Abstract
On 11 January 2013, France, with political and moral support from the government and large parts of the population of Mali, the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, NATO and the UN Security Council, began a new western campaign of military intervention very shortly before an imminent advance on the capital city of Bamako by a coalition of Islamist rebel groups who as a result of the collapse of the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya are very well armed. Other European states and the USA have begun to provide logistical support for the French troops, who initially total 2500. Soldiers from several west African states and from Chad are to assist the French and Malian troops. It is likely that the military intervention, which according to the French foreign minister will last “a few weeks”, will in fact continue for many months and years. Other states will also send their troops to Mali. Islamists have already begun to extend their terrorist activities to other countries in support of the Islamist rebels in Mali, starting with Algeria.
The far-reaching military internationalisation of the civil war in Mali already in itself brings other military interventions to mind. The security of Germany, it is already being claimed, must be defended not only in Afghanistan, but also in Mali. For the time being, this will only involve providing transport planes for the west African troops. However, it is likely that the French will soon request military support. Other voices fear that France is too weak to win the war, so that ultimately, the USA will intervene, as was the case in Indochina in 1954. At present, the military and political goals of the French and west African military intervention are rather unclear. A new western war of intervention can be anticipated that will last months if not years, this time with the political support of Russia and China and thus also of the UN Security Council.
The alternative to an expansion of the war would be a narrow restriction of the military aims and negotiations with those in power in northern Mali, in conjunction with an offer of a comprehensive economic package in order to deprive extreme Islamism of its sources of recruits among a population that is suffering from extremely high unemployment and the destruction of agricultural production areas as a result of climate change and irresponsible use of the soil. If it proves impossible to leave the military and political conflict regulation in Mali to the parties within the country and to the neighbouring African states, the risk of Islamist terror attacks in Europe will increase.
After this lecture was given on 4.2.2013, the military reinstalment of the state unity of Mali succeeded rapidly. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) established by the UN on 1 July 2013 as a successor to the AFISMA, with participation by 11,200 soldiers and 1440 police from 42 states (as of 28 February 2014 according to http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml), secured the formal consolidation of Mali and the election of a new president (Ibrahim Boubacar Keїta) on 11 August 2013 from the old ruling caste. Keїta has already been a prime minister. Since then, very little has changed with regard to the socio-political structures and problems in the country, as well as the inadequate integration of the Tuareg.
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- 1.
The French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, already indicated in August 2012 that the international community would probably have to intervene according to Der Spiegel, 20 August 2012, p. 92.
- 2.
Security Council/10698 in. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2056%282012%29
- 3.
Scheen (2013a).
- 4.
AQMI was created in 2007 from the Groupe salafiste pour le combat et la prédication (GSPC). For more detailed information on the networked leadership of the Islamic groupings, see Soudan (2012).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Scheen and Wiegel (2013).
- 8.
Ehrhardt (2013).
- 9.
Mben and Puhl (2013).
- 10.
Interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 January 2013, p. 2.
- 11.
Der Tagesspiegel, 17 January 2013.
- 12.
Anti-Terroreinsatz in Mali wird verstärkt, Deutschlandradio, 13 January 2013, http://www.dradio.de/aktuell/1977034/
- 13.
Für Sicherheit in Afrika und Europa, in: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2013/01/2013-01-16-besuch-ouattara.html
- 14.
Interview in Die Welt, 31 January 2013: “Unsere Sicherheit wird in Timbuktu verteidigt”.
- 15.
According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 January 2013, p. 6.
- 16.
According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 13 January 2013, p. 3.
- 17.
Mben and Puhl (2013, p. 84).
- 18.
Scheen (2013b, p. 3).
- 19.
Thus foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, according to Mben and Puhl (2013, p. 93).
- 20.
According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 January 2013, p. 2.
- 21.
In detail: Timbuktu covers 409,000 km2 with a population of 682,000, Gao covers 171,000 km2 with a population of 544,000, Kidal covers 151,000 km2 with a population of 68,000 in 2009.
- 22.
von Hiller (2013).
- 23.
Lerch (2013).
- 24.
Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2013, Frankfurt 2012, p. 300. Wikipedia gives different figures: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali (retrieved on 20.1.2013).
- 25.
Scheen (2013c).
- 26.
Freedom House, Mali, in: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/mali
- 27.
Freedom House, Mali, in: http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/mali
- 28.
- 29.
Lacher and Tull (2013, p. 2).
- 30.
Wiedemann (2012, p. 10).
- 31.
Security Council SC/10789 in. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2071%282012%29
- 32.
Security Council, S/RES/2085 (2012), in: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%282012%29
- 33.
Gebauer and Stark (2012).
- 34.
The data on refugee numbers varies greatly, partially because many refugees attempt to find private places to live, rather than go to refugee camps, see e.g.: http://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/spenden/online-spenden/nothilfe-mali.html?gclid=CNrU_-Wkl7UCFYdd3god8lAAxg; http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2013-01/mali-frankreich-fluechtlinge
- 35.
Mben and Puhl (2013, p. 86).
- 36.
Puhl (2012).
- 37.
Walter Ischinger in an interview with Die Welt, 31 January 2013 entitled “Unsere Sicherheit wird in Timbuktu verteidigt”. Markus Kaim also propagates the use of EU battle groups, in: Deutschland und das internationale Konfliktmanagement in Mali, SWP-Aktuell 8, January 2013.
- 38.
Ischinger (2013).
- 39.
- 40.
These difficulties are referred to in detail in Lacher and Tull (2013, pp. 3–4).
- 41.
Wiedemann (2012, p. 8).
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Jahn, E. (2015). The New Western War of Intervention in Mali. In: World Political Challenges. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47912-4_13
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