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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pp 99–110Cite as

Article 5

Treaties constituting international organizations and treaties adopted within an international organization

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Abstract

The wording of Art 5 conveys the impression that the provision’s main task is to determine the scope of the VCLT ratione materiae: constituent instruments of international organizations as well as treaties adopted within an organ of an international organization fall within the scope of the Convention, provided that the members of the organization are party to the Convention. However, the negotiating history reveals that the function of Art 5 is primarily that of a general reservation clause: even if the Convention (lex generalis) is in principle applicable to constituent instruments of international organizations and treaties adopted within international organizations, it is the subsidiary legal regime. The relevant rules of the respective international organization occupy the preeminent position in determining issues such as amendment, modification and interpretation of the constituent instrument (lex specialis), subject to the condition that the parallel provisions of the VCLT are optional treaty law. In addition, the international organization may provide for special procedural rules to be applied when adopting the text of a treaty within the organization.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf the statement by the representative of Sweden UNCLOT I 45, para 34.

  2. 2.

    [1963-II] YbILC 213 (Draft Art 48): “Where a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization, or has been drawn up within an international organization, the application of the provision of part II, section III, shall be subject to the established rules of the organization concerned.”

  3. 3.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 4, 191, para 1.

  4. 4.

    Waldock IV 18.

  5. 5.

    [1965-I] YbILC 308, para 27.

  6. 6.

    See the comments by the governments of Israel, Luxembourg and the Netherlands [1966-II] YbILC 300 (lit e), 312 (Art 48), 319 (Art 48).

  7. 7.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 4, 191, para 2.

  8. 8.

    See the comment by the government of Luxembourg [1966-II] YbILC 312.

  9. 9.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 4, 191, para 2.

  10. 10.

    See UNCLOT I 42–57.

  11. 11.

    UNCLOT I 45, para 34.

  12. 12.

    See the statement by the representative of Ceylon UNCLOT I 45, para 38.

  13. 13.

    See eg the statements by the observers for the ILO and the Council of Europe UNCLOT I 36, para 3 et seq, 47, para 12.

  14. 14.

    UNCLOT III 95, 116, para 57.

  15. 15.

    On the multitude of denominations for constituent instruments of international organizations see Blokker (2016), p. 945.

  16. 16.

    ICJ Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 19; see also Blokker (2016), pp. 950–951.

  17. 17.

    On different types of internal rules, see Schmalenbach (2014), paras 67–76.

  18. 18.

    Art 2 para 1 lit j VCLT II: “rules of the organization means, in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established practice of the organization”.

  19. 19.

    Gardiner (2015), p. 282.

  20. 20.

    ICJ Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 19.

  21. 21.

    Skubiszewski (1983), pp. 891, 892; Kelsen (1952), p. 172.

  22. 22.

    Monaco (1974), pp. 153, 154; Simon (1981), pp. 157–166; Sato (1996), pp. 230–232.

  23. 23.

    Klabbers (2004), pp. 31–58; Wellens (2002), p. 14; Peters (2005), pp. 39, 44; for a distinction between constitutionalism and functionalism, see Peters (2006), p. 594.

  24. 24.

    Cf Bartoš [1963-I] YbILC 305, para 69; for the details of the debate within the ILC, see Rosenne (1989), pp. 211–223.

  25. 25.

    ICJ Certain Expenses of the United Nations [1962] ICJ Rep 151, para 157: “[the Court] has recognized that the [UN] Charter is a multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics”; Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict [1996] ICJ Rep 66, paras 19, 21; Effect of Awards [1954] ICJ Rep 47, para 57; Namibia Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16; for an excellent analysis of the ICJ’s jurisprudence, see Sato (1996), pp. 150–160.

  26. 26.

    Quayle (2016), p. 871.

  27. 27.

    ICJ Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 26; see also Brölmann (2007), p. 121.

  28. 28.

    Kuijper (1998), p. 10; for an ‘international legal order’: Schilling (1996), pp. 403–404; different opinion: Weiler and Haltern (1996), pp. 420–423; see also Hartley (2001), p. 10; Sørensen (1983).

  29. 29.

    ECJ Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585; see also GC Kadi v Commission T-85/09 [2010] ECR II-5177, para 119.

  30. 30.

    ECJ Kadi and Barakaat v Council and Commission C-402/05 P, C-415/05 P [2008] ECR I-6351 (opinion AG Poiares Maduro), para 21.

  31. 31.

    See for example ECJ Europäische Schulen v Oberto and O’Leary C 464/13 and C 465/13 ECLI:EU:C:2015:163, para 36; ECJ Helm Düngemittel C-613/12 ECLI:EU:C:2014:52, para 37; ECJ Brita C-386/08 [2010] ECR I-1289, para 41.

  32. 32.

    See eg the statement of the CFI in SP SpA et al v Commission T-27/03, T-46/03, T-58/03, T-79/03, T-80/03, T-97/03 and T-98/03 [2007] ECR II-1357, para 58: “The reference to international law, and in particular to Articles 54 and 70 of the Vienna Convention (on the Law of Treaties), fails to have regard to the sui generis nature of the Community legal order. The indivisibility of the Community legal order and the lex specialis to lex generalis relationship between the ECSC and EC Treaties mean that the consequences of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty are not governed by the rules of international law but must be assessed in the light of the provisions existing within the Community legal order.”

  33. 33.

    However, the ECJ applies the VCLT to treaties concluded by the EU (formerly EC); see in this regard the comprehensive study of Hoffmeister (2008), p. 37.

  34. 34.

    ECJ Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium Case 90/63, 91/63 [1964] ECR 625; see also ECJ Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd C-5/94 [1996] ECR I-2553, para 20.

  35. 35.

    ECJ France v Commission C-327/91 [1994] ECR I-3641, para 36; CFI France v Commission T-240/04 [2007] ECR II-4035, para 45.

  36. 36.

    Fleischhauer (2002), Art 13 MN 1–5; Schermers and Blokker (2011), § 1262.

  37. 37.

    The tradition can be traced back to the multilateral conferences of Münster and Osnabrück that brought forth the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 141.

  38. 38.

    Within the UN, several organs are competent to draft the treaty texts later adopted by the UNGA or traditionally on a diplomatic conference, first and foremost the ILC but also the Sixth Committee, special bodies (eg UNCITRAL) and ad hoc committees (eg the Committee on International Terrorism), for details, see Fleischhauer (2002), Art 13 MN 12–81; in the case of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 24 September 1996, (1996) 35 ILM 1439, the Australian government submitted the draft to the UNGA after the diplomatic conference had failed to reach consensus; the UNGA adopted the text by Res 50/245, 10 September 1996, UN Doc A/RES/50/245, for details, see Brölmann (2007), p. 106.

  39. 39.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 4, 191, para 3; Villiger (2009), Art 5 MN 6.

  40. 40.

    On the discussion whether a competence is required, see Schermers and Blokker (2011), § 1274.

  41. 41.

    Art 13 para 1 lit a UN Charter; Art 15 Statute of the Council of Europe ETS No 1; Art 2 lit b of the 1958 IMO Convention 289 UNTS 3; Art 14 of the 1945 FAO Constitution Yearbook of the United Nations 1946–1947 part 2 ch 2 685, 693; Art 19 of the 1948 WHO Constitution 14 UNTS 185; Art IV para 4 of the 1946 UNESCO Constitution 4 UNTS 275; Art 19 of the 1919 ILO Constitution 15 UNTS 35.

  42. 42.

    Maupain (2000), pp. 129, 130.

  43. 43.

    Maupain (2000), p. 130.

  44. 44.

    Art 61 para 2 of the 1974 Treaty on the International Energy Agency 1040 UNTS 271; Art 7 of the 1945 Constitution of the League of Arab States 70 UNTS 248.

  45. 45.

    Art 12 of the 1947 Convention on the International Civil Aviation Organization (Chicago Convention) 15 UNTS 295.

  46. 46.

    For the definition, see Art 2 para 1 lit j VCLT II.

  47. 47.

    Cf Schermers and Blokker (2011), § 1260.

  48. 48.

    See ICAO Assembly Resolution A31-15, Appendix B (‘Procedure for Approval of Draft Conventions on International Air Law’).

  49. 49.

    See for the drafting history Bassiouni (1999), p. 443.

  50. 50.

    Under the 2002 Treaty of the European Union (Nice), the European Council was authorized to “establish conventions, which it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional instruments” (ex Art 34 para 2 lit d 2002 TEU). Ex-Art 34 para 2 lit d, which addressed so-called ‘third pillar conventions’, was repealed by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.

  51. 51.

    Schermers and Blokker (2011), § 1273; see eg Agreement between the Member States of the European Union Concerning Claims Introduced by Each Member States Against Any Other Member States for Damage to Any Property Owned, Used or Operated by It or Injury or Death Suffered by Any Military or Civilian Staff of Its Services, in the Context of an EU Crisis Management Operation [2004] OJ C 116, 1.

  52. 52.

    Cf the United Kingdom’s understanding of the term “rules of international organizations” UNCLOT I 44, para 31.

  53. 53.

    Brölmann (2007), p. 116.

  54. 54.

    Cf Art 108 UN Charter; Art 73 WHO Constitution 14 UNTS 185; Art 13 UNESCO Constitution 4 UNTS 275; Art 7 of the 1955 Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation 264 UNTS 3791; Art 28 of the 1947 Convention of the World Meteorological Organization 77 UNTS 143.

  55. 55.

    See Waldock IV 67, para 9.

  56. 56.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 39, 236, para 1.

  57. 57.

    Cf the comment by the Observer for the Council of Europe UNCLOT I 47, para 15, mentioning Art 26 (pacta sunt servanda), Art 51 (coercion of a representative), Art 52 (coercion of a State) and Art 62 (clausula rebus sic stantibus) as ius cogens whereas he considered the bulk of the Convention’s provisions ius dispositivum.

  58. 58.

    See eg Klein (1980); Simma (1986); for further references see → Art 34 MN 39–59.

  59. 59.

    Vitzthum (2002), Art 2 para 6 MN 15; Falk (1965), p. 619.

  60. 60.

    Alvarez (2005), p. 446.

  61. 61.

    See FAO, Principles and Procedures Which Should Govern the Conventions and Agreements Concluded under Arts XIV and XV of the Constitution, Appendix D of the Report of the 9th Session of the FAO Conference (1957) as amended by FAO Res 8/91 (1991).

  62. 62.

    Rules of the ILO Conference, Part II (Standing Orders Concerning Special Subjects) Section E (Convention and Recommendation Procedure), 21 November 1919, including all amendments up to 2002; see also UNCLOT I 36, para 5.

  63. 63.

    The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2302 UNTS 166) is so far the only convention concluded under Art 2 lit k and Art 19 WHO Constitution; for the rules of the treaty-making process, see WHO Doc A/FCTC/WG1/5, adopted on the first meeting of the Working Group on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 3 September 1999.

  64. 64.

    Polakiewicz (1999), p. 19 et seq.

  65. 65.

    Sabel (2006), pp. 35–36.

  66. 66.

    Among EU Member States, only France, Malta and Romania have abstained from acceding to the VCLT.

  67. 67.

    For the discussion on the limitation of Member States’ external competences, see Scannell (2002); Cremona (2011), p. 137; Tridimas and Eeckhout (1994).

  68. 68.

    ECJ Exportur C-3/91 [1992] ECR I-5529, para 8.

  69. 69.

    de Witte (2000), pp. 31, 47.

  70. 70.

    Reuter XI p. 23, para 2.

  71. 71.

    Heywodd Anderson (2011), Art 5 VCLT II MN 7.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Professor of Public International Law and European Union Law, Law Faculty, Paris Lodron University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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  1. Kirsten Schmalenbach
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  1. European Legal Studies Institute, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany

    Oliver Dörr

  2. Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law/International Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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Schmalenbach, K. (2018). Article 5. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_7

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