Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

Abstract

It is hardly possible to judge the merits of the German corporate governance system without also having a basic knowledge of German business or enterprise law and without analysing it within its wider cultural context and linguistic background. Whereas business law or enterprise law refer to all legal aspects pertaining to businesses or enterprises, the focus of this book is on corporate governance in context of primarily large companies or corporations. A distinctive feature of German companies or corporations is the particular relationship amongst the various corporate organs and the unique synthesis between corporations law and labour law. Understanding this synthesis is fundamental when the merits of the English and American one-tier system and the German two-tier system (referring to the management board and the supervisory board as the two tiers respectively) with employee participation (at supervisory board level) are analysed and compared. These aspects have often been neglected in the academic literature attempting to analyse the German corporate governance system from a traditional Anglo-American perspective.

Otto Sandrock sadly passed away shortly after the completion of this chapter.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    In Germany, phrases like company law, corporate law and corporations law have different meanings and are often associated with specific political or academic theories. See and compare, for example, Raiser (1988), pp. 111, 122 et seq; Teubner (1988), pp. 130 et seq. For the purposes of this book these terms will be used interchangeably.

  2. 2.

    See Großfeld (2000a), p. 1; Großfeld (2004a).

  3. 3.

    Großfeld (2003a), p. 154.

  4. 4.

    For a general overview see Großfeld (1973); Oquendo (2001), p. 975.

  5. 5.

    See in particular Wiethölter (1961), pp. 272 et seq; Großfeld (1968), pp. 113 et seq; Kübler and Assmann (2006), pp. 5 et seq; Großfeld and Irriger (1988), p. 531.

  6. 6.

    For purposes of this book, the term codetermination (Mitbestimmung) will be used in its legal context, indicating the codetermination of employees in terms of various statutory provisions—see Chap. 5 for a closer description of the different ways in which the term codetermination is used. The term Mitbestimmung is also sometimes used in more general terms—see Windbichler (1991), p. 35. See generally Vagts (1966), pp. 23, 26 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Raiser (1988), pp. 111, 113.

  8. 8.

    Ibid 114.

  9. 9.

    See especially the comprehensive exposition by Reuter (1979), pp. 509–566.

  10. 10.

    Ibid 409–517.

  11. 11.

    Raiser (1988), pp. 111, 118, 122 et seq.

  12. 12.

    See especially Großfeld and Ebke (1977), pp. 59, 62 et seq. See also Martens (1979), pp. 493, 508, 509.

  13. 13.

    Rehbinder (1979), pp. 471, 478, 480, 481; Kübler and Assmann (2006), pp. 176 et seq.

  14. 14.

    Großfeld (2000b), p. 261; Großfeld (2003b), p. 847; Großfeld (2001), p. 167.

  15. 15.

    Großfeld (2002a), p. 341.

  16. 16.

    Großfeld (2002b), p. 197; Großfeld (2004b), p. 338.

  17. 17.

    Directives 2014/95/EU amending parts of Directive 2013/34/EU (Disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095>.

  18. 18.

    Inaugural ICGL Forum, ‘Key themes and issues in a globalised and internationalised world’, Muenster, Germany, 4–5 November 2013 <http://2013.icgl.org.au/>. The papers delivered at this Forum were published In a Special Issue (2015, Volume 26, Issue 1) of the European Business Law Review (2015).

  19. 19.

    Großfeld and Lehmann (1994), pp. 41, 43. See also Saenger (2015a), p. 1.

  20. 20.

    This was in accordance with the general principle of the German law of corporations that large public corporations should be regulated in detail in a separate act—see Großfeld and Lehmann (1994), pp. 41, 42; Großfeld and Ebke (1977), pp. 59 et seq; Kübler and Assmann (2006), p. 4.

  21. 21.

    See S 23(5)1 AktG which provides that the articles of incorporation can only contain deviations from the prescribed provisions of the Act when it is specifically provided for.

  22. 22.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl I 1965, 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  23. 23.

    Eisenhardt and Wackerbarth (2015), p. 2.

  24. 24.

    See in particular Hanau (1991), pp. VII–XX.

  25. 25.

    See further Chap. 5.

  26. 26.

    Kübler and Assmann (2006), pp. 13 et seq. With regard to the articles of incorporation (Satzung), see Mertens (1977), pp. 270, 283–288 and Mertens (1994), pp. 426, 438–440; Grunewald (1995), pp. 68, 84–85.

  27. 27.

    See in particular Chaps. 2 and 4.

  28. 28.

    See in particular Chap. 2, Part 2.6.

  29. 29.

    Vagts (1966), pp. 23, 33.

  30. 30.

    On the basic forms of German enterprises, see Baums (1992), p. 503.

  31. 31.

    See Schneider and Heidenhain (2000) and Peltzer and Hickinbotham (1999).

  32. 32.

    In particular the Joint Stock Companies Act 1837 (1 Vict c 73); Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110) (5 September 1844); Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 47) (14 Julie 1856) and several Amendments Acts like the Joint Stock Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 896); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict c 131; Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1877 (40 & 41 Vict c 26); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict c 76); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1880 (43 Vict c 19); Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict c 28); and Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act 1886 (49 Vict c 23).

  33. 33.

    See Scott (1912).

  34. 34.

    Wordsworth (1854), Lindley (1860), Clark (1866), Thring (1868), Beach (1891) and Chadwyck Healey et al. (1894).

  35. 35.

    See Niedostadek (2004).

  36. 36.

    See, for instance as far as South Africa is concerned, Olbrisch (1997); Olbrisch and du Plessis (1997), pp. 315 et seq.

  37. 37.

    Deutsches Aktieninstitut [DAI], DAI-Factbook, 1-1 (statute of 5 April 2013).

  38. 38.

    Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2010, Umsatzsteuer 2008, 617.

  39. 39.

    Statistisches Bundesamt, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/OeffentlicheFinanzenSteuern/Steuern/Umsatzsteuer/Tabellen/Voranmeldungen_Rechtsformen.html>.

  40. 40.

    See du Plessis et al. (2007), p. 6.

  41. 41.

    Ebke (2005), p. 39; Kersting and Schindler (2003).

  42. 42.

    See Sect. 6.2.2.

  43. 43.

    Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen.

  44. 44.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.1.

  45. 45.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl I 1965, 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  46. 46.

    Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl 1892, 477) (Official Journal of the former Reich, 1992 at 477).

  47. 47.

    See Sect. 6.3.2.

  48. 48.

    That is the place where those companies maintain their main administrative headquarters.

  49. 49.

    See Sect. 6.3.3.1.

  50. 50.

    See Sect. 6.3.3.2.

  51. 51.

    Statistisches Bundesamt, ‘Gewerbeanzeigen August 2015’, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/UnternehmenHandwerk/Gewerbeanzeigen/Gewerbeanzeigen2020500151084.pdf?__blob=publicationFile>.

  52. 52.

    For details, see Sect. 6.4.1.

  53. 53.

    For details, see Sect. 6.5.

  54. 54.

    See <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-891_en.htm>.

  55. 55.

    Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on single-member private limited liability companies <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:212:FIN>.

  56. 56.

    A “normal SE” is an SE with operations and more than 5 employees. In contrast to that, “empty SEs” are SEs with operations but without employees, “Shelf SEs” (a great number of which have been incorporated) are SEs with neither operations nor employees—see Sect. 6.4.5.

  57. 57.

    For details, see Sect. 6.4.5.

  58. 58.

    See also Ebke (2005), p. 39; Kersting and Schindler (2003).

  59. 59.

    du Plessis (1996), pp. 44–46.

  60. 60.

    Until 2012 large Dutch companies had to adopt a two-tier board system, but under current Dutch law they have a choice between a unitary or a two-tier board system.

  61. 61.

    Saenger (2015a), p. 293, para 571.

  62. 62.

    Rühmkorf (2015), pp. 73 et seq.

  63. 63.

    Jungmann (2006), pp. 426, 437.

  64. 64.

    BGH, 03 Mar 1991 – II ZR 188/89, BGHZ 114, 127, 129 et seq; affirmed by BGH, 15 Nov 1993 – II ZR 197/93, BGHZ 126, 340, 340 et seq. Both judgements (with further bibliography) described the function of the supervisory board as follows: ‘According to S 111 AktG the supervisory board is primarily responsible for monitoring the management. This control does not only relate to completed issues, but also to points of principles of the future business policy; [the control] is not limited to a review of legality, but must include the management’s expediency and thrift. Monitoring functions understood in this regard can only be effectively exercised by regular discussions with the management board and its ongoing consultancy; therefore, counselling is the leading instrument of a future-oriented management supervision.’ See Lutter and Kremer (1992), pp. 87 et seq for further details of these judgements. For questions of the supervisory board’s liability in this regard see Buchta and van Kann (2003), pp. 1665 et seq.

  65. 65.

    See s 198A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. See further AWA Ltd v Daniels (t/a Deloitte Haskins & Sells & Ors) (1992) 10 ACLC 933.

  66. 66.

    See FRC, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance (October 2010) <http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/The-UK-Approach-to-Corporate-Governance.aspx>; and ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (2014). See also Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (Higgs Report) (January 2003) < http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609003228/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf>.

  67. 67.

    See Tricker (1994), pp. 44–45.

  68. 68.

    See Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Members (January 2002) at 4–5; Government Commission, German Corporate Governance Code (also referred to as the GCGC) (2015) <http://www.dcgk.de//files/dcgk/usercontent/en/download/code/2015-05-05_Corporate_Governance_Code_EN.pdf> at 1; Owen (2008), pp. 21, 22.

  69. 69.

    See Berrar (2001), pp. 2181, 2185, 2186.

  70. 70.

    Hopt (2000), pp. 784–785; Claussen (1996), p. 484; Baums (1995), p. 15; Langenbucher and Blaum (1994), pp. 2197, 2198; Grundmann and Mülbert (2001), pp. 221, 222. Also Davies (2001), p. 292.

  71. 71.

    Röller (1994), p. 334. See generally Gerhard Cromme, ‘Status and Development of Corporate Governance in Germany’ address delivered at 7th German Corporate Governance Code Conference, Berlin, 27 July 2008 <http://www.dcgk.de/files/dcgk/usercontent/en/download/2008/080627_Cromme_Konferenz_en.pdf> at 1. See also Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010, available at <http://zip-online.de/volltext.html?id=2a38a4a9316c49e5a833517c45d31070> at 10, para 1.1.3.

  72. 72.

    See e.g. Weil et al. (2002), pp. 4, 5.

  73. 73.

    With regard to the strength and weaknesses of the one-tier model see also Jungmann (2006), pp. 426, 458–462.

  74. 74.

    Jungmann (2006), pp. 426, 461.

  75. 75.

    Cf Hartmann (2003), pp. 18, 31.

  76. 76.

    Therefore it is, for example, traditionally the task of the supervisory board to institute actions against management board members, see also in detail Saenger (2015b), pp. 13, 19 et seq.

  77. 77.

    Owen (2003), pp. 167, 168.

  78. 78.

    Böckli (2009), pp. 270–272.

  79. 79.

    Röller (1994), p. 334.

  80. 80.

    Baums (1995), p. 15.

  81. 81.

    Martin (2003), p. 952.

  82. 82.

    Mülbert (2010), pp. 375 et seq; Möslein (2010), pp. 72, 73 et seq; Seibert (2009), p. 1498; Peltzer (2009), p. 1041.

  83. 83.

    For a very good and realistic overview of the aims and objectives of comparative research in the area of corporate governance, see Mäntysaari (2005), pp. 9 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Davies (2000), p. 135, para 135.

  85. 85.

    Roe (1993), pp. 1927, 1979, 1980.

  86. 86.

    Also Conrad (1984), p. 1459; Buxbaum (1991), p. 1. For an analysis of Conrad and Buxbaum’s insights, see Rock (1995), pp. 291, 293, 296–298.

  87. 87.

    Vagts (1966), pp. 76–78, 87, 88.

  88. 88.

    Baums (1992), pp. 516 and 523.

  89. 89.

    Lutter (1991), pp. 249, 250. Lutter (2001), pp. 226, 227 points out two of the unique characteristics of the German corporate governance system, namely the two-tier board system and employee at supervisory board level. He is, however, adamant that none of these should be changed (at 227).

  90. 90.

    See Probst and Theisen (2010), pp. 1573, 1578; Gerum (2007), pp. 418, 419 and 436–438; Wooldridge and Pannier (2005), pp. 225, 240, 241; Großfeld and Lehmann (1994), vol. 1, p. 45.

  91. 91.

    See Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Bullock Report – Minority Report) 174 para 17, 177 para 36 and 189–91 (Appendix B); Wedderburn of Charlton, ‘Companies and Employees: Common Law or Social Dimension?’ [1993] LQR 230–38; Hadden (1977), pp. 447, 448; Côté (1973), pp. 276, 277. Also see Preamble to the 1st Draft Fifth Dir (1972 Bulletin of the European Communities (Supplement 10/72) 6–7); ‘Explanatory Memorandum’ [1972] Bulletin of the European Communities (Supplement 10/72) 33.

  92. 92.

    Bericht der Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex an die Bundesregierung, November 2010, available at <http://zip-online.de/volltext.html?id=2a38a4a9316c49e5a833517c45d31070> at 9, 10, para 1.1.3.

References

  • Baums T (1992) Corporate governance in Germany: the role of the banks. AJCL

    Google Scholar 

  • Baums T (1995) Der Aufsichtsrat – Aufgaben und Reformfragen. ZIP 16:15

    Google Scholar 

  • Beach CF (1891) Company law: commentaries on the law of private corporations whether with or without capital stock, also of joint-stock companies. TH Flood & Co, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Berrar C (2001) Die zustimmungspflichtigen Geschäfte nach § 111 Abs. 4 AktG im Lichte der Corporate Governance-Diskussion. Der Betrieb (Zeitschrift) 54:2181, 2185, 2186

    Google Scholar 

  • Böckli P (2009) Konvergenz: Annäherung des monistischen und des dualistischen Führungs- und Aufsichtssystem. In: Hommelhoff P, Hopt KJ, von Werder A (eds) Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis, 2nd edn. Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln, pp 270–272

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchta J, van Kann J (2003) Die Haftung des Aufsichtsrats einer Aktiengesellschaft – aktuelle Entwicklungen in Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung. DStR 39:1665 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Buxbaum RM (1991) Institutional owners and corporate management: a comparative perspective. Brooklyn Law Rev 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Chadwyck Healey CEH, Wheeler PF, Burney C (1894) A treatise on the law and practice relating to joint stock companies under the acts of 1862–1890, 3rd edn. Sweet and Maxwell, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark FW (1866) A treatise on the law of partnership and joint stock companies according to the law of Scotland. T & T Clark, Edinburgh

    Google Scholar 

  • Claussen CP (1996) Aktienrechtsreform 1997. AG 41:484

    Google Scholar 

  • Conrad AF (1984) The supervision of corporate management: a comparison of developments in European Community and US Law. Michigan Law Rev 1459

    Google Scholar 

  • Côté AC (1973) Legal regulation and workers’ participation in the enterprise. PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, pp 276, 277

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies P (2000) Employee representation and corporate law reform: a comment from the UK. Comp Labor Law Pol J 22:135

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies P (2001) Struktur der Unternehmensführung in Großbritannien und Deutschland: Konvergenz oder fortbestehende Divergenz? ZGR 30:292

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ (1996) Corporate governance: reflections on the German two-tier system. TSAR 20:44–46

    Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ, Großfeld B, Luttermann C, Saenger I, Sandrock O (2007) German corporate governance in international and European context. Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, p 6

    Google Scholar 

  • du Plessis JJ, Hargovan A, Bagaric M, Harris J (2015) Principles of contemporary corporate governance, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 109 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Ebke W (2005) The European conflict-of-corporate-laws revolution: Überseering, inspire art and beyond. The International Lawyer, p 39

    Google Scholar 

  • Eisenhardt U, Wackerbarth U (2015) Gesellschaftsrecht I – Recht der Personengesellschaften, 16th edn. CH Beck Verlag, München, p 2

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerum E (2007) Das deutsche Corporate Governance-System. Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart, pp 418, 419 and 436–438

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (1968) Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmenskonzentration und Kleinaktionär. Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen, pp 113 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (1973) Management and control of marketable share companies. In: International encyclopaedia of comparative law. Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2000a) Comparative law as a comprehensive approach. Richmond J Global Law Bus 1:1

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2000b) Global accounting: where internet meets geography. Am J Comp Law 48:261

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2001) Lawyers and accountants: a semiotic competition. Wake Forest Law Rev 36:167

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2002a) Changing concepts of rules: global corporate assessment. Law Bus Rev Am 8:341

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2002b) Global valuation: geography and semiotics. SMU Law Rev 55:197

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2003a) Comparatists and languages. In: Legrand and Munday (eds) Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions. OUP, Oxford, p 154

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2003b) Comparative corporate governance: generally accepted accounting principles v international accounting standards? North Carolina J Int Law Commer Reg 28:847

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2004a) Core questions of comparative law. Carolina Academic Press, Durham

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B (2004b) Global financial statements/local enterprise valuation. J Corp Law 29:338

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B, Ebke W (1977) Probleme der Unternehmensverfassung in rechtshistorischer und rechtsvergleichender Sicht (I). AG 22

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B, Irriger U (1988) Intertemporales Unternehmensrecht. JZ 43:531

    Google Scholar 

  • Großfeld B, Lehmann U (1994) Management structures and worker’s codetermination in Germany with European perspectives. Corporate Law Development Series

    Google Scholar 

  • Grundmann S, Mülbert PO (2001) Corporate Governance – Europäische Perspektiven. ZGR 30:221, 222

    Google Scholar 

  • Grunewald B (1995) Die Auslegung von Gesellschaftsverträgen und Satzungen. ZGR 24:68, 84, 85

    Google Scholar 

  • Hadden T (1977) Company law and capitalism, 2nd edn. Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, pp 447, 448

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanau P (1991) Einführung. In: Mitbestimmungsgesetze in den Unternehmen mit allen Wahlordnungen, 4th edn. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, pp VII–XX

    Google Scholar 

  • Hartmann K (2003) Die Aufsichtsratsvergütung als Erfolgsfaktor im deutschen Corporate-Governance-System. Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt, pp 18, 31

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopt KJ (2000) Gemeinsame Grundsätze der Corporate Governance in Europa? ZGR 29:784–785

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jungmann C (2006) The effectiveness of corporate governance in one-tier and two-tier board systems. ECFR 4

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersting C, Schindler CP (2003) Inspire Art Decision of Sept 2003 and its effects on practice. German Law J (Electronic Journal) 4(12)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kübler F, Assmann H-D (2006) Gesellschaftsrecht, 6th edn. CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Langenbucher G, Blaum U (1994) Audit Committees – Ein Weg zur Überwindung der Überwachungskrise? DB 47:2197, 2198

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindley N (1860) A treatise on the law of partnership, including its application to joint-stock and other companies. William Maxwell, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Lutter M (1991) Unternehmensplanung und Aufsichtsrat. AG 38:249, 250

    Google Scholar 

  • Lutter M (2001) Vergleichende Corporate Governance – Die deutsche Sicht. ZGR 30:226, 227

    Google Scholar 

  • Lutter M, Kremer T (1992) Die Beratung der Gesellschaft durch Aufsichtsratsmitglieder. ZGR 21:87 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäntysaari P (2005) Comparative corporate governance. Springer Verlag, Berlin, pp 9 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Martens K-P (1979) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und das Gesellschaftsrecht. ZGR 8:493, 508, 509

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin C (2003) Das U.S. corporate governance system – Verlust der Vorbildfunktion. NZG 6:952

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertens H-J (1977) Zuständigkeiten des mitbestimmten Aufsichtsrats. ZGR 6:270, 283–288

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertens H-J (1994) Satzungs- und Organisationsautonomie im Aktien- und Konzernrecht. ZGR 23:426, 438–440

    Google Scholar 

  • Möslein F (2010) Contract Governance und Corporate Governance im Zusammenspiel. JZ 72, 73 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Mülbert PO (2010) Corporate Governance in der Krise (Editorial). ZHR 375 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Niedostadek O (2004) The Proprietary Company – das Recht der Australischen Private Company. LIT Verlag, Münster

    Google Scholar 

  • Olbrisch N (1997) Die südafrikanische close corporation und ihre strukturellen Unterschiede zur deutschen GmbH. LIT Verlag, Münster

    Google Scholar 

  • Olbrisch N, du Plessis JJ (1997) Some structural differences between the South African close corporation and the German GmbH. TSAR, pp 315 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Oquendo AR (2001) Breaking on through to the other side: understanding continental European corporate governance. Univ Pennsylvania J Int Econ Law 22:975

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen CJ (2003) Board games: Germany’s monopoly on the two-tier system of corporate governance and why the post-Enron United States would benefit from its adaption. Penn State Int Law Rev 22:167, 168

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen SG (2008) The role of the board. In: Rushton (ed) The business case for corporate governance, pp 10, 21, 22

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzer M (2009) Trial and Error – Anmerkungen zu den Bemühungen des Gesetzgebers, die Arbeit des Aufsichtsrates zu verbessern. NZG 27:1041

    Google Scholar 

  • Peltzer M, Hickinbotham AG (1999) German stock corporation act and the co-determination act: German-English text with an introduction in English. OVS Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln

    Google Scholar 

  • Probst A, Theisen MR (2010) Herausforderungen und Grenzen “mitunternehmerischer” Entscheidungen im Aufsichtsrat. DB 65:1573, 1578

    Google Scholar 

  • Raiser T (1988) The theory of enterprise law in the Federal Republic of Germany. AJCL

    Google Scholar 

  • Rehbinder E (1979) Das Mitbestimmungsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus unterneh-mensrechtlicher Sicht. ZGR 8:471, 478, 480, 481

    Google Scholar 

  • Reuter D (1979) Der Einfluß der Mitbestimmung auf das Gesellschafts– und Arbeitsrecht. AcP 509–566

    Google Scholar 

  • Rock E (1995) America’s fascination with German corporate governance. AG 40:291, 293, 296–298

    Google Scholar 

  • Roe MJ (1993) Some differences in corporate structure in Germany, Japan, and the US. Yale L J 1927, 1979, 1980

    Google Scholar 

  • Röller W (1994) Quo vadis Aufsichtsrat? AG 39:334

    Google Scholar 

  • Rühmkorf A (2015) Corporate social responsibility, private law and global supply chains. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp 73 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Saenger I (2015a) Gesellschaftsrecht, 3rd edn. Verlag Franz Vahlen, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Saenger I (2015b) The best interest of the corporation, procedural questions of enforcing individual and corporate rights and legal actions against board members. EBLR 19:13, 19 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider H, Heidenhain M (2000) The German Stock Corporations Act, 2nd edn. CH Beck Verlag, München

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott WR (1912) The general development of the joint-stock system to 1720. The University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Seibert U (2009) Das VorstAG – Regelungen zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und zum Aufsichtsrat. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Bankrecht 32:1498

    Google Scholar 

  • Teubner G (1988) Enterprise corporation: new industrial policy and the “Essence” of the legal person. AJCL 130 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Thring H (1868) The law and practice of joint-stock public companies, 2nd edn. Stevens & Sons, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Tricker (1994) International Corporate Governance, pp 44, 45

    Google Scholar 

  • Vagts DF (1966) Reforming the “Modern” corporation: perspectives from the German. Harvard Law Rev 80

    Google Scholar 

  • Weil, Gotshal, Manges (2002) Comparative study of corporate governance codes relevant to the European Union and its Members (January), pp 4, 5

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiethölter R (1961) Interessen und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im Amerikanischen und Deutschen Recht. CF Müller Verlag, Karlsruhe, pp 272 et seq

    Google Scholar 

  • Windbichler C (1991) Grenzen der Mitbestimmung in einer markwirtschaftlichen Ordnung. ZfA 35

    Google Scholar 

  • Wooldridge F, Pannier M (2005) The German corporate governance code: status and development. EBLR 225(240):241

    Google Scholar 

  • Wordsworth C (1854) The law of mining, banking, insurance and general joint stock companies not requiring express authority of parliament, 6th edn. WG Benning and Co, London

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Deakin Law School, Deakin University, Locked Bag 20001, Waterfront Campus, Geelong, VIC, 3220, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

  2. University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany

    Bernhard Großfeld & Ingo Saenger

Authors
  1. Jean J. du Plessis
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Bernhard Großfeld
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Ingo Saenger
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Otto Sandrock
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jean J. du Plessis .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

du Plessis, J.J., Großfeld, B., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O. (2017). An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54198-2_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-54197-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-54198-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation