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Strategien zur Verbesserung der Steuermoral

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Die Psychologie des Steuerzahlens

Part of the book series: Die Wirtschaftspsychologie ((DWP))

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Zusammenfassung

Den Finanzbehörden stehen grundsätzlich zwei Strategien zur Verfügung, um das Verhalten der Steuerzahler zu regulieren: einerseits auf die Abschreckungswirkung von Kontrollen und Strafen zu setzen und andererseits Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um das Vertrauen der Steuerzahler zu gewinnen. Durch Ausübung von Macht kann Steuerehrlichkeit erzwungen werden. Gerechte Entscheidungsprozesse, professionelle Dienstleistungen und positive soziale Normen können das Vertrauen und damit freiwillige Kooperation fördern. Die beiden Strategien müssen ausgewogen eingesetzt und an den vorherrschenden sozialen Normen ausgerichtet werden. Idealtypisch gilt es, ein „Steuerklima“ zu schaffen, das von wechselseitigem Vertrauen zwischen Steuerzahlern und ‐behörden geprägt ist.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Der Abschnitt zu Horizontal Monitoring wurde von Maximlian Zieser verfasst.

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    Stephan Mühlbacher

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Mühlbacher, S. (2018). Strategien zur Verbesserung der Steuermoral. In: Die Psychologie des Steuerzahlens. Die Wirtschaftspsychologie. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53846-3_7

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