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The Commodification of Internet Intermediary Safe Harbors: Avoiding Premature Harmonization Around a Suboptimal Standard

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TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

Twenty years after the initial wave of national and international activity outlining the role of copyright within the world’s first digital communications policy, the contours of a few fundamental policy principles at the intersection of copyright law and Internet regulation have begun to take shape. This paper focusses its attention on the continuing development of one such principle: The premise that legislatively mandated limitations on internet intermediary liability with regard to third party acts of copyright infringement (so-called safe harbors) are required to promote investment and innovation in Internet-related infrastructure and technology in order to achieve the goal of a robust public information environment.

In the early days of the Internet, internet intermediaries argued that without certain limitations on their liability, little-to-no investment in the nascent information infrastructure would occur, i.e. there would be no market creation. Rightholders consistently countered this contention by arguing that, in the absence of adequate protection, they would not place their works online, i.e. there would be no goods on the market. Safe harbors were seen as a mechanism for ensuring right holder safety in the online environment without discouraging rapid market creation or hindering the democratic potential of the Internet. For the initial phase of the digital era, this compromise worked rather well.

This paper demonstrates that, while consensus may be found regarding the basic premise of this precept and perhaps even with regard to specific aspects of its implementation, there is certainly nothing approaching universal understanding on how to best effectuate the policy goal. The reasons for this disagreement are manifold and rather comprehensible. The rapidly evolving technological landscape, the differing national and regional approaches to the regulation of the Internet, and the diverse legal and cultural environments all combine to make arrival at a globally appropriate safe harbor regime very challenging.

Recognizing the obstacles to harmonization in this field is particularly relevant considering the ongoing attempts of the US to convince its trade partners to adopt a safe harbor framework largely equivalent to, and in certain respects likely narrower than, that which is laid out in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA-plus). This paper argues that while harmonization may seem attractive given the international nature and overall importance of the Internet, standardization based upon an intricate and outdated internet safe harbor regime originally tailored to fit the needs of US industry is suboptimally configured for the digital communications policy requirements of the entire world.

Seth Ericsson is Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 of 15 April 1994 (hereinafter TRIPS).

  2. 2.

    A bit of historical context: Tim Berners-Lee invented the first web browser in 1990. Netscape, the “World’s first popular browser”, was not introduced until 1993. Microsoft did not get into the web browsing game until 1995 with the release of Internet Explorer 1. The founding dates of a few Internet intermediary giants are also informative in this regard: eBay Inc. (1995); Google Inc. (1998); Facebook Inc. (2004); YouTube LLC (2005).

  3. 3.

    W. Cornish & K. Liddell (2015), The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 3 (this volume).

  4. 4.

    M.A. Hamilton (1996), The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1996, 613; the regulatory conception of copyright law is taken from T. Wu (2004), Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2004, 278.

  5. 5.

    The co-development of copyright law alongside reproduction and dissemination technologies is nothing new. J. Ginsburg (2001), Copyright and Control over new Technologies of Dissemination, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 2001, 1613.

  6. 6.

    J. Hughes (2004), On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 Cardozo A.E.L.J. 2004, 725; Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008), RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, 30 September 2008.

  7. 7.

    See T. Wu (2004), Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2004, 278 (speaking in terms of market entrant disseminators and market incumbent disseminators).

  8. 8.

    J. Litman (2001), Digital Copyright.

  9. 9.

    See, WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.) (hereinafter DMCA); European Union Council Directive 2000/31, On Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on Electronic Commerce’), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (hereinafter ECD).

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting §512(c) of the DMCA); see also ECJ, Scarlet Extended, C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771 (interpreting article 15 of the ECD).

  11. 11.

    J. Hughes (2002), The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 2002, 359. (“Perhaps one can think of the Internet as an Atlantis-like continent that has risen from the sea, been promptly populated, and now needs sufficient order to ensure that the inhabitants do not hurt one another (or the people on other continents) too much. The new region is now undergoing a program of “colonization”—lawyers, legislators, and lobbyists have moved quickly to extend familiar laws and regimes into the new territory.”).

  12. 12.

    These “newer” issues include: data protection, network neutrality, network design and regulation, freedom of expression, information and participation, network accessibility etc.

  13. 13.

    See e.g. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) (hereinafter: Draft Data Protection Regulation); See also Proposal for a Regulation laying down Measures concerning the European Single Market for Electronic Communications and to achieve a Connected Continent COM(2013) 627 final (Sept. 11, 2013).

  14. 14.

    Y. Lev-Aretz (2012), Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 2012, 203; A. Bridy (2010), Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 Or. L. Rev. 2010, 81.

  15. 15.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, p. 136 (referring to “the double helix that is now formed between Berne and its associated agreements, on the one hand, and TRIPS, on the other”).

  16. 16.

    See e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, 36 I.L.M. 65 of 20 December 1996 (hereinafter: WCT); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 36 I.L.M. 76 of 20 December 1996 (hereinafter: WPPT and together with the WCT, the Internet Treaties).

  17. 17.

    For an example of expansion see Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, WIPO Doc. AVP/DC/20 of 24 June 2012 (hereinafter Beijing Treaty); for an example of limitation see Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, WIPO Doc VIP/DC/8 of 27 June 2013 (hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty).

  18. 18.

    L.R. Helfer (2004), Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 2004, 1; S. Sell (2009), Cat and Mouse: Forum-Shifting in the Battle over Intellectual Property Enforcement, American Political Science Association Meeting of 3–6 September 2009; H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2011), The International Law Relation between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2009, 325.

  19. 19.

    See S. Sell (2010), TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2010, 447; see also J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).

  20. 20.

    For the more traditional and narrower approach to the role state practice in norm creation see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 (regarding “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty”). For a newer and broader take on the function of state practice in norm creation see G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime (formulating “an international intellectual property “acquis”—a set of basic principles that form the background norms animating the intellectual property system).

  21. 21.

    K. Opsahl & C. Rossini (2012), TPP Creates Legal Incentives For ISPs To Police The Internet. What Is At Risk? Your Rights, Electronic Frontier Foundation of 24 August 2012.

  22. 22.

    D. Seng (2010), Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the Liability of Internet Intermediaries of 10 November 2010 (preliminary version of WIPO study).

  23. 23.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, pp. 135–136.

  24. 24.

    R. Okediji (2008), Regulation of Creativity under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2008, 2393–2394; Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 3769 (“In paragraph 6.66 we discussed the need to interpret the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement in a way that reconciles the texts of these two treaties and avoids a conflict between them, given that they form the overall framework for multilateral copyright protection. The same principle should also apply to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT. The WCT is designed to be compatible with this framework, incorporating or using much of the language of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. The WCT was unanimously concluded at a diplomatic conference organized under the auspices of WIPO in December 1996, one year after the WTO Agreement entered into force, in which 127 countries participated. Most of these countries were also participants in the TRIPS negotiations and are Members of the WTO. For these reasons, it is relevant to seek contextual guidance also in the WCT when developing interpretations that avoid conflicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly contain different obligations.”).

  25. 25.

    Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886. As revised at Paris on 24 July 1971, and amended on 29 September 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter Berne Convention).

  26. 26.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, p. 85 (“Article 17 of the 1886 Act provided for periodic Revision, and these (apart from the first and last) have occurred at roughly twenty-year Intervals during this Period: in 1896, 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and then, finally, in 1971.”).

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    P. Goldstein (2003), Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox; G.W. Austin (2012), Radio: Early Battles Over the Public Performance Right, in B. Sherman & L. Wiseman (Eds.), Copyright and the Challenge of the New, pp. 115–140.

  29. 29.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond.

  30. 30.

    D. Gervais (2008), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, p. 440.

  31. 31.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, pp. 159–160 (“The real steel in the spine of the TRIPs Agreement is provided by the dispute-prevention and dispute-settlement provisions in articles 63 and 64.”).

  32. 32.

    TRIPS Article 9(1); D. Gervais (2008), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, p. 213.

  33. 33.

    M. Prensky (2001), Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants, 9 On the Horizon 2001, 1. (“the single biggest problem facing education today is that our Digital Immigrant instructors, who speak an outdated language (that of the pre-digital age), are struggling to teach a population that speaks an entirely new language.”).

  34. 34.

    D. Desai (2014), The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and Disruption, 65 Hastings L.J. 2014, 1469.

  35. 35.

    N.W. Netanel (1997), The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1997, 441.

  36. 36.

    G.B. Dinwoodie (2002), The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 2002, 1005.

  37. 37.

    The focus of this essay is on the WCT.

  38. 38.

    B. Sherman & L. Wiseman (2012), Copyright and the Challenge of the New.

  39. 39.

    G.B. Dinwoodie (2007), WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmaking, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 2007, 758.

  40. 40.

    J. Reinbothe & S. Lewinski (2002), The WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal Analysis.

  41. 41.

    G.B. Dinwoodie (2007), WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright Lawmaking, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 2007, 758.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    G.B. Dinwoodie (2000), Essay: The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 Colum. J.L. & Arts 2000, 307.

  45. 45.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 369.

  46. 46.

    Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property And The National Information Infrastructure of 1995 (hereinafter White Paper).

  47. 47.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 369; P. Jaszi (1996), Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 Or. L. Rev. 1996, 299; J. Litman (1994), The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo A.E.L.J. 1994, 29.

  48. 48.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The Copyright Grab, Wired 4.01 of January 1996.

  49. 49.

    Due corporate mergers, the traditional copyright industry may now, at least partially, be seen as part of the ICT. However, throughout the paper ICT is used to denote the cooperation between the telecommunications industry and high tech sectors of the economy at this particular point in history.

  50. 50.

    J. Reichman, G.B. Dinwoodie & P. Samuelson (2007), A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Pubic Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2007, 990.

  51. 51.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 382.

  52. 52.

    M. Stoltz (2014), Collateral Damages: Why Congress Needs To Fix Copyright Law’s Civil Penalties, Electronic Frontier Foundation of July 2014.

  53. 53.

    J. Reichman, G.B. Dinwoodie & P. Samuelson (2007), A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Pubic Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2007, 989–990.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The Copyright Grab, Wired 4.01 of January 1996.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 373; J.S. Sheinblatt (2014), The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2014, 545.

  58. 58.

    J.S. Sheinblatt (2014), The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2014, 545.

  59. 59.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 374.

  60. 60.

    S. Ricketson & J.C. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, p. 150 (“By comparison with the intimate nature of the early Berne conferences, this was a huge gathering, attended with all the colour and movement of any modern international meeting, with hurried corridor conferences, hectic lobbying, and frantic mobile telephone and e-mail communications between delegate, interest groups, and home bases.”). Of course, the technology of the time seems almost stone-aged when compared to today’s seamless communications standards. However, at the time, it was revolutionary. See S. Preston (1994), Electronic Global Networking and The NGO Movement: The 1992 Rio Summit And Beyond, 3(2) Swords & Ploughshares: A Chronicle Of International Affairs (exploring the emergence of electronic communication at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).

  61. 61.

    Ibid, pp. 147–148.

  62. 62.

    The estimated importance of the Internet is also reflected in the language used to describe this issue. The rhetorical device of choice has been to analogize this public policy debate to war. J. Litman (2002), War Stories. 20 Cardozo A.E.L.J. 2002, 337; W. Patry (2009), Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars; P. Baldwin (2014), The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle.

  63. 63.

    WCT Preamble.

  64. 64.

    It is important to note that there is no explicit mention of intermediary liability in the WCT. However, it is clear from the context that questions of intermediary liability were at the heart of the clash between the copyright industry and ICT industry. Both WCT Article 8 (Right of Communication to the Public) and WCT Agreed Statement Concerning Article 1(4) are axiomatic examples of this clash.

  65. 65.

    See J. Reinbothe & S. Lewinski (2002), The WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty: Commentary and Legal Analysis; see also M. Ficsor (2002), The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their Interpretation and Implementation.

  66. 66.

    P. Samuelson (1997), Big Media Beaten Back, Wired 5.03 of March 1997.

  67. 67.

    R. Okediji (2008), Regulation of Creativity under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2008, 2393–2394.

  68. 68.

    J.S. Sheinblatt (2014), The WIPO Copyright Treaty, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2014, 545.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Note 10.10, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 of 30 August 1996 (hereinafter: WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty).

  71. 71.

    M. Burri (2014), Permission to Click: Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union after Svensson, NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 20/2014 of 17 October 2014; A. Tsoutsanis (2014), Why Copyright and Linking can tango, 9 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 2014, 495 (discussing the evolution of hyperlinking technology in the context of the recent Svensson case).

  72. 72.

    B. White (2010), Viacom v. Youtube: A Proving Ground for DMCA Safe Harbors Against Secondary Liability, 24 JCRED 2010, 811; C. Angelopoulos (2013), Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright Infringement in Europe, 3 IPQ 2013, 253; M. Leistner (2014), Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe, 9 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 2014, 76.

  73. 73.

    A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

  74. 74.

    See L. Kaplow (1992), Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 1992, 557.

  75. 75.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 1996, 369.

  76. 76.

    R. Okediji (2008), Regulation of Creativity under the WIPO Internet Treaties, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2008, 2381; M. Burri (2014), Permission to Click: Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union after Svensson, NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 20/2014 of 17 October 2014, p. 4.

  77. 77.

    See supra text accompanying fn. 64.

  78. 78.

    D. Seng (2010), Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the Liability of Internet Intermediaries of 10 November 2010 (Preliminary Version of WIPO Study); L. Edwards (2011), Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO-ISOC/GE/11/REF/01/EDWARDS of 22 June 2011.

  79. 79.

    B. Farano (2012), Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement: Reconciling the EU and U.S. Approaches, 14 TTLF Working Papers 2012, 1 (thoroughly investigating this issue with regard to both copyright and trademark law in the US and EU).

  80. 80.

    Although this story is told from a US point of view, the European version of the story has the same basic plot. Ibid.

  81. 81.

    M.A. Lemley & R.A. Reese (2004), Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stanford L. Rev. 2004, 1345.

  82. 82.

    See generally P. Swire (1998), Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet. (“In considering legal regulation of the Internet, there is an important distinction between large players, which one might call “elephants,” and small and mobile actors, called “mice.”. . . Elephants are large, powerful, and practically impossible to hide. . . . The situation is quite different for mice, which are small, nimble, and breed annoyingly quickly.”).

  83. 83.

    For instance, certain courts rendered decisions holding intermediaries strictly liable for transmitting and hosting infringing works placed on their networks by third parties. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).

  84. 84.

    Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

  85. 85.

    See J. Reichman, G.B. Dinwoodie & P. Samuelson (2007), A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Pubic Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2007, 981.

  86. 86.

    The Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report (1998), S. Rep. No. 105–190 of 1998, p. 8 (hereinafter: Senate Report) (expressing concern that “without clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet”); L. Edwards (2011), Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO-ISOC/GE/11/REF/01/EDWARDS of 22 June 2011, p. 6 (“In Europe this argument was even stronger as the US online industry already had a head start, and it was feared unlimited liability on EC online intermediaries would encourage them to migrate to more sympathetic jurisdictions”).

  87. 87.

    P. Samuelson (1996), The Copyright Grab, Wired 4.01 of January 1996.

  88. 88.

    L. Edwards (2011), Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO-ISOC/GE/11/REF/01/EDWARDS of 22 June 2011; N. Elkin-Koren (2014), After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online Intermediaries, in S. Frankel & D. Gervais (Eds.), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, pp. 29–51.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    J. Ginsburg (1995), Putting Cars on the Information Superhighway: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1995, 1467.

  92. 92.

    R.H. Coase (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1960, 1.

  93. 93.

    Senate Report supra fn. 86.

  94. 94.

    European Commission (2009), EU Study on the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society, DLA Piper of 2009, Ch. 6 Liability of Online Intermediaries (“…the Service Providers will be exempted from contractual liability, administrative liability, tortuous/extra-contractual liability, penal liability, civil liability or any other type of liability, for all types of activities initiated by third parties, including copyright and trademark infringements, defamation, misleading advertising, unfair commercial practices, unfair competition, publications of illegal content, etc.”).

  95. 95.

    For the latter types of content the less conditional standard of §230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) applies. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 52. Very generally speaking, the CDA grants broad immunity from secondary liability to intermediaries as long as the content at issue was provided by a third party. (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).

  96. 96.

    Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”).

  97. 97.

    17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).

  98. 98.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000).

  99. 99.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2000).

  100. 100.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000).

  101. 101.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000).

  102. 102.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000).

  103. 103.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(i),(k) (2000) (“The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider—(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.”).

  104. 104.

    N. Elkin-Koren (2014), After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online Intermediaries, in S. Frankel & D. Gervais (Eds.), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, pp. 29–51.

  105. 105.

    ECD Article 12.

  106. 106.

    ECD Article 13.

  107. 107.

    ECD Article 14.

  108. 108.

    17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000).

  109. 109.

    European Commission (2007), E.U. Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries, MARKT/2006/09/E of 12 November 2007, p. 5 (hereinafter: EU Liability Study) (“At the time when the directive was adopted, it was decided that notice and takedown procedures should not be regulated in the directive itself. Instead, Article 16 and recital 40 of the directive expressly encourage self-regulation in this field.”).

  110. 110.

    Ibid. pp. 15–17.

  111. 111.

    B. Farano (2012), Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement: Reconciling the EU and U.S. Approaches, 14 TTLF Working Papers 2012, 1.

  112. 112.

    Ibid.

  113. 113.

    Ibid.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    M. Leistner (2014), Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe, 9 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 2014, 76.

  116. 116.

    B. Farano (2012), Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement: Reconciling the EU and U.S. Approaches, 14 TTLF Working Papers 2012, 1.

  117. 117.

    Ibid.

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    It must be noted that the Shift to bi- and plurilateral Free Trade Agreements has been roundly criticized for a Variety of generally applicable Reasons as well as several IP-specific ones. See H. Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013), Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 IIC 2013, 878. From a procedural perspective, the FTA negotiations have been universally blasted not only for the (unnecessary and counterproductive) level of secrecy surrounding the negotiations, but also for the secrecy-related practice (again counterproductive) of allowing only a privileged few, usually industry lobbyists, to provide meaningful input during the drafting process. See D. Levine (2012), Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 Cardozo A.E.L.J. 2012, 105; A. Bridy (2012), Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 Cardozo A.E.L.J. 2012, 153. FTAs have also been criticized, to the extent possible given the limited access to draft proposals, on their substance as well. S. Flynn et al. (2011), Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP Chapter, Northeastern University School of Law Research Paper No. 82–2012 of 6 December 2011.

  120. 120.

    See Max Planck Principles supra fn. 119.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    Matters relating to freedom of expression, privacy, and net neutrality, just to name a few, are present in the societal debates surrounding the safe harbors in all countries.

  124. 124.

    U.S.-Sing. Free Trade Agreement of 6 May 2003, Art. 16.9, para. 22; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement of 6 June 2003, Art. 17.11, para. 23; U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement of 18 May 2004, Art. 17.11, para. 29; U.S.-Morocco of 15 June 2004, Art. 15.11, para. 28; U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Cent. Am. Free Trade Agreement of 5 August 2004, Art. 15.11, para. 27; U.S.-Bahr. Free Trade Agreement, Art. 14.10, para. 29 of 14 September 2004; U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement of 19 January 2006, Art. 15.10, para. 29; U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement of 12 April 2006, Art. 16.11, para. 29; U.S.-Colum. Free Trade Agreement of 22 November 2006, Art. 16.11, para. 29; U.S.-Pan. Free Trade Agreement of 28 June 2008, Art. 15.11, para. 27; U.S.-S. Kor. Free Trade Agreement of 30 June 2007, Art. 18.10, para. 30.

  125. 125.

    Intellectual Property Chapter Working Document for all 12 Nations with Negotiating Positions, Wikileaks Release of 16 May 2014, available at http://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2.

  126. 126.

    It should be noted that the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and US represents a conspicuous exception to this trend. Given the obvious discrepancies between the jurisdictions with regard to interpretation of matters concerning internet intermediary liability, one might have expected “improved regulatory coherence” (i.e. harmonization) or, at the very least, “improved cooperation” to be high on the secret negotiating agenda. In light of the importance of trade in digital goods and services, the omission is rather glaring. There are likely two explanations for this high-profile absence. Either the US and EU think that the level of harmonization in this field is acceptable as it stands or the trading partners have deliberately left it off the table given recent public reaction to such legislative efforts such as SOPA, PIPA and ACTA. In light of the already tense negotiating atmosphere and obvious lack of harmonization, the latter is much more likely.

  127. 127.

    D. Seng (2014), The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 Va. J.L. & Tech. 369; M.E. Kaminski (2012), Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2012, 203.

  128. 128.

    Ibid.; J.M. Urban & L. Quilter (2006), Efficient Process or Chilling Effects – Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 2006, 621; W. Seltzer (2010), Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 2010, 171.

  129. 129.

    M.E. Kaminski (2012), Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2012, 203.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., 10: “The most dangerous part of establishing intermediary liability safe harbors . . . is that the procedures often take place outside of the judicial system. . . . There are ways to better protect due process: Chile, for example, uses courts to determine whether material is infringing before intermediaries must take it down.”

  131. 131.

    17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3)(A)(i–vi).

  132. 132.

    17 U.S.C. §512(g)(3)(c).

  133. 133.

    D. Seng (2014), The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 Va. J.L. & Tech. 369; W. Seltzer (2010), Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 2010, 171.

  134. 134.

    For example, Canada has implemented a notice and notice regime. Canada Copyright Modernization Act, Bill C-11, 41st Parliament § 47. Chile has involved the judicial system to determine whether a notice is justified. Chilean Law No. 17.336, Art. 85.

  135. 135.

    See e.g. U.S.-Bahr. Free Trade Agreement of 14 September 2004, Art. 14.10, para. 29.

  136. 136.

    For an idea of what such private ordering looks like in practice see Center for Copyright Information (2014), CCI Provides First Copyright Alert System Progress Report Highlighting Initial Accomplishments, press release of 28 May 2014. “Bandwidth throttling is the intentional slowing of Internet service by an Internet service provider.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwidth_throttling.

  137. 137.

    A. Bridy (2010), Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 Or. L. Rev. 2010, 81; R. Giblin (2014), Beyond Graduated Response, in S. Frankel & D. Gervais (Eds.), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, pp. 81–112.

  138. 138.

    See M.E. Kaminski (2012), Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2012, 203.

  139. 139.

    See EU Liability Study supra fn. 109.

  140. 140.

    See Max Planck Principles supra fn. 119.

  141. 141.

    N. Elkin-Koren (2005), Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 2005, 18 (“Here, ISPs and copyright holders, or for that matter, any law enforcement agencies, may share similar interests. Peer-to-peer technology, which was first introduced by non-market players, confronted ISPs with a dilemma: it boosted their business, increasing the demand for broadband and upgraded services, but at the same time created a growing burden of limitless bandwidth consumption.”).

  142. 142.

    Harmonization around a U.S. model may have far-reaching consequences for competition as well.

  143. 143.

    For a thorough discussion on the changed role of intermediaries see N. Elkin-Koren (2014), After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online Intermediaries, in S. Frankel & D. Gervais (Eds.), The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, pp. 29–51.

  144. 144.

    For example, Google is currently ranked fourth on the FT Global 500 list, which ranks company value by stock market price, FT 500 2014.

  145. 145.

    WCT Preamble.

  146. 146.

    Ibid.

  147. 147.

    Internet Society (2014), Global Internet Report of 2014; McKinsey Global Institute (2011), Internet Matters: The Net’s Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs, and Prosperity.

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    Seth Ericsson

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Ericsson, S. (2016). The Commodification of Internet Intermediary Safe Harbors: Avoiding Premature Harmonization Around a Suboptimal Standard. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_8

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