The Significance of Freedom of Competition in the European Union Law

Frenz, Walter

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_1

The Significance of Freedom of Competition in the European Union Law

Walter Frenz²

Chapter
First Online: 19 December 2015

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Abstract

Protecting competition from restrictions has now been made part of the objective of the Internal Market in Art. 3 (3) TEU as may be seen in Protocol 27 to the Treaty of Lisbon on the Internal Market and Competition. This protection against distortions of competition, and thus a true competitive system, is reflected by the fact that it is based on ensuring equality of opportunity for all market participants. The distortion-free competition has an independent function. The more economic approach is to reject. The structure is comparable with the fundamental freedoms. The fundamental rights have meanwhile a high importance.

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Notes

1.
ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 20)—TeliaSonera Sverige.
2.
ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 (para 230)—Deutsche Telekom; Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376 (para 51)—MOTOE; thus the Treaty of Lisbon changed nothing in this regard; Petzold (2012), p. 56 et seq.
3.
See below para 22.
4.
For a detailed discussion on the relationship between the Common Market and the Internal Market, see Frenz (2012a), paras 34 et seq. with further citations.
5.
Regarding this difference of opinion, see e.g. Eckard (2011), p. 207.
6.
ECJ, Case 15/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:135 (para 33)—Schul; Case C-41/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:196 (para 19)—France/Commission; Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (407 et seq.)—Italy/Council and Commission; see also Zuleeg (1982), p. 27 with additional citations.
7.
Cf. generally Hoppmann (1988), p. 132 et seq.
8.
Günther (1968), p. 44; Blank (1991), p. 34 et seq. with additional citations; see also Zuleeg (1978), p. 76 et seq.
9.
ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42—Italy/Council and Commission. See also in detail id. paras 22 et seq.
10.
See Busch (2010), p. 9 et seq. for a discussion of the term “workable competition”. See for the benchment of perfect competition Lorenz, An introduction to EU Competition Law (2013), p. 5.
11.
ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 20)—Metro I.
12.
See fundamentally ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 22 et seq.)—Continental Can.
13.
ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 20)—Metro I.
14.
ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4 (para 5)—Walt Wilhelm for Art. 85 TEEC.
15.
Bach (1992), p. 233; Weltrich (1992), p. 150.
16.
Krimphove (1992), p. 46 with additional citations in fn 89; Greiffenberger, In: Schulte (2010), paras 66 et seq.
17.
Schröter, In: Schröter et al. (2014), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101–109 AEUV para 16.
18.
See General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (paras 118 et seq.)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services; however contra ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (paras 63 et seq.)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; with additional citations and criticism paras 60 et seq., 70.
19.
See ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 20)—TeliaSonera Sverige; para 1 above.
20.
Ipsen (1972), p. 607.
21.
Cf. ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 18 et seq.)—Continental Can.
22.
See Ipsen (1972), p. 608; Hossenfelder et al. (1996), p. 3; also ECJ, Case 240/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:59 (para 9)—ADBHU: general principle of Community Law in addition to the principles of freedom of trade and the free movement of goods.
23.
Basedow (2007), p. 712.
24.
Von Weizsäcker (2007), p. 1078; Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU D para 15 with additional citations: detailed discussion paras 76 et seq.
25.
Holzinger (2011), p. 115. Citing the source quoted below.
26.
AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133 (para 68)—British Airways.
27.
See ECJ, Cases 46/87 and 227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337 (para 25)—Hoechst; Case 136/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:169 (para 20)—National Panasonic, where the public interest is listed before individual enterprises and consumers; accord. Bunte, In: Langen and Bunte (2014) Einf. EU-Kartellrecht paras 43 et seq.
28.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
29.
See e.g. Schwarze (2004), p. 136.
30.
Terhechte (2004), p. 109, 113 et seq.
31.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2011), para 2053.
32.
See e.g. Frenz and Unnerstall (1999), p. 111 et seq., 129 et seq.
33.
See Scherhorn (2005), p. 141, 149 et seq. on the issue of an ecological re-interpretation.
34.
Meanwhile also refused by General Court, Case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547—Intel.
35.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (paras 64 et seq.)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services; further paras 58 et seq.
36.
See most recently Ellger (2014), p. 127 et seq.; Frenz (2013c), 980 et seq.
37.
For additional detail, see e.g. Roth (1977), p. 6 et seq.
38.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172—Post Danmark.
39.
ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (344)—Consten und Grundig; Birk (2000), p. 164, fn. 739 taking into account Hesiod (1990), Vers 17–26.
40.
Bunte, In: Langen and Bunte (2014), Einf. EU-Kartellrecht para 38.
41.
AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133 (para 68)—British Airways. Cf. Oppermann et al. (2014), § 20 para 19; Krimphove (1992), p. 44 et seq. with additional citations.
42.
Explicitly referred to both side-by-side ECJ, Case C-46/87 and C-227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337 (para 25)—Hoechst as well as Case 136/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:169 (para 20)—National Panasonic.
43.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; accord AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133 (para 68)—British Airways; from the literature Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Einl EU D para 15.
44.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1, last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
45.
Schröter, In: Schröter et al. (2014), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101–109 AEUV para 16 with a reference to the first report on the Commission’s competition policy from 1971, introduction p. 11 et seq.
46.
See Schmidbauer (1974), p. 32 et seq.
47.
See I. Schmidt (2012), p. 9; on the issue of fairness and efficiency, see Rüthers et al. (2011), paras 38 et seq.; on the importance of fundamental freedoms, cf. Frenz (2012a), paras 12 et seq.
48.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172—Post Danmark; ECJ, Case C-6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can, referring to the objective of Art. 3 (then lit. f) EEC Treaty).
49.
For a detailed discussion, see Mestmäcker (1965), p. 363 et seq. In this context, see ECJ, Case C-56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (343 et seq.)—Consten und Grundig.
50.
Schubert (1999), p. 217 as well as a similar interpretation Ullrich (1992), p. 613.
51.
Caspari (1989), p. 16 et seq. cf. also Ehlermann (1992), p. 7.
52.
Nowak (2004a), p. 80; additional discussion Baquero Cruz (2002), p. 98 et seq.
53.
See above paras 1 et seq.
54.
ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (344)—Consten und Grundig.
55.
See above paras 13 et seq.
56.
Birk (2000), p. 164.
57.
Birk (2000), p. 164; Hoppmann (1988), p. 241.
58.
Guzdek (2012), p. 44 et seq., 50.
59.
Schröter, In: Schröter et al. (2014), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101–109 AEUV para 17.
60.
ECJ, Cases 15 and 16/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:29 (para 31)—EAGGF in connection with state aid.
61.
Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004) § 2 paras 39 et seq., thus address the fundamental freedoms in the section “competition in the Internal Market”. Detailed discussion of the references to freedom of competition as well as the fundamental freedoms in this context, see Frenz (2012a), paras 18 et seq., 133 et seq. likewise with regard to the following.
62.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-180/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:233 (paras 14 et seq.)—Moser; regarding recent departures Frenz (2010a), 609 et seq.
63.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 271, 769 et seq. with reference in particular to ECJ, Cases C-321–324/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:229 (para 43)—Pistre. Weyer (1997), p. 35 et seq., 55 et seq. is satisfied with effects that extend beyond competition between trade by the Member States; see also Weyer (1998), p. 443: Effects on competition in the national markets.
64.
However, the fundamental freedoms are only partially effective in this regard as well; furthest expansion in this regard ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (para 34)—Angonese; detailed discussion Frenz (2012a), paras 346 et seq.
65.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 22)—Post Danmark.
66.
Rüthers et al. (2011), paras 365 et seq.; more detailed discussion Herdzina (1999), p. 29 et seq.; summarising the functions Busch (2010), p. 18 et seq. as well as I. Schmidt (2012), p. 40.
67.
For additional discussion, see Pieper (1994), p. 136 et seq.; Brenner (1996), p. 49 et seq.; Frenz (2001), p. 112 et seq.
68.
With additional citations, Frenz (2011), paras 2120, 3557, 3567 et seq.
69.
Contra, see Bunte, In: Langen and Bunte (2014) Einf. EU-Kartellrecht para 32, who, however, likewise presupposes a foundation of market economy principles.
70.
Frenz (2011), para 2119.
71.
Kempen, In: Streinz (2012), Art. 119 AEUV para 17.
72.
With additional citations Nowak (2004a), p. 90; Hatje (2009), p. 810 et seq.; Müller-Graff (2002), p. 22. In relation to the Internal Market, see Bungenberg (2004), p. 75.
73.
ECJ, Case C-9/99, ECLI:EU:C:2000:532 (para 25)—Échirolles Distribution.
74.
Explained and described as an “oversight” by Drexl (2009), p. 909 referring to the British Airways Case and the Microsoft decision as well as the actions of Sarkozy.
75.
Drexl (2009), p. 915.
76.
On this relationship, paras 1 et seq.
77.
ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 25)—Continental Can, still referring to Art. 2 and 3 lit. f) EEC Treaty.
78.
ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 25 end)—Continental Can.
79.
Behrens (2008), p. 193; Dietrich (2012), p. 77; Seeger and Emmanouilidis (2007), p. 16 et seq.
80.
Regarding the controversial discussion of purpose or objective, see I. Schmidt (2012), p. 40 et seq.
81.
Behrens (2008), p. 193; Dietrich (2012), p. 41; Nowak (2009), p. 184, 190.
82.
Regarding agricultural policy, see ECJ, Case 139/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:250 (paras 23 et seq.)—Maizena.
83.
Likewise as conceived by the ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can.
84.
ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (para 25)—Continental Can.
85.
Andresen (2005), p. 170 et seq.
86.
Müller-Graff (1997), p. 433 et seq.
87.
In favour, see Bach (1992), p. 251 et seq.; see also Bleckmann (1989), p. 273; Schwintowski (1994), p. 234, who presume a binding legal principle; contra in relation to the Member States Slot (1987), p. 186.
88.
For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (1997c), p. 22.
89.
ECJ, Case 13/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:220 (1596)—Parliament/Council.
90.
Dreher (1998), p. 657; Bruhns (2001), p. 34; Essebier (2005), p. 20; Dietrich (2012), p. 42, 73 et seq.
91.
See Scheuing (1989), p. 176 et seq.; Epiney (2013), p. 172 et seq., this principle, shaped by Zuleeg (1987), p. 280 et seq. to date only discussed in German literature, has indeed been acknowledged but not subject to critical scrutiny.
92.
More detailed discussion, with additional citations Frenz (2011), paras 2381 et seq.
93.
Frenz (2013a), 428, regarding the following as well.
94.
General Court, Case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547—Intel.
95.
ECJ, Case C-413/14 P.
96.
General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
97.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (paras 64 et seq.)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
98.
See ECJ, Cases C-403 and 429/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631 (paras 140 et seq.)—Football Association Premier League.
99.
General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 1035)—Microsoft.
100.
General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118)—GlaxoSmithKline Services citing Cases T-213 and 214/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151 (para 115)—Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft, with a citation to ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (339)—Consten und Grundig; Case 28/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:133 (para 56)—Tepea.
101.
See General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118 end)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services.
102.
General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 119)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
103.
General Court, Cases T-213 and 214/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151 (para 115)—Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft.
104.
General Court, Cases T-213 and 214/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151 (para 115)—Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft.
105.
General Court, Cases T-213 and 214/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151 (para 115 end)—Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft.
106.
Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
107.
ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (339)—Consten und Grundig.
108.
General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
109.
ECJ, Case 28/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:133 (para 52/56)—Tepea.
110.
General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 119)—GlaxoSmithKline Services citing ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (340 et seq.)—Consten und Grundig as well as Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (248 et seq.)—Maschinenbau Ulm.
111.
ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (340, 344)—Consten und Grundig.
112.
Mixing the approaches, General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 121)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
113.
See ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (343)—Consten und Grundig; accord on this point General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 120)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
114.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 64)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
115.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 62)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
116.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
117.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; identical Case C-8/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343 (para 38)—T-Mobile Netherlands inter alia.
118.
Riesenkampff (2011), p. 489.
119.
Eickhof and Isele (2005), p. 11.
120.
ECJ, Case C-8/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343 (para 39)—T-Mobile Netherlands inter alia.
121.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
122.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 with comments Dittert (2012), p. 570 et seq.
123.
ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221.
124.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 26)—Post Danmark; Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (paras 18, 71)—Tomra.
125.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 25, 38)—Post Danmark; Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (paras 37 et seq.)—Tomra citing ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 79)—TeliaSonera Sverige.
126.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (paras 40 et seq.)—Post Danmark.
127.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 41)—Post Danmark citing ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 (para 86)—British Airways and Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 (para 76)—TeliaSonera Sverige.
128.
See e.g. previous ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (343)—Consten und Grundig regarding taking all facts and circumstance of the specific case into account; supra para 69.
129.
For a detailed analysis, see Dittert (2012), p. 582; contra Bien and Rummel (2012), p. 740: “it would go to far to see [the ruling in Tomra] as final capitulation in favour of the more economic approach by the ECJ when assessing rebate systems.”
130.
ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172 (para 42)—Post Danmark.
131.
See contrary view General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 119)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; for more detail on this point, see supra paras 60 et seq.
132.
See Behrens (2011), p. 115: “Abschied vom more economic approach?”.
133.
General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 1035)—Microsoft.
134.
General Court, Case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547—Intel; see above para 58.
135.
The conclusion of Behrens (2011), p. 115 (130) in relation to the Commission.
136.
ECJ, Case 28/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:133 (paras 43 and 56)—Tepea.
137.
See above para 67.
138.
As stated in the ECJ ruling cited by the ECJ, Case C-373/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:17 (para 12)—X.
139.
See supra paras 60 et seq.
140.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 4), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
141.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 4), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
142.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 20), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
143.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 95)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; from cases issued by the General Court, Case T-328/03, ECLI:EU:T:2006:116 (paras 69 et seq.)—O2.
144.
Balancing considerations, Guzdek (2012), p. 50. “Thus, understanding of the modern industrial economy may be relied upon for assessing the permissibility of anti-competitive actions only to the extent that this does not conflict with the dynamic concept of competition.”
145.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 58)—GlaxoSmithKline Services with additional citations.
146.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 29), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
147.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 27), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
148.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 28), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
149.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 28), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
150.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (paras 39 et seq.), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
151.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 21), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
152.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU D para 23.
153.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU D para 19 et seq.
154.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (paras 57 et seq.), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
155.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 65), last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
156.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU D para 20.
157.
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 6).
158.
Behrens (2011), p. 118, 130.
159.
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 2010 C 130, p. 1 (para 7).
160.
Riesenkampff (2011), p. 499.
161.
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 2000 C 291, p. 1 (para 7).
162.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU D para 12.
163.
EAGCP, An economic approach to Art. 82, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/studies/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.
164.
Quoted in Behrens (2011), p. 119.
165.
Behrens (2011), p. 118.
166.
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004 Merger Guidelines), OJ 2004 C 31, p. 5 (paras 78 et seq. “The relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not be worse off as a result of the merger”).
167.
Seehafer (2009), p. 737.
168.
See General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118)—GlaxoSmithKline Services.
169.
Commission Communication—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 2009 C 45, p. 7 (para 5); Assessment by Behrens (2011), p. 118. See previous discussion at para 84.
170.
Monti (2001).
171.
Eckard (2011), p. 243.
172.
Commission Communication—Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ 2011 C 11, p. 1 (para 2 likewise with the aspects referred to above); last amended by OJ 2011 C 172, p. 22.
173.
Eckard (2011), p. 204.
174.
Palatzke (2012), p. 248.
175.
I. Schmidt (2006b), p. 409 et seq.
176.
Kirchner (2007), p. 7 et seq.
177.
Favourable view Schmidtchen (2006), p. 707.
178.
This is demanded by Monti (2004), p. 2.
179.
Dreher (2008), p. 23.
180.
Dreher (2008), p. 23.
181.
Setting out a summary, Palatzke (2012), p. 248, 250.
182.
For additional discuss, see Hildebrandt (2005), p. 513 et seq.; Christiansen (2010) passim.
183.
Bundeskartellamt, Working Group on Competition Law, Discussion Paper “Wettbewerbsschutz und Verbraucherinteressen im Lichte neuerer ökonomischer Methoden” dated 27 September 2004.
184.
Commission discussion paper on abuse of dominance—frequently asked questions dated 19 December 2005 (MEMO/05/486).
185.
A. Schmidt (2006a), p. 7 with additional citation.
186.
Röller and Strohm, In: Hirsch et al. (2007), Einführung para 1559.
187.
Christiansen (2010), p. 83 et seq.
188.
Röller and Strohm, In: Hirsch et al. (2007), Einführung para 1559.
189.
Palatzke (2012), p. 220.
190.
Christiansen (2010), p. 36.
191.
Seehafer (2009), p. 735 et seq.
192.
On this point, see Ewald (2011), p. 15 et seq.
193.
Christiansen (2010), p. 36.
194.
Palatzke (2012), p. 206.
195.
Kühnen (2012), p. 458.
196.
See Seehafer (2009), p. 728 et seq.
197.
Kirchner (2010), p. 3.
198.
See above para 70.
199.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (paras 65 et seq.)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services.
200.
General Court, Case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547—Intel; see above para 58.
201.
See Ehle (1996), p. 157.
202.
See General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265 (para 118)—Glaxo-SmithKline Services.
203.
Ewald (2011), p. 15.
204.
Palatzke (2012), p. 206 et seq. addressing the lack of justification as well.
205.
For additional discussion, see above paras 70 et seq.
206.
Palatzke (2012), p. 244.
207.
Palatzke (2012), p. 206, 211.
208.
Ewald (2011), p. 15.
209.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012) Einl EU B paras 35, 76.
210.
See above paras 2, 19 et seq.
211.
For a detailed discussion of the fundamental freedoms, see Frenz (2012a), paras 14 et seq.
212.
Term still used in Drexl (2003), p. 777.
213.
Roth (2013), p. 23.
214.
For a more detailed discussion, see Schubert (1999), p. 217 et seq. with additional citations, as well as above, paras 12, 22 et seq.
215.
See ECJ, Case 78/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59 (paras 6 et seq.)—Deutsche Grammophon.
216.
Accordingly with reservations in this respect as well, Nowak (2004a), p. 80.
217.
Therefore, it is still about the original basic function, for additional discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 113 et seq., 149 et seq.
218.
ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (405)—Italy/Council and Commission; Case C-26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 20)—Metro I.
219.
For a more detailed discussion, see Schubert (1999), p. 334 et seq.; taking a contrary position Nicolaysen (2003), p. 741.
220.
E.g. Zuleeg (1987), p. 283 et seq.; Zuleeg (1993), p. 32 et seq.; Kahl (1993), p. 10 et seq.; Scheuing (1989), p. 178 et seq.; taking a contrary position Everling (1991), p. 29 (44); Frenz (1997b), paras 169 et seq.
221.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 42 et seq.
222.
Regarding fundamental freedoms, see e.g. ECJ, Case 41/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133 (para 18/19)—van Duyn.
223.
With regard to European competition law, see e.g. General Court, Case T-66/92, ECLI:EU:T:1994:84 (para 32)—Herlitz.
224.
Cf. in the context of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) Frenz (1997a), p. 212.
225.
Frenz (2012a), para 21.
226.
Further, see also paras 138 et seq.
227.
Private actors may only then violate the prohibition of state aid if they have been established or tasked with implementing the state aid regulations, ECJ, Case 78/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:52 (paras 21 et seq.)—Steinike & Weinlig; Case 290/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:37 (paras 14 et seq.)—Commission/France; Case 57/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:284 (paras 12 et seq.)—Greece/Commission; a permanent control is enough, Case C-262/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851 (para 21)—Vent de Colère.
228.
ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (para 49)—Corsica Ferries II; Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303 (paras 53 et seq.)—CNSD, without referring to Art. 3 (1) lit. g) EC as had earlier case law.
229.
ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (para 34)—Angonese. However this decision cannot be generalised; for additional discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 346 et seq. Also the ruling Fra.bo (Case C-171/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453, in particular para 31) refers to a standardisation function with quasi-state authority; for additional discussion, see Roth (2013), p. 17 et seq. On the topic of reference to effects and the subordination of authorship, see Müller-Graff (2014), p. 28.
230.
Providing a summary, Müller-Graff (2014), p. 28.
231.
See ECJ, Case C-265/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595 (paras 31 et seq.)—Commission/France (agricultural blockades); Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (paras 57 et seq.)—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade); for additional discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 198 et seq.
232.
That likewise under ECJ, Case C-350/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205 (paras 19 et seq.)—Clean Car employers are also granted rights is an exception and relates back to the (concurrent) guarantee of employee rights, Frenz (2012a), paras 1443 et seq.
233.
Frenz (2012a), paras 259 et seq.
234.
Cf. for the fundamental freedoms Weiß (2003a), 568 et seq.; Weiß (2003b), 169 et seq.; Frenz (2012a), paras 247 et seq.
235.
ECJ, Case C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7 (paras 30 et seq.)—SAT Fluggesellschaft; Case C-343/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:160 (paras 16 et seq.)—Calì & Figli; same result, e.g. von Bernuth (1996), p. 113 et seq.
236.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 92 et seq.
237.
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ 2004 L 123, p. 18. See, e.g. Schütz, In: Busche and Röhling (2013), Art. 7 VO 1/2003 para 8 as well as in general and paras 2490 et seq.
238.
ECJ, Case C-5/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:320 (paras 14 et seq.)—BVG-Aluminium; contrary opinion German Federal Administrative Court 92, 81 (84).
239.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Einl EU B para 78.
240.
On this issue, see Baur (1988), p. 257 et seq. as well as paras 1784 et seq.
241.
See paras 1785 et seq.
242.
Immenga and Mestmäcker, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Einl EU B para 79.
243.
ECJ, Case C-68/95, ECLI:EU:C:1996:452 (para 59)—Port.
244.
On the topic of an expansion of options for filing competition-related complaints, see Frenz (2014a), 367 et seq.
245.
ECJ, Case 169/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:42 (paras 27 et seq.)—Cofaz as well as paras 3169, 3206 et seq.
246.
See below para 3168 on competition law. Regarding state aid proceedings, see ECJ, Case 169/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:42 (paras 24 et seq.)—Cofaz citing Case 264/82, ECLI:EU:C:1985:119 (para 16)—Timex; by contrast, not required by the General Court, Case T-266/94, ECLI:EU:T:1996:153 (paras 46 et seq.)—Skibsvaerftsforeningen; for further discussion, see Klingbeil (1998), p. 231 et seq.
247.
See above para 126.
248.
In particular, using this as a base Nowak (2004a), p. 81.
249.
See ECJ, Cases 177 and 178/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:144 (para 11)—van de Haar.
250.
See, e.g. most recently General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323 (para 139)—Microsoft II.
251.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 (para 63)—GlaxoSmithKline Services; Palatzke (2012), passim. For additional discussion, see above paras 58 et seq.
252.
See, e.g. Riesenkampff (2011), p. 498.
253.
See most recently, ECJ, Case C-171/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453 (para 31)—Fra.bo; Roth (2013), p. 17 et seq.; further regarding a binding effect in general, see Müller-Graff (2014), p. 8 et seq.
254.
See e.g. ECJ, Cases C-1 and 176/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:327 (para 13)—Aragonesa de Publicidad for all fundamental freedoms.
255.
By contrast, discussing the scope of application in the context of the fundamental freedoms as well, see Jarass (2000), p. 705 et seq.
256.
Schröter, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 101 AEUV para 35.
257.
Schröter, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Art. 101 AEUV para 36.
258.
ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 25 et seq.)—Continental Can.
259.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 408 et seq. Contra Kingreen (1999), p. 84 et seq.
260.
Lach (2008), p. 245; see also Frenz (2010a), 612 et seq. for the law of public tender.
261.
Frenz (2010a), 612 et seq.
262.
More expansive regulations may be put in place via secondary law; namely in order to achieve harmonisation of national legal systems.
263.
See Lach (2008), p. 245.
264.
See above para 134 as well as paras 3168 et seq., 3206 et seq.
265.
There is likewise hardly a right to demand a prohibition based on competition law under domestic laws. See, e.g. Commichau and Schwartz (2002), paras 573 et seq. with further citations.
266.
See above paras 126 et seq.
267.
See below paras 381 et seq.
268.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2010b), paras 446 et seq.
269.
Guadeloupe, French Guayana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands.
270.
For further discussion, see e.g. Schmalenbach, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011) Art. 349 AEUV paras 1 et seq.; Frenz (2010b), paras 464 et seq.
271.
See Question No. 655/85 of 10 June 1985, OJ 1985 C 341, p. 8 et seq. Further Kokott, In: Streinz (2012), Art. 355 AEUV para 7.
272.
Frenz (2010b), paras 469 et seq., likewise with regard to the following. Further treatment, see Stapper (1999).
273.
OJ 1972 L 73, p. 5.
274.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2010b), paras 504 et seq.
275.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 423 et seq.
276.
Explicitly referring to this regulation (then Art. 86 EEC Treaty), ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (408)—Italy/Council and Commission; Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 482/483)—Suiker Unie.
277.
For additional discussion, see paras 605 et seq.
278.
ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42 (408)—Italy/Council and Commission.
279.
ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 482/483, para 541/542)—Suiker Unie.
280.
See ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174 (para 544/547)—Suiker Unie.
281.
This conformed fully to that of the ECJ at an earlier point in time, see Commission Decision 73/109/EEC, OJ 1973 L 140, p. 17 (41)—European sugar industry.
282.
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 2010 C 130, p. 1 (paras 13 et seq.)
283.
See below paras 670 et seq.
284.
See e.g., Ulmer (1985), p. 519 et seq.
285.
For additional discussion, see I. Schmidt (2012), p. 279 with additional citations.
286.
Contra qualification as grounds for justification, Ehle (1996), p. 113.
287.
In favour, Väth (1987), p. 73, 256, 267.
288.
ECJ, Case 23/67, ECLI:EU:C:1967:54 (415)—Haecht then for Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. With reference to this, ECJ, Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91 (paras 14, 20, 31)—Delimitis; see also Case 262/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:334 (para 20)—Coditel II; Case C-399/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:434 (para 10)—Oude Luttikhuis; General Court, Case T-77/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:70 (para 140)—VGB; Case T-374/94 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:1998:198 (para 136)—European Night Services.
289.
General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 (para 76)—M6.
290.
See General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 (para 76)—M6 on the corresponding submission of the participants.
291.
See above paras 58 et seq.
292.
ECJ, Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (250)—Maschinenbau Ulm; see also ECJ, Cases 19 and 20/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:58 (para 14)—Kali und Salz; Case 258/78, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211 (paras 55 et seq.)—Nungesser.
293.
ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (para 21)—Metro I.
294.
However, taking just this position, see Ackermann (1997), p. 153 et seq.
295.
See above paras 58 et seq. in connection with the more economic approach.
296.
General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 (para 74)—M6.
297.
In favour of this view, Steindorff (1984), p. 642 et seq.
298.
Detailed discussion at paras 1361 et seq.
299.
Explicitly ECJ, Case 23/67, ECLI:EU:C:1967:54 (414 et seq.)—Haecht; General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 (para 76)—M6.
300.
Likewise contra, e.g. Everling (1990), p. 1003; van der Esch (1988), p. 569 et seq.; Fritzsche (1996), p. 49; see in particular ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (340)—Consten und Grundig.
301.
Very reserved, General Court, Case T-14/89, ECLI:EU:T:1992:36 (para 265)—Montedipe; Case T-148/89, ECLI:EU:T:1995:68 (para 109)—Tréfilunion: “even if such a rule were to be applied within the framework of Community competition law.”
302.
ECJ, Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (250)—Maschinenbau Ulm.
303.
ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41 (326)—Consten und Grundig.
304.
ECJ, Case 258/78, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211 (paras 57 et seq.)—Nungesser.
305.
ECJ, Case 161/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:41 (paras 14 et seq.)—Pronuptia.
306.
ECJ, Case 42/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327 (para 19)—Remia.
307.
Relying on the need for complete contract fulfilment which strengthens competition as such, ECJ, Case 42/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327 (para 20)—Remia; similarly Commission Decision 76/743/EEC, OJ 1976 L 254, p. 40—BASF.
308.
For additional discussion, see paras 3424 et seq.
309.
See, e.g. Müller-Graff, In: Hailbronner et al. (1998), Art. 85 para 83; Frenz (1997c), p. 42 et seq.
310.
Stating this position, Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 111 with additional citations.
311.
See above paras 60 et seq.
312.
ECJ, Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (250)—Maschinenbau Ulm.
313.
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), OJ 2014 C 291, p. 1. For a more detailed discussion of the De minimis Notice, see Schultze et al. (2011), paras 147 et seq.
314.
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice), OJ 2014 C 291, p. 1 (para 2). For additional discussion, see paras 1110 et seq.
315.
See fundamentally ECJ, Cases 177 and 178/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:144 (para 13)—van de Haar; later, e.g. Case 103/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:229 (para 18)—Commission/Italy. Concurrence regarding state measures also by Müller-Graff (2014), p. 19.
316.
Frenz (2012a), paras 463 et seq., 901 et seq. with additional citations.
317.
ECJ, Case C-69/88, ECLI:EU:C:1990:97 (para 11)—Krantz; Case C-379/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296 (para 24)—Peralta; Case C-96/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:308 (para 41)—Spediporto; Cases C-140–142/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:330 (para 29)—DIP/Bassano del Grappa.
318.
Although the fundamental freedoms may contain the term “restriction” it is nevertheless identical in meaning to the term “impairment”. The ECJ also uses the later, see e.g. Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (para 92)—Bosman. For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 470 et seq.
319.
For additional detail regarding the prescribed alternatives of “intent or effect” below paras 888 et seq., 1004 et seq.
320.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2007), paras 37 et seq., 696 et seq.
321.
ECJ, Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38 (249)—Maschinenbau Ulm.
322.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 474 et seq.
323.
ECJ, Case 8/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:82 (para 5)—Dassonville; see also, e.g. Case C-470/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:224 (paras 12 et seq.)—Mars.
324.
For a detailed discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 149 et seq. with numerous citations.
325.
Discrimination comprises the unequal treatment of the same or at least similar arrangements, ECJ, Case C-279/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31 (para 30)—Schumacker; Frenz (2012a), paras 488 et seq. with further citations.
326.
See previously, e.g. Seidel (1967), p. 2081 et seq. with additional citations.
327.
Since ECJ, Case C-79/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:592 (paras 26 et seq.)—Payroll; Case C-208/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:632 (para 95)—Überseering for the freedom of establishment and already ECJ, Case 33/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131 (para 10/12)—van Binsbergen for the free movement of services. Of course the distinction remains relevant for the applicable justifications. See for further discussion, Frenz (2012a), paras 517 et seq.
328.
See, General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 (para 139)—Microsoft.
329.
See Frenz (2014b), 16 et seq.
330.
Council Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 6 February 1962, OJ No. 13, p. 204, last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1216/1999, OJ 1999 L 148, p. 5; this was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 effective 1 May 2004.
331.
On the issue of actual intensification, see Müller (2012), p. 32.
332.
See previously Terhechte (2004), p. 116 et seq.
333.
Affirming Forrester and Norall (1984), p. 40. However, for a clear border between fundamental freedoms and rules on competition, see Roth (1995), p. 1243.
334.
See Dreher (1994), p. 209.
335.
Jacobs (1993), p. 40; Pernice (1992), p. 142; contra Ehle (1996), p. 110 et seq. Recent comprehensive treatment, see Ellger (2014), p. 127 et seq.
336.
For environmental protection Pernice (1990), p. 208; Hoffmann-Riem (1991), p. 25 et seq.; Wiegand (1993), p. 537; Wasmeier (1995), p. 67.
337.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 564 et seq. with additional citations for Art. 3 TEU.
338.
Guzdek (2012), p. 149 et seq. contra Monti (2002), p. 1095; Monti (2007), p. 89 et seq.
339.
See e.g. Commission Decision 84/380/EEC, OJ 1984 L 207, p. 17 (para 37)—synthetic fibres as well as 86/405/EEC, OJ 1986 L 236, p. 30 (para 59)—fibre optic cable; on the entire issue, see C. R. Schmidt (1992), p. 106 et seq.
340.
ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610—GlaxoSmithKline Services inter alia; General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215 (para 76)—M6.
341.
The ruling in ECJ, Case 240/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:59 (paras 14 et seq.)—ADBHU was before the EEA on 28 February 1986, which included environmental protection as Community policy.
342.
See fundamentally ECJ, Case 120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 (para 8)—Cassis.
343.
See additionally from the view of ECJ, Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98—Wouters and paras 1531 et seq.
344.
In detail, Jarass (1995), p. 202 et seq.; cf. also Bleckmann (1986), p. 73 et seq.
345.
Regarding free movement of services, see ECJ, Cases 110 and 111/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:8 (para 28)—van Wesemael; Case 279/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:314 (paras 17 et seq.)—Webb; for freedom of establishment Case C-19/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125 (para 32)—Kraus; Case C-55/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411 (para 37)—Gebhard; for the free movement of workers Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (paras 103 et seq.)—Bosman; for the free movement of capital, in particular the golden shares line of cases, starting with Case C-367/98, ECLI:EU:C:2002:326 (para 49)—Golden shares I (Commission/Portugal).
346.
Regarding the fundamental freedoms, see Frenz (2012a), para 541.
347.
ECJ, Case 120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 (para 8)—Cassis.
348.
ECJ, Case 120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 (para 8)—Cassis: “in particular”.
349.
Clear following several preceding rulings, ECJ, Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (paras 74 et seq.)—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade).
350.
ECJ, Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (paras 86, 104, 121)—Bosman; no longer mentioned in Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (para 42)—Angonese.
351.
ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (para 42)—Angonese.
352.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 578 et seq., 2111 et seq.
353.
Detailed discussion at paras 1365 et seq.
354.
Concurring Niemeyer (1994), p. 730; Dreher (1994), p. 209.
355.
In connection with voluntary commitments as an expression of private opportunities for flexibility, see Frenz (2001), p. 350 et seq.
356.
In particular ECJ, Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (paras 82 et seq.)—Bosman.
357.
For additional discussion, see Frenz (2013c), 980 et seq. as well as paras 1365 et seq.
358.
See Kingreen, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 36 AEUV paras 87 et seq.
359.
In detail with additional citations Becker, In: Schwarze (2012), Art. 36 AEUV paras 82 et seq.; Frenz (2012a), paras 584 et seq., 1225 et seq.
360.
See ECJ, Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (paras 71 et seq.)—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade), para 73 especially provides for the required compatibility of measures with the fundamental rights, which may not only include injunctions, but also positive actions which may be justified on grounds other than the fundamental rights. In general, see Frenz (2012a), paras 603 et seq.
361.
Regarding the minor significance of reasonableness, see Frenz (2012a), para 598 with additional citations.
362.
ECJ, Cases 43 and 63/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:9 (para 52)—VBVB u. VBBB; critical and paras 1181 et seq.
363.
See ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167 (paras 44 et seq.)—Metro I; Commission, XXII. Report on Competition Policy 1992, COM (1993) 162 final, sub-section 177.
364.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-463/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:272 (paras 69 et seq.)—Golden shares IV (Commission/Spain); Case C-463/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:797 (paras 78 et seq.)—Pfandpflicht; Case C-309/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:799 (paras 79 et seq.)—Radlberger on the starting point; in general Frenz (2012a), paras 593 et seq.
365.
High product quality itself is sufficient, General Court, Case T-17/93, ECLI:EU:T:1994:89 (paras 118 et seq.)—Matra Hachette.
366.
See e.g. Commission Decision 71/23/EEC, OJ 1971 L 10, p. 15 (22)—Wall and floor tiles.
367.
See ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 (paras 24 et seq.)—Continental Can.
368.
Taking this view on Art. 19 (2) German Basic Law Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 80, 367 (373), established case law.
369.
Regarding German fundamental rights Jarass, In: Jarass and Pieroth (2014), Art. 19 para 9.
370.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), para 600.
371.
Roth (2013), p. 23; without explanation ECJ, Case C-519/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492 (para 28)—Meca-Medina; Case C-438/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 (para 53)—Viking; Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98 (paras 66 et seq., 120 et seq.)—Wouters.
372.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316 (paras 61, 63)—Dusseldorp.
373.
See e.g. ECJ, Case 311/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:418 (paras 23 et seq.)—Vlaamse Reisbureaus; further discussion with examples from the waste management industry Frenz (1997c), p. 1 et seq.
374.
Extensive treatment Frenz (2001), p. 380 et seq.; see below para 1140.
375.
Extensive treatment Frenz (2001), p. 263 et seq. as well as paras 1119 et seq.
376.
See ECJ, Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463 (paras 82 et seq.)—Bosman as well as Case C-171/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453 (para 31)—Fra.bo.
377.
ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (paras 33 et seq.)—Angonese.
378.
Canaris (2002), p. 43; similarly in favour of a distinction Kluth (1997), p. 574 et seq.; further treatment Frenz (2012a), paras 366 et seq.; other view Ganten (2000), p. 72 et seq.
379.
See also ECJ, Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98 (para 120)—Wouters; Case C-438/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 (para 57)—Viking.
380.
ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40 (para 7/8)—Sacchi; Case C-17/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:172 (paras 10 et seq.)—Fedicine; most recently ECJ, Case C-36/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614 (paras 26 et seq.)—Omega in each case regarding the distinction between the free movement of goods and services.
381.
This principle is in particular represented by the Golden Share rulings, e.g. ECJ, Case C-463/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:272 (paras 85 et seq.)—Golden Shares IV (Commission/Spain) regarding parallel impact on free movement of capital and freedom of establishment, however see also, e.g. Case C-79/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:592—Payroll. For further discussion overall, see Frenz (2012a), paras 395 et seq.
382.
See e.g. ECJ, Case 18/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:175 (para 13)—Commission/France; Case C-21/88, ECLI:EU:C:1990:121 (para 21)—Du Pont de Nemours Italiana.
383.
ECJ, Case 74/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:51 (paras 14 et seq.)—Iannelli; Case 18/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:175 (para 13)—Commission/France; presented in more detail in Frenz (2012a), paras 1034 et seq.
384.
ECJ, Case 103/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:229 (para 19)—Commission/Italy.
385.
Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 86, 28 (37); 65, 196 (210); German Federal Administrative Court 65, 167 (174); Scholz, In: Maunz and Dürig (2014), Art. 12 paras 87 et seq., 144 et seq.: competition as a consequence of the freedom to choose an occupation.
386.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2009), paras 2711 et seq. (also in favour of a subjective legal and not merely objective legal guarantee). Open however Rengeling and Sczcekalla (2004), paras 801 et seq. with further citations.
387.
Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303, p. 23. Referring to this as well Rengeling and Sczcekalla (2004), para 795.
388.
See Art. 51 (1) CFR as well as ECJ, Cases 60 and 61/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:329 (para 26)—Cinéthèque; Case 355/85, ECLI:EU:C:1986:410 (para 11)—Cognet; Cases 80 and 159/85, ECLI:EU:C:1986:426 (para 24)—Edah: Necessity of European regulation, see in detail Frenz (2009), paras 222 et seq.
389.
For additional discussion, see paras 658 et seq.
390.
See only ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306 (paras 48 et seq.)—Corsica Ferries II.
391.
See Art. 51 (1) CFR, for additional discussion Frenz (2009), paras 222 et seq.
392.
See Magiera (2000), p. 1025.
393.
Esp. ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296 (paras 30 et seq.)—Angonese.
394.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2009), paras 279 et seq., 3993 et seq.
395.
For further discussion, see Nowak (2004b), p. 23 et seq.
396.
In particular, using this as a base Nowak (2004a), p. 81.
397.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2009), paras 1060 et seq., 1077.
398.
Detailed discussion Suerbaum (2003), p. 390 et seq. as well as Szczekalla (2002); Frenz (2009), paras 359 et seq.
399.
ECJ, Case C-265/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595 (paras 31 et seq.)—Commission/France (agricultural blockades); Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (paras 57 et seq.)—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade).
400.
Jürgensen and Schlünder (1996), p. 212.
401.
Referring to this in connection with the duties of protection related to the fundamental freedoms Meurer (1998), p. 197.
402.
For further discussion, see Frenz (2012a), paras 199 et seq.; Frenz (2009), paras 360 et seq., likewise with regard to the following.
403.
Specially deriving protective duties there from Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 81, 242 (255 et seq.)—Handelsvertreter.
404.
E.g. Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 92, 26 (46) for the duties to protect fundamental rights based on the Basic Law.
405.
Regarding duties of protection related to the fundamental freedoms balanced against the fundamental rights, ECJ, Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (paras 81 et seq.)—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade). On this point, see Frenz (2012a), paras 208 et seq.
406.
Also affirming this meaning in general Mager (2004), p. 54.
407.
ECJ, Case C-94/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603 (para 29)—Roquette Frères III; further discussion of this development Maus (2007), p. 121 et seq. as well additional citations Frenz (2009), paras 1239 et seq.
408.
See only AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:126 (para 41)—Schenker.
409.
Regarding the underlying rights to information, see ECJ, Case C-360/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389—Pfleiderer as well as Case C-536/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366—Donau Chemie.
410.
ECJ, Case C-94/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603 (para 29)—Roquette Frères III; still contrary Cases 46/87 and 227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337 (paras 17 et seq.)—Hoechst.
411.
ECHR, ruling of 16 December 1992, No. 72/1991/324/394—Niemietz/Germany; ruling of 16 April 2002, No. 37971/97—Stés Colas Est inter alia/France.
412.
Mager (2004), p. 46, 55.
413.
Still making this connection ECJ, Case C-94/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603 (paras 27 et seq., 46 et seq. with additional citations).—Roquette Frères III.
414.
ECJ, Cases 100–103/80, ECLI:EU:C:1983:158 (paras 105, 109)—Musique Diffusion française.
415.
ECJ, Cases 100–103/80, ECLI:EU:C:1983:158 (para 108)—Musique Diffusion française; see also, e.g. General Court, Case T-14/89, ECLI:EU:T:1992:36 (para 346)—Montedipe.
416.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 108)—E.ON citing the AG Opinion of 26 October 2010, Cases C-201 and 216/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:190 (paras 41 et seq.)—Arcelor.
417.
ECHR, ruling of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22 (§§ 44, 82 et seq.)—Menarini Diagnostics/Italy.
418.
See, e.g. Nehl (2012), p. 132.
419.
Drawing a distinction, see Wils (2010), p. 12 et seq.; General Court, Case T-138/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362 (para 53)—Schindler.
420.
See, e.g. Bechtold and Bosch (2011), p. 160 et seq.; Werner (2013), p. 180.
421.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 72)—E.ON.
422.
See AG Kokott, Case C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:126 (para 41)—Schenker.
423.
AG Kokott, Case C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:126 (para 41)—Schenker.
424.
Most recently, ECHR, ruling of 27 September 2011, No. 43509/08 (para 40)—Menarini Diagnostics/Italy.
425.
General Court, Case T-138/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362 (paras 49 et seq.)—Schindler, by contrast still open Case T-67/01, ECLI:EU:T:2004:3 (para 36)—JCB Service and for Art. 7 ECHR Case T-279/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:103 (para 71)—Degussa; for further discussion of the development with additional citations Vilsmeier (2013), p. 10 et seq. also regarding the ECHR and ECtHR.
426.
Previously, ECHR, ruling of 30 May 1991, No. 11598/85, Series A No. 232 A (para 65)—Société Stenuit/France. Similarly General Court, Case T-138/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362 (para 52)—Schindler; AG Sharpston, ECJ, Case C-272/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:63 (para 67)—KME Germany; Soltész (2012), p. 145; against this distinction Bechtold and Bosch (2011), p. 160 (163 et seq.).
427.
ECHR, ruling of 23 November 2006, No. 73053/01 (para 43)—Jussila/Finland; similarly ruling of 4 March 2008, No. 11529/02 (para 32)—Hüseyin Turan/Turkey.
428.
Demanding another standard in this regard, Bueren (2012), 365; completely ruling out terms of imprisonment Frenz (2014a), 367 et seq.
429.
See e.g. ECJ, Case C-210/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:440 (paras 52 et seq.)—Käserei Champignon.
430.
See by contrast AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 111)—E.ON.
431.
Frenz (2012b), 360 et seq.
432.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (paras 103 et seq., 108)—E.ON referring to ECHR, ruling of 23 October 1995, Series A No. 328.A, § 36—Schmautzer/Austria; ruling of 10 January 2001, Rep. 2006-III, p. 21—Valico/Italy; ruling of 27 September 2011, No. 43509/08, §§ 59, 64 et seq.—Menarini Diagnostics/Italy.
433.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (paras 112 et seq.)—E.ON.
434.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 126)—E.ON.
435.
Critical due to the lack of a specific analysis based on the circumstances of the individual case Werner (2013), p. 179.
436.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (paras 127 et seq.)—E.ON.
437.
ECJ, Case C-3/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:88 (paras 61 et seq.)—Danone.
438.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 114)—E.ON citing ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (para 107)—Tomra.
439.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 123)—E.ON; Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 (paras 198, 204)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España. Also in this regard from the perspective of a reformatio in peius, further discussion under paras 3085 et seq.
440.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 120)—E.ON.
441.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 126)—E.ON.
442.
ECJ, Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 (para 205)—Telefónica and Telefónica de España; Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (paras 125 et seq.)—E.ON.
443.
Werner (2013), p. 184 citing BGHSt 29, 319 (320).
444.
Relying on this, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 126)—E.ON.
445.
See AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 130)—E.ON citing No. 29 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Art. 23 (2) lit. a) of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2 deviating from the General Court, Case T-141/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:516 (para 289)—E.ON.
446.
See ECJ, Cases 100–103/80, ECLI:EU:C:1983:158 (paras 105, 109)—Musique Diffusion Française adjustment of the amount of the fine possible at any time to match policy considerations.
447.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 127)—E.ON.
448.
For further discussion—also with regard to the development of the jurisprudence of the ECJ, Cases C-92 and 93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662 (paras 81 et seq.)—Schecke und Eifert—based on ECJ, Case C-280/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367 (para 78)—Banana regime: Frenz (2012a), paras 57 et seq.; Guckelberger (2011), p. 126 et seq.
449.
General Court, Case T-45/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:359 (para 48)—Unipetrol; Rose and Bailey (2013), para 5.024.
450.
ECJ, Cases 29 and 30/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:130 (paras 16 et seq.)—CRAM and Rheinzink; General Court, Case T-240/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:284 (para 49)—Heineken Nederland.
451.
Werner (2013), p. 186.
452.
By contrast expressing a critical view Werner (2013), p. 186.
453.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 129)—E.ON.
454.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 128)—E.ON. Critical view Werner (2013), p. 186: Proximity of a risk. However, this represents criticism of the conception of the requirements for the offence.
455.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 131)—E.ON.
456.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 132)—E.ON.
457.
See above paras 235 et seq.
458.
AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375 (para 114)—E.ON.
459.
Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 88, 203 (254)—Schwangerschaftsabbruch II.
460.
Frenz (2012b), 361 et seq. regarding the following issue as well.
461.
In the case at issue, General Court, Case T-138/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362—Schindler.
462.
AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388 (para 43)—Otis citing inter alia ECHR, ruling of 21 July 2011, No. 32181/04 and 35122/05 (paras 147 et seq.)—Sigma Radio Television/Cyprus
463.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 64)—Otis.
464.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 53)—Otis citing the basic decision Case 314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452 (paras 12 et seq.)—Foto-Frost.
465.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 59)—Otis; Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815 (para 54)—Chalkor.
466.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 60)—Otis.
467.
OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2.
468.
ECJ, Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815 (para 62)—Chalkor.
469.
ECJ, Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815 (para 63)—Chalkor.
470.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 63)—Otis.
471.
ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689 (paras 56 et seq.)—Masterfoods.
472.
AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388 (paras 49, 53 et seq.)—Otis.
473.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 66)—Otis.
474.
Forrester (2009), p. 817; Lang (2011) without page reference; Lang (2013), p. 132 et seq.; more open O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p. 92.
475.
Vilsmeier (2013), p. 72.
476.
ECHR, ruling of 23 November 2006, No. 73053/01—Jussila/Finland.
477.
See, e.g. ECHR, ruling of 14 November 2000, No. 35115/97 (para 40)—Riepan/Austria; similarly ruling of 27 January 2004, No. 73797/01 (para 44)—Kyprianou/Cyprus.
478.
Without examination of a possibility of cure, ECHR, ruling of 11 June 2009, No. 5242/04 (paras 60 et seq.)—Dubus/France.
479.
Gundel (2010), § 146 para 89; Vilsmeier (2013), p. 65.
480.
ECJ, Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815 (para 63)—Chalkor.
481.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (paras 62 et seq.)—Otis; Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 123)—E.ON.
482.
ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 126)—E.ON.
483.
ECJ, Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815 (para 62)—Chalkor; Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 61)—Otis.
484.
General Court, Case T-110/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:68 (para 323)—Siemens, affirmed by ECJ, Case C-239 inter alia/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:866 (paras 332 et seq.)—Siemens inter alia.
485.
Even if only with regard to an excessive increase, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738 (para 126)—E.ON.
486.
Using this as a starting point de Bronett (2014), p. 8 et seq., 11.
487.
ECJ, Case C-189/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408 (paras 278 et seq.)—Dansk Rørindustri.
488.
This involves a mere consequence of the application of the upper limit to the final amount, ECJ, Case C-189/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408 (para 279)—Dansk Rørindustri.
489.
General Court, Case T-211/08, ECLI:EU:T:2011:289 (para 75)—Putters International.
490.
ECHR, ruling of 27 September 2011, No. 43509/08 (para 59)—Menarini Diagnostics.
491.
ECHR, ruling of 15 June 2009, No. 5242/04 (paras 60 et seq.)—Dubus/France.
492.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 75)—Otis.
493.
See however Vilsmeier (2013), p. 74, regarding the preparation of Commission decisions.
494.
Vilsmeier (2013), p. 73 et seq.
495.
AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388 (para 57)—Otis.
496.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 71)—Otis, Case C-514 inter alia/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541 (para 88)—API; Case C-13/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:329 (paras 32 et seq.)—TEAM; ECHR, ruling of 22 February 1996, No. 17358/90, ÖJZ 1996, 430 (para 47)—Bulut/Austria; Frenz (2009), para 5044.
497.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 71 end)—Otis.
498.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 71)—Otis.
499.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 72)—Otis following AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388 (para 58).
500.
So-called doctrine of the apparent existence (of a circumstance) ECHR, ruling of 7 June 2001, No. 39594/98, CEDH 2001-VI (para 85)—Kress/France; accepted by the ECJ, see e.g. Case C-197/09 RX-II, ECLI:EU:C:2009:804 (paras 39 et seq.)—Revision M/EMEA.
501.
AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388 (para 56)—Otis.
502.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (paras 74 et seq.)—Otis also on the distinction from the ECHR, ruling of 24 April 2003, Rep. 2003-V—Yvon/France, where there were no such guarantees.
503.
ECJ, Case C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 (paras 26 et seq.)—Courage und Crehan.
504.
See ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 42)—Otis.
505.
General Court, Case T-437/08, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752 (para 47)—CDC.
506.
See fundamentally ECJ, Case C-360/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389 (paras 26 et seq.)—Pfleiderer.
507.
General Court, Case T-344/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:242 (para 128)—EnBW.
508.
ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 (para 42)—Otis; in the instant context Frenz (2013b), 781.
509.
ECJ, Case C-536/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366 (paras 45 et seq., in particular 48)—Donau Chemie.
510.
ECJ, Case C-450/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:91 (paras 48 et seq.)—Varec with additional citations. Frenz (2009), paras 1367, 2505 et seq., 2722.
511.
ECJ, Cases C-92 and 93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662 (paras 53, 87)—Schecke und Eifert.
512.
ECJ, Case C-461/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:219—Bonnier Audio.
513.
Summarising Möller (2012), 520 citing ECJ, Case C-557/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:107—LSG-Gesellschaft as well as Case C-275/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54—Promusicae. In the present context, previously Frenz (2012b), 362 et seq.
514.
Cf. regarding applicability to the insurance industry, see ECJ, Case 45/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:34 (para 14)—Verband der Sachversicherer; to banks, Case 172/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:178 (para 8)—Züchner; to waste management undertakings, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171 (para 35)—Almelo.
515.
Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 2.
516.
Frenz (2011), para 3141.
517.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 169/2009 of 26 February 2009 applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway, OJ L 61, p. 1.
518.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006 repealing Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, and amending Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and international tramp services, OJ L 269, p. 1.
519.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 487/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, OJ L 148, p. 1.
520.
Council Regulation No. 26/62 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to production of and trade in agricultural products, OJ 1962 No. 30, p. 993. In detail on the overall subject, Schweizer, In: Immenga and Mestmäcker (2012), Landwirtschaft C, p. 1751 et seq.
521.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1184/2006 of 24 July 2006 applying certain rules of competition to the production of, and trade in, agricultural products, OJ L 214, p. 7, last amended on 11 December 2013 by OJ L 354, p. 1.
522.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products, OJ L 299, p. 1, last amended on 26 November 2011 by OJ L 313, p. 47, last amended on 17 December 2013 by OJ L 347, p. 865.
523.
In detail on the overall subject, Busse, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 42 AEUV paras 4 et seq.; Frenz (2011), paras 2524 et seq.
524.
Busse, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 42 AEUV para 10.
525.
ECJ, Case C-319/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:433 (paras 31 et seq.)—Dijkstra.
526.
Busse, In: Lenz and Borchardt (2013), Art. 42 AEUV para 10.
527.
Schröter, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101–105 AEUV paras 97–98.
528.
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 18 April 1951, OJ II 1952, p. 447, effective 23 July 1952.
529.
See Schröter, In: von der Groeben et al. (2015), Vorbemerkungen zu Art. 101–105 AEUV para 3.
530.
Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 3.
531.
Accord ECJ, Case 23/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:6—Klomp; Case C-119/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:434 (para 41)—Lucchini.
532.
ECJ, Cases C-201 and 216/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:190 (paras 60, 63)—Arcelor.
533.
ECJ, Cases C-201 and 216/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:190 (para 64)—Arcelor.
534.
Weiß, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 101 AEUV para 4.
535.
For further discussion, Wegener, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 346 AEUV paras 1 et seq., 6 seq.; Calliess, In: Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 347 AEUV paras 1 et seq. as well as paras 4031 et seq.

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Table of Cases

AG Bot, ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:375—E.ON

AG Cruz Villalón, ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:388—Otis

AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:133—British Airways

AG Kokott, ECJ, Case C-681/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:126—Schenker

AG Sharpston, ECJ, Case C-272/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:63—KME Germany

ECHR, ruling of 4 March 2008, No. 11529/02—Hüseyin Turan/Turkey

ECHR, ruling of 7 June 2001, No. 39594/98, CEDH 2001-VI—Kress/France

ECHR, ruling of 8 June 1976, Series A No. 22—Menarini Diagnostics/Italy

ECHR, ruling of 10 January 2001, Rep. 2006-III, p. 21—Valico/Italy

ECHR, ruling of 11 June 2009, No. 5242/04—Dubus/France

ECHR, ruling of 14 November 2000, No. 35115/97—Riepan/Austria

ECHR, ruling of 16 April 2002, No. 37971/97—Stés Colas Est inter alia/France

ECHR, ruling of 16 December 1992, No. 72/1991/324/394—Niemietz/Germany

ECHR, ruling of 21 July 2011, No. 32181/04 and 35122/05—Sigma Radio Television/Cyprus

ECHR, ruling of 22 February 1996, No. 17358/90, ÖJZ 1996, 430—Bulut/Austria

ECHR, ruling of 23 October 1995, Series A No. 328.A—Schmautzer/Austria

ECHR, ruling of 23 November 2006, No. 73053/01—Jussila/Finland

ECHR, ruling of 24 April 2003, Rep. 2003-V—Yvon/France

ECHR, ruling of 27 January 2004, No. 73797/01—Kyprianou/Cyprus

ECHR, ruling of 27 September 2011, No. 43509/08—Menarini Diagnostics

ECHR, ruling of 30 May 1991, No. 11598/85, Series A No. 232 A—Société Stenuit/France

ECJ, Cases 56 and 58/64, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41—Consten und Grundig

ECJ, Case 32/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:42—Italy/Council and Commission

ECJ, Case 56/65, ECLI:EU:C:1966:38—Maschinenbau Ulm

ECJ, Case 23/67, ECLI:EU:C:1967:54—Haecht

ECJ, Case 14/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4—Walt Wilhelm

ECJ, Case 23/68, ECLI:EU:C:1969:6—Klomp

ECJ, Case 78/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59—Deutsche Grammophon

ECJ, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22—Continental Can

ECJ, Case 40 inter alia/73, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174—Suiker Unie

ECJ, Case 155/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:40—Sacchi

ECJ, Case 8/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:82—Dassonville

ECJ, Cases 19 and 20/74, ECLI:EU:C:1975:58—Kali und Salz

ECJ, Case 33/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:131—van Binsbergen

ECJ, Case 41/74, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133—van Duyn

ECJ, Cases 15 and 16/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:29—EAGGF

ECJ, Case 26/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167—Metro I

ECJ, Case 74/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:51—Iannelli

ECJ, Case 78/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:52—Steinike & Weinlig

ECJ, Case 28/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:133—Tepea

ECJ, Cases 110 and 111/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:8—van Wesemael

ECJ, Case 120/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42—Cassis

ECJ, Case 258/78, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211—Nungesser

ECJ, Case 136/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:169—National Panasonic

ECJ, Case 139/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:250—Maizena

ECJ, Cases 100–103/80, ECLI:EU:C:1983:158—Musique Diffusion française

ECJ, Case 172/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:178—Züchner

ECJ, Case 279/80, ECLI:EU:C:1981:314—Webb

ECJ, Case 15/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:135—Schul

ECJ, Case 262/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:334—Coditel II

ECJ, Cases 43 and 63/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:9—VBVB u. VBBB

ECJ, Cases 177 and 178/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:144—van de Haar

ECJ, Case 264/82, ECLI:EU:C:1985:119—Timex

ECJ, Case 13/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:220—Parliament/Council

ECJ, Cases 29 and 30/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:130—Heineken Nederland

ECJ, Case 180/83, ECLI:EU:C:1984:233—Moser

ECJ, Case 240/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:59—ADBHU

ECJ, Case 290/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:37—Commission/France

ECJ, Case 18/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:175—Commission/France

ECJ, Case 42/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:327—Remia

ECJ, Cases 60 and 61/84, ECLI:EU:C:1985:329—Cinéthèque

ECJ, Case 103/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:229—Commission/Italy

ECJ, Case 161/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:41—Pronuptia

ECJ, Case 169/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:42—Cofaz

ECJ, Case 45/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:34—Verband der Sachversicherer

ECJ, Cases 80 and 159/85, ECLI:EU:C:1986:426—Edah

ECJ, Case 11/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:418—Vlaamse Reisbureaus

ECJ, Case 314/85, ECLI:EU:C:1987:4529—Foto-Frost

ECJ, Case 355/85, ECLI:EU:C:1986:410—Cognet

ECJ, Case 57/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:284—Greece/Commission

ECJ, Cases 46/87 and C-227/88, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337—Hoechst

ECJ, Case C-21/88, ECLI:EU:C:1990:121—Du Pont de Nemours Italiana

ECJ, Case C-69/88, ECLI:EU:C:1990:97—Krantz

ECJ, Case C-5/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:320—BVG-Aluminium

ECJ, Case C-234/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:91—Delimitis

ECJ, Cases C-1 and 176/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:327—Aragonesa de Publicidad

ECJ, Case C-373/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:17—X

ECJ, Case C-17/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:172—Fedicine

ECJ, Case C-19/92, ECLI:EU:C:1993:125—Kraus

ECJ, Case C-364/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:7—SAT Fluggesellschaft

ECJ, Case C-379/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:296—Peralta

ECJ, Case C-393/92, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171—Almelo

ECJ, Case C-41/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:196—France/Commission

ECJ, Case C-279/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31—Schumacker

ECJ, Case C-280/93, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367—Banana regime

ECJ, Case C-319/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:433—Dijkstra

ECJ, Case C-399/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:434—Oude Luttikhuis

ECJ, Case C-415/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463—Bosman

ECJ, Case C-470/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:224—Mars

ECJ, Case C-55/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:411—Gebhard

ECJ, Case C-96/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:308—Spediporto

ECJ, Cases C-140–142/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:330—DIP/Bassano del Grappa

ECJ, Cases C-321–324/94, ECLI:EU:C:1997:229—Pistre

ECJ, Case C-68/95, ECLI:EU:C:1996:452—Port

ECJ, Case C-265/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595—Commission/France (agricultural blockades)

ECJ, Case C-343/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:160—Calì & Figli

ECJ, Case C-35/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:303—CNSD

ECJ, Case C-203/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:316—Dusseldorp

ECJ, Case C-266/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:306—Corsica Ferries II

ECJ, Case C-350/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205—Clean Car

ECJ, Case C-281/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296—Angonese

ECJ, Case C-344/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:689—Masterfoods

ECJ, Case C-367/98, ECLI:EU:C:2002:326—Golden shares I (Commission/Portugal)

ECJ, Case C-9/99, ECLI:EU:C:2000:532—Échirolles Distribution

ECJ, Case C-13/99 P, ECLI:EU:C:2000:329—TEAM

ECJ, Case C-309/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98—Wouters

ECJ, Case C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465—Courage und Crehan

ECJ, Case C-94/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603—Roquette Frères III

ECJ, Case C-112/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333—Schmidberger (Brenner Blockade)

ECJ, Case C-208/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:632—Überseering

ECJ, Case C-210/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:440—Käserei Champignon

ECJ, Case C-463/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:272—Golden shares IV (Commission/Spain)

ECJ, Case C-79/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:592—Payroll

ECJ, Case C-463/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:797—Pfandpflicht

ECJ, Case C-36/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614—Omega

ECJ, Case C-189/02 P, ECLI:EU:C:2005:408—Dansk Rørindustri

ECJ, Case C-309/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:799—Radlberger

ECJ, Case C-95/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166—British Airways

ECJ, Case C-519/04 P, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492—Meca-Medina

ECJ, Case C-119/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:434—Lucchini

ECJ, Case C-438/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:772—Viking

ECJ, Case C-3/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2007:88—Danone

ECJ, Case C-275/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54—Promusicae

ECJ, Case C-450/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:91—Varec

ECJ, Case C-501 inter alia/06 P, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610—GlaxoSmithKline Services

ECJ, Case C-49/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:376—MOTOE

ECJ, Case C-514 inter alia/07 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:541—API

ECJ, Case C-557/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:107—LSG-Gesellschaft

ECJ, Case C-8/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343—T-Mobile Netherlands inter alia

ECJ, Case C-280/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603—Deutsche Telekom

ECJ, Cases C-403 and 429/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631—Football Association Premier League

ECJ, Case C-52/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83—TeliaSonera Sverige

ECJ, Cases C-92 and 93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662—Schecke und Eifert

ECJ, Case C-197/09 RX-II, ECLI:EU:C:2009:804—Revision M/EMEA

ECJ, Cases C-201 and 216/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:190—Arcelor

ECJ, Case C-360/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389—Pfleiderer

ECJ, Case C-209/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172—Post Danmark

ECJ, Case C-386/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815—Chalkor

ECJ, Case C-461/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:219—Bonnier Audio

ECJ, Case C-549/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:221—Tomra

ECJ, Case C-89/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2012:738—E.ON

ECJ, Case C-171/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:453—Fra.bo

ECJ, Case C-199/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684—Otis

ECJ, Case C-239 inter alia/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:866—Siemens

ECJ, Case C-536/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:366—Donau Chemie

ECJ, Case C-262/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:851—Vent de Colère

ECJ, Case C-295/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062—Telefónica and Telefónica de España

General Court, Case T-14/89, ECLI:EU:T:1992:36—Montedipe

General Court, Case T-148/89, ECLI:EU:T:1995:68—Tréfilunion

General Court, Case T-66/92, ECLI:EU:T:1994:84—Herlitz

General Court, Case T-17/93, ECLI:EU:T:1994:89—Matra Hachette

General Court, Case T-266/94, ECLI:EU:T:1996:153—Skibsvaerftsforeningen

General Court, Case T-374/94 inter alia, ECLI:EU:T:1998:198—European Night Services

General Court, Case T-77/94, ECLI:EU:T:1997:70—VGB

General Court, Case T-112/99, ECLI:EU:T:2001:215—M6

General Court, Case T-67/01, ECLI:EU:T:2004:3—JCB Service

General Court, Case T-168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265—GlaxoSmithKline Services

General Court, Cases T-213 and 214/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:151—Österreichische Postsparkasse und Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft

General Court, Case T-279/02, ECLI:EU:T:2006:103—Degussa

General Court, Case T-328/03, ECLI:EU:T:2006:116—O2

General Court, Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289—Microsoft

General Court, Case T-45/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:359—Unipetrol

General Court, Case T-110/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:68—Siemens

General Court, Case T-138/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:362—Schindler

General Court, Case T-240/07, ECLI:EU:T:2011:284—Heineken Nederland.

General Court, Case T-141/08, ECLI:EU:T:2010:516—E.ON

General Court, Case T-167/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323—Microsoft II

General Court, Case T-211/08, ECLI:EU:T:2011:289—Putters International

General Court, Case T-344/08, ECLI:EU:T:2012:242—EnBW

General Court, Case T-437/08, ECLI:EU:T:2011:752—CDC

General Court, Case T-286/09, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547—Intel

German Federal Administrative Court 65, 167

German Federal Constitutional Court 65, 196

German Federal Constitutional Court 80, 367

German Federal Constitutional Court 81, 242—Handelsvertreter

German Federal Constitutional Court 86, 28

German Federal Constitutional Court 88, 203—Schwangerschaftsabbruch II.

German Federal Constitutional Court 92, 26

German Federal Administrative Court 92, 81

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Frenz, W. (2016). The Significance of Freedom of Competition in the European Union Law. In: Handbook of EU Competition Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48593-4_1

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