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Assessing China's Naval Power pp 57–108Cite as

Comparing Naval Capability and Estimating the Cost Impact

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Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

This chapter describes the major factors to consider when evaluating naval power from the point of view of military hardware. This encompasses not only naval weapon systems and vessel types, but also their strategic functions, life-cycle issues, and cost influences. Although these interrelated factors have a strong impact on the actual naval capability level of all countries, they are not sufficiently taken into consideration as the material basis that defines the upper limit of what is achievable through naval strategy. Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, the performance of a navy relies upon all the contributing factors of naval power. While state ideology and geostrategic orientation may shape a country’s world outlook and determine the range of possible actions perceived by its leaders, it is the available technology that largely defines what is practicable. Therefore, this part of the study will attempt to demonstrate how different types of naval weapon systems can be systematically evaluated from the point of view of their strategic value when put to use.

夫兵者, 不祥之器, 天道惡之。

“Weapons are ominous instruments, and the Dao of Heaven abhors them.”

—Huang Shi Gong san lüe, sect. 3. Transl. by Lo Ping-cheung (2012: 410).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Till (2009: 114) cites a slightly different yet somewhat compatible classification system of nine ranks which is based on previous work by Eric Grove and Michael Morris. The main difference to Todd’s and Lindberg’s system consists of a further rank inserted between their Ranks 1 and 2, while their Ranks 7 and 8 are lumped together and their Rank 9 is left out completely.

  2. 2.

    Note that Todd and Lindberg’s definition of the term “blue-water navy” differs from its common usage, which often implies an existing carrier capability.

  3. 3.

    The Royal Thai Navy is an anomaly, because although it operates a small carrier, it is not included in the Rank 3 navies. The reason for this is that Thailand does not fulfil the other criteria necessary for Rank 3, and the carrier is mainly used for ceremonial purposes.

  4. 4.

    Other possible proxies that could be used for the present purpose include the country’s degree of connectivity to global shipping networks as measured by UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (UNCTAD 2014) or by container port traffic (World Bank 2014). Though there are variations in position, the above named indices yield strikingly similar lists as the world trade share distribution shown in Figs. 2.1 and 3.3. I am indebted to Michael Funke for pointing this out.

  5. 5.

    Cf. the discussion in Hardy and Pape (2013) and Grevatt (2011).

  6. 6.

    On a sober note, it must be stated that in recent years modern diesel-electric submarines have on various occasions successfully evaded detection by even the most advanced naval forces during numerous exercises, and it is quite possible that this strategic problem could be beyond remedy, rendering even the most advanced large surface vessels inherently vulnerable to modern subs (various shipbuilding and navy sources interviewed by the author of this study during 2013).

  7. 7.

    The established manufacturers as of 2014 are the U.S. and Britain (nuclear powered), France, Russia and China (nuclear and diesel-electric), Germany, Sweden, Japan and Spain (only diesel-electric), with modern German and French AIP designs reaching performance levels comparable with nuclear submarines in terms of quietness and endurance (cf. Scott 2011). India, Italy and South Korea have built submarines under license agreements for their own use (Phipps and Hardy 2014). Germany, France, Spain, Russia and Sweden have so far been willing to export diesel submarines, while nuclear-powered submarines are generally not available on the export market, even though Russia has agreed to lease one to India, and France has offered “assistance” to Brazil for building the nuclear power-plant. India and Brazil are currently developing a capability for building nuclear powered submarines.

  8. 8.

    The criteria for assigning vessel types to ships are less than clear-cut, especially with the larger surface combatants. Examples for downplaying actual capability would include the under-classification of the German F-124 and the Franco/Italian FREMM as frigates instead of destroyers, as well as the initial under-classification of the South African Valour-class frigates as “corvettes.” Examples of over-classification can also be found, e.g. in the Argentine Navy.

  9. 9.

    Even relatively advanced naval shipbuilding nations, however, such as Brazil and Poland, have experienced surprising difficulties with indigenous corvette programs during the last 10 years, even though in Poland’s case a basic design was purchased in the export market.

  10. 10.

    For an informative and balanced account of the various reasons for cost increases in large-scale arms projects worldwide, see ‘The Cost of Weapons: Defence Spending in a Time of Austerity’ (2010).

  11. 11.

    For a discussion of the industrial influence and economic standing of these companies, see Surry (2007), Lague and Zhu (2012) and Grevatt (2013).

  12. 12.

    While a “class” of ships means the group of vessels built to the same design initially, a further “batch” of vessels is sometime built later on to the same or a slightly modified design. Such follow-on vessels are usually then designated as “x class flight II” (or batch II) vessels.

  13. 13.

    For a very accessible treatment of this subject, see Friedman (2009).

  14. 14.

    Cf. Jane’s World Navies (2013), el. ed., South Korea chapter.

  15. 15.

    Airbus Defence and Space will supply the German Navy’s new frigate F-125 with the TRS-3D NR radar while TKMS and Airbus Defence and Space subsidiary Atlas Elektronik supplies the ANCS CDS to this project. Atlas has also supplied CDS to many German submarine projects, both domestic and export. The French partially state-owned Thales Group’s SETIS, TACTICOS and SEWACO combat systems have so far been in use in many surface vessels worldwide, with TACTICOS alone installed on hundreds of vessels. Italian Finmeccanica’s subsidiary Selex combines its PAAMS combat system and EMPAR Radar with Aster 15/30 SAM on the Italian variant of the pan-European FREMM frigate project (which, like the German F-124 and F-125, is a destroyer rather than a frigate by the standards used in this book). British defense giant BAE Systems combines a different radar (SAMPSON) with a variant of the Italian PAAMS combat system, while Raytheon’s SSDS is the combat system in use aboard the US Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (which are never exported), LPDs, and LHDs.

  16. 16.

    A former naval commander from Europe who had partaken in embargo operations during the Yugoslavia war described a scenario he witnessed when a Serbian submarine was reported submerged without trace in the Mediterranean Sea for several hours. In the words of the source, “the single U.S. carrier in the vicinity sought to gain distance so fast it almost crept up the Italian shore.” He insisted that the actual threat to carriers even from relatively outdated diesel submarines like the one in question here is in fact even graver than publicly reported, and that two torpedo hits would probably suffice to sink a fleet carrier. This is confirmed by Scott (2011) who writes that “even the possibility of a submarine lurking undetected in the vicinity will weigh heavy in the thinking of a maritime component commander transiting a chokepoint or attempting to access the littoral.”

  17. 17.

    Nominal amounts are a better indicator of a country’s actual “buying power” for major military procurement than the GDP percentage, because a large percentage of a small GDP can still be much less money in absolute terms than a small percentage of a large GDP, as indicated in Fig. 3.12. The ratio of defense spending per total military manpower, on the other hand, indicates the relative sophistication level of the force.

  18. 18.

    Cf. Cole (2010: xviii) who gives a figure of 15 % as the average yearly growth rate of the PLA budget during 1993–2009.

  19. 19.

    According to Liff and Erickson, “The difference between SIPRI’s [2009] estimate and the upper bound of the Department of Defense’s estimate was US$65.1 billion, a difference larger than China’s entire official defence budget that year” (Liff and Erickson 2013: 15).

  20. 20.

    See, however, the diverging analysis by Kiselycznyk and Saunders (2010: 35), who conclude that if compared e.g. to Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, “China is significantly less transparent than its peers, especially in the areas of defense budget, force structure, and future modernization plans.”

  21. 21.

    The variables included in the BICC’s GMI include a country’s defense expenditures as a percentage of the GDP, and in relation to health spending; the number of military and para-military personnel including reserves in relation to total population size, and in relation to the number of physicians; and the number of “heavy weapons,” defined as “armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, light tanks, main battle tanks), artillery (multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled artillery, towed artillery) above 100 mm caliber, combat aircraft (attack helicopters, fixed-wing fighter aircraft), and major fighting ships (submarines, major surface combatants above corvette size)” in relation to total population; cf. Grebe (2011: 16–17).

  22. 22.

    According to the GMI editors, “There is no reliable data on military spending, number of armed forces, and number of heavy weapons systems on North Korea. This makes a calculation of its degree of militarization impossible” (Grebe 2012: 1, footnote 4).

  23. 23.

    According to a World Bank report, the physical and economic cost impact of air and water pollution in China already amounted to a staggering 5.8 % of the GDP in 2007. Xinhua reported on Dec. 19, 2013 that China would have to invest ca. 1.75 trillion yuan (ca. 290 billion U.S. dollars) for its air pollution treatment plan from 2013 to 2017 alone (cf. World Bank 2007 and ‘China to invest heavily in air pollution treatment’ 2013).

  24. 24.

    Cf. the insightful discussion in ‘China’s Military Rise’ (2012).

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  1. Department of Chinese Language and Culture Asia-Africa-Institute, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Sarah Kirchberger

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Kirchberger, S. (2015). Comparing Naval Capability and Estimating the Cost Impact. In: Assessing China's Naval Power. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47127-2_3

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