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Article 54

Termination of or withdrawal from a treaty under its provisions or by consent of the parties

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Abstract

Part V of the VCLT on invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties sets out exceptions to the general rule pacta sunt servanda (Art 26) and thereby introduces a certain indispensable amount of flexibility into international legal relations. It consists of five sections. Section 3 (Arts 54–64) deals with the termination of treaties and the suspension of their operation. It both systematically and logically follows Section 2, which regulates the invalidity of treaties (Arts 46–53), for only valid treaties can be terminated or suspended pro futuro (Arts 70 and 72), whereas invalid treaties are void ab initio (Art 69). Thus, the two sections overlap at no point, but thematically interlock where treaties come into conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law (ius cogens): in this case the treaty will be void according to Section 2 (Arts 53 and 71), if such a conflict existed already at the time of its conclusion; whereas the later emergence of a conflicting ius cogens norm automatically terminates the treaty under Section 3 (Arts 64 and 71).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1296; Lekkas and Tzanakopoulos (2014), p. 312 et seq.

  2. 2.

    Lekkas and Tzanakopoulos (2014), p. 320 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Or, for that matter, any other Non-State subject of international law (cf Art 2 para 1 lit a, Art 3).

  4. 4.

    Art 54 lit a, Art 55, Art 56 para 1, Art 57 lit a, Art 58 para 1 lit a, para 2, Art 60 para 4.

  5. 5.

    Helfer (2012), p. 636 et seq (who identifies exit clauses in treaties as risk management tools—id 647 et seq).

  6. 6.

    Id 644 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Rosenne (2002), p. 1312.

  8. 8.

    As of November 2017, the current number of UN Member States is 193.

  9. 9.

    See the negative answer given to the question whether Art 4 functions as a clause si omnes with regard to multilateral treaties by Dopagne (2011), Art 4 MN 10–11. If Art 4 is not a clause si omnes, the VCLT applies to a multilateral treaty even if not all its parties had already been parties to the VCLT, but it will then only cover the treaty relationships between those parties that had.

  10. 10.

    See Art 38 para 1 lit b and c ICJ Statute.

  11. 11.

    Cf ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 47.

  12. 12.

    Art 42 must of course be read in the light of Art 73 VCLT, which indicates that the international legal rules on State succession, State responsibility and outbreak of hostilities between States may provide additional grounds for terminating a treaty relationship (Sinclair 1984, p. 163).

  13. 13.

    Aust (2013), p. 245.

  14. 14.

    Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 2.

  15. 15.

    This was also remarked by some governments which commented on an earlier version drafted by Waldock who in response referred to the ‘code’ concept of the ILC’s work (Waldock V 25).

  16. 16.

    Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 4.

  17. 17.

    Whether this ‘mastership’ is without exception remains to be seen (→ MN 47–48).

  18. 18.

    Annex to 1871 Protocol No 1 of the London Conferences (de Martens Nouveau recueil général de traités Ser 1 Vol 18 (1873) 278). See Bederman (1988), p. 3, who provides the following translation: “[I]t is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Parties by means of an amicable arrangement.”

  19. 19.

    Fitzmaurice II 25 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Waldock II 36 et seq.

  21. 21.

    Cf Draft Art 40, Waldock V 28 et seq.

  22. 22.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 51, 249, para 4.

  23. 23.

    UNCLOT III 176. See also the explanation given by the representative of the Netherlands UNCLOT I 335.

  24. 24.

    UNCLOT III 176.

  25. 25.

    See eg the statements by the representatives of Norway and Australia UNCLOT I 335, paras 9–11. See also Nahlik (1971), p. 749 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Cf eg Art 58 ECHR as amended by Protocol No 11 ETS 155; Art 12 of the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 999 UNTS 171; Art 31 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment 1465 UNTS 85; Art 33 of the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 18 December 2002, UN Doc A/RES/57/199.

  27. 27.

    Aust (2013), p. 245 who therefore suggests that the term should be avoided. But see Helfer (2012), p. 635 n 6.

  28. 28.

    Aust (2013), p. 245.

  29. 29.

    Helfer (2012), p. 635 et seq. See Art 38 paras 2 and 3 of the ILC Draft Articles of 1963 ([1963-II] YbILC 188, 199). But see Art 28 of the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits 173 LNTS 229 according to which this multilateral treaty will be terminated if denounced by one party only.

  30. 30.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1296.

  31. 31.

    Cf eg Art 97 of the 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 261 UNTS 140.

  32. 32.

    Aust (2013), p. 267 et seq; Villiger (2009), Art 54 MN 4. An example is Art 28 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (n 26) which provides for a fixed (but prolongable) duration of twenty years with the proviso that the principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in Art 1 of the Convention shall continue without limit of time. One can also imagine transitional regulations in a treaty that are to expire after a fixed period of time.

  33. 33.

    By virtue of Art 5, the VCLT applies to constituent instruments of international organizations.

  34. 34.

    Cf eg Art 6 of the 1945 UN Charter and Art 8 of the 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe ETS 1.

  35. 35.

    Capotorti (1971), pp. 511–512.

  36. 36.

    Art 58 para 4 ECHR and Art 37 para 2 of the 1961 European Social Charter 529 UNTS 89 provide examples of the first alternative, and Art 41 para 2 ICCPR should be treated analogously.

  37. 37.

    See Aust (2013), p. 268; id (2006), MN 52–53. See also para 2.3 of the ILC’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties 2011.

  38. 38.

    Cf eg Art XIII of the 1994 WTO Agreement 1867 UNTS 154. See also the fairly common declarations made by Arab States when acceding to multilateral treaties that their accession should not establish any treaty relationship with Israel. These declarations amount to reservations ratione personae. See eg the declarations made by Morocco and Syria when acceding to the VCLT and the Israeli reaction thereto (Israel not yet having become a party to the VCLT).

  39. 39.

    Helfer (2012), p. 636.

  40. 40.

    See the many examples provided by Blix and Emerson (1973), p. 96 et seq and Aust (2013), p. 246 et seq and Helfer (2012), pp. 641 et seq, 758 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Cf eg the clear expiry clause of Art 97 ECSC Treaty 261 UNTS 140. The expiry clause in Art 14 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 78 UNTS 277 is less clear.

  42. 42.

    Cf eg Art 21 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 66 UNTS 195: one year period of notice.

  43. 43.

    ICJ Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, para 72 et seq.

  44. 44.

    Cf eg Art 58 para 2 ECHR; Art 78 para 2 of the 1969 ACHR OASTS 36. See Mejía-Lemos (2013). For a general discussion of legal limits to the denunciation of human rights treaties see Klein (2011), p. 484 et seq.

  45. 45.

    Aust (2013), p. 253; Lekkas and Tzanakopoulos (2014), p. 337 et seq.

  46. 46.

    Cf eg Art XV of the Genocide Convention 78 UNTS 277, according to which the Convention will cease to be in force when, as a result of denunciations, the number of parties falls below 16; Art 58 para 3 ECHR (according to which a party that ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe automatically also ceases to be a party to the Convention.

  47. 47.

    See eg Art 52 paras 3 and 4 of the 2001 International Coffee Agreement 261 UNTS 312; Art 63 paras 4 and 5 of the 2001 International Cocoa Agreement [2002] OJ L 342, 2.

  48. 48.

    Cf eg Art 13 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty 34 UNTS 241.

  49. 49.

    Cf eg Art 14 Genocide Convention 78 UNTS 277.

  50. 50.

    729 UNTS 161. See also, among others, the parallel provision in Art XVI para 2 of the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 1974 UNTS 45.

  51. 51.

    But see Helfer (2005), p. 1598; Joyner (2012).

  52. 52.

    UNSC Res 825 (1993), 11 May 1993, UN Doc S/RES/825 (1993).

  53. 53.

    See Aust (2013), pp. 249–250.

  54. 54.

    UNSC Res 1718 (2006), 14 October 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1718 (2006).

  55. 55.

    [2015-II] BGBl Fundstellennachweis B (as of 31 December 2014), 630.

  56. 56.

    See eg UNSC Res 1874, 12 June 2009, UN Doc S/RES/1874; UNSC Res 2094, 7 March 2013, UN Doc S/RES/2094. Harnisch (2010), p. 157. See also Talmon (2009), p. 100 et seq.

  57. 57.

    UNSC Res 2270 (2016), 2 March 2016, UN Doc S/RES/2270.

  58. 58.

    This has become less likely after the settlement of the dispute with Iran (see UNSC Res 2231, 20 July 2015, UN Doc S/RES/2231).

  59. 59.

    Dörr (2006), p. 151 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Krisch (2012), Art 39 MN 10.

  61. 61.

    Plender (1986), p. 136 et seq; Aust (2013), p. 269.

  62. 62.

    Dahm et al (2002), p. 720. But see Aust (2013), p. 269.

  63. 63.

    Dahm et al (2002), p. 727 et seq.

  64. 64.

    Feist (2001), p. 209 et seq.

  65. 65.

    See Art 2, 6 TEU. See also the 5th recital of the preamble and Art 52 para 3, 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

  66. 66.

    For the non-objecting States, this follows from Art 21 para 1 VCLT, for the objecting States, from Art 21 para 3 VCLT.

  67. 67.

    An example is the US reservation when acceding to the WHO, which was unanimously approved by the World Health Assembly (see Widdows (1983), p. 100 et seq) See also Waldock II 69; Christakis (2011), Art 56 MN 65.

  68. 68.

    ICJ Nicaragua (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 60.

  69. 69.

    Ibid para 63.

  70. 70.

    Ibid paras 61, 63.

  71. 71.

    Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 8.

  72. 72.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 51, 249 para 3.

  73. 73.

    Aust (2006), MN 23.

  74. 74.

    Capotorti (1971), p. 494 et seq; Sinclair (1984), p. 184.

  75. 75.

    See Dahm et al (2002), p. 724 et seq. The 1919 and 1920 treaties on the protection of minorities which they cite as examples, however, do not make consensual termination by the parties dependent on the consent of the League of Nations as an external guarantor. Only the unilateral modification by the territorial State in which the minorities lived was made subject to the assent of a majority of the League Council (see eg Art 12 of the 1919 Treaty of Peace between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and Poland (1919) 13 AJIL Supp 423.

  76. 76.

    Capotorti (1971), p. 496 et seq; Villiger (2009), Art 54 MN 7.

  77. 77.

    Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 24 (referring to the 1978 continental shelf arbitration between the United Kingdom and France). If a subsequent rule of customary law does not bring about the termination of the earlier treaty pursuant to Art 54 lit b VCLT, the lex posterior rule will come in (in analogy to Art 30 para 3 VCLT).

  78. 78.

    ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 114.

  79. 79.

    See also Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 12, 23.

  80. 80.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 39, 237, para 5. See also Lekkas/Tzanakopoulos (2014), p. 324 et seq.

  81. 81.

    Capotorti (1971), p. 516 et seq; Sinclair (1984), p. 163 et seq. But see Plender (1986), p. 138 et seq. See also Simma (1978), p. 93 et seq.

  82. 82.

    This is, however, what Capotorti (1971), p. 519 et seq suggests. But see Kohen (2011), p. 350 et seq.

  83. 83.

    But see Kontou (1994), p. 135 et seq, who argues that the VCLT was not intended to regulate the relationship between conventional and customary rules. Excepting customary grounds of termination from Art 42 para 2 VCLT would, however, render that provision obsolete. See also Plender (1986), p. 139 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Société des Nations, Journal Officiel, Supplément Spécial No 194 (1946) 269 (English translation in Knipping et al (1997), p. 213 et seq.

  85. 85.

    See ICJ South West Africa Opinion (separate opinion Read) [1950] ICJ Rep 167.

  86. 86.

    Aust (2013), p. 270. For the text of the declaration and the response notes of the other parties cf (1990) 51 ZaöRV 520 et seq.

  87. 87.

    Jennings and Watts (1992), p. 1297. For the text of the declaration cf (1990) 51 ZaöRV 524 et seq. However, see Dörr (2006), p. 153, who assumes that these were clausula cases (Art 62).

  88. 88.

    Cf UNCLOT I 476.

  89. 89.

    Chapaux (2011a), Art 54 MN 5, 10 et seq.

  90. 90.

    Not yet in force.

  91. 91.

    Cf Dominick (1992), p. 776 et seq.

  92. 92.

    Cf Art 67 paras 2 and 3, which indicate that only parties can raise objections with suspensive effect.

  93. 93.

    Cf Arts 35–37 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UNGA Res 56/83, 12 December 2001, UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex), which are declaratory of customary international law.

  94. 94.

    Art 53 TEU; Art 356 TFEU.

  95. 95.

    See Art 50 TEU added by the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1 December 2009.

  96. 96.

    Eckes (2007), Art 51 TEU MN 73.03.

  97. 97.

    See Art 2 para 1 lit a.

  98. 98.

    Herzog (1998), Art 240 TEC MN 240.03, 240.04.

  99. 99.

    See Chapaux (2011b), Art 54 VCLT II MN 1.

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  1. Professor of EU Law, Public International Law and Public Law, Director of the Europa-Institut, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Thomas Giegerich

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  1. European Legal Studies Institute, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany

    Oliver Dörr

  2. Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law/International Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Kirsten Schmalenbach

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Giegerich, T. (2018). Article 54. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_57

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