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The Industrial Organization of Banking pp 243–280Cite as

Regulation and the Structure of the Banking Industry

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Abstract

To this point, discussion of sources of interplay between bank market structure and regulation has emphasized how market structure influences effects of regulatory policies. This chapter focuses on how regulation itself can impinge on the structure of banking markets. In addition, the chapter considers the implications of competition among bank regulators, a state of affairs that has been commonplace in the United States for some time and which likely will become more pervasive elsewhere in the coming years.

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    David VanHoose

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VanHoose, D. (2017). Regulation and the Structure of the Banking Industry. In: The Industrial Organization of Banking. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54326-9_9

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