Abstract
It appears that the issue of who bears the guilt for the war, which previously dominated academic and public debate surrounding the origins of the First World War, has almost entirely disappeared from most new academic studies about the war that have been published to mark the 100th anniversary of the assassination in Sarajevo and the beginning of the war. These studies no longer wish to present themselves as judges in a legal or moral sense and at most speak of the responsibility for sparking the war. The book by Christopher Clark, “The Sleepwalkers”, which has sold extraordinarily well in Germany, goes one step further and underpins the old thesis by David Lloyd George that the leaders of the states unwillingly slithered into the war, and in so doing absolves them from any guilt or at most accuses them of negligence and incompetence.
Any serious debate about who bears the guilt must first clarify the norms the violation of which constitutes guilt. It only makes sense to regard guilt as being individual misconduct if one takes as a prerequisite the norm that is generally recognised today that an aggressive war is illegitimate, while a defensive war is legitimate. This norm further assumes that one can speak of guilt only when the perpetrators have no sense of guilt themselves. In international law, in 1914, the state leaders most certainly did still have the right to wage wars of aggression. It was only later, when the extent of the horrors of the First World War became evident, that the moral delegitimisation of wars of aggression that had already reached an advanced stage during the nineteenth century gained the upper hand and on the initiative of the USA led to the “War Guilt Clause” in the Paris peace accords that was to have such a devastating impact. However, at the same time, this delegitimisation also led to the founding of the League of Nations and later also to the ban on wars of aggression in international law. The findings made by historians show that the key political figures in the warring countries consciously made a decision, after full and long consideration, to unleash bilateral wars. To this extent, the slogan “sleepwalkers”, which implies that those in positions of responsibility were somehow of unsound mind, deserves to be declared the non-word of 2014.
The First World War is a combination of numerous individual wars that were begun by identifiable people and which could also have been avoided in most cases, as can be demonstrated by a realistic counterfactual scenario of events. Belgium was the only country to unambiguously wage a war of defence. The main significance of a debate surrounding the guilt, which has been assigned many times in the past, for the wars that together made up a world war, is to raise awareness among today’s decision-makers and their electorate that in situations where there is a risk of war, all possibilities for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict must be fully exploited.
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Notes
- 1.
The exceptions include in particular Immanuel Geiss, who did not shy away from talking of guilt for the war (synonymous with responsibility), and who in a rather simplified manner, ignoring the studies on the decision-making process in the other major powers, assigned it to Berlin—and only secondarily to Vienna—when he declared that “the large portion of the responsibility for triggering the First World War” clearly lay with the German Empire. See Geiss (1979, pp. 204–229, here p. 228).
- 2.
Dülffer (2014).
- 3.
Clark (2013, p. xxv).
- 4.
Mommsen (2002).
- 5.
Schmidt (2009).
- 6.
Steiner and Neilson (2003).
- 7.
McMeekin (2013).
- 8.
Rauchensteiner (2014).
- 9.
Mitrović (2007).
- 10.
Isenghi (2009).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
“The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay[…] The nations backed their machines over the precipice[…] not one of them wanted war; certainly not on this scale.” Lloyd George (1933) War memoirs, vol. 1, p. 49, quoted from Hamilton and Herwig (2003, p. 38). Lloyd George had already presented the same argument in 1920.
- 14.
- 15.
Ullrich (2014).
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
Beyrau (2014).
- 19.
Rauchensteiner calls this phrase, which was coined by George F. Kennan, an “unofficial truism”, but begins his book as follows: “The almost unanimous conclusion was that the war was unleashed [referring to the Second World War being unleashed by the National Socialists, E.J.]. In the case of the First World War, the answer is not so obvious. It is likely that while to a certain extent the war did break out, it was also precipitated and unleashed to an equal degree. In general, however, precisely who was responsible for precipitating, triggering or unleashing the war, and who simply failed to prevent it, is portrayed differently according to subjective evaluation and emphasis.” Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 13). However, Rauchensteiner does not explain what an outbreak of war might actually mean.
- 20.
Clark (2013, p. 560).
- 21.
Ibid.
- 22.
Ibid., p. 561, and “Conclusion. Note 5”, p. 665. The book by Rusconi is entitled: Rischio 1914. Come si decide una Guerra, Bologna 1987.
- 23.
Albertini (1952–1957). This work is still regarded today as the unsurpassed standard work on the First World War.
- 24.
On the importance of the two Balkan wars prior to the world war, see Hall (2000).
- 25.
In total, 41 declarations of war had been made by 1918, Leonhard (2014, p. 110).
- 26.
Kramer (2009, p. 282).
- 27.
Quoted Kramer (2009, p. 282).
- 28.
Extraordinary International Socialist Congress on 24 and 25 November 1912, Berlin 1912, pp. 23–27.
- 29.
For a more detailed discussion of both movements, see the lectures “The Peace Congress of the Socialist International in Basel on 24/25 November 1912” and “A century of wars and striving for peace since the Peace Congress of Basel in 1912”.
- 30.
Thus Austria-Hungary claimed that Serbia had already begun military action on 26 July by firing shots near Temes Kubin (Kovin), (Rauchensteiner 2014, pp. 127–130), and the German Empire that France had already bombed Nuremberg and Karlsruhe before 3 August, according to Tuchman (2013) and Fischer (1969, p. 729 et seq.).
- 31.
Art. 177 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Art. 161 of the Treaty of Trianon, Art. 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, Art. 231 of the Treaty of Sèvres.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
Fritz Fischer in the foreword to Geiss (1976, p. 8).
- 35.
Ferguson (1998).
- 36.
Fischer (1967 p. 82). See also Fischer (1969, pp. 663–738), with the conclusion that “at the beginning of August, the concept decided one month previously of exploiting the favourable opportunity of the assassination of Sarajevo in order to trigger the continental war regarded as necessary by Germany [was] successfully implemented” (p. 738).
- 37.
Erdmann (1960, p. 23).
- 38.
Lenin (1972a, p. 301, 304).
- 39.
Lenin (1972b, p. 13).
- 40.
Lenin (1972c, p. 148).
- 41.
Mombauer (2014, p. 14).
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
Krumeich (2013, p. 184).
- 45.
Leonhard (2014, p. 95 and 119).
- 46.
Clark (2013, p. xxvii).
- 47.
- 48.
The changes in the international system is presented very well by Craig and George (1994).
- 49.
Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 23, 77).
- 50.
Fischer (1961, p. 97). See also Fischer (1970).
- 51.
Fischer (1967, p. 82).
- 52.
Ritter (1960).
- 53.
Ullrich (2014, p. 17).
- 54.
“There is no doubt that Germany in the summer of 1914 was one of the key players responsible for the outbreak of war—but it by no means bore this responsibility alone.” Münkler (2013, p. 10). Münkler happily mixes the terms “sole guilt”, “guilt”, “main guilt” and “complicity”, p. 13.
- 55.
For an example of this, see Geppert et al. (2014).
- 56.
Ceadel (1980, p. 3). Evidently, no extensive studies have been made of the degree and consequences of illegal conscientious objection in other countries.
- 57.
Tuchman (2013).
- 58.
Kennedy (1969).
- 59.
It is an extreme trivialisation to speak of “political errors” and “clumsiness” (Münkler 2013, p. 12).
- 60.
Rauchensteiner (2014, p. 86).
- 61.
These arguments are based on the account of the assassination by Manfried Rauchensteiner (2014, pp. 83–87, in particular p. 85).
- 62.
Barbara Tuchman begins her book The Guns of August (2013) with a detailed account of the family relationships between the monarchs on the occasion of their joint attendance of the funeral of King Edward VII in May 1910.
- 63.
On the Austro-Hungarian war aims, see Rauchensteiner (2014, pp. 286–297).
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Jahn, E. (2015). Sarajevo 1914. A Century of Debate About the Guilt for the First World War. In: World Political Challenges. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47912-4_6
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