Abstract
This paper examines the constitutionality of fiscal decentralization between central and local governments in China from the following aspects: First, in what way does fiscal decentralization relate to the realization of the state task and state administration? Second, how does the unitary state structure set boundaries for fiscal decentralization? Third, what is the relationship between the vertical and horizontal division of powers and fiscal decentralization? Fourth, how do we establish boundaries and methods for fiscal decentralization between central and local governments within the constitutional norms?
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Notes
- 1.
The heated debate over the constitutionality of the “reform of state-owned enterprises” and the “property law” highlights the profound system tension and public emotion during the age of social transformation.
- 2.
The idea of “bona fide unconstitutionality” is a belief that the reform “accords with the fundamental interests of the people although it might contravene the constitution of the time, thus it got its name”; “constitutional adaptation” is a belief that “the local reforms, as long as they accord with the principles of protecting human rights and do not damage the interests of the state as a whole, should be tolerated, although there might be questions about their legality or constitutionality.” Please refer to Hao Tiechuan “On Bona Fide Unconstitutionality,” Chinese Journal of Law, 1996 (4) and Zhang Qianfan “Constitutional Adaptation and Local Experiments,” Chinese Journal of Law, 2007 (1).
- 3.
Accordingly, some scholars begin to assume that “if the system of fiscal decentralization between central and local governments cannot be brought into the scope of the constitution and laws, and the constitution and laws cannot have rigid control over the tax sharing system, we have to say this is a deviation far from the basic requirements of a constitutional socialist state.” Please refer to Xu Duoqi “China’s Tax Sharing System Reform: Constitutional Retrospects and Prospects,” Studies in Law and Business, 2011 (5).
- 4.
Prof. Zhou Gangzhi put forward the concept of “fiscal constitutional interpretation,” and “presumption of constitutionality” and “constitutional interpretation” as its basis and path. Please refer to Zhou Gangzhi: “Theoretical Construction of Fiscal Constitutional Interpretation – Study on the Approach of Department Constitutional Interpretation” Taxation Research, 2008 (10).
- 5.
Wang Renbo, Chinese Road to Constitutionalism. Shandong People’s Publishing House, 2003: p. 5.
- 6.
For more detailed argument and analysis, see Zhang Yan, Gong Liutang: Tax Sharing System Reform, Fiscal Decentralization and China’s Economic Growth, Economics Vol. 5 (1).
- 7.
There are studies about the independent interest tendency of local governments in the fields of law and political sociology. See Miao Lianying, Wang Guiyu: “Local ‘Personification’, Fiscal Decentralization and the Relations between Central and Local Governments,” Henan Social Sciences, 2009 (3); Zhou Xueguang: “Collusion Among Local Governments – Institutional Logic of Government Behavior,” Open Times, 2009 (12).
- 8.
Zou Hengfu, Yu Zhiguo: Tax Sharing System Reform, State-owned Enterprise Reform and Excessive Decentralization, from caogenwang: http://www.caogen.com/blog/infor_detail.aspx?id=64&articleId=7397
- 9.
Guo Xiao Cong: Centralization and Decentralization: Basis, Boundary and Restriction. Academic Research, 2008 (2).
- 10.
Please refer to Zhou Wenxing and Zhang Zheng: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic growth in China: A New Hypothesis and Time Series Test. Institutional Economics, 2006 (1).
- 11.
Zhang Qianfan: The Central-Local Separation of Fiscal Powers: China’s Experiences, Problems and Solutions, Tribune of Political Science and Law, 2011 (9).
- 12.
Notably, as people argue whether this is a so-called Chinese model, the discourse on various local models has become quietly popular, including the Guangdong model, Chongqing model, South of Jiangsu model, Zhejiang model, and others. See Zhang Jie: “Local Models: Exploration of the Chinese Road,” Financial Digest, 2012 (11).
- 13.
Chao Yungmau: Theory and Practice of Decentralization between Central and Local Authorities, Hanlu Pess, 1998.
- 14.
Liu Ruiming, Bai Yongxiu: Fiscal Decentralization, Institutional Innovation and Economic Growth, Research on Institutional Economics, 2007 (4).
- 15.
See Montinola Gabriella, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1995. “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics, Vol.48, No. 1.
The idea of a “Chinese model” is based on the premise that the political system remains unchanged and the economy maintains rapid growth; but this view ignores the strong demand for political and administrative reforms which is an inevitable result of economic development. See Montinola Gabriella, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1995 “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics, Vol.48, No. 1.
- 16.
Cai Dingjian: Defending Democracy! – Answer to the Current Anti-democracy Theories. Peking University Law Journal, 2007 (3).
- 17.
Lin Laifan: Lectures on Constitutional Law, Law Press, 2011: p. 181.
- 18.
Zheng Yongnian, Wang Xu: On Problems of Centralization and Democracy in the Relation between Central and Local Authorities. Strategy and Management, 2001 (3).
- 19.
Huang Xiaoguang: Statistical Analysis of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in China 1953–1998. Journal of Applied Statistics and Management, 2005 (3).
- 20.
Fang Ming: Tax Sharing System, Fiscal Transfer Payment and the Rationale of the State – From the Perspective of the Constitutional Relation between Central and Local Authorities. Summit on Public Administration, 2010 (2).
- 21.
Wang Wenhua: Analysis of the Game between the Central and Local Financial Relationship, Research on Social Sciences, 1999 (2)
- 22.
Wang Shitao: On Fiscal Federalism in Unitary China – From the Relationship between Central and Local Finances, Northern Legal Science, 2010 (5).
- 23.
See Roy Bahl & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2006. Fiscal federalism and economic reform in China, Federalism and Economic Reform: International Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, pages 249–300.
See Roy Bahl & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez: Fiscal Federalism and Economic Reform in China, Federalism and Economic Reform: International Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2006: p. 249–300.
- 24.
Ren Jiantao: Relations between Central and Local Authorities from the Perspective of Constitutional Decentralization. Academia Bimestris, 2007 (1).
- 25.
Wang Xu: Curbing Judicial Localization, Hongqi Wengao, 2001 (19).
- 26.
Yang Guangbin: Local Decentralization: Main Mode of Chinese Economic Reform and its Political Implications. Open Times, 1995 (1).
- 27.
Gu Yin, Wang Zhenhai: Analysis of Local Finance in France. Theory Monthly, 2003 (11).
- 28.
Ding Ying, Shi Yingxin, Hu Quanqiao: Fiscal Decentralization Reform in Japan after WWII. Comparative Economic and Social Systems, 2011 (5).
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Wang, L. (2015). A Constitutional Review of the Division of Fiscal Responsibilities Between Central and Local Governments. In: Liu, X. (eds) Public Budgeting Reform in China: Theory and Practice. Research Series on the Chinese Dream and China’s Development Path. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47776-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47776-2_5
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