Abstract
Recently an unlinkable version of the U-Prove attribute-based credential scheme was proposed at Financial Crypto’14 [9]. Unfortunately, the new scheme is forgeable: if sufficiently many users work together then they can construct new credentials, containing any set of attributes of their choice, without any involvement of the issuer. In this note we show how they can achieve this and we point out the error in the unforgeability proof.
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© 2017 International Financial Cryptography Association
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Verheul, E., Ringers, S., Hoepman, JH. (2017). The Self-blindable U-Prove Scheme from FC’14 Is Forgeable (Short Paper). In: Grossklags, J., Preneel, B. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9603. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54970-4_20
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