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Excluding Braess’s Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing

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Book cover Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 9347))

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Abstract

Braess’s paradox exposes a counterintuitive phenomenon that when travelers selfishly choose their routes in a network, removing links can improve overall network performance. Under the model of nonatomic selfish routing, we characterize the topologies of k-commodity undirected and directed networks in which Braess’s paradox never occurs. Our results generalize Milchtaich’s series-parallel characterization for the single-commodity undirected case.

Research supported in part by NNSF of China under Grant No. 11222109, 11021161 and 10928102, by 973 Project of China under Grant No. 2011CB80800, and by CAS Program for Cross & Cooperative Team of Science & Technology Innovation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We remark that the definition of paradox-ridden network here is a substantial relaxation the ones given by Roughgarden [11] and Fotakis et al. [4], which admit instances suffering from the most severe performance loss in terms of Braess’s paradox.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China

    Xujin Chen, Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu

Authors
  1. Xujin Chen
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  2. Zhuo Diao
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  3. Xiaodong Hu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xujin Chen .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Martin Hoefer

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Chen, X., Diao, Z., Hu, X. (2015). Excluding Braess’s Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing. In: Hoefer, M. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9347. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48432-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48433-3

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