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Special Transferable Utility Games

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Book cover Game Theory

Part of the book series: Springer Texts in Business and Economics ((STBE))

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Abstract

In this chapter we consider a few classes of games with transferable utility which are derived from specific economic (or political) models or combinatorial problems. In particular, we study assignment and permutation games, flow games, and voting games.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Also called the Shapley-Shubik power index in this context.

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Peters, H. (2015). Special Transferable Utility Games. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_20

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