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On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9928))

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Abstract

We consider nonatomic network games with one source and one destination. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we show that, under suitable conditions, the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case. The counterexamples occur in simple parallel graphs.

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Acknowledgments

Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi is a member of GNCS-INdAM. Roberto Cominetti gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of LUISS during a visit in which this research was initiated. His research is also supported by Núcleo Milenio Información y Coordinación en Redes ICM/FIC P10-024F. Marco Scarsini is a member of GNAMPA-INdAM. His work is partially supported by PRIN and MOE2013-T2-1-158.

The authors thank three referees for their insightful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS, Viale Romania 32, 00197, Rome, Italy

    Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi & Marco Scarsini

  2. Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile

    Roberto Cominetti

Authors
  1. Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
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  2. Roberto Cominetti
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  3. Marco Scarsini
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marco Scarsini .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Martin Gairing

  2. University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Rahul Savani

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Colini-Baldeschi, R., Cominetti, R., Scarsini, M. (2016). On the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network Games. In: Gairing, M., Savani, R. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9928. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_10

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