Abstract
This contribution seeks to provide an answer to the question how much regulatory innovation TRIPS allows. It starts from the premise that TRIPS fosters innovation—and actually legal regimes should also profit from the benefits of an innovative structure. This, however, clashes with traditional concepts of legal certainty. The benefits outweigh the costs of a less certain, more open legal regime. The debate on regulatory competition pays some attention to this. The authors thus analyse the TRIPS Agreement with specific focus on the regulatory power and pressure exerted by rules in TRIPS. For this endeavour, they apply an institutional perspective and turn to regulatory techniques used in TRIPS. Regarding the regulation of intellectual property in TRIPS, different mechanisms can be distinguished that have a different impact for the member states. To make this plain, the authors “code” the different instruments used in the Agreement with numbers attaching more extreme numbers to rules that have a high intensity of regulation. In a second step, the authors analyse the meta-structure of TRIPS to find out how open it is for adaption. Several different approaches towards TRIPS are included. In both instances, the authors point to the possibilities of change. A shift towards a more innovation-friendly, more open, more flexible regulatory regime would make TRIPS a “learning treaty”.
Prof. Dr. Rupprecht Podszun is Professor at the University of Bayreuth and Affiliated Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich. Dr. Benjamin Franz was Research Assistant at the University of Bayreuth.
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Notes
- 1.
See J.A. Schumpeter (1947), A Creative Response in Economic History, 7 J. Econ. Hist. 1947, 149, 151.
- 2.
Cf. G.M.P. Swann (2009), The Economics of Innovation, pp. 23 et seq.; J. Tidd & J. Bessant (2013), Managing Innovation, p. 18; R. Kraßer (2004), Patentrecht, p. 41. The process of knowledge diffusion is examined (with a strong focus on geographic proximity) by D. Bahar, R. Hausmann & C.A. Hidalgo (2012), International Knowledge Diffusion and the Comparative Advantage of Nations, HKS Faculty Working Paper No. RWP12-020. Their research does, however, also provide an overview of the general topic, cp. pp. 3 et seq.
- 3.
J.A. Schumpeter (1976), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 81 et seq.; cf. S.W. Waller & M. Sag (2015), Promoting Innovation, 100 Iowa Law Rev. 2015, discussing Schumpeter from a lawmaking point of view.
- 4.
This is disputed, especially for the interpretation of law in systems that know precedent, cp. W. Fikentscher (1975), Methoden des Rechts, p. 146.
- 5.
Cf. M. Eifert (2008), Innovationsfördernde Regulierung, in M. Eifert & W. Hoffmann-Riem (Eds.), Innovationsfördernde Regulierung, pp. 11 et seq., stating that a criteria for regulation is that it serves to reach a certain (known) goal and therefore is contrary to an innovation process aimed at a surprising and new result.
- 6.
Cf. R. Podszun (2014), Wirtschaftsordnung durch Zivilgerichte, pp. 107 et seq., 167.
- 7.
Cf. G.M.P. Swann (2009), The Economics of Innovation, chs. 19 and 20.
- 8.
An approach to the problems of law and innovation that tries to make use of principles of institutional economics has also been suggested with a focus on national law by W. Hoffman-Riem (2005), Risiko- und Innovationsrecht im Verbund, 38 Die Verwaltung 2005, 145, 170 et seq.
- 9.
See on the term “rule of law”: e.g. W. Fikentscher (1975), Methoden des Rechts, pp. 133 et seq.; on legal certainty ibid. p. 143; comprehensively A. von Arnauld (2006), Rechtssicherheit; cf. on legal certainty and the rule of law: J. Waldron (2008), The Concept and the Rule of Law, NYU Research Paper Series No. 08–50, pp. 5 et seq.
- 10.
A. von Arnauld (2006), Rechtssicherheit, pp. 625, 661.
- 11.
See O.A. Rognstad (2008), The Exhaustion/Competition Interface in EC Law – is there Room for a Holistic Approach?, in J. Drexl (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp. 427, 436; H.P. Götting (2014), Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, p. 48, para. 1.
- 12.
See e.g. J. Waldron (2008), The Concept and the Rule of Law, NYU Research Paper Series No. 08–50, pp. 5 et seq.
- 13.
On the concept of precedent see R.J. Kozel (2014), The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 2014, 179.
- 14.
Cf. the witty critique by R. Morgan (2012), Ensuring Greater Legal Certainty in OHIM Decision-Taking by Abandoning Legal Formalism, 7 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 2012, 408 et seq.
- 15.
Cf. P.S. Menell (2002–2003), Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 2002–2003, 63 et seq. about the challenges to intellectual property law posed by digital technology; also cf. R. Podszun (2015), The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the Digital Economy, in G. Surblyte (Ed.), Competition on the Internet, pp. 101 et seq.
- 16.
Cf. for a broader view on flexibility in societies and its effect on innovation: R.M. Kanter (1988), When a Thousand Flowers Bloom: Structural, Collective, and Social Conditions for Innovation in Organization, 10 Research in Organizational Behavior 1988, 169, 171 et seq.
- 17.
Cf. Lord Scarman in the well-known case McLoughlin v. O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410.
- 18.
Contended. US scholars put forward this argument for the efficiency-orientation of case law, see R.A. Posner (2011), Economic Analysis of Law, para. 19.2.
- 19.
R. Dworkin (1978), Taking Rights Seriously, ch. 2.3.
- 20.
Ibid.
- 21.
From a comparative perspective see J. Esser (1990), Grundsatz und Norm, pp. 183 et seq.
- 22.
As defined by A. Kaufmann (1962), Gesetz und Recht, in T. Würtenberger, W. Maihofer & A. Hollerbach (Eds.), Existenz und Ordnung – Publication in Honor of Erik Wolff, pp. 357, 362.
- 23.
“Grundsatznorm”, ibid., p. 387.
- 24.
“Gesetz”.
- 25.
Ibid., p. 387.
- 26.
See for a critical analysis of general clauses in national law ibid., p. 386; stating that the application of the general clause § 242 BGB equals Munchhausen pulling himself out of the swamp on his own hair.
- 27.
Cp. for an overview on the different ideas of the term “law” in continental and common law W. Fikentscher (1977), Methoden des Rechts, p. 140.
- 28.
Cp. J. Esser (1990), Grundsatz und Norm, pp. 186 et seq.
- 29.
Ibid., stating that the principle survives even with the rule derived from it changing from case to case. For an economic analysis of rules and standards see L. Kaplow (1992), Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 1992, 557.
- 30.
As opposed to “over time” as Esser shows when stating that the principle withstands different approaches in different cases over time.
- 31.
Cf. L. Kaplow (1992), Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 1992, 557 et seq.
- 32.
Cf. R. Podszun (2014), Wirtschaftsordnung durch Zivilgerichte, pp. 132 et seq.
- 33.
See for a sociological analysis of “governance of innovation” A. Bora (2009), Innovationsregulierung als Wissensregulierung, in M. Eifert & W. Hoffmann-Riem (Eds.), Innovationsfördernde Regulierung, pp. 23, 40.
- 34.
See for the concept of “learning law” tailored to fit on the national level W. Hoffman-Riem (2005), Risiko- und Innovationsrecht im Verbund, 38 Die Verwaltung 2005, 145, 167 et seq.
- 35.
On the concept of “new cases” see R. Podszun (2014), Wirtschaftsordnung durch Zivilgerichte, p. 156.
- 36.
Cf. W. Kerber & O. Budzinski (2003), Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws, ZWeR 2003, 411 with further references in n. 1.
- 37.
See e.g. O. Vahrenholt (2011), Marktabgrenzung und Systemwettbewerb, pp. 21 et seq. understanding “system competition” as the competition of systems in a sense of products bundled together by consumers; G. Ambrosius (2005), Regulativer Wettbewerb und koordinative Standardisierung zwischen Staaten, p. 11, who does not make a difference between Institutionenwettbewerb, Systemwettbewerb and Standortwettbewerb.
- 38.
As W. Kerber & O. Budzinski (2003), Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws, ZWeR 2003, 412 et seq. state, the term “regulatory competition” is not completely clear in itself either.
- 39.
C. Hafner (1998), Systemwettbewerb versus Harmonisierung in Europa, p. 10.
- 40.
F.A. von Hayek (1968), Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, p. 5.
- 41.
This characteristic, “new knowledge” is a very common one for different understandings of “innovation”, see W. Hoffmann-Riem (2008), Immaterialgüterrecht als Referenzgebiet innovationserheblichen Rechts, in M. Eifert & W. Hoffman-Riem (Eds.), Geistiges Eigentum und Innovation, pp. 15, 20.
- 42.
See about “learning law” on the national level W. Hoffman-Riem (2005), Risiko- und Innovationsrecht im Verbund, 38 Die Verwaltung 2005, 145, 167 et seq.
- 43.
Cf. M. Lamping (2015), Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 313 (this volume). For an overview cf. D.A. Kenyon (1997), Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, New Eng. Econ. Rev. 1997, 13 et seq.
- 44.
W. Kerber (1998), Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnung für den Systemwettbewerb, in K.E. Schenk et al. (Eds.), JNPÖ Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik, pp. 199, 202 (n. 4) referring to M. Vihanto (1992), Competition Between Local Governments as a Discovery Procedure, 148 JITE 1992, 411 et seq.; V. Vanberg & W. Kerber (1994), Institutional Competition among Jurisdictions, 5 Constit. Polit. Econ. 1994, 193 et seq.
- 45.
Cf. V. Mehde (2005), Wettbewerb zwischen Staaten, pp. 98 et seq.
- 46.
A.O. Hirschman (1974), Abwanderung und Widerspruch, pp. 3 et seq., 17 et seq.
- 47.
C.M. Tiebout (1956), A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Polit. Econ. 1956, 416.
- 48.
Cf. D.C. Esty & D. Geradin (2000), Regulatory Co-opetition, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2000, 235, 252; J.H. Reichman (2000), The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 441, 463 et seq., suggesting a cooperative-approach implementing TRIPS.
- 49.
See W. Kerber & O. Budzinski (2003), Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws, ZWeR 2003, 414 et seq.
- 50.
D.A. Kenyon (1997), Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition, New Eng. Econ. Rev. 1997, 13, 26 et seq.
- 51.
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, p. 146.
- 52.
W. Kerber (1998), Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnung für den Systemwettbewerb, in K.E. Schenk et al. (Eds.), JNPÖ Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik, pp. 199, 217 et seq.
- 53.
Cf. V. Mehde (2005), Wettbewerb zwischen Staaten, pp. 592 et seq.; D.C. Esty & D. Geradin (2000), Regulatory Co-opetition, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2000, 235 with empirical research focusing on law-making in environmental law.
- 54.
Cf. G.B. Dinwoodie (2007), The WIPO Copyright Treaties: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmaking?, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 2007, 751, 760.
- 55.
W. Kerber (1998), Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnung für den Systemwettbewerb, in K.E. Schenk et al. (Eds.), JNPÖ Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik, pp. 199, 208.
- 56.
J.H. Reichman (2000), The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 459 refers to “wiggle room”, that can be used by states if the legal framework allows to do so.
- 57.
Commonly a divide is seen between IP-exporting states and IP-importing states, cf. G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, p. 11.
- 58.
See P.K. Yu (2007), The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 2007, 827, 858 et seq., criticizing TRIPS as too close to the “rich-country model” of IP-protection; but see also P. Ganea (2008), TRIPS als Innovationsmotor?, in M. Eifert & W. Hoffmann-Riem (Eds.), Geistiges Eigentum und Innovation, p. 119 stating that harmful effects of TRIPS have not been proven.
- 59.
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, pp. 10 et seq.
- 60.
See for a general approach: R.P. Merges (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2000, 1857; for patents: L. Vertinsky (2012), An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 Minn. J.L. Sc. & Tech 2012, 211.
- 61.
M. Erlei, M. Leschke & D. Sauerland (2007), Neue Institutionenökonomik, p. 22.
- 62.
D.C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p. 3.
- 63.
M. Erlei, M. Leschke & D. Sauerland (2007), Neue Institutionenökonomik, p. 22.
- 64.
L.E. Davis & D.C. North (1970), Institutional Change and American Economic Growth: A First Step Towards a Theory of Institutional Innovation, 30 J. Econ. Hist. 1970, 131, 133; cf. O.E. Williamson (1993), Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & Econ. 1993, 453, 457.
- 65.
Cf. H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume).
- 66.
See M. Erlei, M. Leschke & D. Sauerland (2007), Neue Institutionenökonomik, p. 22.
- 67.
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, p. 7.
- 68.
Depiction of the WTO organization chart at the official website, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm (accessed 19 November 2014).
- 69.
Marrakesh Agreement, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1995.
- 70.
World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
- 71.
For an analysis cf. J. Pauwelyn (2010), The Dog that Barked But Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. Int’l Dispute Settlement 2010, 389; W.J. Davey (2005), The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2005, 17.
- 72.
Drexl points out that the mechanisms are imported into TRIPS from the national standards and trade-offs known in IP regulation and may therefore miss an original international approach. It has to be conceded that some of the variants presented in this contribution may have the same deficit. Cf. J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).
- 73.
See G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, p. 3.
- 74.
Some authors suggest that “policy flexibility” within the framework of TRIPS is a viable countermeasure to a problematic “one-size-fits-all” approach, cp. V. Vaish & M. Haji (2012), Is there a Need to ‘Substantially Modify’ the Terms of the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 JIPR 2012, 195, 197, especially referring to the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act, at 200.
- 75.
R.M. Hilty (2015), Ways out of the Trap of Article 1(1) TRIPS, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 185 (this volume).
- 76.
Cf. A. Kur (2015), From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 133 (this volume).
- 77.
Cf. O. Brand (2009), in P.T. Stoll, J. Busche & K. Arend (Eds.), WTO, Article 8, paras. 5 et seq. On the proportionality principle and its role in TRIPS cf. M. Wallot (2015), The Proportionality Principle in the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 213 (this volume).
- 78.
See esp. for patents: C. Osterrieth (2009), Patent-Trolls in Europa – braucht das Patentrecht neue Grenzen?, 111 GRUR 2009, 540; A. Ohly (2008), “Patenttrolle” oder: Der patentrechtliche Unterlassungsanspruch unter Verhältnismäßigkeitsvorbehalt?, 57 GRUR Int. 2008, 787; with a focus on the IT-industry in the USA: M.A. Lemley & A.D. Melamed (2013), Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2013, 2117, 2170.
- 79.
It is true that, given another focus, different values could be chosen. This is, however, at our opinion an acceptable risk, as the focus is not so much on the values as such but on their usefulness as gears fitting into a larger machine.
- 80.
W. Kerber (1998), Zum Problem einer Wettbewerbsordnung für den Systemwettbewerb, in K.E. Schenk et al. (Eds.), JNPÖ Band 17: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik, pp. 199, 206.
- 81.
Cf. J. Gernhuber (1983), § 242 BGB – Funktionen und Tatbestände, 23 JuS 1983, 764, who spoke of a sliding scale of regulation with the general clause marking the extreme of uncertainty.
- 82.
And difficult; see e.g. for the “single undertaking” approach of WTO negotiations: S.E. Rolland (2010), Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO, 13 J. Int’l Econ. L 2010, 65.
- 83.
Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641, 6 December 2005.
- 84.
See the dates of acceptance on the official website of the World Trade Organization, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (accessed 19 November 2014).
- 85.
Cf. H.P. Hestermeyer (2004), Flexible Entscheidungsfindung in der WTO, 53 GRUR Int. 2004, 194, 200.
- 86.
See the website of the WTO on the dispute resolution mechanism, wto.org; for an overview see O. Budzinski & K. Monostori (2012), Intellectual Property Rights and the WTO: Innovation Dynamics, Commercial Copyrights and International Governance, 1 ILR 2012, 108; J. Pauwelyn (2010), The Dog that Barked But Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. Int’l Dispute Settlement 2010, 389.
- 87.
According to the WTO Search Engine.
- 88.
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2009), Designing a Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO and Beyond, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09–63.
- 89.
Cf. G.B. Dinwoodie (2007), The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms, National Courts, and private Ordering, in D. Gervais (Ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a Trips-Plus Era, pp. 61, 93 et seq.
- 90.
TRIPS is covered by an understanding of the member states, see App. 1 to the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 1 No. 1 DSU.
- 91.
Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9.
- 92.
Panel Report, United States – Sections 301 310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, DSR 2000:II, p. 815.
- 93.
See the official website of the World Trade Organization, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who%27sSigned (accessed 19 November 2014).
- 94.
Cf. M.R. Hashim (2013), International Influence – TRIPS and Patentable Subject-Matter, IIC 2013, 656, 658 et seq.
- 95.
Cf. K. Kaiser (2009), in P.T. Stoll, J. Busche & K. Arend (Eds.), WTO, Article 68, para. 11.
- 96.
M. Lamping et al. (2014), Declaration on Patent Protection – Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 IIC 2014, 679.
- 97.
Ibid., para. 2.
- 98.
B. Lindstrom (2010), Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 NYU J. Int.’l L.Pol. 2010, 917, 919; P.K. Yu (2007), The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 2007, 827, 867, suggests to distinguish between TRIPS plus, TRIPS extra and TRIPS restrictive in order to mirror more accurately the level of protection that is granted additionally; cf. R.U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 2003-2004, 125 et seq.
- 99.
See C.M. Correa (2013), High Costs, Negligible Benefits from Intellectual Property Provisions in FTAs, 44 IIC 2013, 902, 904: “a shocking element is the lack of proportion between the high costs imposed on developing countries and the low benefit derived by the intended beneficiaries”.
- 100.
Ibid.
- 101.
Cf. J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (2014), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property.
- 102.
H. Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013), Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 IIC 2013, 878.
- 103.
Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS285/ARB, 21 December 2007, DSR 2007:X, p. 4163.
- 104.
Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 24 March 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2237.
- 105.
See e.g. F.M. Abbott & J.H. Reichman (2007), The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended Provisions, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2007, 921, 925 et seq.
- 106.
C.M. Correa (2013), High Costs, Negligible Benefits from Intellectual Property Provisions in FTAs, 44 IIC 2013, 902, 905; F.M. Abbott (2011), Intellectual Property and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge of Sustainability, Global Health Programme Working Paper No. 7/2011, pp. 5 et seq. at note 65 seems far less optimistic stating that “unless and until governments demonstrate a willingness to employ [… existing mechanisms…], refinement […] is probably not the best use of diplomatic energies”.
- 107.
K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2004), The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 279, 311.
- 108.
J.H. Reichman (2000), The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 441, 446.
- 109.
O. Budzinski & K. Monostori (2012), Intellectual Property Rights and the WTO: Innovation Dynamics, Commercial Copyrights and International Governance, 1 ILR 2012, 102, 115 argue that initiatives such as SOPA and PIPA are a result of failures of TRIPS.
- 110.
G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS.
- 111.
With examples: J.H. Reichman (2000), The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 457.
- 112.
Cf. G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS, pp. 5 et seq., referring to it as a “neofederalist regime”; cf. J.H. Reichman (1997), From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. Int.’l L.Pol. 1997, 26–86.
- 113.
Cf. R.M. Hilty (2015), Ways out of the Trap of Article 1(1) TRIPS, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 185 (this volume).
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Podszun, R., Franz, B. (2016). Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design of the TRIPS Agreement. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_9
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