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Revisiting the Principle of Technological Neutrality in Patent Protection in the Age of 3D Printing Technology and Cloud Computing

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TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

Contemporary patent laws based on the norms of the WTO-TRIPS Agreement seem to be driven toward technological neutrality and universal applicability. In most countries, a technologically neutral standard of patentability applies in a non-discriminating manner, regardless of the field of technology, and regardless of the identity of the inventor and the place of the invention. Neutrality in the substantive aspects of patent laws, among others, now extends to the subject matter neutrality—that the availability of patent protection is not tied to the technological field and neutrality in the enjoyment of the right. In contrast to this neutral outlook of contemporary patent law, subjective policy aspects of patent law have long been part of patent law making. For society, the need for an economic and innovation policy not to subject to a certain field of industry to patenting still exists. As a matter of practice, the need to differentiate various technological fields so as to determine exact parameters for substantive patent examination continues to exist. New emerging technologies such as cloud computing and 3D printing are good examples.

This paper reviews the notion of technological neutrality in patent protection and its meaning in the age of 3D printing and cloud computing. Both of these technologies are further instances of computer programming technology in which the industry is currently defining its own field of activity, and where the copying of the expression may lead to the exploitation of ideas, literally. Using these two new technologies as examples of subject matters where not only the standard of patent eligibility but also exploitation is questioned, this paper will examine the exact parameters of technological specificity set down in the TRIPS principle of neutrality of patent protection and explore to what extent and manner the future international patent norm should consider the principle of neutrality.

Prof. Dr. Nari Lee is Professor of Law at Hanken School of Economics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    L. Bennett Moses (2007), Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to keep up with Technological Change, 2 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 2007, 240.

  2. 2.

    See for example P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who owns the Knowledge Economy?. See also C. May (2013), The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures?.

  3. 3.

    Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Vol. 31 of 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].

  4. 4.

    See for example, M.A. Hamilton (1996), The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1996, 613–1151; compare, D. Harris (2010), TRIPS after Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2010, 367–400; J.H. Reichman (1996), Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1996, 363–390; P.K. Yu (2003), The Harmonization Game: What Basketball can Teach about Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 2003, 218–256.

  5. 5.

    See for example, literature on cloud computing, J.Q. Anderson & H. Rainie (2010), The Future of Cloud Computing. For prediction, see for example, N.G. Carr (2005), The End of Corporate Computing, 46 MIT SMR 2005.

  6. 6.

    For example, 3D printers printing parts and food, seemed to be stemming from the idea of a “replicator” shown in a movie Star Trek. R. Gray (2013), NASA to send ‘Star Trek Replicator’ to Space Station, The Telegraph of 14 August 2013. Also the nearest prior art for tablet device, iPad, arguably comes from Star Trek’s “replicator” or their version of electric clip board. See C. Foresman (2010), How Star Trek artists imagined the iPad 23 years ago, Ars Technica of 10 August 2010.

  7. 7.

    G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS‬: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime‬, pp. 66–67.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

  8. 8.

    TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.

  9. 9.

    See for example, M. Lamping et al. (2014), Declaration on Patent Protection – Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 IIC 2014, 679. See also C.M. Correa (2000), Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options; J.H. Reichman (2009), Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries lead or follow?, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 2009, 1115–1185.

  10. 10.

    See for example, D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696; G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517.

  11. 11.

    See G.B. Dinwoodie & C.R. Dreyfuss (2007), Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPs Agreement, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 2007, 445–456.

  12. 12.

    Subject to TRIPS Agreement Article 27(2) and (3) (emphasis added).

  13. 13.

    See L. Bennett Moses (2007), Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to keep up with Technological Change, 2 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 2007, 240. See also Y. Gendreau (2000), A technologically neutral Solution for the Internet: Is it Wishful Thinking?, in P. Torremans & I. Stamatoudi (Eds.), Copyright in the New Digital Environment: The Need to Redesign Copyright Perspectives on Intellectual Property Series Vol. 7, pp. 1–16.

  14. 14.

    Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289 [hereinafter, Canada Pharmaceuticals].

  15. 15.

    See D. Gervais (2008), The TRIPs Agreement, Drafting History and Analysis, pp. 334–340.

  16. 16.

    See for example W. Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont (2009), A special Legislation for Genetic Inventions – a Violation of Article 27(1) TRIPS?, in W. Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. (Eds.), Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World, p. 289. In contrast, see G.B. Dinwoodie & C.R. Dreyfuss (2007), Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPs Agreement, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 2007, 445–456. See also E. Arezzo & G. Ghidini‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬ (2011), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law: A Comparative Review of New Developments. ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

  17. 17.

    See, for the examples in developed nations in the case of biotechnological inventions, J. Chambers (2002), Patent Eligibility of Biotechnical Inventions in the United States, Europe, and Japan: How much Patent Policy is Public Policy, 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 2002, 223. Compare to the examples from developing nations (BRICS) in J.H. Reichman (2009), Intellectual Property in the twenty-first Century: Will the Developing Countries lead or follow?, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 2009, 1115–1185.

  18. 18.

    See, Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9 [hereinafter, India Pharmaceuticals I]; Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Complaint by the European Communities and their member States, WT/DS79/R, adopted 22 September 1998, DSR 1998:VI, p. 2661 [hereinafter, India Pharmaceuticals II], which was a dispute on the TRIPS consistency of the Indian “Mailbox Rule” which was a transitional procedure to preserve novelty and priority in respect of applications for product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions.

  19. 19.

    See, for example, India Pharmaceuticals I & II, supra fn. 18, which both dealt with the absence of patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products in India. See also, Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina – certain measures on the protection of patents and test data, WT/DS196/1 of 6 June 2000, which was a dispute on the TRIPS inconsistency of the Argentinian exclusion of micro-organisms from patentability.

  20. 20.

    Canada Pharmaceuticals supra fn. 14.

  21. 21.

    See, Request for consultations by Canada, European Communities – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS153/1 of 7 December 1998, which was a dispute concerning the TRIPS inconsistency of the European two supplementary protection certificate (SPC) regulations, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92 and European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1610/96, which apply only to pharmaceutical, agricultural and chemical products.

  22. 22.

    Canada Pharmaceuticals supra fn. 14.

  23. 23.

    See D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696; G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517. Compare R. Polk Wagner (2004), Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2004, 1341.

  24. 24.

    See D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696; G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517.

  25. 25.

    R. Polk Wagner (2002), (Mostly) against Exceptionalism, U. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper 02-18.

  26. 26.

    D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696.

  27. 27.

    G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517.

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Convention on the grant of European patents (European Patent Convention), of 5 October 1973, as amended [hereinafter EPC], Article 52.

  30. 30.

    R.M. Ballardini et al. (2013), The “one-size-fits-all” European Patent System Challenges in the Software Context, in K. Weckström (Ed.), Governing Innovation and Expression: New Regimes, Strategies and Techniques, pp. 327–350.

  31. 31.

    See D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696.

  32. 32.

    Canada Pharmaceuticals supra fn. 14.

  33. 33.

    India Phamaceuticals I, supra fn. 18, at paras. 42–48. The panel noted that legitimate expectations are reflected in the text of the treaty itself.

  34. 34.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27, ILM 8,679 [hereinafter VCLT], Article 31(1) which reads “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (emphasis added).

  35. 35.

    I. Van Damme (2009), Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, pp. 213–223.

  36. 36.

    VCLT Article 32.

  37. 37.

    R.C. Dreyfuss & S. Frankel (2014), From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 Mich. J. Int’l L. 2014, 14–53.

  38. 38.

    See Article 2(1) Japanese Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, English translation available at: http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=42&vm=04&re=02&new=1 (accessed 25 August 2014).

  39. 39.

    Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International 573 U.S.—(2014). See also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).

  40. 40.

    Arguably TRIPS compliance may be questioned. There is at least one author who argues that the exclusions may be viewed TRIPS inconsistent. D. Schiuma (2000), TRIPS and Exclusion Software ‘as such’ from Patentability, 31 IIC 2000, 36. See also EPO Technical Board of Appeal, Computer Program Product, T 1173/97, ECLI:EP:BA:1998:T117397.19980701. In a decision that was not followed, the EPO Technical Board of Appeal stated “it is the clear intention of TRIPS not to exclude from patentability any inventions, whatever field of technology they belong to, and therefore, in particular, not to exclude programs for computers as mentioned in and excluded under Article 52(2)(c) EPC,” prior to the revision.

  41. 41.

    Deletion of the excluded subject matters was discussed but not adopted finally. See Conference Proceedings for Conference of the contracting states to revise the 1973 European Patent Convention Munich, 20 to 29 November 2000. MR/24/00 at 69–71.

  42. 42.

    See, N. Lee (2013), Patentability of Medical Methods in Japan, in J. Drexl & N. Lee (Eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law: A Trilateral Perspective, 2013, pp. 85–108.

  43. 43.

    D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2009), The Patent Crisis and how the Courts can solve it, pp. 110–112.

  44. 44.

    Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, Official Journal L 213, 30/07/1998 P. 0013–0021, [Hereinafter EU Biotech Directive], Article 5(3).

  45. 45.

    EU Biotech Directive, Article 5(3). See G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 459–469.

  46. 46.

    See Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013). See Myriad’s European patents have been more limited as results of oppositions. See documenting the process, G. Matthijs et al. (2013), The European BRCA Patent Oppositions and Appeals: Coloring inside the Lines, 31 Nature biotechnology 2013, 704–710.

  47. 47.

    EPC, Article 54(1).

  48. 48.

    EPC, Article 56.

  49. 49.

    EPC, Article 83.

  50. 50.

    D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696 and D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2009), The Patent Crisis and how the Courts can solve it, pp. 110–112. Burk and Lemley identified that the CAFC have used pre-grant policy levers, in the context of the US patent law. Similarly, Van Overwalle identified those used by the EPO in each standard. See G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517.

  51. 51.

    See for example, J. Pila (2010), The Future of the Requirement for an Invention: Inherent Patentability as a pre-and post-patent Determinant, in E. Arezzo & G. Ghidini (Eds.), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law: A Comparative Review on New Developments, p. 57.

  52. 52.

    G.B. Dinwoodie & C.R. Dreyfuss (2007), Diversifying without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPs Agreement, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 2007, 450.

  53. 53.

    See D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley (2003), Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2003, 1575–1696 and G. Van Overwalle (2009), Policy Levers tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 2009, 435–517.

  54. 54.

    B. Kahin (2007), Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 2007, 389–399.

  55. 55.

    See D. Gervais (2008), The TRIPs Agreement, Drafting History and Analysis, pp. 163–166.

  56. 56.

    Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 9.

  57. 57.

    Canada Pharmaceuticals supra fn. 14, para. 7.94.

  58. 58.

    See texts accompanying supra fn. 9.

  59. 59.

    TRIPS Article 28(2).

  60. 60.

    TRIPS Article 28(1).

  61. 61.

    Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra fn. 14.

  62. 62.

    See for example, Bolar type exception to meet regulatory approval, Canada Pharmaceuticals, supra fn. 16.

  63. 63.

    EU Biotech Directive, Article 9, supra fn. 46.

  64. 64.

    See W. Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont (2009), A special Legislation for Genetic Inventions – a Violation of Article 27(1) TRIPS?, in W. Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. (Eds.), Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World, p. 304.

  65. 65.

    See G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS‬: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime‬, p. 19‬‬‬‬. ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

  66. 66.

    Monsanto Technology v Cefetra BV and Others, C-428/08, EU:C:2010:402.

  67. 67.

    Ibid., para. 76.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., para. 77.

  69. 69.

    See P.K. Yu (2009), The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 2009, 979.

  70. 70.

    H. Lipson & M. Kurman (2010), Factory @ Home: The Emerging Economy of Personal Manufacturing.

  71. 71.

    See texts accompanying supra fn. 47.

  72. 72.

    See L. Bennett Moses (2007), Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to keep up with Technological Change, 2 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 2007, 240.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    See for examples listed in the website of Stratasys.

  75. 75.

    See for example, MakerBot replicator mini is set at the price of 1375 USD, available at: http://store.makerbot.com/replicator-mini (accessed on 14 October 2014).

  76. 76.

    TIME (2014), The 25 Best Inventions of 2014, TIME of 20 November 2014.

  77. 77.

    See for example, N.G. Carr (2005), The End of Corporate Computing, 46 MIT SMR 2005.

  78. 78.

    For a critique of legal commentator’s penchant for legal prediction for things not yet happened to solidify the importance of the discipline, see B. Beebe (2013), Fair Use and Legal Futurism, 25 Law & Lit. 2013.

  79. 79.

    D.R. Desai & G.N. Magliocca (2014), Patents, meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 Geo. L.J. 2014, 1691–1841; S. Bradshaw, A. Bowyer & P. Haufe (2010), The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 7 ScriptEd 2010, 5–31. See also D. Mendis (2013), The Clone Wars – Episode 1: The Rise of 3D Printing and its Implications for Intellectual Property Law – Learning Lessons from the Past?, 35 EIPR 2013, 155–169.

  80. 80.

    For examples, U.S. Patent No. 4575330 Apparatus for Production of Three-Dimensional Objects by Stereolithography, as well as, U.S. Patent No. 5121329, Fused Deposition Modelling.

  81. 81.

    See text accompanying supra fn. 42.

  82. 82.

    The approach of the EPO Technical Board of Appeal was referred to as “any hardware approach” by a UK judge, Jacob LJ in Aerotel Ltd. v. Wave Crest Group Entertainment Ltd. and others [2009] EWCA Civ. 408 at para. 26. The three decisions cited are EPO, The Controlling pension benefits system/PBS Partnership, T 0931/95, EP:BA:2000:T093195.20000908, OJEPO 441; EPO, Auction method/Hitachi, T 0258/03, EP:BA:2004:T025803.20040421, OJEPO 575 and EPO, Clipboard formats I/Microsoft, T 0424/03, EP:BA:2006:T042403.20060223. Compare T 1173/97, supra fn. 42, to EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal, G 0003/08, Programs for computers, EP:BA:2010:G000308.20100512. Although the enlarged board of appeal dismissed the referral, it has thoroughly discussed the patentability issues and found no inconsistencies in following any hardware approach.

  83. 83.

    See for example, EPO, Item matching/AMAZON, T 0313/10, EP:BA:2012:T031310.20120719, which ruled the claimed computer program method patent eligible but not inventive; see also EPO, T 0414/12, EP:BA:2013:T041412.20130410 concerning a mix of technical and non-technical claims to a electronic gaming apparatus, which rule claimed apparatus patent eligible but not inventive.

  84. 84.

    See Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, Supreme Court Docket No 13-298 (2014), 573 U. S. (2014). See also, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).

  85. 85.

    Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, Supreme Court Docket No 13-298 (2014), 573 U. S. (2014).

  86. 86.

    Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).

  87. 87.

    State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

  88. 88.

    See A.C. Cotropia & M. Lemley (2009), Copying in Patent Law, 37 N.C.L. Rev. 2009, 1421.

  89. 89.

    See for example, J. Bessen & E. Maskin (2009), Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. Econ. 2009, 611–635.

  90. 90.

    See N. Lee (2008), Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the Global Economy, 48 I.E. 2008, 355–356.

  91. 91.

    D. Doherty (2012), Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D Printing Revolution, 26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 2012, 353; D.H. Brean (2013), Asserting Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No Use, 23 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 2013, 771.

  92. 92.

    See H. Surden (2013), Technological Cost as Law in Intellectual Property, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 2013, 196–198.

  93. 93.

    An example of a design and file sharing platform is Thingiverse.

  94. 94.

    Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. 692 F. 3d 1301, 1308–1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012 (per curiam)).

  95. 95.

    Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 572 U. S. (2014).

  96. 96.

    See D. Wu (2013), The Use of Use for Patented Systems in a Single or Joint Infringement World, 14 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 2013, 514–558. See also solutions proposed in L.J. Oswald (2014), Simplifying Multiactor Patent Infringement Cases Through Proper Application of Common Law Doctrine, 51 ABLJ 2014, 1–69.

  97. 97.

    See D.R. Desai & G.N. Magliocca (2014), Patents, meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 Geo. L.J. 2014, 1691–1841.

  98. 98.

    For example, US patent 5597589, Apparatus for producing parts by selective sintering, expired on 28.1.2014.

  99. 99.

    Information for RepRap self-replicating manufacturing machine is found on its website.

  100. 100.

    H. Ullrich (1989), The Importance of Industrial Property Law and other Legal Measures in the Promotion of Technological Innovation, 28 Industrial Property 1989, 102–103.

  101. 101.

    See M. Koskenniemi (1989), From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument.

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Lee, N. (2016). Revisiting the Principle of Technological Neutrality in Patent Protection in the Age of 3D Printing Technology and Cloud Computing. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_11

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