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Introduction

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Game Theory

Part of the book series: Springer Texts in Business and Economics ((STBE))

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Abstract

The best introduction to game theory is by way of examples. This chapter starts with a global definition in Sect. 1.1, collects some historical facts in Sect. 1.2, and presents examples in Sect. 1.3. Section 1.4 briefly comments on the distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Nasar (1998) for a biography, and the later movie with the same title A Beautiful Mind.

  2. 2.

    Feyerabend’s (1974) ‘anything goes’ adage reflects a workable attitude in a young science like game theory.

  3. 3.

    The numbers in this table are the total payoffs to coalitions and not the net payoffs compared to the coalition members staying alone instead of cooperating. These would be, respectively, 0, 0, 0, 7, 12, 0, and 13.

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Peters, H. (2015). Introduction. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_1

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