Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

An Almost Ideal Coordination Mechanism for Unrelated Machine Scheduling

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9928))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The desirable properties of a coordination mechanism includes simplicity in its definition and efficiency of the outcomes of the induced game. We present a broad class of coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling that are simple to define and we identify one of its members (mechanism DCOORD) that is superior to all known mechanisms. DCOORD induces potential games with logarithmic price of anarchy and only constant price of stability. Both bounds are almost optimal.

This work was partially supported by the Caratheodory grant E.114 from the University of Patras and the project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 “CoCoRICo-CoDec”. Part of the work was done while the second author was visiting the Institute for Mathematical Sciences, National University of Singapore in 2015.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Even though their mechanism Balance heavily uses job IDs, Cohen et al. [9] claim that it is anonymous. This is certainly false according to our terminology since anonymity imposes that two jobs with identical load vectors should be indistinguishable.

References

  1. Abed, F., Correa, J.R., Huang, C.-C.: Optimal coordination mechanisms for multi-job scheduling games. In: Schulz, A.S., Wagner, D. (eds.) ESA 2014. LNCS, vol. 8737, pp. 13–24. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Abed, F., Huang, C.-C.: Preemptive coordination mechanisms for unrelated machines. In: Epstein, L., Ferragina, P. (eds.) ESA 2012. LNCS, vol. 7501, pp. 12–23. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Grove, E.F., Kao, M.-Y., Krishnan, P., Vitter, J.S.: Load balancing in the \(L_p\) norm. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 383–391 (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Azar, Y., Fleischer, L., Jain, K., Mirrokni, V.S., Svitkina, Z.: Optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Oper. Res. 63(3), 489–500 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Bhattacharya, S., Im, S., Kulkarni, J., Munagala, K.: Coordination mechanisms from (almost) all scheduling policies. In: Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), pp. 121–134 (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Caragiannis, I.: Better bounds for online load balancing on unrelated machines. In: Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 972–981 (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Caragiannis, I.: Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling. Algorithmica 66, 512–540 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E., Nanavati, A.: Coordination mechanisms. Theor. Comput. Sci. 410(36), 3327–3336 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Cohen, J., Dürr, C., Thang, N.K.: Smooth inequalities and equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games. In: Goldberg, P.W. (ed.) WINE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7695, pp. 350–363. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Cole, R., Correa, J.R., Gkatzelis, V.S., Gkatzelis, N.: Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games Econ. Behav. 92, 306–326 (2015)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Immorlica, N., Li, L., Mirrokni, V.S., Schulz, A.S.: Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling. Theor. Comput. Sci. 410(17), 1589–1598 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CTI “Diophantus” and University of Patras, Rion, Greece

    Ioannis Caragiannis

  2. CNRS (UMR-6211), Caen, France

    Angelo Fanelli

Authors
  1. Ioannis Caragiannis
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Angelo Fanelli
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ioannis Caragiannis .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Martin Gairing

  2. University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Rahul Savani

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A. (2016). An Almost Ideal Coordination Mechanism for Unrelated Machine Scheduling. In: Gairing, M., Savani, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9928. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_25

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_25

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-53353-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-53354-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation