Abstract
From an EU law perspective, anti-avoidance measures adopted by Member States have long been subject of scrutiny of the CJEU under EU fundamental freedoms (See also the judgment in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Case C-524/04, ECLI:EU:C:2007:161, paragraph 25; judgment in Lankhost-Hohorst, C-324/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:749; judgment in Lasertec, C-492/04, ECLI:EU:C:2007:273; judgment in NV Lammers & Van Cleeff, C-105/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:24; judgment in Itelcar—Automóveis, C-282/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:629). This article focuses on the treatment of anti-tax avoidance measures under EU State aid law in the light of current international developments as regards fight against base erosion and profit shifting. Anti-tax avoidance measures indeed often contain rather open-ended notions and entail distinctions based on criteria relating to economic substance, which leads to a wide margin of appreciation by tax authorities. Therefore, they are likely to be caught by the prohibition of State aid. After a brief introduction on the principles guiding the application of State aid rules to fiscal measures, a typology of anti-avoidance measures adopted by the EU and its Member States according to their source, scope and their effects is provided. Then, the article discusses the most significant case-law on the topic, i.e. the Finnish P Oy and German Sanierungsklausel cases and their consequence on the current approach taken by EU institutions in the fight against purely tax driven arrangements. Finally, it proposes interpretative tools to reconcile state aid enforcement with substance-based anti-avoidance measures, in particular as regards the definition of the reference framework, the selection of the main objective of the tax measure at stake and the assessment of the genuine character of economic activities.
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Notes
- 1.
Schön (2003), in particular p. 18 et seq.
- 2.
See the founding Italian textile case, judgment in Italy v Commission, C-173/73, EU:C:1974:71. See also judgment in Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, C-143/99, EU:C:2001:598; judgment of 13 September 2006, British Aggregates v Commission, T-210/02, EU:T:2006:253; judgment in British Aggregates v Commission, C-487/06, EU:C:2008:757 and judgment of 7 March 2012, British Aggregates v Commission, T-210/02 RENV, EU:T:2012:110;judgment in GIL Insurance and Others, C-308/01, EU:C:2004:252; judgment in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and UK, C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732; judgment of 7 November 2014, Autogrill Espana v Commission, T-219/10, EU:T:2014:939; judgment of 7 November 2014, Banco Santander, SA and Santusa Holding, SL v European Commission, T-399/11, EU:T:2014:938. On State aid and taxation in general, see Quigley (2015), pp. 97–152; Rust and Micheau (2013); Micheau (2013); Hancher et al. (2012), pp. 321–362; Kube (2005), pp. 99–117; Panayi (2004), p. 283; Waelbroeck (2004), p. 1023; Luja (2003); Wouters and Van Hees (2001), p. 655; Schön (1999), pp. 927–928.
- 3.
Judgment in Italy v Commission, EU:C:1974:71, paragraph 15.
- 4.
- 5.
See on this issue, Lang (2012), p. 418.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Judgment in P Oy, C-6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraphs 19–20.
- 9.
Judgment in Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 49 and cited case-law.
- 10.
Judgment in Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, EU:C:2001:598, paragraph 42.
- 11.
Judgment in Paint Graphos and others, joined cases C-78/08 and 80/08, paragraphs 73–75.
- 12.
European Commission (1998), paragraph 12.
- 13.
The examples provided at the 1998 Commission Notice, such as the progressive nature of an income tax scale or profit tax scale, the calculation of asset depreciation and stock valuation methods or the arrangements for the collection of fiscal debt, instead of clarifying this concept appear to add further uncertainty. See European Commission (1998), paragraphs 23–27. See also recent guidance provided in the Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p. 36 – 40) and in the DG Competition – Internal Working Paper – Background to the High Level Forum on State Aid of 3 June 2016 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/working_paper_tax_rulings.pdf, last accessed on 10 August 2016).
- 14.
See European Commission (1998), paragraphs 10, 12, 21–22 and judgment in Déménagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT), C-256/97, EU:C:1999:332, paragraph 30; Judgment in P Oy, C-6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 27.
- 15.
- 16.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 24.
- 17.
Judgment in Déménagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT), EU:C:1999:332, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited.
- 18.
Judgment in Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and UK, EU:C:2011:732, paragraph 75.
- 19.
OECD (2016a).
- 20.
The measures, by their nature, are not legally binding, but it is expected that they will be applied according to the consensus.
- 21.
OECD (2015f), p. 6.
- 22.
- 23.
In respect of the obligation of MS to abide by EU law, the CJEU in several cases made it clear that “it should be recalled that, although direct taxation falls within their competence, Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law”. See judgment in Wielockx v Inspecteur der directe belastingen, Case C-80/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:271, paragraph 16; judgment in Imperial Chemical Industries v Colmer, C-264/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:370, paragraph 19; judgment in De Baeck, C-268/03, ECLI:EU:C:2004:342, paragraph 19. See Kemmeren (2014), p. 190.
- 24.
Council of the European Union (2009), pp. 34–46.
- 25.
These structuring practices are referred as to treaty shopping. For a definition of treaty shopping, see De Broe (2008), pp. 5–20.
- 26.
OECD (2015a), pp. 20 seq.
- 27.
OECD (2015a), pp. 42 seq.
- 28.
However, transfer pricing rules can also be considered as a system aiming at establishing a fair(er) allocation income between jurisdictions. This does not appear to be the original intent of the first transfer pricing legislations. See Schoueri (2015), p. 690.
- 29.
- 30.
See Luja (2015), pp. 12–13.
- 31.
Judgment in Hans Markus Kofoed v Skatteministeriet, C-321/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:408, paragraph 38. The principle of non-application of EU law to abusive practices was applied for the first time in the area of VAT in the Halifax and University of Huddersfield cases (judgment in Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd, County Wide Property Investments Ltd v HMRC, C-255/02, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, and judgment in University of Huddersfield Higher Education Corporation v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, C-223/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:124. On the prohibition of abuse in EU direct tax law, see in particular the judgment in Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544; judgment in Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, C-524/04, EU:C:2007:161 and judgment in Glaxo Wellcome, C-182/08, EU:C:2009:559. On the principle of abuse of rights in EU tax law, see O’Shea (2011), p. 77; De la Feria (2008); De Broe (2008), pp. 755 et seq. For a critical comment, see Arnull (2009), pp. 18–23; and Sørensen (2006), p. 423.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
Council of the European Union (2015), pp. 1–3.
- 35.
“An artificial arrangement or an artificial series of arrangements which has been put into place for the essential purpose of avoiding taxation and leads to a tax benefit shall be ignored.” See European Commission (2012a). The distinction between main purpose and essential purpose or even sole purpose in also to be found in the VAT case of the CJEU on abuse of rights. See Case C-653/11, Newey, [2013], ECLI:EU:C:2013:409, paragraph 46 and the case-law quoted). For an analysis of the GAAR recommended by the Commission in 2012 and the relationship with BEPS, see Dourado (2015a), pp. 42–57.
- 36.
OECD (2015d).
- 37.
OECD (2015d), p. 17.
- 38.
OECD (2015e).
- 39.
See OECD (2010).
- 40.
For a description, see Traversa (2013), p. 611.
- 41.
OECD (2015d), pp. 13 and 17 et seq.
- 42.
European Commission (2016a), Article 4.
- 43.
First Germany (2008), followed by Italy (2008), Spain (2012), Portugal (2013) and Finland (2014) and Greece.
- 44.
See Dourado (2015b), p. 353: “CFC legislation can either be seen as restoring the original right of a jurisdiction to tax its residents on a worldwide tax principle or an exception to the international tax rule that recognises deferral of taxation of profits accrued by foreign entities.”
- 45.
It notably discusses the definition of a CFC and recommends the adoption of a broad definition applicable to corporate entities including transparent entities (partnerships and trusts) and permanent establishments. The recommendation also concerns the required type and level of control to qualify. It proposes to apply both a legal test and an economic test and to establish a threshold at minimum 50 % control, whether direct or indirect.
- 46.
European Commission (2016a), Articles 8 and 9.
- 47.
For a global overview, see Van Weeghel (2010), pp. 18 et seq.
- 48.
See OECD (2015d), p. 20 and Annex A, p. 85.
- 49.
Judgment in P Oy, C-6/12, EU:C:2013:525. See Traversa (2014).
- 50.
Judgment of 4 February 2016 in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, T-287/11, ECR, EU: T:2016:60, and judgment of 4 February 2016 in GFKL Financial Services AG v European Commission, T-620/11, ECR, EU:T:2016:59.
- 51.
- 52.
European Commission (2009), p. 1.
- 53.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, para. 8.
- 54.
KStG §8(4).
- 55.
The conditions to benefit from the new Sanierungsklausel were the following:
a) the acquisition serves the purpose of restructuring the corporate entity
b) the company is, or is likely to be, insolvent or over-indebted at the time of the acquisition
c) the company’s fundamental business structures are preserved, which requires:
– the corporate entity to honour an agreement between management and works council (Betriebsvereinbarung) on the preservation of jobs, or
– preservation of 80 % of the jobs (in terms of the average annual wage bill) for the first five years following the acquisition, or
– injections of significant business assets or write-off of debts which still have an economic value within 12 months; business assets are significant if they represent at least 25 % of the assets of the previous financial year; any transfer back to the acquiring entity within the first three years are deducted;
– the company does not change sector of activity during the five years following the acquisition;
– the company had not ceased operation at the time of the acquisition.
- 56.
European Commission (2011), paragraph 21–23.
- 57.
European Commission (2011), paragraph 66.
- 58.
European Commission (2011), paragraphs 80–83.
- 59.
European Commission (2011), paragraphs 83–89.
- 60.
European Commission (2011), paragraphs 109–113.
- 61.
Judgment of 4 February 2016 in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, T-287/11, EU:T:2016:60.
- 62.
Heitkamp had also invoked the protection of legitimate expectation in a plea which was deemed inadmissible, see judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, paragraphs 146–150.
- 63.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraphs 151–174.
- 64.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 99.
- 65.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 107.
- 66.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraphs 123–138.
- 67.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 141 and cited judgment of 7 November 2014 in Autogrill Espagna/Commission, T-219/10, EU:T:2014:939, paragraphs 44–45.
- 68.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 140.
- 69.
Judgment in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 161.
- 70.
Judgment of 4 February 2016 in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraphs 162–164.
- 71.
Judgment of 4 February 2016 in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraph 170.
- 72.
See Opinion AG Sharpston, 7 February 2013, C-6/12, EU:C:2013:69, paragraph 34. According to the Advocate general, since the measures at stake were already into force in the moment of Finland’s accession to the EU, even if they would constitute State aid, had to be considered as existing aid and for applied by the national judge as long as the Commission would not have intervened on the ground of Art. 108(2) TFUE.
- 73.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 22. See also judgment in Paint Graphos and others, EU:C:2011:550, paragraph 65.
- 74.
European Commission (2006), recital 133 and seq. This decision illustrates the high standard to meet for a Member State to prove the existence of a justification based on the internal logic of the tax system. Although in that case the Commission had found at paragraphs 134–135 that “by limiting the amount of deductible depreciation [the legal provision] does in fact seek to combat abusive recourse to tax-transparent structures with a view to achieving a tax saving as part of operations to finance assets leased out or otherwise made available. That objective is clearly necessary and rational for purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the scheme of tax-deductible depreciation of assets leased out or otherwise made available and must therefore be considered to form an inherent part of the said scheme”. However, after acknowledging that a derogation was admissible, the Commission emphasized at paragraph 136 that “although derogations […] are admissible, they should be based only on criteria the fulfilment of which would be capable of preventing recourse, for tax optimisation purposes, to the financing […] by means of tax-transparent structures such as EIGs” and concluded to the absence of any valid justification.
- 75.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 21.
- 76.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 32. This is the case in most, if not all, EU Member States. It can be seen as a measure implementing the principle according to which each taxpayer asked to be taxed according to the ability to pay principle. See Michelsen (1998), pp. 21–69; Ault and Arnold (2010), pp. 393–397 and from the German prospective, Brodersen and Mückl (2014).
- 77.
Ibid, Judgment of 4 February 2016 in Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, EU:T:2016:60, paragraphs 107.
- 78.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 20.
- 79.
European Commission (1998), paragraph 26.
- 80.
Judgment in P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 8.
- 81.
Judgement in Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep BV vs Staatssecretaris van Financien, joined Cases C-487/01, EU:C:2004:263 and judgment in Holin Groep, C-7/02, EU:C:2004:263, paragraph 76; judgment in Halifax and Others, C-255/02, EU:C:2006:121, paragraph 71; judgment in Mahagében and Dávid, Cases C-80/11 and C-142/11, EU:C:2012:373, paragraph 41; judgment in Bonik, C-285/11, EU:C:2012:774, paragraphs 35 and 36; judgment LVK 56, C-643/11, EU:C:2013:55, paragraph 58.
- 82.
Judgment in Cadbury Schweppes, EU:C:2006:544, and the case-law and literature quoted at footnote 34.
- 83.
- 84.
See European Commission (2016a).
- 85.
European Commission (2016a), Explanatory memorandum, at 3.
- 86.
See European Commission (2016a), Articles 4 and 6.
- 87.
See judgment of 5 April 2006 in Deutsche Bahn v Commission, T-351/02, EU:T:2006:104.
- 88.
See European Commission (2016a), Explanatory memorandum, at 7.
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Traversa, E., Sabbadini, P.M. (2016). Anti-avoidance Measures and State Aid in a Post-BEPS Context: An Attempt at Reconciliation. In: Richelle, I., Schön, W., Traversa, E. (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation. MPI Studies in Tax Law and Public Finance, vol 6. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53055-9_6
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