see Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at paras. 78-81. It should be safe to say, however, that legal norms limiting a state’s discretion in voting as a member of an international organ do not touch upon this threshold.

  95. 95.

    See Samantha Besson, “Sovereignty”, in Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at para. 125.

  96. 96.

    On implications of R2P for state sovereignty, cf. e.g. Anne Peters, “Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty” (2009) 20:3 E.J.I.L. 513.

  97. 97.

    Elisabeth Zoller indeed submits the powers of appreciation which the sovereign state has as a member of the organ to the principle of good faith, see Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1977) at 160.

  98. 98.

    While not explicitly stipulated in the UN Charter, it has been established by the ICJ in its 1949 Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations that the Organization of the United Nations can itself possess the rights and duties that are necessary to fulfil its functions under the UN Charter, see International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf> at 178-180.

  99. 99.

    Ibid ., at 178-179; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, in id., Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), GAOR, 56th Session, Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 59, Article 57 at para. 2.

  100. 100.

    See International Court of Justice, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, [1999] I.C.J. Rep. 62, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/100/7619.pdf> at para. 66; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, in id., Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), GAOR, 56th Session, Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 59, Article 57 at para. 2.

  101. 101.

    The International Law Commission’s draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations are reproduced in the annex to General Assembly Resolution 66/100, see UN General Assembly, Responsibility of international organizations, GA Res. 66/100, UN GAOR, 66th Sess., 82nd Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/66/100 (9 December 2011), Annex, and, with commentaries by the ILC, in the report of the ILC on the work of its sixty-third session, see International Law Commission, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations, with commentaries, in id., Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third session (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011), GAOR, 66th Session, Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011) 69 [ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011)]. On the dual role of states as sovereign entities and members of the organ of an international organization, cf. also in the context of the good faith principle Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne foi en droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1977) at 159-160.

  102. 102.

    Cf. specifically for the Security Council Jost Delbrück, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 21 (endorsing the opinion, which he finds to be prevailing, that “the members of the SC do not act for their governments but via the SC as an organ of the UN acting on behalf of the Organization as a whole”).

  103. 103.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Part Five at para. 2.

  104. 104.

    Cf. Ralph Wilde, “Enhancing Accountability at the International Level: The Tension Between International Organization and Member State Responsibility and the Underlying Issues at Stake” (2005-2006) 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 395 at 402.

  105. 105.

    Ibid ., at 401-402.

  106. 106.

    See e.g. Ian Brownlie, “The Responsibility of States for the Acts of International Organizations” in Maurizio Ragazzi, ed., International responsibility today: essays in memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 355; Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) 297 at 306-314; Constantine Antonopoulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 11. On the views of the ILC, ILA and the European Court of Human Rights, see in further detail the following two Parts 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below.

  107. 107.

    The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are reproduced in the annex to General Assembly Resolution 56/83, see UN General Assembly, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, GA Res. 56/83, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., 85th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/Res/56/83 (12 December 2001), Annex, and, with commentaries by the ILC, in the report of the ILC on the work of its fifty-third session, see International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, in id., Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001), GAOR, 56th Session, Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) 59 [ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)].

  108. 108.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 57 and commentary to Article 57 at para. 4.

  109. 109.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 57 at para. 4.

  110. 110.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 57.

  111. 111.

    Cf. ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), General commentary at para. 2, Part Five at para. 1.

  112. 112.

    The ILC moreover addresses the question of a subsidiary responsibility of member states for internationally wrongful acts of the organization by virtue of their membership (Article 62). According to the rule proposed by the ILC, states do not incur responsibility for wrongful acts of an international organization simply by virtue of their membership, but only under the additional requirement that they either accept responsibility for those acts towards the injured third party or have led that party to rely on their responsibility, see ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 62(1) and commentary thereto, at paras. (1) and (2).

  113. 113.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Part Five at para. 4.

  114. 114.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Articles 58(2) and 59(2). Article 60 of the 2011 Draft, dealing with coercion of an international organization, by contrast, contains no such second paragraph, as the ILC eventually assumed that it was hardly perceivable to find an act conforming to the rules of an organization which simultaneously amounted to coercion of that organization, see ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 60 at para. 3.

  115. 115.

    International Law Commission, Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations adopted by the Commission on first reading, in id., Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-first session (4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2009), GAOR, 64th Session, Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/64/10 (2009) 39 [ILC, Provisional Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2009)].

  116. 116.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 59 at para. 2 (suggesting that “a distinction has to be made between participation by a member State in the decision-making process of the organization according to its pertinent rules, and direction and control which would trigger the application of the present article”); cf. ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 58 at paras. 4-5 (explicitly noting that “an act by a member State which is done in accordance with the rules of the organization does not as such engage the international responsibility of that State for aid or assistance”, ibid . at para. 4); see already ILC, Provisional Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2009), Article 57 at para. 2, Article 58 at para. 2, and Article 59 at para. 2; ILC Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, Fourth report on responsibility of international organizations, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add.1 (2006) at para. 62; but see Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) 297 at 307-309 (agreeing that the mere fact of participation in the decision-making process that led to a wrongful act of the organization was not sufficient to establish control by a state over the activities of the organization, but contemplating a broader theory of complicity, according to which the act of voting by a member state could be regarded as a form of assistance in the commission of a wrongful act, noting, however, that the narrower view taken by the ILC in its 2009 provisional draft articles was more likely to be endorsed by states).

  117. 117.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 59 at para. 2; ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 58 at paras. 4-5.

  118. 118.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 58 at para. 4; ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 59 at para. 2.

  119. 119.

    ILC Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, Fourth report on responsibility of international organizations, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add.1 (2006) at para. 62.

  120. 120.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 59 at para. 5.

  121. 121.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61 at paras. 3 to 5 and accompanying notes; cf. also text accompanying notes 129 to 130 below.

  122. 122.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61 at para. 6.

  123. 123.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61(1) and commentary to Article 61 at paras. 6-8.

  124. 124.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61 at para. 2.

  125. 125.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61 at para. 2 (submitting that an act of the organization which had not been intended by the state could not be qualified as a “circumvention” of its obligations).

  126. 126.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 61 at para. 7.

  127. 127.

    See ILC Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, Fourth report on responsibility of international organizations, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add.1 (2006) at para. 67.

  128. 128.

    For reference to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the work of the ILC see already ILC Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja, Fourth report on responsibility of international organizations, Addendum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/564/Add.1 (2006) at paras. 69-70.

  129. 129.

    Cf. Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) 297 at 313; cf. also ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), at paras. 3-4.

  130. 130.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, no. 26083/94, Judgment (18 February 1999, Grand Chamber), ECHR 1999-I at para. 67; Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, no. 45036/98, Judgment (30 June 2005, Grand Chamber), ECHR 2005-VI at para. 154. See also Constantine Antonopoulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 11 (who applies this line of reasoning also to the members of the UN Security Council and the duty to prevent and suppress genocide).

  131. 131.

    See International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004): Accountability of International Organisations. Final Report, online: International Law Association <www.ila-hq.org> at 18-19.

  132. 132.

    Ibid ., at 19.

  133. 133.

    Cf. Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute; see in detail Part 2.3.4 above.

  134. 134.

    The ILC itself moves, given the limited availability of relevant practice, several of its draft articles in the direction of a progressive development rather than a codification of existing law, see ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), General commentary at para. 5; cf. also Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) 297 at 307, 314 (noting that the cases in which the responsibility of a state has potentially been engaged in connection with the wrongful act of an international organization have been rare and the different concepts of such joint or parallel responsibility of the state hence “purely theoretical”). The announcement by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that it would hold the UK responsible for its conduct in the Security Council was the case that came closest to an attempt to implement the complicity theory in the sense of Article 58 ILC Draft 2011, cf. Pierre Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010) 297 at 308 (on the basis of Article 57 ILC Draft 2009).

  135. 135.

    See European Court of Human Rights, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, no. 26083/94, Judgment (18 February 1999, Grand Chamber), ECHR 1999-I at para. 67; Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, no. 45036/98, Judgment (30 June 2005, Grand Chamber), ECHR 2005-VI at para. 154.

  136. 136.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 67; International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004): Accountability of International Organisations. Final Report, online: International Law Association <www.ila-hq.org> at 19.

  137. 137.

    See Jean-Marc Thouvenin, “Article 103” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Economica, 2005) 2133 at 2133-2134; Rudolf Bernhardt, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. II (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) 1292 at para. 37; Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at para. 81.

  138. 138.

    Article 103 UN Charter.

  139. 139.

    See Jean-Marc Thouvenin, “Article 103” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Economica, 2005) 2133 at 2136-2142; see also Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at paras. 49-73.

  140. 140.

    For Paulus and Leiß, the prevailing view is that Article 103 UN Charter has to be interpreted broadly and applies also in the case of a conflict between Charter law and customary international law, see Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at para. 68. Pro also: Rudolf Bernhardt, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. II (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) 1292 at para. 21. Contra e.g.: Jean-Marc Thouvenin, “Article 103” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Economica, 2005) 2133 at 2140-2142; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “Responsibility and the United Nations Charter” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 115 at 121.

  141. 141.

    International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep.325, Lauterpacht J., separate opinion, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/7323.pdf> 407 at para. 100; cf. also Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, “Introduction to Chapter VII” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 29 (with further references in fn. 93); but see Nico Krisch, “Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 1237 at paras. 45-46.

  142. 142.

    This aspect is covered, for instance, in the polemic argument by Gabriël H. Oosthuizen, “Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law” (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 at 556-558; the ILA also qualifies the finding that member states of an international organization may be internationally responsible for their conduct in the organs of the organization by holding that Article 103 UN Charter establishes limits to the conventional obligations that have to be discharged by the members of the UN, see International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004): Accountability of International Organisations. Final Report, online: International Law Association <www.ila-hq.org> at 19; the ILC places its entire draft on the responsibility of international organizations, including the articles on state responsibility in connection with the conduct of an organization, under the qualifier that the UN Charter is not prejudiced thereby, see ILC, Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations (2011), Article 67, with specific reference to Article 103 UN Charter in the commentary to Article 67 at para. 1.

  143. 143.

    See VCLT, Article 26 and preambular para. 3.

  144. 144.

    Cf. Rudolf Bernhardt, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. II (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) 1292 at para. 12.

  145. 145.

    See Article 1(1) UN Charter; cf. also Michael Bothe, “Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 67 at 69 (submitting that, since the United Nations are based on respect for law, it would be inconceivable to exempt one of its core activities from legal considerations).

  146. 146.

    Article 103 UN Charter.

  147. 147.

    See Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at paras. 33-36.

  148. 148.

    Ibid ., at para. 35.

  149. 149.

    See Rudolf Bernhardt, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. II (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) 1292 at para. 9; Jean-Marc Thouvenin, “Article 103” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Paris: Economica, 2005) 2133 at 2135; Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at para. 38.

  150. 150.

    Cf. namely the decision of the ICJ in the Lockerbie Case and the text accompanying notes 22 to 25 above.

  151. 151.

    See Andreas Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiß, “Article 103” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 2110 at para. 29.

  152. 152.

    Ibid ., at paras. 14, 16.

  153. 153.

    Ibid ., at paras. 20-28.

  154. 154.

    Ibid ., at paras. 3, 81.

  155. 155.

    Cf. also the argument made by Vera Gowlland-Debbas that, while Article 103 UN Charter serves to derogate the provisions of other international agreements, including human rights conventions, their core human rights provisions continue to set limits to Security Council action to the extent that they “may be said to give effect to the broad purposes of the United Nations”, see Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 305.

  156. 156.

    See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 92 (labelling Article 27 “the sole provision of the Charter regulating the decision-making process in the SC”) and 94 (noting that “[i]t is appropriate to regard Art. 27 and its content as the foremost, genuine and comprehensive ‘sedes materiae’ for decision-making in the SC” and that “Article 27 is, in the last instance, the decisive yardstick whether a valid SC decision comes about or not”); cf. also Paul Tavernier, “Article 27” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 935 at 936-937 (noting, aside from Article 27 UN Charter, only Article 109 of the Charter, which provides for the necessary majorities for the holding of a review conference and for alterations of the Charter pursuant to the recommendation of such conference, as well as Article 10 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice on the election of judges for the ICJ).

  157. 157.

    Article 27 UN Charter. Technically speaking, this norm does not provide for a veto right, i. e. the power to block a decision that has already been adopted, but rather makes the adoption of any such decision dependent on the affirmative vote of each permanent member to begin with, cf. Torsten Stein & Christian von Buttlar, Völkerrecht, 13th ed. (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 2012) at para. 411. In its practical effect, however, it means that no substantive decision can be taken against the will of one or several of the P5.

  158. 158.

    See Bruno Simma & Stefan Brunner, “Art. 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar (München: C.H. Beck, 1991) at para. 107.

  159. 159.

    See Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 102.

  160. 160.

    See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 95.

  161. 161.

    Cf. W. Michael Reisman, “The Legal Effect of Vetoed Resolutions” (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 904 at 906.

  162. 162.

    See Michel Virally, L’Organisation Mondiale (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1972) at 102; see also Paul Tavernier, “Article 27” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 935 at 956.

  163. 163.

    See Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 102.

  164. 164.

    See Eckart Klein & Stefanie Schmahl, “Die Internationalen und die Supranationalen Organisationen” in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum & Alexander Proelß, eds., Völkerrecht, 6th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013) 237 at para. 142 (noting that, as evidenced by its drafting history, the UN Charter would not have been adopted without the veto right); Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1998) at 170 (noting that their permanent membership and right of veto in the Security Council had been “presented [by the major allies] to the rest of the world as a condicio sine qua non of the establishment of the United Nations Organization”).

  165. 165.

    See on this Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 7; Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at para. 41.

  166. 166.

    For the current version of the provisional rules of procedure, see UN Security Council, Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7 (21 December 1982).

  167. 167.

    Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 227; Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 95; see also in a similar vein Paul Tavernier, “Article 27” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 935 at 936-937.

  168. 168.

    See Anthony Aust, “The procedure and practice of the Security Council today” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 365 at 365.

  169. 169.

    See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 127; cf. also Anthony Aust, “The procedure and practice of the Security Council today” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 365 at 365.

  170. 170.

    See Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the Security Council, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 17-18; Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 126.

  171. 171.

    See Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 127.

  172. 172.

    The United States of America (US), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Republic of China.

  173. 173.

    See Statement by the Delegations of the four sponsoring governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, 7 June 1945 (1946-47) Yearbook of the United Nations 23 [“San Francisco Declaration”]. See generally on the declaration and its legal nature Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at paras. 19, 38-41.

  174. 174.

    See San Francisco Declaration, at para. 8; see also Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 8, n. 13.

  175. 175.

    See Paul Tavernier, “Article 27” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 935 at 948.

  176. 176.

    See Chile, Draft resolution on the situation in Czechoslovakia, 281st Mtg., 12 April 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.281, 2. On the Chilean draft resolution and for a summary of the ensuing debates in the Security Council, see also generally Yuen-Li Liang, “Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations” (1949) 43 American Journal of International Law 134 at 134-144.

  177. 177.

    See UN Security Council, 303rd Mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.303 (24 May 1948) at 19.

  178. 178.

    Ibid ., at 19-21, 28-29. On the issue of the “double veto” in this case, see also in further detail Yuen-Li Liang, “Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations” (1949) 43 American Journal of International Law 134 at 134-144.

  179. 179.

    See France, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 19 at 19; USSR, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 7 at 9; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 2 at 3-4 (suggesting that even the non-permanent members were bound by the San Francisco Declaration which it asserted to be “an inseparable part of the Charter”).

  180. 180.

    See Argentina, Statement in the Security Council, 288th Mtg., 29 April 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.288, 25 at 26; Canada, Statement in the Security Council, 300th Mtg., 21 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.300, 39 at 40; Syria, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 4 at 4; but see France, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 19 at 19-20 (noting that in at least one case a Security Council President who represented a non-permanent member had taken the San Francisco Declaration into account and thereby supposedly set a precedent).

  181. 181.

    See Canada, Statement in the Security Council, 300th Mtg., 21 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.300, 39 at 40-41.

  182. 182.

    The Ukrainian view, according to which the San Francisco Declaration was in fact a part of the UN Charter (see Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 2 at 3-4) finds no support in the statements made by other delegations. It also conflicts with the contemporary view that the declaration was, for want of the necessary acceptance by the other contracting states, not even an instrument to be taken into account as part of the context pursuant to Article 31(2)(b) VCLT, let alone an authentic interpretation of the Charter, but only a supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 VCLT, see Bruno Simma, Stefan Brunner & Hans-Peter Kaul, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 5, cf. also Andreas Zimmermann, “Article 27” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 871 at para. 39.

  183. 183.

    See Syria, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 4 at 4. A similar acknowledgment had already been made by the Argentinean representative, see Argentina, Statement in the Security Council, 288th Mtg., 29 April 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.288, 25 at 26 (noting that the San Francisco Declaration bound the great powers and that “perhaps the representative of the USSR can ask them to fulfil the obligation contracted”).

  184. 184.

    See Argentina, Statement in the Security Council, 303rd Mtg., 24 May 1948, UN Doc. S/PV.303, 11 at 15.

  185. 185.

    UN General Assembly, Uniting for Peace, GA Res. 377 (V) A, UN GAOR, 5th Sess., 302nd Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/RES/377(V)[A-C] (3 November 1950), preambular para. 5.

  186. 186.

    Cf. Paul Tavernier, “Article 27” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 935 at 949-950.

  187. 187.

    See on these different approaches ibid ., at 948-949, 953-957 (with references).

  188. 188.

    Cf. also Paul Tavernier, who sees the only potential avenue for legal limits to the veto in the concept of jus cogens, but notes that this possibility has, so far, been largely unexplored, ibid ., at 954-955.

  189. 189.

    See Part 3.4 above.

  190. 190.

    Cf. Articles 23-25 UN Charter.

  191. 191.

    See e.g. Anne Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal Consequences for the UN Security Council and Its Members” in Ulrich Fastenrath et al., eds., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 297 at 314; id., “The Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 8 International Organization Law Review 1 at 24-25.

  192. 192.

    Article 24(1) UN Charter.

  193. 193.

    See generally on this point Jost Delbrück, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at paras. 6, 11; cf. also Anne Peters, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 761 at paras. 41-47.

  194. 194.

    See René Degni-Ségui, “Article 24: Paragraphes 1 et 2” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 879 at 883.

  195. 195.

    See already the early commentary by Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 280 (suggesting that “[t]he third statement [in Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, to the effect that the members ‘agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’] is a theoretical characterisation of the function of the Security Council, which, as such, is legally irrelevant and, in addition, incorrect” in that it tended to make the organization disappear behind its member states); see generally Jost Delbrück, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 11 (finding that the majority of writers had subscribed to Kelsen’s view on this point); cf. also Anne Peters, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 761 at para. 45.

  196. 196.

    See Jost Delbrück, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 11; Anne Peters, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 761 at para. 45.

  197. 197.

    See Jost Delbrück, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd ed., Vol. I (München: C. H. Beck, 2002) at para. 6; cf. also Anne Peters, “Article 24” in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 761 at para. 45.

  198. 198.

    Cf. also the line of argument submitted in Part 4.3.2 below.

  199. 199.

    Cf. René Degni-Ségui, “Article 24: Paragraphes 1 et 2” in Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies: Commentaire article par article, 3rd ed., Vol. I (Paris: Economica, 2005) 879 at 883.

  200. 200.

    Cf. e.g. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 148 (acknowledging the necessity for the Security Council to possess discretionary powers specifically in appraising the existence of a threat to the peace); Constantine Antonopoulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 3 (recognizing as a preliminary matter that the Security Council has a “wide discretion […] in the field of international peace and security [which] implies a wide spectrum of options to address specific situations” and that “[t]he choice of a particular alternative is a political matter”); Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, “The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 269 at 269 (speaking of a “quasi-discretionary” power of the Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter); but cf. also Michael Bothe, “Les limites des pouvoirs du Conseil de Sécurité” in René-Jean Dupuy, ed., Le développement du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité: peace-keeping and peace-building (Colloque, La Haye, 21-23 juillet 1992) (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 67 at 69-70 (insisting that the Security Council properly speaking possesses no discretionary powers but merely a legally limited margin of appreciation when it comes to determining the existence of a situation within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter).

  201. 201.

    See on this prerequisite for Chapter VII action e.g. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “Responsibility and the United Nations Charter” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson, eds., The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 115 at 127; Nico Krisch, Article 39”, in Bruno Simma et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 1272 at paras. 45-47.

  202. 202.

    Cf. in a similar vein Mohammed Bedjaoui, Nouvel ordre mondial et contrôle de la légalité des actes du conseil de sécurité (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994) at 47, 148 (submitting that the Security Council is bound by international law but recognizing its discretionary powers in matters of the maintenance of international peace and security); Constantine Antonopulos, “The UN Security Council and Genocide” (2008) 61 Revue hellénique de droit international 3 at 3, 7-11 (submitting that inaction of the Security Council in the face of genocide may be a violation of the duty to prevent and suppress genocide and give rise to the legal responsibility of both the UN and the member states who control the Security Council’s decision-making process, despite her acknowledgment that the Security Council possesses some degree of discretion and may make political choices in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security).

  203. 203.

    Hans Kelsen suggested that Article 39 of the UN Charter empowered the Security Council to enforce decisions by the Council itself or any other UN organ through collective measures, irrespective of whether those decisions were compatible with international law, see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 294-295. In Kelsen’s words, “the Security Council would not be bound to maintain or restore the existing law. For the Council would be empowered to establish justice if it considered the existing law as not satisfactory, and hence to enforce a decision which it considered to be just though not in conformity with existing law”, ibid . at 295.

  204. 204.

    John Foster Dulles even went so far to call the Security Council “a law unto itself, capable of taking arbitrary action”, that “could be a tool enabling certain powers to advance their selfish interests”, and which could turn into “arbitrary despotism” was it not constrained by the veto of one of the great powers, see John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1955) at 194-195.

  205. 205.

    See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 303.

  206. 206.

    Articles 40-42 UN Charter [my emphasis].

  207. 207.

    Cf. Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 9; cf. also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “The Functions of the United Nations Security Council in the International Legal System” in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 277 at 303-304 (noting that the vague normative concepts of a threat to, or a breach of, the peace in Article 39 UN Charter grant states broad margins of discretion and appreciation which are, however, conditioned and not unlimited).

  208. 208.

    Cf. Matthias Herdegen, Die Befugnisse des UN-Sicherheitsrates: Aufgeklärter Absolutismus im Völkerrecht? (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1998) at 9.

  209. 209.

    Cf. ibid .

  210. 210.

    Article 40 sentence 2 UN Charter.

  211. 211.

    Article 24(2) UN Charter.

  212. 212.

    Article 2(2) UN Charter; for the view that Articles 2(2) and 24(2) UN Charter constitute legal limits to the discretion enjoyed by the Security Council members, see already Jean Spiropoulos, “L’abus du droit de vote par un Membre du Conseil de Sécurité” (1948) 1 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 3 at 7-8.

  213. 213.

    UN Charter, preamble at para. 3. For Kelsen, this clause is, firstly, hardly applicable to enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and even if it were, it would not limit the Security Council to action that is in conformity with existing international law but would allow for such action that it considers necessary in the pursuit of justice, see Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 295.

  214. 214.

    Cf. already Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1950) at 294-295.

  215. 215.

    See United Nations Conference on International Organization, Commission I: General Provisions, Summary Report of Ninth Meeting of Committee I/1, UN Doc. 742 (1 June 1945), reproduced in United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco 1945, Volume VI: Commission I, General Provisions (London, 1945) 317 at 318

  216. 216.

    Ibid .

  217. 217.

    Ibid .; see also for this historical argument Katarina Månsson, “UN Peace Operations and Security Council Resolutions: A Tool for Measuring the Status of International Human Rights Law?” (2008) 26:1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 79 at n. 16.

  218. 218.

    See Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 102 (arguing that this effect was also evidently not intended by the ICJ’s ruling in the Bosnian Genocide Case). For the contrary view see Louise Arbour “The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 445 at 453-455 (making a strong argument that membership in the Security Council as such matched the criteria developed by the ICJ to determine the responsibility to act).

  219. 219.

    See on the whole Matthias Wenzel, Schutzverantwortung im Völkerrecht: Zu Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der ‘Responsibility to Protect’-Konzeption (Hamburg: Kovač, 2010) at 102.

  220. 220.

    Cf. ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Article 2(a) and ibid . at para. 5-6.

  221. 221.

    ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), Articles 4-11. To be clear, not all of the ILC’s draft articles on state responsibility necessarily codify existing customary law, cf. ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), General commentary at para. 1 (identifying the draft articles as a work not only of codification but also of a progressive development of international law) and e.g. Article 41, at para. 3 (acknowledging that it was open to question whether the positive duty to cooperate to bring to an end any serious breach of jus cogens proposed in draft article 41(1) was already part of international law or rather a matter for progressive development). The ICJ consequently notes the customary quality of the respective draft articles which it applies for the determination of state responsibility, but avoids taking a stance as regards the customary law quality of the other rules of attribution in the ILC Draft, see e.g. International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 385 (for draft article 4), 398 (for draft article 8) and 414.

  222. 222.

    See International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, [2007] I.C.J. Rep. 43, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> at paras. 377-424.

  223. 223.

    Ibid ., at paras. 428-438, 471, op. clauses 5 and 7.

  224. 224.

    Ibid ., at para. 434.

  225. 225.

    See ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), General commentary at para. 1.

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Kolb, A.S. (2018). The Security Council and International Law. In: The UN Security Council Members' Responsibility to Protect. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 274. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55644-3_3

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