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Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade

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TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

In order to enjoy credibility and acceptance among those involved, harmonization must be the outcome of a deliberative process with a defined goal, but without a predetermined solution. States need to be clear about the purpose of harmonization and the measures for achieving it; they need to agree about how to handle different needs, priorities and expectations; and they need to be prepared to accept compromises beyond their narrow self-interest. The TRIPS Agreement tells a different story. Countries have learned to live with it, but nobody is entirely happy. In order to make international law more inclusive and responsive to different socio-economic conditions and needs, the TRIPS Agreement needs to be reconceptualized as a market framework regulation that promotes competition and innovation but also allows states to regulate the use of intellectual property in ways that grow out of, and comply with, their own traditions and interests. This ultimately means that the marriage of convenience between trade and intellectual property may have to come to an end.

Dr. Matthias Lamping is Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See W. Cornish & K. Liddell (2015), The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 3 (this volume).

  2. 2.

    See H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume).

  3. 3.

    A considerable number of patent, design and trademark applications are processed in more than one office (see WIPO’s “World Intellectual Property Indicators”). It is estimated that about three quarters of what is being examined at large offices like the USPTO and the EPO is repeated elsewhere in the world at some point in time. The problem is that without a full convergence of the requirements of protection and the examination process, applications must be examined autonomously, i.e. without reliance on the results obtained in other offices. Harmonization is thus a prerequisite for most forms of substantive cooperation between offices, such as the mutual recognition and exploitation of search and examination results (ranging from the simple exchange of search reports to the recognition of decisions on the application), and a step towards reducing the offices’ steadily growing workload burdens.

  4. 4.

    Copyright in the Internet era is a prime example. Whatever wisdom prevailed in 1994 about copyright protection in the 21st century, the unexpected rise of the information society has overruled most of it. See S. Ericsson (2015), The Commodification of Internet Intermediary Safe Harbors: Avoiding Premature Harmonization around a Suboptimal Standard, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 245 (this volume); G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 12 et seq., with further examples.

  5. 5.

    See R. Podszun & B. Franz (2015), Regulatory Innovation and the Institutional Design of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 279 (this volume); J.H. Reichman & R.C. Dreyfuss (2007), Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 Duke L.J. 2007, 85, 93; J.F. Duffy (2002), Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 2002, 685, 709 et seq.; G.B. Dinwoodie (2006), Some Remarks on the Limits of Harmonization, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 2006, 596, 601 et seq.; C.R. Frischtak (1993), Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Right Regimes, in M.B. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee & R.A. Schoen (Eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, pp. 89 et seq.; for arguments in favour of uniformity, see R. Sherwood (1993), Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World, in M.B. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee & R.A. Schoen (Eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, pp. 68 et seq.

  6. 6.

    Such as efficacy requirements for the patentability of known substances (see Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act), compulsory licenses for research tools (see Article 40b of the Swiss Patent Act), purpose-bound protection for genes (see Article 9 of the EU Biotech Directive 98/44/EC), business method patents (see State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)), patents for software (see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)) or computer-implemented inventions (see EPO, G 3/08 (Programs for Computers), OJ 1/2011, 10), supplementary protection certificates (see Council Regulation No. 1768/92), motion and sound trademarks (see ECJ, Shield Mark, C-283/01, EU:C:2003:641), three-dimensional trademarks (see ECJ, Apple, C-421/13, EU:C:2014:2070), colour trademarks (see ECJ, Libertel, C-104/01, EU:C:2003:244), texture trademarks, flavour and fragrance trademarks (see In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990)), ancillary copyrights for sport event organizers or press publishers (see Article 87f of the German Copyright Act), and so forth.

  7. 7.

    See M. Lamping (2010), Patentschutz und Marktmacht, pp. 66 et seq.

  8. 8.

    U. Loewenheim (1996), Harmonization and Intellectual Property in Europe, 2 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1996, 481.

  9. 9.

    See E. Fox (2003), International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 2003, 911, exploring the dichotomy between national and global antitrust approaches to problems of externalities, legitimate jurisdiction and nationalistic incentives.

  10. 10.

    To this end, intellectual property was reinterpreted from an exception (cf. Article XX(d) GATT) to a condition for international trade (see the Punta del Este Declaration of 20 September 1986, and the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement). The economic considerations behind this “trade-relatedness” can be summarized as follows: In a closed economy, intellectual property is protected in order to prevent a market failure caused by the inability of creators and inventors to prevent others from free-riding on their achievements without bearing the costs for research and development. The TRIPS Agreement embraces a similar line of reasoning: In a transnational setting, harmonization is necessary in order to prevent countries from free-riding on the creative and innovative capacities of others while not contributing to the social costs entailed in the development of these capacities (including access restrictions and, concomitantly, higher prices for protected goods and services). This distorts the conditions of interstate competition, because countries with weak IP systems benefit from “positive externalities” created in countries with stronger IP systems. As a result, the aggregated market income generated by the intellectual asset at issue is not distributed according to “market performance”. In short, free regulatory competition fails to produce desirable results for technology-exporters, so harmonization is called upon in order to create a “level playing field” by internalizing cross-border externalities. This is also part of the explanation for why the Agreement follows a minimum standards approach. If the main goal is to prevent jurisdictional externalities, there is no need to worry about other countries granting too much protection. However, this is likely to create a vicious circle. As soon as a country raises its level of protection beyond the agreed standards, it creates new positive externalities to its detriment. It will therefore try to induce other states to also raise their level of protection by arguing that the only way to restore fairness of interstate competition and international trade is by adapting minimum standards to those of its own.

  11. 11.

    See D. Leebron (1996), Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 1996, 63, 84 et seq.

  12. 12.

    For references, see infra fn. 79.

  13. 13.

    D. Ricardo (1821), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ch. 7.

  14. 14.

    G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, p. 14.

  15. 15.

    G. Dutfield (2008), North/South: An Asymmetric Global Market?, in G. Ghidini & G. Genovesi (Eds.), Intellectual Property and Market Power, p. 180.

  16. 16.

    See, for example, Article 4(20) of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, restricting the grounds for granting compulsory licenses; Article 14 of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, providing that trademark protection shall include certification marks; Article 17 of the U.S.–Australia FTA, extending the term of copyright protection to 70 years; for further examples and references, see contributions in J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (2014), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?; H. Grosse Ruse-Khan et al. (2013), Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 44 IIC 2013, 878.

  17. 17.

    For a summary of the main concerns, see P.K. Yu (2006), Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Property Regime, in P.K. Yu (Ed.), Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age, Vol. 4: International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, pp. 77 et seq.

  18. 18.

    See, for example, the Ministerial Declaration adopted after the 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 20 November 2001, paras. 17 et seq.; Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of 20 November 2001; Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 of 1 September 2003.

  19. 19.

    Such as “local working requirements” in patent law. See Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 9, para. 30; C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, pp. 285 et seq.; G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 41 et seq.

  20. 20.

    See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 1 et seq.; S.K. Sell (2003), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 1 et seq.; P. Drahos (1995), Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 Prometheus 1995, 6; T.P. Stewart (1993), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Vol. II: Commentary, pp. 2253 et seq.; M.J. Trebilcock & R. Howse (2002), Regulation of International Trade, pp. 406 et seq.; D. Matthews (2002), Globalising Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 7 et seq.; for a summary, see M. Lamping (2010), Innovationsförderung nach TRIPS: Zwischen progressiver Liberalisierung und regulativem Fundamentalismus, in R. Hilty, T. Jaeger & M. Lamping (Eds.), Herausforderung Innovation, pp. 119, 122 et seq.

  21. 21.

    See U.S. House of Representatives (1984), Unfair Foreign Trade Practices – Stealing American Intellectual Property: Imitation is not Flattery (Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce). The industry coalition that lobbied for the Uruguay Round was mainly composed of U.S. companies. Since domestic markets were either losing purchasing power or becoming increasingly saturated, they sought ways to secure new revenues in foreign – mainly developing – markets in order to compensate the erosion of profits at home. At political level, they kicked down open doors. The U.S. government itself had a vested interest in facilitating trade with developing countries in order to make up the huge trade deficit that it had been facing since the early 70s (mainly due to high imports of oil and consumer products). See R.R. Nelson & G. Wright (1992), The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership, 30 JEL 1992, 1931; W. Cornish & K. Liddell (2015), The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 3 (this volume); H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume); J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).

  22. 22.

    See W. Kingston (2010), Beyond Intellectual Property: Matching Information Protection to Innovation, pp. 65 et seq.

  23. 23.

    See the drafts prepared during the Uruguay Round: Annell Draft (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 of 23 July 1990), Brussels Draft (MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1 of 3 December 1990) and Dunkel Draft (MTN.TNC/W/FA of 20 December 1991); see also T.P. Stewart (1993), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986–1992), Vol. II: Commentary, pp. 2264 et seq.; T.P. Stewart (1999), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986–1994), Vol. IV: The End Game (Part I), pp. 465 et seq.

  24. 24.

    For a general discussion of this issue, see G.N. Horlick (1994), Sovereignty and International Trade Regulation, 20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 1994, 57.

  25. 25.

    See P. Drahos (2002), Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting, 7 JWIP 2002, 765; P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 133 et seq., 189 et seq.

  26. 26.

    For details, see J.J. Gorlin (1999), An Analysis of the Pharmaceutical-Related Provision of the WTO TRIPS (Intellectual Property Agreement), p. 4.

  27. 27.

    See H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume).

  28. 28.

    See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 190 et seq.

  29. 29.

    See E.A. Posner (2009), The Perils of Global Legalism, pp. 28 et seq.

  30. 30.

    Indeed, there are specialized institutions involved in the negotiation of “global collective action” matters (such as, in the field of intellectual property, WTO and WIPO), but they do little more than providing institutional support.

  31. 31.

    See S.A. Shapiro (2002), International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 2002, 436, 440 et seq., discussing the issue in the context of the United States.

  32. 32.

    See P.B. Stephan (1999), The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1999, 743; A. Reich (2014), The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 2014, 321, 365.

  33. 33.

    Like special interest groups (e.g. generic drug manufacturers and associations), other civil society groups (e.g. NGOs, indigenous people or farmer’s representatives), and international institutions (e.g. WHO, UNCTAD or OECD). At the same time, consensus among developed countries and among industry coalitions started crumbling. Several unresolved issues became manifest, like the role of moral rights in copyright law, the scope of protection for geographical indications or the admissibility of border seizures. It is no coincidence that most of the disputes before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) were between developed countries and not, as one might expect, between developing and developed ones. See D. Matthews (2002), Globalising Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 105 et seq.

  34. 34.

    G.B. Dinwoodie (2000), The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 2000, 307, 309.

  35. 35.

    With regard to border measures, for example, the TRIPS Agreement even extended protection beyond the level applicable in some industrialized countries.

  36. 36.

    See H. Ullrich (1996), Technology Protection According to TRIPS: Principles and Problems, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 374; K. Saggi & J.P. Trachtman (2011), Incomplete Harmonization Contracts in International Economic Law, 10 World Trade Rev. 2011, 63, 85 et seq.

  37. 37.

    See Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 3, para. 1.

  38. 38.

    For a general discussion, see P. Drahos (1996), A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, pp. 1 et seq.

  39. 39.

    On the latter aspect, see K.D. Beiter (2015), Establishing Conformity between TRIPS and Human Rights: Hierarchy in International Law, Human Rights Obligations of the WTO and Extraterritorial State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 445 (this volume).

  40. 40.

    This discussion is particularly well developed in international sales law. See C.B. Andersen (2005), The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, 24 J.L. & Com. 2005, 159; R. Goode (1993), Reflections on the Harmonization of Commercial Law, in R. Cranston & R. Goode (Eds.), Commercial and Consumer Law: National and International Dimensions, pp. 1 et seq.; M.F. Sturley (1989), International Uniform Law in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Va. J. Int’l L. 1989, 729.

  41. 41.

    P. Legrand (1996), European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1996, 52, 56 et seq.

  42. 42.

    J. Merryman (1987), Letter to the Editor: Civil Law Tradition, 35 A. J. Comp. L. 1987, 438, 439.

  43. 43.

    Consider, for example, third-party entitlements to use protected subject matter. In contrast to common law, most civil law traditions are not used to applying equity principles. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the finding of an infringement is automatically followed by an order of injunctive relief. The situation is different in most common law countries. Notwithstanding the statutory right to exclude, injunctions are subject to an equity assessment that not only encompasses an inter partes balance of hardships but also erga omnes effects for the market and even the public interest (see, for example, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). It is thus easy for these countries to be restrictive with regard to the grounds and modalities of compulsory licenses (see, for example, Article 4(20) of the U.S.–Jordan FTA), but for civil law countries that are innately less flexible when it comes to balancing interests in the context of enforcement, granting a compulsory license may be crucial for delivering justice.

  44. 44.

    D.W. Leebron (1996), Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 1996, 63, 106; G. Teubner (1998), Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 Mod. L. Rev. 1998, 11.

  45. 45.

    W.B. Arthur (1989), Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 Econ. J. 1989, 116.

  46. 46.

    See L.A. Bebchuk & M.J. Roe (2000), A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 2000, 127.

  47. 47.

    A rather extreme but eye-catching example is Asia, where the duplication of literary works was traditionally – in fact, for centuries – perceived as making something valuable available to the public and thereby honouring the author, and not as a form if intellectual property “theft”. It is quite unlikely that this has hampered the development or constrained the diversity of Asia’s cultural heritage.

  48. 48.

    See G.J. Mossinghoff (2000), National Obligations under Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 Fed. Circuit B.J. 2000, 591, 603, noting that the TRIPS Agreement “tells all countries – developed, developing and least-developed – what they must do and when and how they must do it” (emphasis in original).

  49. 49.

    M.J. Trebilcock & R. Howse (2002), Regulation of International Trade, p. 314; see also K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2005), The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, p. 10.

  50. 50.

    S.K. Sell (1998), Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust, p. 177.

  51. 51.

    G.A. Manne & S. Weinberger (2012), International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law, 57 Antitrust Bull. 2012, 485, 540.

  52. 52.

    K.R. Popper (1945), The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I: The Spell of Plato, p. 101.

  53. 53.

    See supra Sect. 2.1.

  54. 54.

    E.A. Posner (2009), The Perils of Global Legalism, p. 35.

  55. 55.

    See O. Kahn-Freund (1974), On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1974, 1. Kahn-Freund’s analysis draws on Montesquieu’s perception that laws “should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another. Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of the government that is established or that one wants to establish, […] to the way of life of the peoples, […] to the degree of liberty that the constitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are established” (Montesquieu (1777), Complete Works, Vol. 1: The Spirit of Laws, Book I, Ch. 3). Montesquieu uses examples from Greek and Roman law in order to illustrate how the transplantation of identical laws from one culture to another can have a myriad of effects – desirable in one case and fatal in the other (ibid., Book XXIX, Chs VI et seq.). He concludes that laws can neither be easily separated from “the end for which they were made” nor from “the circumstances in which they were made” (ibid., Book XXIX, Chs. XIII and XIV).

  56. 56.

    For a different context, see P.C. Zumbansen (2006), Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 12 ELJ 2006, 534; G. Teubner (1998), Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 Mod. L. Rev 1998, 11.

  57. 57.

    Both paragraphs of Article 8 TRIPS are only applicable to the extent that “measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement” (emphasis added).

  58. 58.

    For an interpretation of the “consistency-test” in Article 8 TRIPS that avoids this, see Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 13, para. 1.3.

  59. 59.

    The Indian dispute between Natco and Bayer (cf. Supreme Court of India, Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Union of India & Others, Civil Appeal No. 2728 of 2013) may be such a case. Here, the Indian generic drug manufacturer Natco was granted a compulsory license for a cancer drug that was sold by Bayer at a price of more than 40 times the projected average per capita income in India. The license was granted on the ground that the drug was not “reasonably affordable” for national consumers. Despite the initial sympathy that one may have for the decision, doubts remain. As a matter of principle, public interest battles should not be fought on the back of the IP system – nor are they suitable for civil proceedings between private parties. Unless this is seen as part of some sort of “corporate social responsibility” (see F. Henning-Bodewig (2015), TRIPS and Corporate Social Responsibility: Unethical Equals Unfair Business Practices?, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 701 (this volume)), it is not incumbent upon private actors to secure affordable access to essential medicines, but rather the state’s responsibility towards its citizenry. Unless high prices constitute an antitrust violation (i.e. an abuse of market power), companies are free to determine their price and distribution policy even if that means that the average national consumer will not be able to afford the respective products. If medicines are sold at arguably excessive prices, it is therefore up to the state to cover for the difference to what it considers “reasonably affordable”.

  60. 60.

    Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of 20 November 2001.

  61. 61.

    For a general introduction into the public goods theory, see P.A. Samuelson (1954), The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ & Stat. 1954, 387; for its application to intellectual property, see K. Arrow (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in R. Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, pp. 609 et seq.; C. Taylor & Z. Silberston (1973), The Economic Impact of the Patent System, p. 24; F. Machlup (1983), Knowledge, Vol. III: The Economics of Information and Human Capital, p. 160.

  62. 62.

    Setting up a system of administration (e.g. patent and trademark offices, collecting societies) and enforcement (e.g. specialized courts, customs authorities) is costly and ties up resources that may otherwise be allocated more efficiently.

  63. 63.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.

  64. 64.

    T. Dreier (2007), Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized World, in I. Govaere & H. Ullrich (Eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, p. 50; G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, p. 32; K.E. Maskus (2012), Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century, p. 95, with further references.

  65. 65.

    K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2005), The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, p. 11.

  66. 66.

    See K.E. Maskus & M. Penubarti (1995), How Trade-Related are Intellectual Property Rights?, 39 J. Int’l Econ. 1995, 227; C.A.P. Braga (1996), Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round and its Economic Implications, in W. Martin & L.A. Winters (Eds.), The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries, p. 381; K.E. Maskus & M. Penubarti (1997), Patents and International Trade: An Empirical Study, in K.E. Maskus et al. (Eds.), Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy, p. 114; C. Fink & C.A.P. Braga (1999), How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 205; L. Branstetter, C.F. Foley & K. Saggi (2010), Has the Shift to Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Promoted Technology Transfer, FDI, and Industrial Development?, 2 WIPO J. 2010, 93; K.E. Maskus (2012), Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century, p. 25.

  67. 67.

    See P.J. Smith (2001), How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect U.S. Exports, Affiliate Sales and Licenses?, 55 J. Int’l Econ. 2001, 411; A.J. Glass & K. Saggi (2002), Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J. Int’l Econ. 2002, 387; L.G. Branstetter et al. (2007), Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence, NBER Working Paper 13033.

  68. 68.

    K.E. Maskus (2012), Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century, p. 314.

  69. 69.

    D. Gervais (2014), Current Issues in International Intellectual Property Norm-Making, in J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?, p. 5.

  70. 70.

    R. Newfarmer et al. (2002), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: Making Trade Work for the World’s Poor (World Bank Report), pp. 129 et seq.; P. McCalman (2001), Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization, 55 J. Int’l Econ. 2001, 161; C.M. Correa (2005), Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 227, 229 et seq.

  71. 71.

    See also infra Sect. 3.2.1.

  72. 72.

    See E. Kantzenbach (1967), Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs, pp. 16 et seq.

  73. 73.

    K.E. Maskus (1998), The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 1998, 109; for empirical evidence, see E. Mansfield (1993), Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in M.B. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee & R.A. Schoen (Eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, p. 140.

  74. 74.

    See, for example, European Commission (2011), A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights: Boosting Creativity and Innovation to Provide Economic Growth, High Quality Jobs and First Class Products and Services in Europe, COM(2011) 287, which is littered with assumptions about the positive impact of strong IP protection on creativity and innovation.

  75. 75.

    K.E. Maskus (1998), The International Regulation of Intellectual Property, 134 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 186, 192; see also B.Z. Khan (2002), Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European History, IPR Commission Study Paper 1a; N. Kumar (2002), Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian Countries, IPR Commission Study Paper 1b.

  76. 76.

    R. Newfarmer et al. (2002), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries: Making Trade Work for the World’s Poor (World Bank Report), pp. 139 et seq.

  77. 77.

    R.P. Merges (1990), Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1990, 245; C. May (2003), Why IPRs are a Global Issue, 25 EIPR 2003, 3.

  78. 78.

    See J.M. Clark (1940), Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1940, 241; J.A. Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 83 et seq.; E. Heuss (1965), Allgemeine Markttheorie, pp. 25 et seq.; J.M. Clark (1961), Competition as a Dynamic Process, pp. 178 et seq.; for a summary, see M. Lamping (2010), Patentschutz und Marktmacht, pp. 12 et seq.

  79. 79.

    The most prominent example is the Swiss pharmaceutical industry, which would probably not assume the leading role that it enjoys today if it was not for the lack of patent protection in Switzerland until the early 20th century. This made it possible to “free-ride” on the achievements of the more advanced German chemical industry, where the patent system was introduced in 1877. See J. Tanner (1998), The Swiss Pharmaceutical Industry: The Impact of Industrial Property Rights and Trust in the Laboratory, 1907–1939, in A.S. Travis et al. (Eds.), Determinants in the Evolution of the European Chemical Industry, 1900–1939, p. 257; C. Simon (1998), The Rise of the Swiss Chemical Industry Reconsidered, in E. Homburg, A.S. Travis & H.G. Schröter (Eds.), The Chemical Industry in Europe, 1850–1914: Industrial Growth, Pollution, and Professionalization, pp. 17 et seq. For more examples, see J.H. Reichman (2009), Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 247; G. Dutfield & U. Suthersanen (2005), Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of History, 23 Prometheus 2005, 131, 135 et seq.; H.-J. Chang (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, pp. 13 et seq.; L. Kim (2002), Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Lessons from Korea’s Experience, UNCTAD/ICTSD Working Paper 2002; H.-J. Chang (2001), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. Hum. Dev. 2001, 288; J.H. Reichman (1996), From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1996, 11; C. Johnson (1995), Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, pp. 74 et seq.; J.A. Ordover (1991), A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 1991, 43; D.J. Jeremy (1981), Transatlantic Industrial Revolution: The Diffusion of Textile Technologies between Britain and America, pp. 8 et seq.

  80. 80.

    G. Dutfield & U. Suthersanen (2005), Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of History, 23 Prometheus 2005, 131, 144.

  81. 81.

    The need to combat trademark counterfeit and copyright piracy was discussed as early as in the 1970s during the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations.

  82. 82.

    Statistics prepared by U.S. Customs and Border Protection indicate that seizures have increased from 1999–2013 by 560 % (from 3.691 to 24.361) in terms of the number of seizures and by 1670 % (from 98.501.594 to 1.743.515.581 USD) in terms of the value of seized goods (calculated on the basis of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price of the goods had they been genuine). For the EU, the reports on EU customs enforcement of IP rights show an increase of border detention cases between 1999 and 2013 by 1750 % (from 4.694 to 86.854).

  83. 83.

    The annual trade reports prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis indicate that merchandise imports to the U.S. have increased by 206 % between 1995 and 2013 (from 749.363 to 2.294.453 million USD) and by 122 % between 1999 and 2013 (from 1.029.917 to 2.294.453 million USD). The numbers for the European Union are similar. The annual “Trade Profiles” prepared by the WTO indicate that merchandise imports to the EU have increased by 53 % between 2005 and 2013 (from 1.462.516 to 2.234.603 million USD). Trade statistics for the EU prepared by Eurostat indicate similar numbers.

  84. 84.

    See OECD (2008), The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, pp. 87 et seq.; UNODC (2010), The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, pp. 173 et seq.; Europol (2011), OCTA 2011: EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment, pp. 25 et seq.; IP Crime Group (2014), IP Crime: Annual Report 2012-2013, pp. 24 et seq.

  85. 85.

    OECD (2009), Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy of Tangible Products: An Update, p. 1, estimating that the share of counterfeit and pirated goods in world trade has increased from 1.85 % in 2000 to 1.95 % in 2007.

  86. 86.

    See supra Sect. 2.3.

  87. 87.

    P. Drahos (2001), BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 JWIP 2001, 791, 798.

  88. 88.

    See M. Andenas, C.B. Andersen & R. Ashcroft (2011), Towards a Theory of Harmonization, in M. Andenas & C.B. Andersen (Eds.), Theory and Practice of Harmonization, p. 581.

  89. 89.

    D.W. Leebron (1996), Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 1996, 63, 65 et seq.

  90. 90.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.

  91. 91.

    C.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin (2008), Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 Eur. L.J. 2008, 271, 272.

  92. 92.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.1.

  93. 93.

    See P. Rott (2005), What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law?, 1 Hanse L. Rev. 2005, 6 et seq., referring to consumer sales law.

  94. 94.

    ECJ, Les Verts, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.

  95. 95.

    ECJ, Werhof, 499/04, EU:C:1986:166, para. 32; ECJ, Borgmann, C-1/02 EU:C:2004:202, para. 30; ECJ, Herbrink, C-98/91, EU:C:1994:24, para. 9.

  96. 96.

    ECJ, Hagen OHG, 49/71, EU:C:1972:6, para. 6; for more recent references, see ECJ, Padawan, C-467/08, EU:C:2010:620, para. 33; ECJ, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, paras. 14 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on EC Private Law (2008), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), p. 134.

  98. 98.

    Unless there is no reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of EU law (“acte clair”) or the Court has previously ruled on the matter at issue (“acte éclairé”), national courts are actually obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. Under the “Francovich” doctrine, member states are liable to pay compensation to individuals who suffer a loss due to a breach of EU law (see ECJ, Francovich and Bonifaci, C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428).

  99. 99.

    Convention 80/934/EEC on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ 1980 L 266/1.

  100. 100.

    This happened through protocols: First Protocol on the Interpretation of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ 1989 L 48/1; Second Protocol Conferring on the Court of Justice Certain Powers to Interpret the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, OJ 1989 L 48/17.

  101. 101.

    See P. Rott (2005), What is the Role of the ECJ in EC Private Law?, 1 Hanse L. Rev. 2005, 7.

  102. 102.

    A. Ohly (2012), Introduction: The Quest for Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law – Useful, Futile, Dangerous?, in A. Ohly (Ed.), Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law, p. 4.

  103. 103.

    See G.B. Dinwoodie (2000), The Integration of International and Domestic Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 2000, 307, 312, referring to the European dispute between Philips and Remington regarding the availability of trade dress rights in the shape of a three-headed rotary shaver (cf. ECJ, Philips, C-299/99, EU:C:2002:377).

  104. 104.

    The “homeward trend” describes the tendency of national courts to be influenced by national patterns and traditions. See M. Andenas, C.B. Andersen & R. Ashcroft (2011), Towards a Theory of Harmonization, in M. Andenas & C.B. Andersen (Eds.), Theory and Practice of Harmonization, p. 592.

  105. 105.

    M. Salokannel, A. Strowel & E. Derclaye (2000), Study Contract Concerning Moral Rights in the Context of the Exploitation of Works through Digital Technology, Final Report (commissioned by DG Internal Market), pp. 212 et seq., 225; I. Sirvinskaite (2011), Toward Copyright “Europeanification”: European Union Moral Rights, 3 J. Int’l Media & Ent. L. 2011, 263, 271 et seq.

  106. 106.

    Directive 2009/24/EC on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, OJ 2009 L 111/16.

  107. 107.

    Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/84/EC on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, OJ 2001 L 272/32.

  108. 108.

    See European Commission (2004), Commission Staff Working Paper on the Review of the EC legal Framework in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights, SEC(2004) 995, p. 16, stating that no evidence exists in the analogue or digital environment that disparities in moral rights protection affect the good functioning of the Internal Market. This finding is partly at odds with older statements. See European Commission (1990), Follow-up to the Green Paper 1991 – Working Programme of the Commission in the Field of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, COM(90) 584; European Commission (1996), Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM(96) 586.

  109. 109.

    See supra Sect. 2.2; for references, see supra fn. 36.

  110. 110.

    See supra note 10. The jurisdictional externalities resulting from a lack of product patent protection for pharmaceuticals in developing countries (generic companies were able to offer bioequivalent drugs, since only the process for obtaining the drug enjoyed protection, but not the drug itself) could have been eliminated in two ways: by obliging these countries to provide for product patents (as has been done through Article 27(1) TRIPS), or by inducing other countries to not grant them. In fact, pharmaceuticals we excluded from patent protection in quite a number of European countries until the late 20th century, such as Germany (until 1968), Switzerland (until 1977), Italy (until 1978), Spain and Portugal (until 1992) and Finland (until 1995).

  111. 111.

    Article II(1) of the WTO Agreement.

  112. 112.

    H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume).

  113. 113.

    Study Group on a European Civil Code & Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (2009), Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR): Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law.

  114. 114.

    O. Lando & H. Beale (2000), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (prepared by the Commission on European Contract Law); O. Lando et al. (2003), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (prepared by the Commission on European Contract Law).

  115. 115.

    Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (2007/2009), Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles).

  116. 116.

    Study Group on a European Civil Code (2006–2014), Principles of European Law.

  117. 117.

    See supra Sect. 3.1.1.

  118. 118.

    See also S.W. Waller (1994), Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 Kansas L. Rev. 1994, 557, 591; G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, p. 15.

  119. 119.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.3.

  120. 120.

    See, for example, Protocol on Social Policy, OJ 1992 C 224/126; Protocol on the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Framework of the European Union, OJ 1997 C 340/93; Protocol on the Position of United Kingdom and Ireland, OJ 1997 C 340/99; Protocol on the Position of Denmark, OJ 1997 C 340/10; Protocol on the Acquisition of Property in Denmark, OJ 1992 C 191/68; Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, OJ 1992 C 191/87; Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom, OJ 2007 C 306/156.

  121. 121.

    A. Ott (2009), EU Constitutional Boundaries to Differentiation: How to Reconcile Differentiation with Integration, in A. Ott & E. Vos (Eds.), Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives, p. 137.

  122. 122.

    Unfortunately the enhanced cooperation procedure (cf. Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 to 334 TFEU) in the area of unitary patent protection has opened the doors to such behavior. See M. Lamping (2011), Enhanced Cooperation: A Proper Approach to Market Integration in the Field of Unitary Patent Protection?, 8 IIC 2011, 879.

  123. 123.

    ECJ, Les Verts, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.

  124. 124.

    According to Article 6(3) TEU, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR “shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”.

  125. 125.

    For a proposal to underpin the TRIPS Agreement with an international intellectual property “acquis”, see G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 175 et seq.

  126. 126.

    See K.D. Beiter (2015), Establishing Conformity between TRIPS and Human Rights: Hierarchy in International Law, Human Rights Obligations of the WTO and Extraterritorial State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 445 (this volume).

  127. 127.

    See the Preamble and Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  128. 128.

    See H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume); K.D. Beiter (2015), Establishing Conformity between TRIPS and Human Rights: Hierarchy in International Law, Human Rights Obligations of the WTO and Extraterritorial State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 445 (this volume); see also G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 181 et seq.

  129. 129.

    For a more detailed analysis, see S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume).

  130. 130.

    See R. Dworkin (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 22 et seq.

  131. 131.

    Examples borrowed from D.W. Leebron (1996), Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 1996, 63, 68.

  132. 132.

    This difference has important political consequences, since different types of compromises and policy trade-offs are required at different governmental or intergovernmental levels. See D.W. Leebron (1996), Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 1996, 63, 68 et seq.

  133. 133.

    Ibid., 68.

  134. 134.

    See supra Sect. 3.1.2.

  135. 135.

    Antitrust is another example. Before states can agree on a provision that defines price-fixing as illegal conduct, they must reach a more fundamental consensus: that concerted practices are bad for economic welfare and that a redistribution of rents from consumers to producers is socially undesirable. On a most basic level, they must agree that competition as such is desirable.

  136. 136.

    H. Ullrich (2012), Intellectual Property: Exclusive Rights for a Purpose – The Case of Technology Protection by Patents and Copyright, in K. Klafkowska-Waśniowska (Ed.), Problemy Polskiego e Europejskiego Prawa Prywatnego: Ksiega Pamiatkowa Profesora Mariana Kępińskiego, pp. 425 et seq.; see also A. Ohly (2012), Introduction: The Quest for Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law – Useful, Futile, Dangerous?, in A. Ohly (Ed.), Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law, p. 6.

  137. 137.

    See supra Sect. 2.2.1.

  138. 138.

    See supra Sects. 2.2.3 and 3.1.3.

  139. 139.

    See also supra Sect. 2.3.

  140. 140.

    F.A. Hayek (1968), Competition as a Discovery Procedure (lecture given at the 1968 meetings of the Philadelphia Society), reprinted in 5 Q.J. Aus. Econ. 1968, 9.

  141. 141.

    Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 12, para. 39.

  142. 142.

    See Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289, paras. 7.88 et seq.

  143. 143.

    Without acknowledging that the effects of patent protection differ according to the field of technology, legal differentiation will almost automatically amount to discrimination. However, if the intrinsic differences between technologies are taken into consideration, the situation is actually inverse. If discrimination is defined as “treating differently situations which are identical, or treating in the same way situations which are different” (cf. ECJ, Wagner/BALM, 8/82, EU:C:1983:41, para. 18), it would not be the unequal treatment of different technologies that amounts to discrimination, but rather their equal – i.e. undifferentiated – treatment. See Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (Version 1.0 of 15 April 2014), p. 4, paras. 6 et seq.; N. Lee (2015), Revisiting the Principle of Technological Neutrality in Patent Protection in the Age of 3D Printing Technology and Cloud Computing, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 361 (this volume).

  144. 144.

    See Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, p. 2289, para. 7.20; Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 2000:VIII, p. 3769, para. 6.74.

  145. 145.

    See A. Kur (2015), From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 133 (this volume); H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2015), IP and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 163 (this volume); H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2011), Enough is Enough – The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, in A. Kur & M. Levin (Eds.), Intellectual Property in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform of TRIPS, pp. 359 et seq.

  146. 146.

    For example, understanding patents as instruments of competition whose purpose is to prevent a market failure serves as a justification for regulatory intervention in the market but concurrently also confines that intervention to what is actually necessary to prevent the market from failing.

  147. 147.

    Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on 1 January 1995.

  148. 148.

    See G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 49 et seq.; S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume).

  149. 149.

    See E.A. Posner (2009), The Perils of Global Legalism, p. 32.

  150. 150.

    See M. Spence (2001), Which Intellectual Property Rights are Trade-Related?, in F. Francioni (Ed.), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, pp. 263 et seq.; A. Reich (2014), The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 2014, 321, 338.

  151. 151.

    See H. Ullrich (2015), The Political Foundations of TRIPS Revisited, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 85 (this volume); regarding the trade rationale of the Agreement, see supra fn. 9.

  152. 152.

    J.H. Reichman (2000), The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 441, 469.

  153. 153.

    If the conciliation rhetoric of Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement was to be taken seriously, one of the primary objectives of harmonizing “trade-related aspects of intellectual property” is to bring the benefits of innovation and creativity to the market by facilitating the transfer of commodified knowledge between those who produce, those who use, and those who consume. If the TRIPS’ objective is defined in terms of building a bridge between producers, users and consumers, it must obviously take account of producer, user and consumer interests.

  154. 154.

    See also infra Sect. 3.3.

  155. 155.

    K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2005), The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 23 et seq., criticizing the “export of a dysfunctional system to the rest of the world”.

  156. 156.

    While multinational agreements serve to consolidate the level of IP protection, bilateral agreements are used to seek additional – internationally not enforceable – gains by introducing new forms of IP protection, eliminating flexibilities, or closing “loopholes”. See P. Roffe (2014), Intellectual Property Chapters in Free Trade Agreements: Their Significance and Systemic Implications, in J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (Eds.), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?, pp. 28 et seq.; J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume). Once the number of bilateral agreements with similar provisions has reached a critical mass, they will inevitably constitute the basis, i.e. a common ground, for discussions about further international harmonization of minimums standards. What has been agreed bilaterally or regionally (following a “Country Club” approach) is easier to assert internationally. This has played itself out repeatedly in the past – in the context of the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement – and it is likely to repeat itself in the future. See B.C. Mercurio (2006), TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in L. Bartels & F. Ortino (Eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, p. 236, speaking of a “manipulation” of multilateralism.

  157. 157.

    H. Ullrich (2004), Expansionist Intellectual Property and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPs Perspective, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 2004, 401.

  158. 158.

    See R.M. Hilty (2015), Ways out of the Trap of Article 1(1) TRIPS, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 185 (this volume). Amending the TRIPS Agreement requires a two-thirds majority of all WTO members (cf. Article X of the WTO Agreement).

  159. 159.

    P. Drahos (2001), BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 JWIP 2001, 791, 798.

  160. 160.

    For references, see supra fn. 145.

  161. 161.

    See R.C. Dreyfuss (2004), TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2002, 22; for concrete proposals, see A. Kur & M. Levin (2011), Intellectual Property in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for Reform of TRIPS, pp. 455 et seq.

  162. 162.

    Like the “Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled”, adopted on 27 June 2013; for an analysis, see K. Köklü (2014), The Marrakesh Treaty – Time to End the Book Famine for Visually Impaired Persons Worldwide, 45 IIC 2014, 737.

  163. 163.

    See D. De Bièvre & L. Thomann (2010), Forum Shopping in the Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime, MZES Working Paper No. 132; L.R. Helfer (2004), Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and the New Dynamics of International Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 2004, 1; P. Drahos (2001), BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 JWIP 2001, 791.

  164. 164.

    Proposed by K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2005), The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (Eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, pp. 36 et seq.

  165. 165.

    The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). All of these agreements intend to complement the current international IP treaties while considerably raising the mandatory minimum standards.

  166. 166.

    Under Section 301, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) undertakes a survey of its trading partners’ IP laws and policies. The “Special 301 Report” identifies countries that do not provide “adequate and effective protection of intellectual property” and “deny fair and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection” (cf. 19 U.S.C. § 2242). The USTR can then impose unilateral trade sanctions, including the suspension of benefits of trade agreement concessions, the imposition of duties or other import restrictions or the suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which grants preferential treatment to developing countries (cf. 19 U.S.C. § 2411).

  167. 167.

    See Council Regulation No. 2641/84 on the Strengthening of the Common Commercial Policy with regard in particular to Protection against Illicit Commercial Practices, OJ 1984 L 252/1, which provides for sanctions against illicit commercial practices of third countries, including violations of the TRIPS Agreement.

  168. 168.

    According to Article 23 DSU, members seeking “the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under [WTO Agreements] or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of [WTO Agreements] […] shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding”. See also Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 February 2002, DSR 2002:III, p. 849, para. 7.170.

  169. 169.

    T. Dreier (2007), Shaping a Fair International IPR-Regime in a Globalized World, in I. Govaere & H. Ullrich (Eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, p. 50; see, however, T.P. Stewart (1999), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1994), Vol. IV: The End Game (Part I), pp. 557 et seq., registering the U.S. government’s intention to continue using Section 301 to pursue foreign unfair trade barriers.

  170. 170.

    See J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).

  171. 171.

    D.C. Etsy & D. Geradin (2001), Introduction, in D.C. Etsy & D. Geradin (Eds.), Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives, p. XXV.

  172. 172.

    See European Council (2000), Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 – Presidency Conclusions, para. 37.

  173. 173.

    So far, the OMC has influenced the regulatory process in a number of areas which fall within the competence of the Member States, such as employment and social inclusion, migration, education and training, tourism, environmental protection, energy policy, health care, pensions, human rights, and company law. See contributions in O. De Schutter & S. Deakin (2005), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe?; J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet & L. Magnusson (2005), The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies. The example of labour law shows how the combination of directives and reflexive governance can raise labour standards for the better. See S. Deakin (2009), Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, 15 Eur. L.J. 2009, 224.

  174. 174.

    F.A. Hayek (1968), Competition as a Discovery Procedure (lecture given at the 1968 meetings of the Philadelphia Society), reprinted in 5 Q.J. Aus. Econ. 1968, 9.

  175. 175.

    See supra Sect. 2.1.

  176. 176.

    O. De Schutter & S. Deakin (2005), Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation, in O. De Schutter & S. Deakin (Eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe?, p. 3.

  177. 177.

    The term is borrowed from S. Deakin (1999), Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation, 2 Cambridge Yearbook Eur. Legal Stud. 1999, 231.

  178. 178.

    See supra Sects. 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.

  179. 179.

    See C.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin (2008), Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 Eur. L.J. 2008, 271, 273 et seq.

  180. 180.

    See J.P. Voß, R. Kemp & D. Bauknecht (2006), Reflexive Governance: A View on an Emerging Path, in J.P. Voß, D. Bauknecht & R. Kemp (Eds.), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, p. 425.

  181. 181.

    See, for example, J.P. Voß & B. Bornemann (2011), Politics of Reflexive Governance: Challenges for Designing Adaptive Management and Transition Management, 16 Ecology & Society 2011, 2, 9.

  182. 182.

    See supra Sect. 2.1.

  183. 183.

    See F. Böhm (1966), Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft, ORDO 1966, 75.

  184. 184.

    See supra Sect. 2.

  185. 185.

    See supra Sect. 3.

  186. 186.

    See supra Sect. 4.

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  1. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Matthias Lamping

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  1. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Hanns Ullrich

  2. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Reto M. Hilty

  3. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Matthias Lamping

  4. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Josef Drexl

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Lamping, M. (2016). Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_10

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