Abstract
In this paper we consider the effect of strategic behavior in matching markets as school graduates get assigned to jobs (or to further education) reacting to multiple incentives:
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Companies want to hire the best students,
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Students want to take the best jobs,
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Schools want to help their graduating students take great jobs.
A full version of the paper can be found at http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02718.
Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0910940 and CCR-1215994, ONR grant N00014-08-1-0031, and a Google Research Grant.
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© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Beyhaghi, H., Dikkala, N., Tardos, É. (2015). Brief Announcement: Effect of Strategic Grading and Early Offers in Matching Markets. In: Hoefer, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9347. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_24
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