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European, National and International Competition Regime

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Handbook of EU Competition Law

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Abstract

Overlaps are nevertheless possible in areas where German competition law under the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) and European Union competition law largely parallel each other. However, this only applies to the limited scope of Art. 101, 102 TFEU, thus only to circumstances which are apt to impair trade between the Member States or have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Internal Market. Outside of the area of merger control, any resulting conflicts had not been resolved by means of European law under Art. 103 (2) lit. e) TFEU for a long period of time. Actual problems are the application of the EU rules on competition to undertakings operating internationally, the compatibility with GATT and WTO and the cooperation with competition authorities from third countries, e.g. from the USA.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Article 21 (2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, p. 1. The entire text was published in the form of an amendment, OJ, 1990 L 257, p. 13.

  2. 2.

    See Khan, In: Geiger et al. (2010), Art. 103 AEUV, para 14.

  3. 3.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

  4. 4.

    Council Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 6 February 1962, OJ No. 13, p. 204, last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 effective 1 May 2004.

  5. 5.

    See by contrast, Art. 9 (1) Regulation No. 17 which provided for the exclusive competence of the Commission in this regard.

  6. 6.

    Critical of this method, Lässig (1997), p. 78 et seq. The aspects set out therein are likewise still of importance on the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 to the extent they are not tied to a requirement to provide notice to national authorities.

  7. 7.

    Brohm (2012), p. 195.

  8. 8.

    General Court, Case T-9/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:70 (para 491)—HFB.

  9. 9.

    Frenz (2010), para 1597.

  10. 10.

    ECJ, Case C-325/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:245 (para 23)—France/Commission; for further discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 1596 et seq. with further citations.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-303/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:424 (paras 23 et seq., 35)—Commission/France; Case C-325/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:245 (paras 30 et seq.)—France/Commission; General Court, Case T-258/06, ECLI:EU:T:2010:214—Germany/Commission; Frenz (2010), paras 1542 et seq.; Thomas (2009), 426 et seq.

  12. 12.

    For further discussion, see Pampel (2005b), p. 83 et seq.; Pampel (2005a), 12; court rulings General Court, Case T-119/02, ECLI:EU:T:2003:101 (para 242)—Philips. For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 1557 et seq. Taking a more reserved approach, Immenga (2012), p. 25: “created a certain degree of confidence.”

  13. 13.

    Also based on this, Immenga (2012), p. 25.

  14. 14.

    ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 24 et seq.)—Expedia.

  15. 15.

    See Frenz (2010), para 1587 as well as Adam (1999), p. 71 et seq.; other view Thomas (2009), p. 436 et seq. For additional discussion, see paras 336 et seq.

  16. 16.

    From the perspective of Art. 3 (2) Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 and paras 335 et seq.

  17. 17.

    See fundamentally ECJ, Case C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709—Mangold; for further discussion, see Frenz (2010), paras 92 et seq.; regarding continued development Frenz (2011a), 199 et seq.

  18. 18.

    For example, the assessment of Durner (2012), p. 958.

  19. 19.

    Frenz (2010), paras 1554 et seq., in particular paras 1560 et seq., 1564 et seq. on competition law; see also in this regard Walzel (2008), p. 342 et seq.

  20. 20.

    Brohm (2012), p. 187 et seq., 199 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See, Immenga (2012), p. 25.

  22. 22.

    However, asserted by Durner (2012), p. 958.

  23. 23.

    ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON.

  24. 24.

    Independent of the question of what the binding effect is based upon, whether the principle of equality or the principle of sincere cooperation (Brohm 2012, p. 181 et seq.). Rejecting the latter, Thomas (2009), p. 435 et seq.; Frenz (2010), para 1588.

  25. 25.

    ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia.

  26. 26.

    Bechtold (2013), § 48.

  27. 27.

    For further discussion of the binding effect, see Ehricke (1994), p. 170 et seq.

  28. 28.

    ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 7)—Walt Wilhelm.

  29. 29.

    Fundamentally Koch (1959), p. 241 et seq.

  30. 30.

    See ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 3)—Walt Wilhelm.

  31. 31.

    ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (paras 8 et seq.)—Walt Wilhelm.

  32. 32.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 16)—Giry und Guerlain.

  33. 33.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain in the event of a comfort letter halting proceedings.

  34. 34.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 14)—Giry und Guerlain: “primary problem”. Providing further analysis, Walz (1994), p. 37 et seq.

  35. 35.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18 end)—Giry und Guerlain.

  36. 36.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain.

  37. 37.

    See ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 3)—Walt Wilhelm.

  38. 38.

    ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1-3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188 (para 18)—Giry und Guerlain.

  39. 39.

    ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 11)—Walt Wilhelm.

  40. 40.

    ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 6)—Walt Wilhelm. In general, see ECJ, Case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 (593 et seq.)—Costa/E.N.E.L.; Case C-184/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:50 (para 20)—Nimz.

  41. 41.

    ECJ, Case 106/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49 (para 17/18)—Simmenthal; Case 249/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:245 (para 14)—Albako.

  42. 42.

    For further discussion, see above paras 1 et seq.

  43. 43.

    Ultimately in favour, Walz (1994), p. 265.

  44. 44.

    However, this does not oblige the authorities of the Member States to examine national law in every case in addition to European Union law, see below, para 322.

  45. 45.

    For a detailed overall discussion, see Post-doctoral thesis from Hucke (2000) passim.

  46. 46.

    Emphasised in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 paras 22 et seq.

  47. 47.

    The Commission expected both, XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004) 658 final, sub-section 30, 724, also in relation to the following aspect.

  48. 48.

    Commission Notice—Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 81 (para 9 end).

  49. 49.

    See, ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 37 et seq.)—Expedia.

  50. 50.

    Hossenfelder and Lutz (2003), p. 120.

  51. 51.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 26.

  52. 52.

    ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 5)—Walt Wilhelm.

  53. 53.

    Bechtold (2001), p. 51; Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 169; Wiedemann, In: Wiedemann (2008), § 13 para 284 even refers to white lists as conflicting with the system.

  54. 54.

    See Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV paras 169 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Viewing this as “questionable” Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 23 end, however in para 25 approving of the context described above.

  56. 56.

    ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (paras 29 et seq.)—Expedia.

  57. 57.

    ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 33)—Expedia.

  58. 58.

    In favour Schweda (2004), p. 1142; contra Frenz (2010), para 1588; Grune (2013), p. 116 et seq.

  59. 59.

    See Frenz (2010), paras 299, 1587 as well as para 1189 with additional citations.

  60. 60.

    See, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON; in this context Frenz (2012a), 359 et seq.

  61. 61.

    Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), OJ 2014 C 2291, p. 1 (para 5).

  62. 62.

    Relying on this, ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 24, 26)—Expedia.

  63. 63.

    ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 (para 37)—Expedia.

  64. 64.

    The exploitation of a dominant position brought about by “several undertakings” is also covered by the prohibition of abusive practices.

  65. 65.

    Accord Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 29.

  66. 66.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 30.

  67. 67.

    Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 3 para 33.

  68. 68.

    In favour Weitbrecht (2003), p. 72 referring to the eighth recital. However, the interpretation of the wording of the text has priority.

  69. 69.

    For a more detailed discussion of overlaps and distinctions, see Bechtold (2013), § 20 paras 115 et seq.

  70. 70.

    Presuming this to be the case Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 30 end.

  71. 71.

    See ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 (para 25)—Commercial Solvents; Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394 (para 26)—CBEM, doctrinally fundamental ECJ, Case C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 (paras 49 et seq.)—Magill; Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (paras 38 et seq.)—Bronner; Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health; further discussion under paras 2077 et seq., 2085 et seq. re Microsoft (General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I as well as Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II).

  72. 72.

    Weidenbach et al. (2012), p. 73; see e.g. BGH, WRP 2005, 1278—Arealnetz.

  73. 73.

    See below paras 2072, 2077 et seq.

  74. 74.

    For further discussion, Frenz (2012b), 188 et seq.

  75. 75.

    Presuming such a general rule, Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 3 para 34.

  76. 76.

    ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 (para 31)—Bronner.

  77. 77.

    For further discussion, see paras 4152 et seq.

  78. 78.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 32.

  79. 79.

    Regarding national and European Union courts as well as the Commission, ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 56)—Masterfoods.

  80. 80.

    Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the functioning of the network of Competition Authorities of 10 December 2002, 15435/02 ADD 1, RC 22, Interinstitutional Dossier: 2000, 0243 (CNS) (para 22).

  81. 81.

    In favour Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 9 para 11.

  82. 82.

    ECJ, Case C-441/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:377 (paras 36 et seq.)—Alrosa; see by contrast then General Court, Case T-170/06, ECLI:EU:T:2007:220 (para 140)—Alrosa; discussed previously in Frenz (2010), paras 3567 et seq.

  83. 83.

    Lübking and von Koppenfels (2012), p. 81.

  84. 84.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 5 para 36.

  85. 85.

    See ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22 (para 45/56)—United Brands.

  86. 86.

    ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 448)—Suiker Unie.

  87. 87.

    Schwarze and Weitbrecht (2004), § 9 para 59.

  88. 88.

    Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (paras 10 et seq.).

  89. 89.

    Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 8).

  90. 90.

    Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 11).

  91. 91.

    Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 14) also including the following examples.

  92. 92.

    Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004 C 101, p. 43 (para 15).

  93. 93.

    On the competitive relationship, above paras 221 et seq.

  94. 94.

    See above para 355.

  95. 95.

    See above para 356.

  96. 96.

    On this issue, above paras 335 et seq.

  97. 97.

    ECJ, Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91 (para 45)—Delimitis.

  98. 98.

    ECJ, Case C-24/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:163 (para 54)—Alcan; Case C-298/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:372 (paras 35 et seq.)—Oelmühle; to a limited extent also Case C-453/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:17—Kühne & Heitz; in this context Frenz (2013b), paras 969 et seq.

  99. 99.

    Accordingly, there are likewise no concerns with regard to the allocation of authority; additional discussion, see Odersky (1996), p. 699 et seq.; Bornkamm (2000), p. 343 et seq.

  100. 100.

    ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 60)—Masterfoods; Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91 (para 46)—Delimitis with regard to the deviation of an exemption regulation.

  101. 101.

    ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 56)—Masterfoods in the context referred to here.

  102. 102.

    Divivier (2014), p. 361 et seq.

  103. 103.

    Regarding an action for annulment against a Commission decision, ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (paras 57 et seq.)—Masterfoods.

  104. 104.

    The following matter also originated from a reference for a preliminary ruling: ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795—Expedia.

  105. 105.

    ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (para 57 end)—Masterfoods.

  106. 106.

    Terhechte (2004), p. 124 contra Emmerich (2001), p. 3 et seq.

  107. 107.

    See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I and Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II.

  108. 108.

    Cf. regarding the mergers Boeing/McDonell Douglas Corp. Commission Decision 97/816/EC, OJ 1997 L 336, p. 16 and Commission Decision 2004/134/EC, OJ 2004 L 48, p. 1—General Electric/Honeywell; summarised in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 108 et seq., § 25 paras 78 et seq.

  109. 109.

    Von Meibom and Geiger (2002), p. 261 et seq.

  110. 110.

    See below paras 424 et seq.

  111. 111.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 49)—Portugal/Council; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 53)—Biret International; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 802)—Microsoft I.

  112. 112.

    For additional discussion, see below para 476 et seq.

  113. 113.

    Cf. on this concept Meng (1994), p. 501.

  114. 114.

    However, this only applies for the definition of the territoriality principle posited here. To some extent, this is also addresses the consequence that the effects of an external act may also be felt within the territory of another state; critical view Meng (1994), p. 504 et seq.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Meng (1994), p. 526.

  116. 116.

    Commission Decision 69/243/EEC, OJ 1969 L 195, p. 11—Farbstoffe.

  117. 117.

    Commission Decision 69/243/EEC, OJ 1969 L 195, p. 11—Farbstoffe.

  118. 118.

    Commission Decision 85/202/EEC, OJ 1985 L 85, p. 1 (para 79)—Zellstoff.

  119. 119.

    Commission Decision COMP/38899 (para 315)—Gas Insulated Switchgear.

  120. 120.

    Commission Decision 76/743/EEC, OJ 1976 L 254, p. 40—Rento, BASE; 85/618/EEC OJ 1985 L 376 p. 29—Siemens/Fanuc; Rose and Bailey (2013), para 1.109.

  121. 121.

    ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (para 14)—Ahlström.

  122. 122.

    ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (para 16)—Ahlström.

  123. 123.

    ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (paras 126/130 et seq.)—ICI.

  124. 124.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 41 with additional citations.

  125. 125.

    Rose and Bailey (2013), para 1.114.

  126. 126.

    On the question of the applicability of international law in the context of European Union law, ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 10/13 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; further discussion with additional citations Frenz (2011b), paras 44 et seq.

  127. 127.

    Regarding this principle, see Hailbronner and Kau, In: Vitzthum (2010), 3rd Part, paras 128 et seq.

  128. 128.

    PCIJ 5, 71 (89 et seq.).

  129. 129.

    Regarding the discussion, Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 48 et seq.; Engel (1988), p. 279.

  130. 130.

    Meng (1994), p. 541 et seq.

  131. 131.

    Engel (1988), p. 273 et seq.; Basedow (1989), p. 636; Knebel (1991), p. 270 et seq.

  132. 132.

    Open General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 103)—Gencor. Reh-binder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 17, 65 each with additional citations.

  133. 133.

    Krimphove (1992), p. 401 et seq.

  134. 134.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 65 citing Commission Decision 97/26/EEC, OJ 1997 L 11, p. 30 (paras 14 et seq.)—Gencor; 97/816/EC, OJ 1997 L 336, p. 16 (18, 39)—Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas; OLG Düsseldorf, WuW/E DE-R 2477 (2481, 2491 et seq.).

  135. 135.

    Asserting this position, Knebel (1991), p. 271.

  136. 136.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 18.

  137. 137.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 19; Meng (1994), p. 616 et seq.

  138. 138.

    These barriers to jurisdiction are likewise found in U.S. legal practice, cf. the reference in Schwarze (2001), p. 1200.

  139. 139.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 21; Meng (1994), p. 535 et seq.

  140. 140.

    Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (paras 92 et seq.)—Gencor; see also the Opinion of AG Mayras, ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:32 (702)—ICI and AG Darmon, ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:258 (paras 47 et seq.)—Ahlström.

  141. 141.

    Meng (1994), p. 536.

  142. 142.

    ECJ, Cases 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120 (para 142)—Ahlström.

  143. 143.

    See ECJ, Cases 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120 (para 144)—Ahlström.

  144. 144.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 22.

  145. 145.

    See above paras 386 et seq., 390 et seq.

  146. 146.

    Cf. Commission Decision 75/77/EEC, OJ 1975 L 29, p. 26 (28)—Pilze; 85/618/EEC, OJ 1985 L 376, p. 29 (para 24)—Siemens/Fanuc. For additional discussion, see below paras 476 et seq.

  147. 147.

    ECJ, Case 174/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:60 (para 44)—Bulk Oil; see however in the event of repercussions for the former Common Market Commission Decision 75/94/EEC, OJ 1975 L 38, p. 10 (para 8)—Goodyear Italiana/Euram: here merely no appreciability. In favour of an expansion, below paras 486 et seq.

  148. 148.

    See also under para 485.

  149. 149.

    Commission Decision 94/815/EC, OJ 1994 L 343, p. 1 (para 47)—Zement.

  150. 150.

    Commission Decision 79/90/EEC, OJ 1979 L 21, p. 16 (para 29)—Bleiweiß.

  151. 151.

    So in ECJ, Case C-306/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:173 (para 19-26)—Javico/Yves Saint Laurent Parfums; stronger in detail Rose and Bailey (2013), paras 1.111 et seq.

  152. 152.

    Commission Decision 75/94/EEC, OJ 1975 L 38, p. 10 (para 8)—Goodyear Italiana/Euram.

  153. 153.

    Commission Decision 2001/418/EC, OJ 2001 L 152, p. 24 (paras 231 et seq.)—Amino acids; 2003/2/EC, OJ 2003 L 6, p. 1 (paras 565 et seq.)—Vitamins.

  154. 154.

    Procedural law is regulated in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1 as well as in Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 L 133, p. 1.

  155. 155.

    Cf. regarding this distinction Knebel (1991), p. 271.

  156. 156.

    ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (paras 13 et seq.)—Ahlström.

  157. 157.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 77; Knebel (1991), p. 271.

  158. 158.

    According to Art. 21 (1) Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004, there are five possible means of sending invitations and documents of the Commission: (a) delivery by hand against receipt; (b) registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt; (c) fax with a request for acknowledgement of receipt; (d) telex; (e) electronic mail with a request for acknowledgement of receipt.

  159. 159.

    Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV para 120.

  160. 160.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 80.

  161. 161.

    See von Stoephasius (1971), p. 134 et seq.

  162. 162.

    Regulation (EC) 802/2004, OJ 2004 L 133, p. 1.

  163. 163.

    ECJ, Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 11)—Geigy.

  164. 164.

    ECJ, Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 11)—Geigy; critical response Haymann (1974), p. 347: no detailed discussion of the international law barriers of service of process to parties located abroad.

  165. 165.

    ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (para 39/43)—ICI; Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73 (para 18)—Geigy; critical Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 80; Gleiss and Hirsch (1993), para 49.

  166. 166.

    See ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (paras 34 et seq.)—ICI, without disagreeing to this method; resp. Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 81. Expressing a critical view Knebel (1991), 273 et seq.

  167. 167.

    Similarly Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 81.

  168. 168.

    OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.

  169. 169.

    For a detailed discussion of investigatory powers in the Regulation, see Klees (2005), § 9 as well as under paras 2511 et seq.

  170. 170.

    Meessen, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), IntKartR para 53; Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 84.

  171. 171.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 84 end.

  172. 172.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 86.

  173. 173.

    See above paras 386 et seq., 390 et seq.

  174. 174.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 86 citing Commission Decision 76/593/EEC, OJ 1976 L 192, p. 27 (28)—CSV; contra Meessen, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), IntKartR, para 53.

  175. 175.

    For example, through so-called “blocking status” which prohibits domestic undertakings from providing information to foreign courts or authorities. See Pallek (2000), 172.

  176. 176.

    Meng (1994), p. 581 et seq.

  177. 177.

    Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 88 with additional citations; see inter alia the cautious position in Commission Decision 76/593/EEC, OJ 1976 L 192, p. 27 (28)—CSV.

  178. 178.

    Approving Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV, para 122; contra Rehbinder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 87.

  179. 179.

    Commission Decision of 14 July 2000, M. 1634—Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; Reh-binder, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), IntWbR para 87 end. Barthelmeß and Rudolf, In: Loewenheim et al. (2009), Art. 18 VerfVO para 20, 36.

  180. 180.

    Haymann (1974), p. 340 et seq.; Knebel (1991), 272.

  181. 181.

    Haymann (1974), p. 340 et seq.

  182. 182.

    Cf. Ruffert, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 299 AEUV para 4; Haymann (1974), p. 340.

  183. 183.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 81.

  184. 184.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (ECMR), OJ L 24, p. 1.

  185. 185.

    There is thus an independent legal basis to such an extent; cf. re Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 83.

  186. 186.

    Council Regulation of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, p. 1. Its entire text was re-published in corrected form due to a series of errors contained in the separate language versions of the Regulation, OJ 1990 L 257, p. 13.

  187. 187.

    General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 79)—Gencor.

  188. 188.

    General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 82)—Gencor.

  189. 189.

    ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447 (paras 16 et seq.)—Ahlström.

  190. 190.

    General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (para 87)—Gencor; see above paras 388 et seq.

  191. 191.

    General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65 (paras 92 et seq.)—Gencor. See above para 397.

  192. 192.

    Bechtold (2000), 20.

  193. 193.

    Bechtold (2000), 21.

  194. 194.

    Accord Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 93.

  195. 195.

    This provision is supplemented by Art. 24 (2) ECMR (EC) No. 139/2004, according to which the Commission regularly prepares a report in which the treatment of undertakings domiciled or having their primary place of business within the European Union is examined in the case of mergers in third countries. To the extent evident, such a report has not yet been prepared so that it may be presumed that disparate treatment is not occurring.

  196. 196.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 95.

  197. 197.

    Cf. e.g. Mestmäcker (2011), p. 409 et seq.

  198. 198.

    Zurkinden and Lauterburg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV para 126–133.

  199. 199.

    Zurkinden and Lauterberg, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015) Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101-105 AEUV, paras 126 et seq.; Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 51 et seq.

  200. 200.

    Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, OJ 1999 L 175, p. 50; Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anti-competitive activities, OJ 2003 L 183, p. 12. Regarding bilateral cooperation with other third countries cf. XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004) 658 final, paras 698 et seq.

  201. 201.

    Philipp (2014), 164 likewise with regard to the foregoing.

  202. 202.

    See the examples provided in Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 para 107 fn. 143 from 1998.

  203. 203.

    Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ 1995 L 95, p. 47. This agreement represents a sort of forerunner. It is the first of the treaties referred to (para 425 above) the structure and wording of which are relied upon by subsequent treaties.

  204. 204.

    Bulletin EU 3-1999, sub-section 1.3.44 (under the index key word “competition”). The Commission made it expressly clear here that the administrative agreement and the associated exchange of protocols did not represent a binding treaty under international law.

  205. 205.

    Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, OJ 1998 L 173, p. 28.

  206. 206.

    Art. III describes what this is understood to mean as follows: “The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the competition authorities of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anti-competitive activities in accordance with the Requested Party's competition laws. Such a request may be made regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws, and regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or contemplate taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws.”

  207. 207.

    This protection of confidentiality is seen as a large barrier to efficient collaboration, cf. Pallek (2000), 195 et seq.

  208. 208.

    Cf. Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America and of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws (January–December 2002), COM (2003) 500 final.

  209. 209.

    See COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.2.

  210. 210.

    COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.4.

  211. 211.

    XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004), 658 final, para 682.

  212. 212.

    See with citations to specific cases XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003, SEC (2004), 658 final, para 684.

  213. 213.

    COM (2003), 500 final., sub-section 1.6; see also Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 6 paras 107 et seq.

  214. 214.

    Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 2.

  215. 215.

    Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 3.

  216. 216.

    Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 18.

  217. 217.

    See Dolzer, In: Vitzthum (2010), 6th Part, para 64.

  218. 218.

    On the history of negotiations, see Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A paras 20 et seq.

  219. 219.

    Cf. the German consent act to the GATT, BGBl. II 1994 p. 1438; regarding the WTO agreement, BGBl. II 1994 p. 1625.

  220. 220.

    Tietje, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 9; Tietje (1998), p. 95.

  221. 221.

    Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 32.

  222. 222.

    See Krenzler, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part A para 34.

  223. 223.

    These include additional panels, arbitrators and expert review groups; on the composition and functions of these institutions, detailed discussion by Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C paras 71 et seq.

  224. 224.

    For a detailed discussion on this topic and additional provisions of the GATT (1994), see Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 24 et seq.

  225. 225.

    Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 82; regarding additional functions of the most favoured nation clause, see Tietje (1998), p. 196 et seq.

  226. 226.

    Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 26.

  227. 227.

    Tietje (1998), p. 223.

  228. 228.

    Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 146 et seq.; Tietje (1998), p. 278 et seq.

  229. 229.

    These parallels are also emphasised by Tietje (1998), p. 283; see also below para 473.

  230. 230.

    Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B para 143.

  231. 231.

    To this extent, this prohibition on discrimination is lex specialis in relation to the most favoured nation principle in Art. I GATT, see Tietje (1998), p. 264 et seq.

  232. 232.

    Berrisch, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part B paras 101 et seq.

  233. 233.

    Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 16.

  234. 234.

    Cf. Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 17.

  235. 235.

    Acceptance may only be refused if an appeal has been lodged against a panel decision or if the DSB unanimously decides to refuse the report; cf. Art. 16 (4) DSU.

  236. 236.

    ECJ, Case 181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (para 2/6)—Haegemann; Case 104/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 (para 13)—Kupferberg; Case 12/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (para 7)—Demirel.

  237. 237.

    This distinction may influence interpretation: For example, the Court of Justice interpreted the legal concept “measures with the same effect as quantitative import restrictions” in a free trade agreement differently than in the context of Art. 28 EC, cf. ECJ, Case 270/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:43 (paras 14 et seq.)—Polydor.

  238. 238.

    ECJ, Case 104/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 (para 23)—Kupferberg; Case 12/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (para 7)—Demirel; Cases C-300 and 392/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:688 (para 42)—Dior.

  239. 239.

    ECJ, settled case law, since Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 5/6 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; Case 181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (para 28/30)—Haegemann; Case C-61/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313 (para 52)—Commission/Germany.

  240. 240.

    Schroeder and Selmayr (1998), 348.

  241. 241.

    Schmalenbach, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 218 AEUV para 34; Epiney (1999), 7.

  242. 242.

    See immediately below regarding the exceptions consolidated into two groups of cases, para 449.

  243. 243.

    ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 10/13 et seq.)—International Fruit Company.

  244. 244.

    ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (para 10/13)—International Fruit Company.

  245. 245.

    ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (para 14/18)—International Fruit Company.

  246. 246.

    ECJ, Cases 21-24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (paras 21 et seq.)—International Fruit Company; confirmed by Case 266/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:77 (para 28)—SIOT; Cases 267-269/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:78 (para 23)—SPI and SAMI; Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 19)—Fediol; Case C-280/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367 (para 109)—Banana regime.

  247. 247.

    ECJ, Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 19)—Fediol.

  248. 248.

    ECJ, Case 69/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186 (paras 30 et seq.)—Nakajima.

  249. 249.

    ECJ, Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 (para 22)—Fediol.

  250. 250.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (paras 25 et seq.)—Portugal/Council.

  251. 251.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 71)—Portugal/Council.

  252. 252.

    Settled case-law, see also e.g. ECJ, Cases C-27 and 122/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161 (para 93)—Omega Air; Case C-76/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (para 53)—Petrotub and Republica; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 52)—Biret International.

  253. 253.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 35)—Portugal/Council.

  254. 254.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 41)—Portugal/Council.

  255. 255.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (paras 42 et seq.)—Portugal/Council.

  256. 256.

    ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (para 49)—Portugal/Council; confirmed in Case C-307/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:228 (para 27)—OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft; Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (para 52)—Biret International; General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 802)—Microsoft I.

  257. 257.

    ECJ, Case C-162/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293 (para 51)—Racke.

  258. 258.

    ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 52)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

  259. 259.

    ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 53)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

  260. 260.

    ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (para 54)—Netherlands/Parliament and Council.

  261. 261.

    See above paras 448 et seq.

  262. 262.

    ECJ, Cases C-27 and 122/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161 (paras 89 et seq.)—Omega Air; Case C-76/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (paras 53 et seq.)—Petrotub and Republica; Case C-93/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517 (paras 52 et seq.)—Biret International.

  263. 263.

    ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 39 et seq.)—Van Parys.

  264. 264.

    ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 41 et seq.)—Van Parys.

  265. 265.

    ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 42 et seq.)—Van Parys.

  266. 266.

    General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (paras 801 et seq.)—Microsoft I.

  267. 267.

    In the opinion of Hilf and Schorkopf (2000), 74, this question is amongst the most disputed in this area of law.

  268. 268.

    Petersmann (1997), 327.

  269. 269.

    Petersmann (1997), 327.

  270. 270.

    Epiney (1999), 11.

  271. 271.

    Petersmann (1997), 327.

  272. 272.

    Hilf and Schorkopf (2000), 74; similarly Sack (1997b), 650 et seq.; Sack (1997a), 688 et seq.

  273. 273.

    COM (1994), 143 final, p. 5a.

  274. 274.

    Tietje (1998), p. 115.

  275. 275.

    Tietje (1998), p. 115.

  276. 276.

    ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (para 43, 48)—Van Parys; see also Ohlhoff, In: Prieß and Berrisch (2003), Part C para 117.

  277. 277.

    For additional discussion, see Tietje (1998), p. 117 et seq.

  278. 278.

    For a comprehensive discussion, see Tietje (1998), p. 112 et seq.

  279. 279.

    Meng (1995), p. 1085.

  280. 280.

    Meng (1995), p. 1076 notes that compliance with WTO/GATT norms could also be compelled by means of the instruments contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; thus the imbalance argument is not persuasive.

  281. 281.

    Cf. criticism by Steinbach (2005), p. 334 et seq.

  282. 282.

    See most recently ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (para 40)—Van Parys.

  283. 283.

    See above para 456.

  284. 284.

    ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (paras 41 et seq.)—Van Parys.

  285. 285.

    ECJ, Case C-76/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4 (para 55)—Petrotub and Republica.

  286. 286.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 1637/98 of 20 July 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas, OJ L 210, p. 28.

  287. 287.

    Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organization of the market in bananas, OJ L 47, p. 1.

  288. 288.

    OJ 1998 L 210, p. 28; additional indicators for the intent to implement in Steinbach (2005), p. 334.

  289. 289.

    Walter, In: Ehlers (2014), § 1 paras 44 et seq.

  290. 290.

    Likewise affirming, Ott (1997), p. 220 et seq.

  291. 291.

    See above para 445.

  292. 292.

    Cf. Epiney (1999), p. 8, who comes to the conclusion that the non-application of an international treaty in the event of a violation of primary law is only an option if the obligations contained in the treaty are invalid (or no longer valid) based on principles of international law.

  293. 293.

    Only the most important trade principles contained in the GATT (1994) discussed above under paras 436 et seq. will be included for purposes of this comparison.

  294. 294.

    Regarding the following discussion, see Frenz (2013a), 461.

  295. 295.

    See above paras 385 et seq.

  296. 296.

    See General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I; Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II.

  297. 297.

    Terhechte (2012), p. 97.

  298. 298.

    See above paras 403 et seq.

  299. 299.

    On this issue, see Terhechte (2008), p. 92 et seq.

  300. 300.

    Terhechte (2012), p. 98 citing Basedow et al. (2011).

  301. 301.

    Kamann (2012), p. 111.

  302. 302.

    Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements; OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 199), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.

  303. 303.

    Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements; OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 205), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22; Kamann (2012), p. 113 et seq. citing the example of the Brandeis agreements, Commission Decision 85/206/EEC, OJ 1985 L 92, p. 1—Aluminium imports from Eastern Europe.

  304. 304.

    For general discussion, see above paras 388 et seq.

  305. 305.

    In accordance with the implementation principle (above paras 386 et seq.).

  306. 306.

    Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements; OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (paras 206 et seq.), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22; Kamann (2012), p. 114 et seq.

  307. 307.

    Kamann (2012), p. 120.

  308. 308.

    Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements; OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 219), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.

  309. 309.

    See generally under paras 2085 et seq., 2355 et seq.

  310. 310.

    Kamann (2012), p. 122 with regard to commodities suppliers.

  311. 311.

    See e.g. ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (paras 48 et seq.)—Corsica Ferries II; Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303 (paras 53 et seq.)—CNSD.

  312. 312.

    WT-DS 394.395, 398/R, Panel report.

  313. 313.

    Extensively treated by Pitschas (2012), p. 65 et seq., summary on p. 79.

  314. 314.

    Additional examples, above para 401.

  315. 315.

    On this issue, Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

  316. 316.

    Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

  317. 317.

    Terhechte (2012), p. 99.

  318. 318.

    Terhechte (2012), p. 96.

  319. 319.

    For example, together with the requirement of consistency, the approach taken by Terhechte (2012), p. 96.

  320. 320.

    See most recently, ECJ, Case C-68/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71 (para 18)—Protimonopolný úrad; previously in Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.

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    Walter Frenz

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Table of Cases

Table of Cases

AG Mayras, ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:32—ICI

ECJ, Case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66—Costa/E.N.E.L.

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4—Walt Wilhelm

ECJ, Case 48/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70—ICI

ECJ, Case 52/69, ECLI:EU:C:1972:73—Geigy

ECJ, Cases 21–24/72, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115—International Fruit Company

ECJ, Cases 6 and 7/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:18—Commercial Solvents

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174—Suiker Unie

ECJ, Case 181/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41—Haegemann

ECJ, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22—United Brands

ECJ, Case 106/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49—Simmenthal

ECJ, Cases 253/78 and 1–3/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:188—Giry und Guerlain

ECJ, Case 270/80, ECLI:EU:C:1982:43—Polydor

ECJ, Case 104/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362—Kupferberg

ECJ, Case 266/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:77—SIOT

ECJ, Cases 267–269/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:78—SPI and SAMI

ECJ, Case 174/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:60—Bulk Oil

ECJ, Case 311/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:394—CBEM

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1988:447—Ahlström

ECJ, Case 89 inter alia/85, ECLI:EU:C:1993:120—Ahlström

ECJ, Case 249/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:245—Albako

ECJ, Case 12/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400—Demirel

ECJ, Case 70/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254—Fediol

ECJ, Case C-69/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186—Nakajima

ECJ, Case C-184/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:50—Nimz

ECJ, Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91—Delimitis

ECJ, Case C-303/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:424—Commission/France

ECJ, Case C-241 and 242/91 P, ECLI:EU:C:1995:98—Magill

ECJ, Case C-325/91, ECLI:EU:C:1993:245—France/Commission

ECJ, Case C-280/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367—Banana regime

ECJ, Case C-61/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313—Commission/Germany

ECJ, Case C-24/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:163—Alcan

ECJ, Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303—CNSD

ECJ, Case C-149/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574—Portugal/Council

ECJ, Case C-162/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293—Racke

ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306—Corsica Ferries II

ECJ, Case C-298/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:372—Oelmühle

ECJ, Case C-306/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:173—Javico/Yves Saint Laurent Parfums

ECJ, Case C-7/97, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569—Bronner

ECJ, Cases C-300 and 392/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:688—Dior

ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689—Masterfoods

ECJ, Case C-377/98, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523—Netherlands/Parliament and Council

ECJ, Case C-307/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:228—OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft

ECJ, Case C-76/00 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4—Petrotub and Republica

ECJ, Cases C-27 and 122/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161—Omega Air

ECJ, Case C-453/00, ECLI:EU:C:2004:17—Kühne & Heitz

ECJ, Case C-418/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257—IMS Health

ECJ, Case C-93/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517—Biret International

ECJ, Case C-377/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121—Van Parys

ECJ, Case C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709—Mangold

ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610—GlaxoSmithKline Services

ECJ, Case C-441/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:377—Alrosa

ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON

ECJ, Case C-226/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795—Expedia

ECJ, Case C-68/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71—Protimonopolný úrad

General Court, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65—Gencor

General Court, Case T-9/99, ECLI:EU:T:2002:70—HFB

General Court, Case T-119/02, ECLI:EU:T:2003:101—Philips

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft I

General Court, Case T-170/06, ECLI:EU:T:2007:220—Alrosa

General Court, Case T-258/06, ECLI:EU:T:2010:214—Germany/Commission

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II

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Frenz, W. (2016). European, National and International Competition Regime. In: Handbook of EU Competition Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_2

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