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Using Intel Software Guard Extensions for Efficient Two-Party Secure Function Evaluation

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9604))

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Abstract

Recent developments have made two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) vastly more efficient. However, because they make extensive use of cryptographic operations, these protocols remain too slow for practical use by most applications. The introduction of Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which provide an environment for the isolated execution of code and handling of data, offers an opportunity to overcome such performance concerns. In this paper, we explore the challenges of using SGX to achieve security guarantees similar to those found in traditional 2P-SFE systems. After demonstrating a number of critical concerns, we develop two protocols for secure computation in the semi-honest model on this platform: one in which both parties are SGX-enabled and a second in which only one party has direct access to this hardware. We then show how these protocols can be made secure in the malicious model. We conclude that implementing 2P-SFE on SGX-enabled devices can render it practical for a wide range of applications.

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Acknowledgements

The first author was supported in part by DARPA contract FA8750-13-2-0058. The second and fourth authors were supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1540217 and CNS-1540218. The third author was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1407454 and CNS-1409599. The fifth author was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1464087 and CNS-1464088. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA, NSF, or the U.S. Government.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA

    Debayan Gupta & Joan Feigenbaum

  2. University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 32611, USA

    Benjamin Mood, Kevin Butler & Patrick Traynor

Authors
  1. Debayan Gupta
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  2. Benjamin Mood
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  3. Joan Feigenbaum
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  4. Kevin Butler
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  5. Patrick Traynor
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joan Feigenbaum .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Concordia University, Montreal, Québec, Canada

    Jeremy Clark

  2. University College London, London, United Kingdom

    Sarah Meiklejohn

  3. Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y.A. Ryan

  4. Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA

    Dan Wallach

  5. Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany

    Michael Brenner

  6. New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Kurt Rohloff

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© 2016 International Financial Cryptography Association

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Gupta, D., Mood, B., Feigenbaum, J., Butler, K., Traynor, P. (2016). Using Intel Software Guard Extensions for Efficient Two-Party Secure Function Evaluation. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9604. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_20

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