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On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9470))

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Abstract

We investigate the efficiency of some Stackelberg strategies in congestion games with affine latency functions. A Stackelberg strategy is an algorithm that chooses a subset of players and assigns them a prescribed strategy with the purpose of mitigating the detrimental effect that the selfish behavior of the remaining uncoordinated players may cause to the overall performance of the system. The efficiency of a Stackelberg strategy is measured in terms of the price of anarchy of the pure Nash equilibria they induce. Three Stackelberg strategies, namely Largest Latency First, Cover and Scale, were already considered in the literature and non-tight upper and lower bounds on their price of anarchy were given. We reconsider these strategies and provide the exact bound on the price of anarchy of both Largest Latency First and Cover and a better upper bound on the price of anarchy of Scale.

This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2010–2011 research project ARS TechnoMedia: “Algorithmics for Social Technological Networks” funded by the Italian Ministry of University.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Physics “Ennio De Giorgi”, University of Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano, P.O. Box 193, 73100, Lecce, Italy

    Vittorio Bilò

  2. Gran Sasso Science Institute, L’Aquila, Italy

    Cosimo Vinci

Authors
  1. Vittorio Bilò
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  2. Cosimo Vinci
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Correspondence to Vittorio Bilò .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece

    Evangelos Markakis

  2. CWI and VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Guido Schäfer

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Bilò, V., Vinci, C. (2015). On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games. In: Markakis, E., Schäfer, G. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9470. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48994-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48995-6

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