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Macroprudential Regulation and International Policy Coordination

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial meltdown and economic downturn and growth slowdown that followed, most nations’ governments mounted substantial efforts to rein in risks of future system-wide crises. One focus of these efforts has been the contemplation of and utilization of so-called macroprudential policies to contain sources of systemic risk. The other area of emphasis has been consideration of and implementation of broadened forms of international regulatory policy coordination. This chapter considers both of these issues.

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    David VanHoose

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VanHoose, D. (2017). Macroprudential Regulation and International Policy Coordination. In: The Industrial Organization of Banking. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54326-9_10

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