Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement

  • Chapter
TRIPS plus 20

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law ((MSIP,volume 25))

Abstract

The essays in this volume focus upon the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement, which is an important element in the constitution and practice of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Known to all as the TRIPS Agreement, it reached its twentieth anniversary in operative effect on January 1, 2015. It is unlikely that the text of the TRIPS Agreement will be substantially amended by the Member states of the WTO for at least another decade or two. Our contributors therefore take its current terms as a continuing authority in international law for its immediate future. They do so, however, questioning how far the Agreement was adequate for its own time and how far it remains so in a world that has been changing so extraordinarily during the intervening 20 years and doubtless will continue to do so for the twenty to follow.

Prof. Dr. William Cornish is Emeritus Herchel Smith Professor of Intellectual Property Law at the University of Cambridge and an External Academic Member of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich. Dr. Kathleen Liddell is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, and Director of its Centre for Law, Medicine and Life Sciences, and Deputy Director of its Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 259.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For legal commentaries on the interpretation of TRIPS, see A. Taubman, H. Wager & J. Watal (2012), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement; J. Malbon, C. Lawson & M. Davison (2014), The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary; C. Correa (2010), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO; C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis; T. Stoll, J. Busche & K. Arend (2009), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. For some imaginative conceptualisation, see esp. G.B. Dinwoodie & R.C. Dreyfuss (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime; which should be read with their essay supporting a central role for WIPO in international development of intellectual property policy.

  2. 2.

    See Lewinski (this volume).

  3. 3.

    For a selection of this extensive literature, see below at fn. 37.

  4. 4.

    See Drexl (this volume).

  5. 5.

    See Beiter et al. (this volume).

  6. 6.

    As acknowledged in the Preamble to TRIPS, Recital 3.

  7. 7.

    For guidance through the evolving theories of free trade advantages, absolute (Smith) or comparative (Ricardo), see M.J. Trebilcock, R. Howse & A. Eliason (2013), Regulation of International Trade, Ch. 1.

  8. 8.

    For recent use of the evidence over time of adopting free trade underpinnings in support of industrialising economies, see H. Chang (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective.

  9. 9.

    A.L. Dunham (1930), The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France after Napoleon.

  10. 10.

    See H. Chang (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective.

  11. 11.

    See esp., J.A. Schumpeter (1955), History of Economic Analysis.

  12. 12.

    For other, more specific forms of IPRs, see below. For further detail, W. Cornish, D. Llewelyn & T. Aplin (2013), Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks & Allied Rights.

  13. 13.

    See A. Ohly (2015), TRIPS and Consumer Protection, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 681 (this volume).

  14. 14.

    The wide use of the term became standard once the UN brought together the supervision of the major international IP Conventions under its World Intellectual Property Organisation (to English speakers, WIPO, to the French, OMPI; sited in Geneva). Thus it became accepted as a type of private property right, bringing together forms of IP previously labelled ‘industrial property’ and ‘copyright’. See further below, Sects. 4.2 and 4.3.

  15. 15.

    See below at Sect. 7.6.

  16. 16.

    See below at Sect. 7.5.

  17. 17.

    Much of the effectiveness of IPRs in practice would depend on the rights being licensed by the right holder. In many legal systems those who took exclusive licences would then acquire rights to pursue infringers of the right themselves, rather than having to oblige the right holder to do so. A right holder might license a single manufacturer or distributor for different countries, in the hope thereby of raising barriers against each licensee directly or indirectly selling on into countries where the authorised licensee was charging higher prices or providing other advantages. To achieve this effect, the IPR in the country of import had to apply a concept of ‘first sale’ or ‘exhaustion of rights’ only to sales within that country, not internationally. Whether, and in what circumstances, the scope of an IPR could be used to prevent the practice of parallel importation of ‘legitimate‘ goods was unquestionably ‘trade-related’. But the issue would eventually be placed outside the embrace of TRIPS (see Art. 5) simply because it was unassuageably contentious.

  18. 18.

    Similar priority arrangements were introduced for the registration of trade marks and registered designs: see The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Stockholm Revision 1967–68) Art. 4. For the evolution of the Convention, L.J. Duncan (1997), From Privileges to the Paris Convention, Chs. 5–7; W. Cornish et al. (2010), Oxford History of the Laws of England, pp. 956–963; S. Ricketson (2015), Commentary on the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.

  19. 19.

    See The Paris Convention, Art. 5.

  20. 20.

    For the evolution and later development of the Berne Convention, see S. Ricketson & J. Ginsburg (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, Vol. 1, Chs. 2, 3; W. Cornish et al. (2010), Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol. 13, pp. 908–918.

  21. 21.

    For the evolution of the Rome Convention, see S. Stewart (1989), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Chs. 7, 8.

  22. 22.

    A fourth international agreement, the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Integrated Circuits (Washington, 1988) proved to be unattractive, since its two main beneficiaries, the US and Japan, refused to accept a provision confining the duration of the right to eight years. This impasse would be overcome by TRIPS Arts. 35–38, which required WTO Members to accept the Treaty, but substituted a term of at least ten years for the right to circuit layout designs.

  23. 23.

    During the GATT Uruguay Round, WIPO achieved the laborious task of persuading both the US and then the Chinese People’s Republic to join the Berne Convention.

  24. 24.

    At that period, a number of Latin American countries began experimenting with legal measures that curbed the effectiveness of IPRs in the eyes of the leading industrial nations.

  25. 25.

    See S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume); also D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, pp. 286–292.

  26. 26.

    Also known as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, the Act raised US duties on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels.

  27. 27.

    A specialist representative for trade negotiations had first been appointed by President Kennedy in 1962 pursuant to the Trade Expansion Act of that year. The position, and its associated Office, were significantly restructured by Congress in 1974 and 1979 to increase its visibility and accountability: F. Boadu & J. Shen (1997), An Empirical Analysis of the Growth and Autonomy of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 6 Currents 1997, 3–5.

  28. 28.

    For a detailed analysis of the GATT (1947) decisions and the consequences, see H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2015), IP and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 163 (this volume).

  29. 29.

    In 1988 ‘Policy’ was inserted in the title after ‘Trade’.

  30. 30.

    S. Sell (2002), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights.

  31. 31.

    H.R. 4848. As US industries sought to tighten the effectiveness of their country’s own IP laws, an intermediate stage was a set of amendments to s. 301 of the 1974 Law introduced by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: S. Sell (2002), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 81–91.

  32. 32.

    See in particular s. 182 and s. 310 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.

  33. 33.

    S. 181 of the Trade Act of 1974.

  34. 34.

    Before reporting on the situation, the USTR was required to consult the country’s own industries. The 1988 amendments also eased the requirements for investigations of imported articles by the US International Trade Commission of breaches of patent rights under s. 337 of the Trade Act of 1974; an additional option for disgruntled US patent owners separate from patent law proceedings in federal district courts. See A. Newman (1989), The Amendments to Section 337: Increased Protection for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1989, 571; S. Sell (2002), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 91–95; and United States – s. 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Report by the GATT Panel, 7 Nov 1989) L/6439.

  35. 35.

    See J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).

  36. 36.

    Panel Report, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, DSR 2000:II, p. 815.

  37. 37.

    For the current debate on flexibilities in TRIPS and their relation to stricter protection through bilateral FTAs, see e.g., H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2011), The International Law Relation between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2011, 485. On the relationship between TRIPS and FTAs see for example: H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2011), Protecting Intellectual Property under BITs, FTAs, and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence, in C. Brown & K. Miles (Eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, pp. 485; R. Hilty & T. Jaeger (2012), Legal Effects and Policy Considerations for Free Trade Agreements: What is Wrong with FTAs, in C. Antons & R. Hilty (Eds.), Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region; R. Merges (1990), Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1990, 239; J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (2014), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?.

  38. 38.

    See J. Drexl, H. Grosse Ruse-Khan & S. Nadde-Phlix (2014), ibid.

  39. 39.

    C. Antons & R. Hilty (2012), Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    There were initially 23 signatory states when the GATT was signed in 1947. By June 2014, there were seven times as many WTO members.

  42. 42.

    See S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume).

  43. 43.

    For a description of the dispute settlement process under TRIPS and its relationship with the original GATT dispute settlement process, see C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 479 et seq.

  44. 44.

    No question of compliance with any IP Convention had ever been raised between states before the International Court of Justice at The Hague, despite acknowledgment in those conventions of their entitlement to do so. However, where an international convention conferred sufficiently clear rights on private individuals in member states, the courts of a state might directly apply such rights in domestic litigation. This could happen only where a particular state adopts a monist approach to Convention obligations. But note in relation to TRIPS, and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the European Council’s declaration that “by its nature, the [Uruguay Round] Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts”: Council Decision, 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986–1994), Official Journal L 336, 23/12/1994 P. 0001–0002 (emphasis added).

  45. 45.

    See above, Sect. 5.1.

  46. 46.

    The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry was beginning to demonstrate what could be achieved by working with public authorities in Asian states to clean up high tides of infringing sound recordings. Thus in Hong Kong, while still a British colony, the legislative powers of the police and customs services were tightened to such an extent that the industry could claim that a market containing only 2 per cent of legitimate music cassettes had between 1973 and 1986 become one which was 99 per cent legal: see D. de Freitas (1989), Hong Kong, in S. Stewart (Ed.), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Ch. 25, esp. pp. 816–817. Similar developments took place between independent countries of the same region: see ibid, Chs. 23, 26–30. For example, Singapore enacted in 1968 the Copyright (Gramophone Records and Government Broadcasting) Act to address music piracy. The Act provided that courts must presume the accuracy of affidavits on the subsistence and ownership of copyright, unless the contrary was proved: see Ch. 25 at p. 860.

  47. 47.

    In Ullrich (this volume).

  48. 48.

    For external literature on the politics of the negotiations: S. Sell (2003), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 91–95; P. Drahos (2005), Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPs and the GATT, 13 Prometheus 2005, 6; A. Menescal (2005), Those Behind the TRIPs Agreement: the Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on International Intellectual Property Decisions, 2 IPQ 2005, 15; F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (1989), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property; F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (1996), From GATT to TRIPs: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; S. Haunss (2011), The Politicisation of Intellectual Property: IP Conflicts and Social Change, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 129–138; P. Gerhart (2007), The Tragedy of TRIPs, Mich. St. L. Rev. 2007, 143; D. Matthews (2011), Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements.

  49. 49.

    See e.g. P. Drahos (2002), Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in P. Drahos & R. Mayne (Eds.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, Ch. 10, pp. 166–172; P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 10–13.

  50. 50.

    See in particular, S. Sell (2003), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 91–95.

  51. 51.

    For literature discussing the difficulties of the TRIPs campaign for developing countries, see: J. Watal (2011), From Punte del Este to Doha and Beyond, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 24; J. Watal (2001), Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries; C. Deere (2008), The Implementation Game: The TRIPs Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries; C. Deere-Birkbeck (2010), Developing Countries in the Global IP system before TRIPS: The Political Context for the TRIPS Negotiations, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, pp. 22–51. See also various contributions in D. Gervais (2007), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPs-plus Era, including those of K. Sanders (Ch. 4), P. Yu (Ch. 5), C. Correa (Ch. 6), and I. Mgbeoji (Ch. 7); J. Reichmann (2000), The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with Developing Countries, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 441; A. George (2006), Globalization and Intellectual Property; W. Pretorius (2002), TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field, in P. Drahos & R. Mayne (Eds.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, pp. 183–197. For a discussion of some of the issues currently facing developing countries: G. Ghidini, R. Peritz & M. Ricolfi (2014), TRIPS and Developing Countries: Towards a New IP World Order?.

  52. 52.

    Arguments about this issue played a prominent part at the Symposium of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition (to use its current title) in July 1988, as is recorded in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (1989), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property.

  53. 53.

    For a description of the issues, see R. Osterfard (2007), Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in D. Gervais (Ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPs-plus Era, Ch. 3.

  54. 54.

    C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 491 et seq. All WTO members had one year to comply with the obligations of TRIPS. Developing countries were allowed an additional period of four years (until 1 Jan 2000), apart from obligations concerning the most-favoured-nation clause (Art. 4), national treatment (Art. 3) and certain other procedural provisions. Least developed countries, however, have been allowed further extensions, currently until 2015. Developing countries also had a further five years (until 1 Jan 2005) to introduce product patent protection in areas of technology that were not already protected in their territory by 1 Jan 2000. Only a few beneficiaries of this provision remained by 2000 because most had introduced protection by this time (p. 493). India, a major producer of generic pharmaceuticals, was one of the few remaining countries, which was a key reason for the adoption of the Doha Decision in 2003 in the twilight of this transitional period, which would continue till 2005.

  55. 55.

    TRIPS Agreement, Arts. 65, 66(1). There were 32 least-developed countries in 2007, and a further 8 in the process of accession. The 10-year grace period was extended a further ten years by the Doha Decision until 1 Jan 2016 in relation to pharmaceutical patents, and until 1 Jan 2013 in other regards: C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 496. The hardliners of the US pharmaceutical industry had in the end to give up their fight for a ”pipeline” protection of patents that would come into effect once, under Art. 27(1), a developing country became obliged to introduce patents for new drugs.

  56. 56.

    Art. 67.

  57. 57.

    Art. 66(2).

  58. 58.

    For example, as to the exclusion of principles of exhaustion under TRIPS, see, e.g., L.M. Genovesi (2010), The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion, in C. Correa, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, p. 216. Genovesi describes Art. 6 as “an agreement to disagree” (i.e. a rule that leaves each Member state free to establish its own regime for exhaustion).

  59. 59.

    The Dunkel draft Text was released on 20 Dec 1991: A. Taubman, H. Wager & J. Watal (2012), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, pp. 7–8.

  60. 60.

    See above Sect. 5.1; and J. Drexl (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 53 (this volume).

  61. 61.

    See TRIPS Arts. 2(2), 3(1). For the WIPO Treaty of 1988 on the Layout of Integrated Circuits and its upgrading in TRIPS itself, see below, Sect. 7.3.

  62. 62.

    See TRIPS Art. 2(1).

  63. 63.

    TRIPS Art. 68. Art. 72 prescribes the conditions under which such a review is to take place.

  64. 64.

    TRIPS Art. 73.

  65. 65.

    GATT 1994, Arts. I and III; TRIPS Arts. 4 and 5. Among the exceptions set out in the two TRIPS Articles, those relating to granting, registration and related procedures under WIPO Conventions, are of basic importance. For the need to observe differences between the GATT and TRIPS provisions on non-discrimination, see H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2015), IP and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 163 (this volume).

  66. 66.

    Where TRIPS imposes obligations on its Members by reference to one of the WIPO Conventions, the definition of the criteria for eligibility of “nationals” has to be read as extending to those persons, natural or legal, who would have been nationals had their state been party to the earlier Convention in question: see TRIPS Art. 1(3).

  67. 67.

    TRIPS, Rec. 1.

  68. 68.

    Rec. 2(b), (c).

  69. 69.

    Rec. 2(e), 5, 6; and see Art. 66, already referred to above in n. 54 and 55.

  70. 70.

    Art. 7. To have expressed this objective in terms of “shall”, rather than “should”, would have introduced the supererogatory notion that each right would become questionable once its lack of practical success could be established. In patent law, such issues can already be addressed by a legal requirement that the claimed invention be capable of industrial application from the start.

  71. 71.

    Art. 31bis; for which see below, text to n. 124 and 125.

  72. 72.

    See further in Bakoum and Conde (this volume). On the scope to which TRIPS protects undisclosed information and controls anti-competitive practices in contractual licences, see: K. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (2005), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime Part IV, section 2 (essays by Drexl, Ullrich, Fox, Fink, Janis and Ghosh); A. Taubman, H. Wager & J. Watal (2012), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, pp. 126–134.

  73. 73.

    For leading commentaries on the drafting history of TRIPS and the resultant shifts in international intellectual property protection, see J.C. Ross & A. Wasserman (1993), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in T.P. Stewart (Ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986–1992, pp. 2241–2334; C. Correa (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis; UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, pp. 1–17; C. Clift (2010), Why IPR Issues were Brought to GATT: A Historical Perspective on the Origins of TRIPS, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, pp. 10–21.

  74. 74.

    But for other products no consensus could finally be reached. TRIPS, Art. 23. Cf. TRIPS, Art. 22; and see H. Grosse Ruse-Khan (2015), IP and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 163 (this volume).

  75. 75.

    For the complexities of the negotiations, see, e.g., Gervais, op. cit., paras. 2.289–2.313.

  76. 76.

    TRIPS, Art. 35; and see, e.g., Gervais, op. cit., pp. 539–550.

  77. 77.

    See above n. 37. This general approach is to be found in Art. 1.1. It is reiterated in particular instances, e.g. Art. 33 laying down that the potential term of a patent shall not end before twenty years from its filing date. For the argument that today such provisions should be regarded as setting maximum standards of protection: see A. Kur (2015), From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 133 (this volume).

  78. 78.

    Occasionally the text states desirable minima which members are left free nonetheless either to exceed or to reduce in certain respects. See for instance the obligation to protect industrial designs in Art. 25.

  79. 79.

    By 1995, there were more Members in the latter than the former category: J. Watal (2001), Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries.

  80. 80.

    Art. 1(1).

  81. 81.

    See above n. 51–57.

  82. 82.

    For the approaches to interpretation that have been employed by Dispute Settlement Panels and in appeals therefrom, see S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume).

  83. 83.

    TRIPS Art. 9(1). The one exclusion was of Berne Art 6bis which requires Member countries to include protection for two moral rights of authors – the right to be named as author and the right to object to changes in the work that would reflect badly on the author’s integrity. This provision was treated as not sufficiently “trade related”, which put on one side the reality that experts from civil law countries believed in these moral rights as articles of faith, while common law experts tended to considerable scepticism about their value.

  84. 84.

    There are a number of qualifications to this in the Convention (see, e.g. Art. 2(7), dealing with works of applied art, etc.), and it is accepted that countries may exceed the prescribed period in their own law, as has happened by the extension of the post mortem period to seventy years in the US, the EU and elsewhere.

  85. 85.

    TRIPS Art. 9(2).

  86. 86.

    Art. 10. It was only in this latter field that the “originality” needed in most national laws for a work to be copyright, was referred to.

  87. 87.

    Art. 11.

  88. 88.

    Also provided in Art. 11.

  89. 89.

    Art. 13.

  90. 90.

    Arts. 26(2) and 30.

  91. 91.

    See especially, D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, p. 279–92, 336–340, 418–420, 472–475.

  92. 92.

    For the details, see D. Gervais (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, p. 301–309.

  93. 93.

    For details of the development, see A. Kur (1996), TRIPS and Trademark Law, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPs: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

  94. 94.

    The Paris Convention, Arts. 5C, 6bis – 6septies, 7–10bis. One substantive provision in Paris was the obligation to protect marks for services, though not necessarily by registration. This was introduced in Art. 6sexies. Another was the obligation to protect trade names, likewise without the need for filing or registration: see Art. 8. It may well therefore be treated as a TRIPS obligation under the general importation of Paris obligations by virtue of TRIPS, Art. 1(3).

  95. 95.

    Art. 6.

  96. 96.

    Art. 6quinquies.

  97. 97.

    Art. 6quinquies B.

  98. 98.

    Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of Marks. The initial system provided for a single attack designed to invalidate the registration for all the countries designated. Numerous states objected to such ‘centrism’; only in 1989 was a Protocol added to avoid this and certain other objections, thus allowing the Madrid system to expand.

  99. 99.

    Art. 7. The provision refers only to the act of registration, not to subsequent invalidation (cf Art. 6quinquies B). It would not be correct to apply it to a requirement that information (other than the mark itself) be excluded, or included, in advertising or information—as with plain packaging of tobacco products (for which see M. Davison (2012), The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging under International Intellectual Property Law, in T. Voon, A. Mitchell & J. Liberman (Eds.), Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes: Legal Issues.

  100. 100.

    Art. 6bis. The practice foreshadowed today’s “cyber-squatting” of internet domain names, concerning which, over the last two decades, WIPO has pioneered an international electronic dispute settlement regime.

  101. 101.

    See, e.g., W. Cornish et al. (2010), Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol. 13, pp. 708–735.

  102. 102.

    See above Sect. 4.2.

  103. 103.

    The Paris Convention, Arts. 2, 3.

  104. 104.

    The Paris Convention, Art. 5A. Forfeiture could only occur after two further years.

  105. 105.

    A short but heterogenous list of matters had accumulated, touching such secondary considerations as independence of patents for the same invention in different Union countries (The Paris Convention, Art. 4bis); naming the inventor (Art. 4ter); restoration of lapsed patents (Art. 5bis); exceptions concerning patented inventions on vessels, aircraft, etc. temporarily in a Union state (Art. 5ter); and importation of articles made by a patented process in another Paris state (Art. 5quater).

  106. 106.

    Or in Europe the regional granting conditions contained in the European Patent Convention of 1973.

  107. 107.

    The requirement applied to all types of patentable technology. In the great majority of countries, it would operate in conjunction with the ‘first-to-file’ concept, which is taken both to determine the validity of a particular applicant’s claim to be the inventor and to be the point from which the term of the patent would be measured, whatever delays there might still be in arriving at a merchantable product (see further below Sect. 7.7). The preference in US law of treating the ‘first-to-invent’ as the person initially entitled to grant (which had much to do with the earning power of patent attorneys in that country) was not touched in TRIPS and would not be altered until 2013 by virtue of the America Invents Act of 2011: for which see, D. Chisum (1997), Chisum on Patents, Vol. 3A, ¶ 10.10–10. 10(4)(d).

  108. 108.

    Ibid., Vol. 5, ¶ 16.05, discussing the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Act of 1984, s. 156.

  109. 109.

    See CIPA (2011), CIPA Guide to the Patents Acts, paras. 128B.01-81.

  110. 110.

    There has been much controversy over whether generic producers could manufacture and administer a still patented drug in order to test their own product’s safety and thus be ready to apply for marketing authority at once after expiry was disputed. The question has remained one for national or regional law, since TRIPS did not include a list of permissible exceptions which inter alia related to research purposes.

  111. 111.

    This delay would add to any extension of the patent term which a particular system allowed by way of compensation for delay in granting authority to market.

  112. 112.

    NAFTA, Art. 1711(6).

  113. 113.

    See below, Sect. 7.7.

  114. 114.

    TRIPS, Art. 27(1).

  115. 115.

    Art. 29(1).

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Art. 27(1).

  118. 118.

    EPC (2000), Art. 52(2) and (3). There is now extensive case-law on the meaning of these Articles. It is unlikely that this omission would be held to prevent Members from including such criteria in their own patent law. It could, for example, be implied in the notion that patents are to be available for “inventions”.

  119. 119.

    TRIPS Art. 27(2). This links with the principle of Art. 8(1), allowing members to adopt measures necessary inter alia to protect health and nutrition (see above Sect. 7.2). Other exceptions can also be justified but only if they satisfy the “two-step test” for patents laid down in Art. 30.

  120. 120.

    As to patents for plants—a subject which raises important policy issues regarding the supply of food, clothing and fodder—Art. 27(3)(b) attempts in convoluted language to require their protection either under a patent system or a sui generis system such as that regulated internationally by the UPOV Convention. See C. Antons (2015), Article 27(3)(b) TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 389 (this volume).

  121. 121.

    See now EPC 2000, Art. 53.

  122. 122.

    Art. 28.

  123. 123.

    By omitting the need for a “special case”, Art. 30 reduces the test to a two-step. The consequences of this are hard to predict.

  124. 124.

    Notification by Canada October 8th, 2007: Document 07-4285.

  125. 125.

    The Paris Convention, Art. 1(2).

  126. 126.

    TRIPS, Arts. 25, 26.

  127. 127.

    The issue caused much debate in the US in mid-twentieth century; but liberal refusals to allow a form of obligation based on secrecy beside a patent system requiring adequate disclosure eventually gave way to the possibility of cumulative protection in the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: see Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974).

  128. 128.

    May the goods be their own, or the complainant’s or even a third party’s? The Article gives no answer.

  129. 129.

    A Note (a) to Art. 39(2) further defines what may constitute “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices”. But nothing further is said about “what is not generally known in relevant circles”, even though it is often the central factor dividing the parties – notably in cases between an employer and a former employee.

  130. 130.

    See above fns. 61 to 63. See further, F. Henning-Bodewig (2015), TRIPS and Corporate Social Responsibility: Unethical Equals Unfair Business Practices? in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 701 (this volume).

  131. 131.

    The novelty of the chemical entity must presumably be judged at the time of the first application or the first lawful marketing thereafter. It must be doubted whether the requirements of any patent law concerning anticipation would be taken to supply the necessary criteria: see C. Correa (2010), Data Exclusivity for pharmaceuticals: TRIPS standards and industry’s demands in free trade agreements, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, pp. 718–727.

  132. 132.

    To the contrary, for example, is the important decision of Justice Gummow of the High Court of Australia, Smith Kline & French v Department of Health (1991), 99 Australian L.R. 679.

  133. 133.

    TRIPS, Art. 61. See C. Geiger (2015), Towards a Balanced International Legal Framework for Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 645 (this volume).

  134. 134.

    See the rather blousy terms of TRIPS’ general clause on the subject (Art. 41(1)).

  135. 135.

    TRIPS, Art. 41(2).

  136. 136.

    Art. 41(3), (4). Art. 41(3) also expresses a “preference” for reasoned judgments that are in writing and are based only on evidence given in the case. But since US courts still sit with juries (under constitutional guarantee), in civil as well as criminal jurisdictions, this provision could scarcely be made mandatory.

  137. 137.

    TRIPS, Art. 50(1).

  138. 138.

    Art. 50(2), (4).

  139. 139.

    Art. 50(3), (5), (6).

  140. 140.

    Art. 50(7), (8).

  141. 141.

    Criminal remedies are required in TRIPS (by Art. 61) for wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Beyond this the question is left to Members: see C. Geiger (2015), Towards a Balanced International Legal Framework for Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 645 (this volume).

  142. 142.

    Art. 44–47.

  143. 143.

    See above n. 44.

  144. 144.

    Subsequent procedures were governed by the GATT 1947, Arts. XXII, XXIII.

  145. 145.

    See S. von Lewinski (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles, p. 603 (this volume).

References

  • Antons, C. (2015), Article 27(3)(b) TRIPS and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 389), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Antons, Ch. & Hilty, R. (2012), Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region, Berlin: Springer

    Google Scholar 

  • Beier, F.-K. & Schricker, G. (1989), GATT or WIPO? New Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, Weinheim: VCH

    Google Scholar 

  • Boadu, F. & Shen, J. (1997), An Empirical Analysis of the Growth and Autonomy of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, 6 Currents 1997, 3, Houston: South Texas College of Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, H. (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisum, D. (1997), Chisum on Patents, Vol. 3A, Irvine: NexisLexis

    Google Scholar 

  • CIPA (2011), CIPA Guide to the Patents Acts, 7th ed., London: The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys

    Google Scholar 

  • Clift, C. (2010), Why IPR Issues were Brought to GATT: A Historical Perspective on the Origins of TRIPS, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, pp. 10–21, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornish, W. et al. (2010), Oxford History of the Laws of England. Vol. 13, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornish, W., LLewelyn, D. & Aplin, T. (2013), Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks & Allied Rights. 8th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Correa, C. (2010), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Correa, C. (2007), Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Davison, M. (2012), The Legitimacy of Plain Packaging under International Intellectual Property Law, in T. Voon, A. Mitchell & J. Liberman (Eds.), Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes: Legal Issues, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • de Freitas, D. (1989), Hong Kong, in S. Stewart (Ed.), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, pp. 816–817, 2nd ed., London: Butterworths

    Google Scholar 

  • Deere, C. (2008), The Implementation Game: The TRIPs Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Deere-Birkbeck, C. (2010), Developing Countries in the Global IP system before TRIPS: the Political Context for the TRIPS Negotiations, in C. Correa (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, pp. 22–51, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Dinwoodie, G.B. & Dreyfuss, R.C. (2012), A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPs: The Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Drahos, P. (2005), Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPs and the GATT, 13 Prometheus 2005, 6, London: Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • Drahos, P. (2002), Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in P. Drahos, R. Mayne (Eds.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, Ch. 10, pp. 166–172, London: Palgrave Macmillan

    Google Scholar 

  • Drahos, P. & Braithwaite, J. (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, pp. 10–13, London: Earthscan

    Google Scholar 

  • Drahos, P. & Mayne, R. (2002), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, pp. 183–197, London: Palgrave Macmillan

    Google Scholar 

  • Drexl, J. (2015), The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 53), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Drexl, J., Grosse Ruse-Khan, H. & Nadde-Phlix, S. (2014), EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?, Berlin: Springer

    Google Scholar 

  • Duncan, L.J. (1997), From Privileges to the Paris Convention, Unpublished PhD-Thesis, Monash University

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunham, A.L. (1930), The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France after Napoleon, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiger, C. (2015), Towards a Balanced International Legal Framework for Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 645), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Genovesi, L.M. (2010), The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property Rights Exhaustion, in C. Correa, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Law and the WTO, p. 216, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • George, A. (2006), Globalization and Intellectual Property, Farnham: Ashgate

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerhart, P. (2007), The Tragedy of TRIPs, Mich. St. L. Rev. 2007, 143, East Lansing: Michigan State University College of Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Gervais, D. (2007), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPs-plus Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Gervais, D. (2012), The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghidini, G., Peritz, R. & Ricolfi, M. (2014), TRIPS and Developing Countries: Towards a New IP World Order?, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Grosse Ruse-Khan, H. (2011), Protecting Intellectual Property under BITs, FTAs, and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence, in C. Brown & K. Miles (Eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, pp. 485–515, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Grosse Ruse-Khan, H. (2011), The International Law Relation between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 2011, 485, Athens: The University of Georgia School of Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Grosse Ruse-Khan, H. (2015), IP and Trade in a Post-TRIPS Environment, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 163), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Haunss, S. (2011), The Politicisation of Intellectual Property: IP Conflicts and Social Change, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 129, Geneva: WIPO

    Google Scholar 

  • Henning-Bodewig, F. (2015), TRIPS and Corporate Social Responsibility: Unethical Equals Unfair Business Practices? in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 701), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hilty, R. & Jaeger, T. (2012), Legal Effects and Policy Considerations for Free Trade Agreements: What is Wrong with FTAs, in C. Antons & R. Hilty (Eds.), Intellectual Property and Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region, Berlin: Springer

    Google Scholar 

  • Kur, A. (1996), TRIPS and Trademark Law, in F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker (Eds.), From GATT to TRIPs: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Weinheim: VCH

    Google Scholar 

  • Kur, A. (2015), From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 133), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Malbon, J., Lawson, C. & Davison, M. (2014), The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Maskus, K. & Reichman, J.H. (2005), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime Part IV, section 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthews, D. (2011), Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Menescal, M. (2005), Those Behind the TRIPs Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on International Intellectual Property Decisions, 2 IPQ 2005, 155, London: Sweet & Maxwell

    Google Scholar 

  • Merges, R. (1990), Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. Int’l L.J. 1990, 239, Boston: Boston University

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman, A. (1989), The Amendments to Section 337: Increased Protection for Intellectual Property Rights, 20 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1989, 571, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Law Center

    Google Scholar 

  • Ohly, A. (2015), TRIPS and Consumer Protection, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 681), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Osterfard, R. (2007), Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in D. Gervais (Ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPs-plus Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Pretorius, W. (2002), TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field, in P. Drahos & R. Mayne (Eds.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development, pp. 183–197, London: Palgrave Macmillan

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricketson, S. (2015), Commentary on the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricketson, S. & Ginsburg, J. (2006), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Reichmann, J. (2000), The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with Developing Countries, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 2000, 441, Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University School of Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, J.C. & Wasserman, A. (1993), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in T.P. Stewart (Ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986–1992, pp. 2241–2334, London: Kluwer Law and Taxation

    Google Scholar 

  • Schumpeter, J.A. (1955), History of Economic Analysis, London: Allen & Unwin

    Google Scholar 

  • Sell, S. (2002), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Stewart, S. (1989), International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 2nd ed., London: Butterworths

    Google Scholar 

  • Stewart, T.P. (Ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986–1992, London: Kluwer Law and Taxation

    Google Scholar 

  • Stoll, T., Busche, J. & Arend, K. (2009), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff

    Google Scholar 

  • Taubman, A., Wager, H. & Watal, J. (2012), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Trebilcock, M.J., Howse, R. & Eliason, A. (2013), Regulation of International Trade, 4th ed., London: Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • UNCTAD-ICTSD (2005), Resource Book on TRIPS and Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • von Lewinski, S. (2015), The WTO/TRIPS Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Experiences and Perspectives, in H. Ullrich, R.M. Hilty, M. Lamping & J. Drexl (Eds.), TRIPS plus 20: From Trade Rules to Market Principles (p. 603), Heidelberg: Springer (this volume)

    Google Scholar 

  • Voon, T., Mitchell, A. & Liberman, J. (2012), Public Health and Plain Packaging of Cigarettes: Legal Issues, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

    Google Scholar 

  • Watal, J. (2011), From Punte del Este to Doha and Beyond, 3 WIPO J. 2011, 24, Geneva: WIPO

    Google Scholar 

  • Watal, J. (2001), Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, The Hague: Kluwer

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

    William Cornish & Kathleen Liddell

Authors
  1. William Cornish
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Kathleen Liddell
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to William Cornish .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Hanns Ullrich

  2. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Reto M. Hilty

  3. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Matthias Lamping

  4. Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Germany

    Josef Drexl

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cornish, W., Liddell, K. (2016). The Origins and Structure of the TRIPS Agreement. In: Ullrich, H., Hilty, R., Lamping, M., Drexl, J. (eds) TRIPS plus 20. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 25. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48107-3_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation