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The Proportionality Principle in the TRIPS Agreement

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Book cover TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

This paper analyses whether the TRIPS Agreement contains a proportionality principle, what content it might have and how such a principle could affect the debate about intellectual property rights on an international level. It first briefly explains the conflicting interpretations of the Agreement as a framework in which the proportionality principle might be applied. In the second section the explicit and implicit sources, especially with regard to Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, of such a principle are identified. Explaining the history, nature and normative content of these two provisions, the paper sheds light on the different functions of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS and how the proportionality principle ties them together. Then, different facets of a proportionality principle are explained, including its use as a “midlevel principle”, its occurrence in WTO law and its dimension for human rights. The paper concludes that, while there is no uniform definition applicable to the TRIPS Agreement, many factors argue in favor of reading Articles 7 and 8 as expressing the principle of proportionality. If Articles 7 and 8 were read in this light, member states would benefit from an increased flexibility for designing national intellectual property laws and from a consolidation of a common ground in the international intellectual property discourse.

Max Wallot, LL.M. (Stanford) is Rechtsreferendar in the district of the Berlin Court of Appeal.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    All articles without title are references to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

  2. 2.

    See, W. Cornish & K. Liddell (2015), The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 3 (this volume); H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume).

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., R. Epstein (2010), The Disintegration of Intellectual Property?: A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stanford L. Rev. 2010, 455; J. Straus (1996), Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Patent Field, in F.K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS.

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), published in 45 IIC 2014, 679; Ch. Geiger, J. Griffiths & R. Hilty (2008), Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 IIC 2008, 707; G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime.

  5. 5.

    G. Mossinghoff (2000), National Obligations under Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 Fed. Circuit B.J. 2000, 591, 603; J. Straus (1996), Bedeutung des TRIPS für das Patentrecht, 55 GRUR Int. 1996, 179; P. Yu (2004), Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2004, 323, 442.

  6. 6.

    K. Saggi & J. Trachtman (2011), Incomplete Harmonization Contracts in International Economic Law: Report of the Panel, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, 10 World Trade Rev. 2011, 63.

  7. 7.

    G. Mossinghoff (2000), National Obligations under Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 Fed. Circuit B.J. 2000, 591, 603.

  8. 8.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, p. 8.

  9. 9.

    A. Kur (2009), Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 2009, 287, 326.

  10. 10.

    The term “freeze-plus dynamics” means that either the status quo remains the same or right holders are able to increase the level of protection for intellectual property rights.

  11. 11.

    A. Kur (2009), Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 2009, 287, 327; M. Senftleben (2004), Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, p. 174.

  12. 12.

    Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9.

  13. 13.

    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, DSR 2009:V, p. 2097.

  14. 14.

    P. Yu (2011), TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2011, 727, 781.

  15. 15.

    M. Lennard (2002), Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2002, 17, 33.

  16. 16.

    H. Ullrich (1996), Technology Protection According to TRIPs: Principles and Problems, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPs – The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 357–400.

  17. 17.

    M. Lemley (2009), A Cautious Defense of Intellectual Oligopoly with Fringe Competition, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 2009, 1025.

  18. 18.

    R. Hilty (2011), Individual, Multiple and Collective Ownership – What Impact on Competition?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 11–04, pp. 4, 6, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774802 (accessed 1 June 2015) (pointing out that legal intervention to combat market failure is a risky undertaking because of uncertainties on how market forces actually work).

  19. 19.

    Concerning the primacy of free competition see R. Hilty (2007), The Law against Unfair Competition and its Interfaces, in R. Hilty & F. Henning-Bodewig (Eds.), Law Against Unfair Competition: Towards a New Paradigm in Europe?, pp. 1–52; A. Kur (2009), Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 2009, 287, 341.

  20. 20.

    S. Sell (2011), TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2011, 447.

  21. 21.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime.

  22. 22.

    A. Sweet & J. Mathews (2009), Proportionality, Judicial Review, and Global Constitutionalism, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor & C. Valentini (Eds.), Reasonableness and Law, pp. 173–212.

  23. 23.

    E. Engle (2013), The General Principle of Proportionality and Aristotle, in L. Huppes-Cluysenaer & N.M.M.S. Coelho (Eds.), Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, pp. 265, 266; I. Porat (2009), Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor & C. Valentini (Eds.), Reasonableness and Law, p. 243.

  24. 24.

    G. Marceau & J.P. Trachtman (2004), GATT, TBT and SPS: A Map of WTO Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, in F. Ortino & E. Petersmann (Eds.), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003, pp. 275, 288.

  25. 25.

    D. Beatty (2004), The Ultimate Rule of Law, pp. 159–188.

  26. 26.

    See Sect. 4.

  27. 27.

    I. Porat (2009), Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor & C. Valentini (Eds.), Reasonableness and Law, p. 243.

  28. 28.

    J. Rawls (1999), A Theory of Justice – Revised Edition, p. 53.

  29. 29.

    This term was coined by Rawls and means that different citizens in a democracy can support the same basic laws and principles regardless of the different reasons they might have, e.g. because of their different theistic, agnostic or atheistic belief systems.

  30. 30.

    G. Bongiovanni & C. Valentini (2009), Reciprocity, Balancing and Proportionality: Rawls and Habermas on Moral and Political Reasonableness, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor & C. Valentini (Eds.), Reasonableness and Law, pp. 81, 91–95 (explaining how the concept of reciprocity and proportionality are interlinked in Rawls’ theory).

  31. 31.

    For this external view, see T. Sebastian (2007), World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 2007, 337.

  32. 32.

    R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, pp. 182–184.

  33. 33.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 47 para. 2.564.

  34. 34.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, p. 429.

  35. 35.

    R. Dworkin (1967), The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1967, 14, 25-27 (distinguishing between principles which have a dimension of weight and rules which lack this dimension but instead can be functionally important or unimportant).

  36. 36.

    R. Alexy (2009), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 67.

  37. 37.

    Such as in a ratio test, see R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, p. 171.

  38. 38.

    Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), p. 1379.

  39. 39.

    West’s Encyclopedia of American Law Vol. 8 (2nd ed. 2005), p. 246.

  40. 40.

    Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 3769, para. 6.225.

  41. 41.

    I. Porat (2009), Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, in G. Bongiovanni, G. Sartor & C. Valentini (Eds.), Reasonableness and Law, pp. 243, 248 (discussing different origins in US and German constitutional law).

  42. 42.

    L. Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, § 43.

  43. 43.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, p. 110.

  44. 44.

    A. Taubman, H. Wager & J. Watal (2012), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, p. 13.

  45. 45.

    Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 3.

  46. 46.

    E.B. Rodrigues Jr. (2012), The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement, pp. 54–61.

  47. 47.

    M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig (2007), Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective, 20 Cambridge Rev. of Int’l Affairs 2007, 71, 74-77, 89; E.B. Rodrigues Jr. (2012), The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement, pp. 56–60.

  48. 48.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 7 para. 2.114; UNCTAD/ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, p. 132.

  49. 49.

    S. Charnovitz (2002), The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2002, 191, 211.

  50. 50.

    S. Charnovitz (2002), The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2002, 191, 211; H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in P.L.C. Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights – Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, pp. 161, 184.

  51. 51.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 7 para. 2.114.

  52. 52.

    Concerning the limited legal obligations found in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, see H. Kelsen (2008), The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, p. 9.

  53. 53.

    F. Höhne (2013), Preamble, in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPs: Internationales und europäisches Recht des geistigen Eigentums, pp. 77, 79.

  54. 54.

    B. Cheng (1953), General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, pp. 130–132; E.B. Rodrigues Jr. (2012), The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement, p. 86.

  55. 55.

    See Article 5A(2) Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property.

  56. 56.

    A. Heinemann (1995), Das Kartellrecht des geistigen Eigentums im TRIPS-Übereinkommen der Welthandelsorganisation, 54 GRUR Int. 1995, 535, 537.

  57. 57.

    B. Conde Gallego (2010), Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, in C.M. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules- Intellectual Property in the WTO, Volume 1, pp. 226, 231–234.

  58. 58.

    See GATT document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 of 14 May 1990.

  59. 59.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 7 para. 2.111.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    See H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in P.L.C. Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights – Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, pp. 161, 173–174.

  62. 62.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, p. 92.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, p. 93.

  65. 65.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 7 paras. 2.111-2.114.

  66. 66.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31(1) reads: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (emphasis added by author).

  67. 67.

    Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, p. 10.

  68. 68.

    Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 114; However, the Appellate Body seems to accept a hierarchy between the particular object of a norm and of the treaty itself. This approach is disputable, as it is not consistent with the wording of Article 31(1) VCLT, see H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in P.L.C. Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights – Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, pp. 161, 181.

  69. 69.

    See, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in P.L.C. Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights – Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, pp. 161, 169–170.

  70. 70.

    Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289.

  71. 71.

    This exception allows potential competitors of the patent owner to use the patented invention without authorization in order to get government marketing approval. The competitors may start selling the goods after the patent has expired.

  72. 72.

    This exception allows competitors to produce and stockpile patented goods during a certain period before the expiration of the patent. However, the goods cannot be sold until after the patent expires.

  73. 73.

    Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, para. 7.24.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., para. 7.25.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para. 7.26.

  76. 76.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – a Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, p. 102.

  77. 77.

    P. Yu (2010), The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, in C. Correa (Ed.) Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules – Intellectual Property in the WTO Volume I, pp. 146, 150–151.

  78. 78.

    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, paras. 7.600-7.601; P. Yu (2011), TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2011, 727, 757–759.

  79. 79.

    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, para. 7.538.

  80. 80.

    P. Yu (2011), TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 2011, 727, 734.

  81. 81.

    Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R, adopted 20 March 2009, para. 7.133.

  82. 82.

    O. Brand (2012), Commentary on Article 8 TRIPS, in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPs: Internationales und europäisches Recht des geistigen Eigentums, pp. 187, 189.

  83. 83.

    D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 7 para. 2.123; P. Yu (2010), The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules – Intellectual Property in the WTO Volume I, pp. 146, 168–169.

  84. 84.

    D. Gervais (2005), Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2005, 505, 507-508 (explaining the genesis of Articles 7 and 8).

  85. 85.

    Chairman’s report to the Group of Negotiations on Goods, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 of 23 July 1990, p. 7.

  86. 86.

    UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, p. 124.

  87. 87.

    The repetition of “adopting measures” was omitted in Article 8(2) for reasons of style only; see A. Heinemann (1995), Das Kartellrecht des geistigen Eigentums im TRIPS-Übereinkommen der Welthandelsorganisation, 54 GRUR Int. 1995, 535, 536.

  88. 88.

    O. Brand (2012), Commentary on Article 8 TRIPS, in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPs: Internationales und europäisches Recht des geistigen Eigentums, pp. 187, 191.

  89. 89.

    E. Fox (1996), Trade, Competition, and Intellectual Property – TRIPS and its Antitrust Counterparts, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1996, 481, 482-483; D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, Art. 8 para. 2.125; H. Ullrich (2004), Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 401, 414; also see A. Heinemann (1995), Das Kartellrecht des geistigen Eigentums im TRIPS-Übereinkommen der Welthandelsorganisation, 54 GRUR Int. 1995, 535, 537 (arguing that Art. 8(2) contains some aspects of the US misuse doctrine as well).

  90. 90.

    O. Brand (2012), Commentary on Article 8 TRIPS, in J. Busche, P. Stoll & A. Wiebe (Eds.), TRIPs: Internationales und europäisches Recht des geistigen Eigentums, pp. 187, 201.

  91. 91.

    For general competition policy in TRIPS see, M. Bakhoum & B. Conde Gallego (2015), TRIPS and Competition Rules: From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Policy, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 529 (this volume).

  92. 92.

    J.H. Reichman (1997), From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1997, 11, 35.

  93. 93.

    C. Smith (2000), Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize Intellectual Property Rights, 26 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 2000, 143, 159.

  94. 94.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – a Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, p. 108.

  95. 95.

    P. Yu (2010), The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, in C. Correa (Ed.) Research Handbook on the Protection of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules – Intellectual Property in the WTO Volume I, pp. 146, 169–191.

  96. 96.

    H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & A. Kur (2008), Enough is Enough – The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law Research Paper Series No. 09–01, pp. 45, 68.

  97. 97.

    Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 14 Nov. 2001, para. 19.

  98. 98.

    G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime.

  99. 99.

    Submission to the Council of TRIPS by the African Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela, IP/C/W/296 of 19 June 2001.

  100. 100.

    This will be explained in Sect. 4.3.

  101. 101.

    The term is borrowed from G. Dinwoodie & R. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS – The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 175–203.

  102. 102.

    R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, pp. 139, 159–191.

  103. 103.

    J. Coleman (2001), The Practice of Principle, p. 54.

  104. 104.

    R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, pp. 150–158.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., p. 160.

  106. 106.

    R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, p. 161.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    M. Lemley & C. Shapiro (2007), Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2007, 1991 (explaining that royalty stacking, i.e. when multiple patents cover a single product, could exacerbate the situation); R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, pp. 161–162, 166.

  109. 109.

    R. Hilty (2009), The Role of Patent Quality in Europe, in J. Drexl et al. (Eds.), Technology and Competition/Technologie et Concurrence – Contributions in Honour of/Mélanges en l’honneur de Hanns Ullrich, pp. 91–121.

  110. 110.

    C. Chien (2014), Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2014, 461; M. Lemley & A. Melamed (2013), Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 2014, 2117.

  111. 111.

    eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).

  112. 112.

    See R. Merges (2006), Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2006, 997.

  113. 113.

    G. Calabresi & D. Melamed (1972), Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View from the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1972, 1089; M. Lemley & P. Weiser (2007), Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2007, 783, 784; R. Merges (1994), Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1994, 2655.

  114. 114.

    M. Stürner (2010), Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im Schuldvertragsrecht, pp. 12, 39.

  115. 115.

    R. Merges (2011), Justifying Intellectual Property, pp. 167–169.

  116. 116.

    A. Desmedt (2001), Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2001, 441–480.

  117. 117.

    M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig (2007), Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: a Comparative Perspective, 20 Cambridge Rev. of Int’l Affairs 2007, 71, 75.

  118. 118.

    M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig (2007), Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: a Comparative Perspective, 20 Cambridge Rev. of Int’l Affairs 2007, 71, 89.

  119. 119.

    G. Westkamp (2005), Convergence of Intellectual Property Rights and the Establishment of “Hybrid” Protection under TRIPS, in F. Macmillan (Ed.), New Directions in Copyright: Volume 1, pp. 108, 126.

  120. 120.

    M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig (2007), Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative Perspective, 20 Cambridge Rev. of Int’l Affairs 2007, 71, 78-82, 89. The authors define the proportionality test stricto sensu as analysing “whether effects of a measure are not disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests affected. … The more intense the restriction of a particular interest, the more important the justification for the countervailing interest needs to be” (at 76).

  121. 121.

    Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 164.

  122. 122.

    A. Kur (2009), Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-Step Test?, 8 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 2009, 287, 338–339.

  123. 123.

    Ibid., 340.

  124. 124.

    Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), published in 45 IIC 2014, 679; Ch. Geiger, J. Griffiths & R. Hilty (2008), Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 39 IIC 2008, 707.

  125. 125.

    G. Westkamp (2005), Convergence of Intellectual Property Rights and the Establishment of “Hybrid” Protection under TRIPS, in F. Macmillan (Ed.), New Directions in Copyright: Volume 1, pp. 108, 115–117.

  126. 126.

    W. Weiß, C. Herrmann & C. Ohler (2003), Welthandelsrecht, p. 222.

  127. 127.

    G. Westkamp (2005), Convergence of Intellectual Property Rights and the Establishment of “Hybrid” Protection under TRIPS, in F. Macmillan (Ed.), New Directions in Copyright: Volume 1, pp. 108, 126.

  128. 128.

    Ibid., pp. 108, 130.

  129. 129.

    C. Geiger & E. Izyumenko (2014), Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 45 IIC 2014, 316; C. Geiger (2007), Author’s Right, Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship (Rethinking Copyright in the Light of Fundamental Rights), in F. Macmillan (Ed.), New Directions in Copyright Law: Volume 5, pp. 24, 36, 43.

  130. 130.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 29 June 2000, “Germania 3”, Case No. 1 BvR 825/98, see GRUR 2001, 149.

  131. 131.

    German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) of 3 February 2005, “Violet Postcard” (Lila-Postkarte), Case No. I ZR 159/02, see 38 IIC 2007, 119.

  132. 132.

    German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of 15 December 1983, “Volkszählung”, Case No. 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83, see BVerfGE 65, 1, para. 157.

  133. 133.

    J. Rivers (2010), A Theory of Constitutional Rights and the British Constitution, in R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. xxxi.

  134. 134.

    European Court of Human Rights of 10 January 2013, Ashby Donald and Others v. France, Case No. 36769/08, see 45 IIC 2014, 354.

  135. 135.

    European Court of Human Rights of 19 February 2013, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, Case No. 40397/12, see 44 IIC 2013, 724.

  136. 136.

    A. Peukert (2011), Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?, 33 EIPR 2011, 67.

  137. 137.

    C. Geiger (2007), Author’s Right, Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship (Rethinking Copyright in the Light of Fundamental Rights), in F. Macmillan (Ed.), New Directions in Copyright Law: Volume 5, pp. 24, 43; L. Helfer (2003), Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 2003, 47, 58.

  138. 138.

    R. Alexy (2009), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, pp. 66–69.

  139. 139.

    This term is used instead of “principles”, as used by Alexy, because otherwise it might be confused with the main topic of the article, which is in fact the proportionality principle.

  140. 140.

    R. Alexy (2009), A Theory of Constitutional Rights, p. 67.

  141. 141.

    J. Sarnoff (2010), Lessons from the United States in Regard to the Recent, more flexible Application of Injunctive Relief, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules – Intellectual Property in the WTO Volume II, pp. 48, 78.

  142. 142.

    C. Cotropia (2009), Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in T. Takenaka (Ed.), Patent Law and Theory, p. 557.

  143. 143.

    C. Chien (2014), Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2014, 461.

  144. 144.

    Novartis AG v. Unions of India & Others, Supreme Court of India, CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2706-2716 (2013).

  145. 145.

    H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in P.L.C. Torremans (Ed.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights – Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, pp. 161, 189.

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    Max Wallot

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    Matthias Lamping

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    Josef Drexl

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Wallot, M. (2016). The Proportionality Principle in the TRIPS Agreement. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_7

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