Skip to main content

The Disclosure of Evidence Under the ‘Antitrust Damages’ Directive 2014/104/EU

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
EU Competition and State Aid Rules

Part of the book series: Europeanization and Globalization ((EAG,volume 3))

Abstract

The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the principles underpinning the disclosure of evidence under Directive 2014/104/EU, namely the principles of proportionality, effectiveness, equivalence and consistency. It also aims to review the legislative techniques that the Directive has used in order to codify the previous case law of the European Union (EU) courts and to discuss several recent rulings, including Carglass, Pilkington, Evonik Degussa and others. Finally, the author draws conclusions on the adequacy of the achieved codification of the previous case law on the disclosure of evidence and access to such evidence, as well as on its potential implications for the Member States.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L 349/1.

  2. 2.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1).

  3. 3.

    See the Amendments by the European Parliament to the Commission proposal: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union of 9 April 2014. Available via http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html. Accessed Jul 2016.

  4. 4.

    See European Commission, press release IP/14/1580, ‘Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on antitrust damages actions’, Brussels, 10 November 2014.

  5. 5.

    See Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

  6. 6.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Recital 16.

  7. 7.

    Ibid, Recital 21 and Article 6(3).

  8. 8.

    Ibid, Recital 21.

  9. 9.

    Ibid, Recital 23.

  10. 10.

    Ibid, Recital 22.

  11. 11.

    See Case C-365/12 P European Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG ECLI:EU:C:2014:112.

  12. 12.

    Ibid, paras 106–108.

  13. 13.

    Case T-677/13 AXA Versicherung AG v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:473.

  14. 14.

    Ibid, para 118.

  15. 15.

    Ibid, para 119.

  16. 16.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Article 5(1).

  17. 17.

    Ibid, Article 5(3).

  18. 18.

    Ibid, Recital 23.

  19. 19.

    Ibid, Recital 23.

  20. 20.

    Case T-462/12 Pilkington Group Ltd v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:508, para 87.

  21. 21.

    See the last sentence of Recital 20, which reads as follows: ‘This Directive should be without prejudice to such rules and practices under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001’.

  22. 22.

    Regulation no 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43.

  23. 23.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Article 6(2).

  24. 24.

    Regulation no 802/2004 of the European Commission of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) no 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2001] OJ L 133/47.

  25. 25.

    See Case T-465/12 AGC Glass Europe SA, AGC Automotive Europe SA, AGC France SAS, AGC Flat Glass Italia Srl, AGC Glass UK Ltd, AGC Glass Germany GmbH EGC ECLI:EU:T:2015:505.

  26. 26.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1.

  27. 27.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Recital 27.

  28. 28.

    Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt ECLI:EU:C:2011:389.

  29. 29.

    Lundqvist and Andersson question why the Commission enacted a Damages Directive that will make it more difficult for cartel victims to gain access to incriminating documents. See Lundqvist and Andersson (2016), pp. 165–186.

  30. 30.

    See Schwab (2014), p. 66.

  31. 31.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Recital 30 and Article 6(11).

  32. 32.

    Ibid, Recital 30.

  33. 33.

    See EU Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on antitrust damages actions’, press release IP/14/1580, Brussels, 10 November 2014.

  34. 34.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Article 5(5).

  35. 35.

    See Article 15(2) and Article 16(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L 123/22.

  36. 36.

    See Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1348 of 3 August 2015 amending Regulation (EC) no 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2015] OJ L 208/3.

  37. 37.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Recital 18.

  38. 38.

    Ibid.

  39. 39.

    See Case T-181/10 Reagens SpA v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:139.

  40. 40.

    See paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission Decisions adopted under Articles 7 to 10, 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003, adopted on 4 June 2015. Available via http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/guidance_on_preparation_of_public_versions_antitrust_04062015.pdf. Accessed Oct 2015.

  41. 41.

    Ibid, paragraph 10.

  42. 42.

    Best Practices on the disclosure of information in data rooms in proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and under the EU Merger Regulation, adopted on 2 June 2015.

  43. 43.

    Ibid, Article 2(8).

  44. 44.

    Ibid, Article 2(5).

  45. 45.

    Ibid, Article 2(6).

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ibid, Article 3(17).

  48. 48.

    Ibid, Article 2(10).

  49. 49.

    See Carglass (n 25).

  50. 50.

    See Case T-198/03 Bank Austria Creditanstalt v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:136. On the earlier case law on disclosure of evidence, see Carlton et al. (2008); on recent developments, see Howard (2015), MacLennan (2016), Vandenborre et al. (2015), p. 747.

  51. 51.

    See Bank Austria Creditanstalt (n 50) para 27; Case T-474/04 Pergan Hilfsstoffe für industrielle Prozesse v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:306.

  52. 52.

    See Pergan (n 51).

  53. 53.

    Case T-534/11 Schenker AG v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:854.

  54. 54.

    See AXA Versicherung (n 13).

  55. 55.

    Decision 2011/695 of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings [2011] OJ L 275/29.

  56. 56.

    See Pilkington (n 20).

  57. 57.

    Ibid, para 35.

  58. 58.

    Ibid, para 37.

  59. 59.

    Ibid, para 49.

  60. 60.

    Ibid, para 50.

  61. 61.

    Ibid, para 54.

  62. 62.

    Ibid, para 58.

  63. 63.

    Ibid, para 59.

  64. 64.

    Ibid, para 60.

  65. 65.

    Ibid, para 68.

  66. 66.

    Ibid, para 68.

  67. 67.

    See Directive 2014/104/EU (n 1) Article 6(5).

  68. 68.

    See paragraph 22(c) of the Guidance on the preparation of public versions of Commission Decisions adopted under Articles 7 to 10, 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003 (n 40).

  69. 69.

    See paragraph 26 of the Amendments to the Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC [2015] OJ C 256/04.

  70. 70.

    Ibid, paragraph 26.

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    See EnBW Energie (n 11).

  73. 73.

    See C-239/07 P European Commission v. Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau ECLI:EU:C:2010:376 para 61 on access to the administrative file regarding state aid; Case C-404/10 P, European Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob ECLI:EU:C:2012:393 para 123 on access to documents in mergers; Case C-477/10 P European Commission v. Agrofert Holding ECLI:EU:C:2012:394 para 64; EnBW Energie (n 11) para 81.

  74. 74.

    See Case T-516/11 MasterCard v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:759.

  75. 75.

    See Case C-615/13 P Client Earth, Pesticide Action Network Europe v. European Food Safety Authority ECLI:EU:C:2015:489.

  76. 76.

    Case T-623/13 Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:268.

  77. 77.

    Ibid, para 15.

  78. 78.

    Ibid, para 43.

  79. 79.

    Ibid, para 44.

  80. 80.

    Ibid, para 44, citing Case C-64/05 P, Sweden v. European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2007:802 para 83.

  81. 81.

    Ibid, para 57.

  82. 82.

    Ibid, para 58.

  83. 83.

    Ibid, para 71.

  84. 84.

    Ibid, para 71.

  85. 85.

    See Transparency Regulation (n 22) Article 4(7).

  86. 86.

    Commission Opinion of 29 October 2015, Opinion of the European Commission in application of Article 15(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, CT.00928 – Interchange fee litigation before the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v. MasterCard Incorporated and Others, C (2015) 7682 final.

  87. 87.

    Ibid, para 8.

  88. 88.

    See Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1348 (n 36) Recital 4.

  89. 89.

    Ibid, Article 16a(2).

  90. 90.

    See paragraph 48 of the Amendments to the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [2015] OJ C 256/03.

  91. 91.

    See Recital 34 of the Amendments to the Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2015] OJ C 256/1.

  92. 92.

    See Recital 33 of the Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/21, as amended by Amendments to the Commission Notice (n 91).

  93. 93.

    For a similar opinion, see Dunne (2015), p. 9.

  94. 94.

    Commission Opinion (n 86).

  95. 95.

    Ibid, para 15.

  96. 96.

    Ibid, para 16.

  97. 97.

    See AXA Versicherung (n 13).

  98. 98.

    Ibid, para 120.

  99. 99.

    Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:366 para 46.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    Ibid, para 121.

  102. 102.

    Ibid, para 122.

  103. 103.

    Ibid, para 123.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Kirst and van den Bergh (2016) are rather fearful that such a balancing exercise will proceed in the absence of ‘clear guidance from EU courts’.

  106. 106.

    See European Commission (2015), p. 4.

  107. 107.

    For a similar opinion, see Guttuso (2015), p. 395; on the risk of relying too much on leniency, see Wils (2016), p. 26; for contrary views that it is essential not to weaken the effectiveness of the leniency programmes, see Wils (2009), p. 3; Wagner-von Papp (2016), p. 54.

  108. 108.

    Available via http://www.justice.gov/atr/corporate-leniency-policy. Accessed Jan 2016.

  109. 109.

    See Harrison and Bell (2006), p. 226; Hewitt (2005), p. 173; Gilbert and Romanenko (2012), p. 385.

  110. 110.

    See Case T-341/12 Evonik Degussa GmbH v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:51.

  111. 111.

    See Decision 2011/695/EU (n 55).

  112. 112.

    Ibid, Article 8(2).

  113. 113.

    See Bank Austria Creditanstalt (n 50) para 33.

  114. 114.

    See Case T-1/89-T-4/89 and T-6/89-T-15/89 Rhône-Poulenc v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:1990:69 para 23; Case T-383/03 Hynix Semiconductor v. Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:T:2005:57 para 60; Case T-108/07 Diamanthandel A. Spira v. European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:367 para 65.

  115. 115.

    See Pergan (n 51) para 33.

  116. 116.

    See Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 paras 24 and 26; Joined Cases C-295/04-C-298/04 Manfredi and Others ECLI:EU:C:2006:461; Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others ECLI:EU:C:2012:684 para 41.

  117. 117.

    Carglass (n 25) para 43.

  118. 118.

    Ibid, para 43.

  119. 119.

    Ibid, para 52.

  120. 120.

    See Pfleiderer (n 28) para 26.

  121. 121.

    Ibid, para 26.

  122. 122.

    See Bank Austria Creditanstalt (n 50) para 33.

  123. 123.

    See Amendments by the European Parliament to the Commission proposal, including Amendment 2 (A 7-0089/2) by Sharon Bowles on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Report (A 7-0089/2014) by Andreas Schwab. Available via http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. Accessed 14 Nov 2015.

  124. 124.

    See Council of the European Union, ‘New rules to facilitate damage claims for antitrust violations’, Brussels, 26 March 2014, 8136/14. Available via http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/141926.pdf. Accessed 14 Nov 2015.

  125. 125.

    Chirita (2015), pp. 407–441.

References

  • ABA Section of Antitrust Law (2006) 2005 Annual review of antitrust developments. In: Hewitt PB (ed) American Bar Association, 2006, p 137

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlton R, Lawrence J, McElwee M (2008) Confidentiality and disclosure in European Commission antitrust proceedings: the case for clarity. Eur Competition J 4:401

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chirita AD (2015) The judicial review of the European Union industrial cartels. Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 18:407–441

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunne N (2015) Courage and compromise: the Directive on Antitrust Damages. Eur Law Rev 4:9

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission (2015) The Damages Directive: towards more effective enforcement of the EU competition rules. Competition Policy Brief 1:4

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert P, Romanenko V (2012) Proposals for reform. In: Foer AA, Stutz RM (eds) Private enforcement of antitrust law in the United States: a handbook. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, p 385

    Google Scholar 

  • Guttuso L (2015) From ‘mono’ to ‘stereo’: fine-tuning leniency and settlement policies. World Competition 38:395

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison G, Bell M (2006) Recent enhancements in antitrust criminal enforcement: Bigger sticks and sweeter carrots. Houst Bus Tax J 6:226

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard A (2015) Disclosure of infringement decisions in competition damages proceedings: how the UK courts are leading the way ahead of the Damages Directive. J Eur Competition Law Pract 6:256

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirst P, van den Bergh R (2016) The European Directive on Damages Actions: a missed opportunity to reconcile compensation of victims and leniency incentives. J Competition Law Econ 12:1

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lundqvist B, Andersson H (2016) Access to documents for cartel victims and cartel members: is the system coherent? In: Bergström M, Iacovides M, Strand M (eds) Harmonising EU competition litigation: the new directive and beyond. Hart, Oxford, pp 165–186

    Google Scholar 

  • MacLennan J (2016) Fundamental rights: Pilkington and the right to confidentiality in published decisions. J Eur Competition Law Pract 7:194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwab A (2014) Finding the right balance: the deliberations of the European Parliament on the draft legislation regarding damage claims. J Eur Competition Law Pract 5:66

    Google Scholar 

  • Vandenborre I, Goetz T, Kafetzopoulos A (2015) Access to file under European competition law. J Eur Competition Law Pract 6:747

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner-von Papp F (2016) Access to evidence and leniency materials. Social Science Research Network, p 54. Available via http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733973. Accessed Mar 2016

  • Wils WPJ (2009) The relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages. World Competition 32:3

    Google Scholar 

  • Wils WPJ (2016) The use of leniency in EU cartel enforcement: an assessment after twenty years. World Competition 39:327–388

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Anca D. Chirita .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Additional information

This contribution is based on a presentation delivered at the 4th Petar Šarčević international conference on ‘EU Competition and State Aid Rules: Interaction between Public and Private Enforcement’ in Rovinj, Croatia. The author would like to thank the organisers of the wonderful conference, the editors and commentators, especially Vlatka Butorac Malnar, Judges Vesna Tomljenović, Marc Jaeger, Viktor Kreuschitz and Miro Prek, and also Marc Barennes and Nuria Bermejo Gutierrez.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Chirita, A.D. (2017). The Disclosure of Evidence Under the ‘Antitrust Damages’ Directive 2014/104/EU. In: Tomljenović, V., Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Butorac Malnar, V., Kunda, I. (eds) EU Competition and State Aid Rules. Europeanization and Globalization, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47962-9_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47962-9_8

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-47961-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-47962-9

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics