Skip to main content

Sarajevo 1914. A Century of Debate About the Guilt for the First World War

  • Chapter
World Political Challenges

Abstract

It appears that the issue of who bears the guilt for the war, which previously dominated academic and public debate surrounding the origins of the First World War, has almost entirely disappeared from most new academic studies about the war that have been published to mark the 100th anniversary of the assassination in Sarajevo and the beginning of the war. These studies no longer wish to present themselves as judges in a legal or moral sense and at most speak of the responsibility for sparking the war. The book by Christopher Clark, “The Sleepwalkers”, which has sold extraordinarily well in Germany, goes one step further and underpins the old thesis by David Lloyd George that the leaders of the states unwillingly slithered into the war, and in so doing absolves them from any guilt or at most accuses them of negligence and incompetence.

Any serious debate about who bears the guilt must first clarify the norms the violation of which constitutes guilt. It only makes sense to regard guilt as being individual misconduct if one takes as a prerequisite the norm that is generally recognised today that an aggressive war is illegitimate, while a defensive war is legitimate. This norm further assumes that one can speak of guilt only when the perpetrators have no sense of guilt themselves. In international law, in 1914, the state leaders most certainly did still have the right to wage wars of aggression. It was only later, when the extent of the horrors of the First World War became evident, that the moral delegitimisation of wars of aggression that had already reached an advanced stage during the nineteenth century gained the upper hand and on the initiative of the USA led to the “War Guilt Clause” in the Paris peace accords that was to have such a devastating impact. However, at the same time, this delegitimisation also led to the founding of the League of Nations and later also to the ban on wars of aggression in international law. The findings made by historians show that the key political figures in the warring countries consciously made a decision, after full and long consideration, to unleash bilateral wars. To this extent, the slogan “sleepwalkers”, which implies that those in positions of responsibility were somehow of unsound mind, deserves to be declared the non-word of 2014.

The First World War is a combination of numerous individual wars that were begun by identifiable people and which could also have been avoided in most cases, as can be demonstrated by a realistic counterfactual scenario of events. Belgium was the only country to unambiguously wage a war of defence. The main significance of a debate surrounding the guilt, which has been assigned many times in the past, for the wars that together made up a world war, is to raise awareness among today’s decision-makers and their electorate that in situations where there is a risk of war, all possibilities for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict must be fully exploited.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The exceptions include in particular Immanuel Geiss, who did not shy away from talking of guilt for the war (synonymous with responsibility), and who in a rather simplified manner, ignoring the studies on the decision-making process in the other major powers, assigned it to Berlin—and only secondarily to Vienna—when he declared that “the large portion of the responsibility for triggering the First World War” clearly lay with the German Empire. See Geiss (1979, pp. 204–229, here p. 228).

  2. 2.

    Dülffer (2014).

  3. 3.

    Clark (2013, p. xxv).

  4. 4.

    Mommsen (2002).

  5. 5.

    Schmidt (2009).

  6. 6.

    Steiner and Neilson (2003).

  7. 7.

    McMeekin (2013).

  8. 8.

    Rauchensteiner (2014).

  9. 9.

    Mitrović (2007).

  10. 10.

    Isenghi (2009).

  11. 11.

    Kennedy (2004) and Cooper (2008).

  12. 12.

    Clark (2013), Leonhard (2014), Münkler (2013) and Krumeich (2013). See also brief summaries from Mombauer (2014), Berghahn (2014).

  13. 13.

    “The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay[…] The nations backed their machines over the precipice[…] not one of them wanted war; certainly not on this scale.” Lloyd George (1933) War memoirs, vol. 1, p. 49, quoted from Hamilton and Herwig (2003, p. 38). Lloyd George had already presented the same argument in 1920.

  14. 14.

    Ullrich (2014, p. 17), Aschenbrenner (2013), Leersch (2013) and Chatzoudis (2013). Compare with the article published almost 50 years previously (Fischer 1965).

  15. 15.

    Ullrich (2014).

  16. 16.

    Martens (2014) and Hassel (2014); also Clark (2014). See also Calic (2014).

  17. 17.

    Seewald (2013) and Wiederschein (2013).

  18. 18.

    Beyrau (2014).

  19. 19.

    Rauchensteiner calls this phrase, which was coined by George F. Kennan, an “unofficial truism”, but begins his book as follows: “The almost unanimous conclusion was that the war was unleashed [referring to the Second World War being unleashed by the National Socialists, E.J.]. In the case of the First World War, the answer is not so obvious. It is likely that while to a certain extent the war did break out, it was also precipitated and unleashed to an equal degree. In general, however, precisely who was responsible for precipitating, triggering or unleashing the war, and who simply failed to prevent it, is portrayed differently according to subjective evaluation and emphasis.” Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 13). However, Rauchensteiner does not explain what an outbreak of war might actually mean.

  20. 20.

    Clark (2013, p. 560).

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Ibid., p. 561, and “Conclusion. Note 5”, p. 665. The book by Rusconi is entitled: Rischio 1914. Come si decide una Guerra, Bologna 1987.

  23. 23.

    Albertini (1952–1957). This work is still regarded today as the unsurpassed standard work on the First World War.

  24. 24.

    On the importance of the two Balkan wars prior to the world war, see Hall (2000).

  25. 25.

    In total, 41 declarations of war had been made by 1918, Leonhard (2014, p. 110).

  26. 26.

    Kramer (2009, p. 282).

  27. 27.

    Quoted Kramer (2009, p. 282).

  28. 28.

    Extraordinary International Socialist Congress on 24 and 25 November 1912, Berlin 1912, pp. 23–27.

  29. 29.

    For a more detailed discussion of both movements, see the lectures “The Peace Congress of the Socialist International in Basel on 24/25 November 1912” and “A century of wars and striving for peace since the Peace Congress of Basel in 1912”.

  30. 30.

    Thus Austria-Hungary claimed that Serbia had already begun military action on 26 July by firing shots near Temes Kubin (Kovin), (Rauchensteiner 2014, pp. 127–130), and the German Empire that France had already bombed Nuremberg and Karlsruhe before 3 August, according to Tuchman (2013) and Fischer (1969, p. 729 et seq.).

  31. 31.

    Art. 177 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Art. 161 of the Treaty of Trianon, Art. 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Art. 231 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

  32. 32.

    http://www.documentarchiv.de/wr/vv.html

  33. 33.

    Walworth (1986); see also Lentin (1985) and Fiebig-von Hase (1997).

  34. 34.

    Fritz Fischer in the foreword to Geiss (1976, p. 8).

  35. 35.

    Ferguson (1998).

  36. 36.

    Fischer (1967 p. 82). See also Fischer (1969, pp. 663–738), with the conclusion that “at the beginning of August, the concept decided one month previously of exploiting the favourable opportunity of the assassination of Sarajevo in order to trigger the continental war regarded as necessary by Germany [was] successfully implemented” (p. 738).

  37. 37.

    Erdmann (1960, p. 23).

  38. 38.

    Lenin (1972a, p. 301, 304).

  39. 39.

    Lenin (1972b, p. 13).

  40. 40.

    Lenin (1972c, p. 148).

  41. 41.

    Mombauer (2014, p. 14).

  42. 42.

    See Große Kracht (2005, pp. 47–68, 184 et seq.). Further literature is cited by Clark (2013, p. 565, note 15). See also Schieder (1969) and Sabrow et al. (2003).

  43. 43.

    Mombauer (2014, p. 14). Also Berghahn (2014, p. 32).

  44. 44.

    Krumeich (2013, p. 184).

  45. 45.

    Leonhard (2014, p. 95 and 119).

  46. 46.

    Clark (2013, p. xxvii).

  47. 47.

    See Geiss (1991) and Mommsen (2002).

  48. 48.

    The changes in the international system is presented very well by Craig and George (1994).

  49. 49.

    Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 23, 77).

  50. 50.

    Fischer (1961, p. 97). See also Fischer (1970).

  51. 51.

    Fischer (1967, p. 82).

  52. 52.

    Ritter (1960).

  53. 53.

    Ullrich (2014, p. 17).

  54. 54.

    “There is no doubt that Germany in the summer of 1914 was one of the key players responsible for the outbreak of war—but it by no means bore this responsibility alone.” Münkler (2013, p. 10). Münkler happily mixes the terms “sole guilt”, “guilt”, “main guilt” and “complicity”, p. 13.

  55. 55.

    For an example of this, see Geppert et al. (2014).

  56. 56.

    Ceadel (1980, p. 3). Evidently, no extensive studies have been made of the degree and consequences of illegal conscientious objection in other countries.

  57. 57.

    Tuchman (2013).

  58. 58.

    Kennedy (1969).

  59. 59.

    It is an extreme trivialisation to speak of “political errors” and “clumsiness” (Münkler 2013, p. 12).

  60. 60.

    Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 86).

  61. 61.

    These arguments are based on the account of the assassination by Manfried Rauchensteiner (2014, pp. 83–87, in particular p. 85).

  62. 62.

    Barbara Tuchman begins her book The Guns of August (2013) with a detailed account of the family relationships between the monarchs on the occasion of their joint attendance of the funeral of King Edward VII in May 1910.

  63. 63.

    On the Austro-Hungarian war aims, see Rauchensteiner (2014, pp. 286–297).

References

  • Albertini L (1952–1957) The origins of the war of 1914, 3 volumes. Oxford University Press, London/New York/Toronto

    Google Scholar 

  • Aschenbrenner C (2013) Hineingeschlittert und nicht herausgekommen. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 December

    Google Scholar 

  • Berghahn V (2014) Der Erste Weltkrieg, 5th edn. Beck, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyrau D (2014) Kriegsszenen. Erfahrungen an der russischen Westfront. Osteuropa 64(2–4):21–41

    Google Scholar 

  • Calic M-J (2014) Kriegstreiber Serbien? Die Südslawen und der Erste Weltkrieg: eine Richtigstellung. Osteuropa 64(2–4):59–72

    Google Scholar 

  • Ceadel M (1980) Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945. The defining of a faith. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Chatzoudis G (2013) Christopher Clark spricht die Deutschen von der Schuld am Ersten Weltkrieg frei, interview with Gerd Krumeich. http://www.lisa.gerda-henkel-stiftung.de/content.php?nav_id=4653

  • Clark C (2013) The sleepwalkers. How Europe went to war. Harper, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark C (2014) Christopher Clark’s response in an interview with Michael Martens. Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 15 June 2014

    Google Scholar 

  • Cooper JM (ed) (2008) Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: progressivism, internationalism, war and peace. Johns Hopkins, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Craig GA, George AL (1994) Force and statecraft. Diplomatic problems of our time. Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dülffer J (2014) Die geplante Erinnerung. Der Historikerboom um den Ersten Weltkrieg. Osteuropa 64(2–4):351–367

    Google Scholar 

  • Erdmann KD (1960) Der erste Weltkrieg. In: Gebhardt B, Grundmann H (eds) Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, 8th edn. Union Verlag, Stuttgart, pp 4–80

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferguson N (1998) The pity of war. Allen Lane, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiebig-von Hase R (1997) Der Anfang vom Ende des Krieges: Deutschland und die USA und die Hintergründe des amerikanischen Kriegseintritts am 6. April. In: Michalka W (ed) Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse. Seehamer, Weyham

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer F (1965) Vom Zaun gebrochen – nicht hineingeschlittert. Die ZEIT, 3 September

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer F (1967) Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18, Düsseldorf. New edition 2009

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer F (1969) Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911–1914 (2nd edn). Droste, Düsseldorf

    Google Scholar 

  • Fischer F (1970) Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914. Droste, Düsseldorf

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiss I (1976) Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914, Eine Dokumentensammlung. Neue Gesellschaft, Bonn-Bad Godesberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiss I (1979) Das Deutsche Reich und die Vorgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs. Hanser, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Geiss I (1991) Der lange Weg in die Katastrophe. Die Vorgeschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges 1815-1914. Piper, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Geppert D, Neitzle S, Stephan C, Weber T (2014) Der Beginn vieler Schrecken…Ein Beitrag zur Schulddebatte 100 Jahre nach dem Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs. Die Welt, 3 January, 03.01.14, http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/politik/article123489102/Der-Beginn-vieler-Schrecken.html

  • Große Kracht K (2005) Die Fischer-Kontroverse. Von der Fachdebatte zum Publikumsstreit. In: idem: Die zankende Zunft. Historische Kontroversen in Deutschland nach 1945. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall RC (2000) The Balkan Wars 1912–1913. Prelude to the First World War. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton RF, Herwig HH (eds) (2003) The origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hassel F (2014) Wie Clarks Geschichtsbuch Serbiens Elite umtreibt. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 January

    Google Scholar 

  • Isenghi M (2009) Italien. In: Hirschfeld G, Krumeich G, Renz I (Eds) Enzyklopöädie Erster Weltkrieg, Paderborn et al. Schöningh, pp. 97–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy R (1969) Thirteen days: a memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy DM (2004) Over here: the First World War and American Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kramer A (2009) Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen. In: Hirschfeld G, Krumeich G, Renz I (Eds) Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, Paderborn et al. Schöningh, p. 282

    Google Scholar 

  • Krumeich G (2013) Juli 1914. Eine Bilanz. Schöningh, Paderborn

    Google Scholar 

  • Leersch H-J (2013) Hineingeschlittert. Erster Weltkrieg. Clark bewertet die Schuldfrage neu. Das Parlament, 23 December

    Google Scholar 

  • Lenin WI (1972a) Sozialismus und Krieg. Die Stellung der SDAP zum Krieg (August 1914). In: Werke, vol 21. Dietz, Berlin, pp 295–341

    Google Scholar 

  • Lenin WI (1972b) Der Krieg und die russische Sozialdemokratie (September 1914). In: Werke, vol 21. Dietz, Berlin, pp 11–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Lenin WI (1972c) Die Konferenz der Auslandssektionen der SDAPR (March 1915). In: Werke, vol 21. Dietz, Berlin, pp 147–153

    Google Scholar 

  • Lentin A (1985) Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the culpability of Germany. Leicester University Press, Baton Rouge

    Google Scholar 

  • Leonhard J (2014) Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs. Beck, Munich

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Martens M (2014) Die Säulen der Wahrheit. Serbien empört sich über Christopher Clarks ‘Schlafwandler’. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 January

    Google Scholar 

  • McMeekin S (2013) The Russian origins of the First World War. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/ London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitrović A (2007) Serbia’s Great War, 1914-1918. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette

    Google Scholar 

  • Mombauer A (2014) Die Juli-Krise. Europas Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg. Beck, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Mommsen WJ (2002) Die Urkatastrophe Deutschlands. Der Erste Weltkrieg 1914-1918. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Münkler H (2013) Der Große Krieg: Die Welt 1914 bis 1918. Rowohlt, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Rauchensteiner M (2014) The First World War and the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Böhlau, Vienna

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritter G (1960) Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland, vol 2. Oldenbourg, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Rusconi GE (1987) Rischio 1914. Come si decide una Guerra. Bologna, Il Mulino

    Google Scholar 

  • Sabrow M, Jessen R, Große Kracht K (2003) Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte, Große Kontroversen seit 1945. Beck, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Schieder W (ed) (1969) Der Erste Weltkrieg. Ursachen, Entstehung und Kriegsziele. Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Cologne/Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt S (2009) Frankreichs Außenpolitik in der Julikrise 1914. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ausbruchs des Ersten Weltkrieges. Oldenbourg, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Seewald B (2013) Besessen von der deutschen Kriegsschuld. Die Welt, 25 October

    Google Scholar 

  • Steiner ZS, Neilson K (2003) Britain and the origins of the First World War. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuchman B (2013) The Guns of August. Presidio Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Ullrich V (2014) Nun schlittern sie wieder. Mit Clark gegen Fischer: Deutschlands Konservative sehen Kaiser und Reich in der Kriegsschuldfrage endlich rehabilitiert. Die ZEIT, 16 January

    Google Scholar 

  • Walworth A (1986) Wilson and his peacemakers. American diplomacy at the Paris peace conference, 1919. Norton, New York/London

    Google Scholar 

  • Wiederschein H (2013) War Deutschland alleine schuld am Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs?. Focus-Online, 11 October, http://www.focus.de/wissen/mensch/geschichte/tid-34022/deutschland-war-nicht-alleine-schuld-fuenf-thesen-zum-ausbruch-des-ersten-weltkriegs_aid_1124900.html (retrieved on 30.1.2014)

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Jahn, E. (2015). Sarajevo 1914. A Century of Debate About the Guilt for the First World War. In: World Political Challenges. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47912-4_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics