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The Common Security and Defence Policy

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Legal Dynamics of EU External Relations
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Abstract

A policy field intimately connected with the CFSP, and thereby also present in the Union’s ‘outer layer’, is the Common Security and Defence Policy. It forms a relatively new addition, reaching full operational status only in 1999. It has nevertheless rapidly grown to become of seminal importance. As the CSDP is inextricably linked to the CFSP, all the features of the latter policy, subjected to closer inspection in the previous chapter, apply mutatis mutandis in this particular field. The current chapter aims to ‘fill in the blanks’ and, after a succinct introduction (Sect. 3.1), discusses in subsequent order the CSDP’s historical evolution (Sect. 3.2); its foundations, main principles and objectives (Sect. 3.3); the theory and practice of CSDP operations (Sect. 3.4); CSDP resources (Sect. 3.5); and the consecutive EU security strategies (Sect. 3.6).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Article 42(1) TEU currently declares the CSDP to be ‘an integral part’ of the CFSP.

  2. 2.

    The leading legal monograph on the subject is Koutrakos (2013); a lucid political science perspective offers Smith (2017).

  3. 3.

    See Protocol No. 22 on the position of Denmark, O.J. [2012] C 326/299.

  4. 4.

    The Pleven Plan , the earlier (stillborn) initiative for constructing a unified defence architecture was discussed in Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.1.

  5. 5.

    The full text may be obtained from www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.

  6. 6.

    Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council , 3–4 June 1999, Annex III, Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence.

  7. 7.

    Which in turn ushered in the disbandment of the WEU per 30 June 2011—see Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, Brussels, 31 March 2010.

  8. 8.

    As the second sentence of Article 42(2) and Article 42(7) TEU make clear. On the interaction between EU and NATO commitments, see e.g. Larik (2013).

  9. 9.

    See Article 42(4) TEU, which applies here as a lex specialis to Article 31 TEU. One should keep in mind that Article 31(4) already rules out QMV for decisions with military or defence implications.

  10. 10.

    Article 41(3) TEU.

  11. 11.

    Again see Article 42(4) TEU.

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    See also Protocol No. 10, annexed to the Treaties, which spells out the level of commitment Member States have to reach in order to apply, how the decision-making takes place, and what is expected of them once they decide to pursue this option.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Article 326 et seq TFEU.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Randelzhofer and Nolte (2012).

  16. 16.

    Compare the wider ‘solidarity clause ’ of Article 222 TFEU, which extends to terrorist attacks on Member States and any natural or man-made disasters. This clause has not been subjected to similar qualifications, albeit that further decision-making is required before specific action has to be taken; and in contrast to the intergovernmental approach in Article 42(7) TEU, a greater involvement of Union institutions is foreseen. See also Council Decision 2014/1415/EU on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, OJ [2014] L 192/53, wherein Article 2(2) underlines that it is to have no defence implications.

  17. 17.

    See Rühl (2014), p. 21, pointing to the fact that the distinctive EU countries that are not NATO members have also repeatedly participated in UN missions with military contingents or observers, cooperating with NATO partners, occasionally even appending their own military contingents.

  18. 18.

    A common synonym for peacemaking is peacebuilding, although some scholars employ a deviant terminology: cf. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2009).

  19. 19.

    The latter phrase is slightly ambiguous: it could encompass lending support through an active (physical) presence of EU forces in those countries, or instead, merely supplying the latter with the means to engage the terrorists themselves.

  20. 20.

    Traditional manifestations were e.g. the establishment of buffer zones, interpositioning of forces, surveillance of conflict lines and monitoring of armistice agreements.

  21. 21.

    More actively promoting and consolidating peace-processes, by e.g. drawing (interim) borders, disarming warring factions, seizing and destroying arms and equipment.

  22. 22.

    Here, a much wider mandate for using force is given, either on a broad reading of self-defence, or with authorisation for peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It thus represents a rupture with the classic ideas of neutrality and consent of the parties.

  23. 23.

    See Graf von Kielmansegg (2007), p. 633.

  24. 24.

    Cf. Article 28 TEU.

  25. 25.

    Article 43(2) TEU.

  26. 26.

    Cf. Article 38 TEU.

  27. 27.

    Which in itself forms a lex specialis for the CSDP, vis-à-vis Article 31 as the lex generalis in the CFSP.

  28. 28.

    EUPM, since 2003; EUFOR ALTHEA, since 2004.

  29. 29.

    AMM Monitoring Mission, 2005–2006.

  30. 30.

    DRC/Artemis, 2003; EUPOL Kinshasa, 2005–2007; EUFOR Congo, 2006; EUSEC Congo, since 2005.

  31. 31.

    EUPOL Afghanistan, since 2007.

  32. 32.

    EUCAP Sahel Niger, since 2012.

  33. 33.

    EUJUST Themis, 2004–2005.

  34. 34.

    EU CAP Nestor, since 2012.

  35. 35.

    EUFOR Tchad, 2007–2009.

  36. 36.

    EUBAM Rafah, since 2005.

  37. 37.

    E.g. the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, taking over from the UN International Police Force; EULEX Kosovo, taking over from KFOR, a NATO operation.

  38. 38.

    Also exemplied in e.g. Pirozzo (2015).

  39. 39.

    Rühl (2014), p. 22.

  40. 40.

    See Article 42(1) and (3) TEU respectively.

  41. 41.

    E.g. WEAG, WEAO, EDEM, OCCAR, POLARM. Some of these are still active at present.

  42. 42.

    Currently governed by Council Decision 2015/1835 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency , OJ [2015] L 266/55.

  43. 43.

    See Article 45 TEU.

  44. 44.

    Currently all Member States do so (with the exception of Denmark, in accordance with its op-out).

  45. 45.

    All EU Member States except Romania and Denmark participate in this scheme; so does Norway.

  46. 46.

    The Code of Conduct applied to contracts worth more than EUR 1 million. It introduced distinctive award criteria based on the most economically advantageous solutions for the particular requirement. It provided for a debriefing after the contract was awarded, during which session, upon request, unsuccessful bidders were given feedback.

  47. 47.

    See e.g. the Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement, COM (2006) 779 final.

  48. 48.

    See e.g. Case C-414/97, Commission v Spain; Case C-284/05, Commission v Finland; Case C-337/05, Commission v Italy.

  49. 49.

    See Directive 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ [2004] 134/114.

  50. 50.

    Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, OJ [2009] L 216/76. See also Directive 2009/43/EC.

  51. 51.

    For an exhaustive study, see Trybus (2014).

  52. 52.

    Heuninckx (2016) comes up with valuable concrete proposals.

  53. 53.

    In operations up to corps level—i.e. up to fifteen brigades (or 50,000–60,000 persons).

  54. 54.

    Requiring an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness, to provide replacements for the initial forces.

  55. 55.

    E.g. with the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, indicating that the capabilities sought would ideally involve 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels, and the European Capabilities Action Plan, focusing on particular crucial pieces of equipment, such as transport planes and unmanned aerial vehicles.

  56. 56.

    Headline Goals 2010, as approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.

  57. 57.

    Civilian Headline Goal 2010, as approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 19 November 2007, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf.

  58. 58.

    European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 19/20 December 2013, EUCO 217/13.

  59. 59.

    European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 15 December 2016, EUCO 34/16.

  60. 60.

    See Biscop (2008), p. 431.

  61. 61.

    ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy’, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

  62. 62.

    E.g. the 1948 Truman doctrine, spelling out the US’s structural assistance to countries in the communist sphere of influence that risked being overwhelmed, or the 2002 Bush doctrine, stressing the US’s readiness to engage in ‘pre-emptive self defence’.

  63. 63.

    See Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf.

  64. 64.

    The ESS should be distinguished from the Union’s Internal Security Strategy, for the first time adopted in February 2010 (available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf). Confusingly though, in some respects, the internal and external security strategies appear to overlap.

  65. 65.

    ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, available at https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en.

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de Waele, H. (2017). The Common Security and Defence Policy. In: Legal Dynamics of EU External Relations. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54817-2_3

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