Abstract
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Nasar (1998) for a biography, and the later movie with the same title A Beautiful Mind.
- 2.
Feyerabend’s (1974) ‘anything goes’ adage reflects a workable attitude in a young science like game theory.
- 3.
The numbers in this table are the total payoffs to coalitions and not the net payoffs compared to the coalition members staying alone instead of cooperating. These would be, respectively, 0, 0, 0, 7, 12, 0, and 13.
References
Aumann, R. J., & Maschler, M. (1985). Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 195–213.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Bertrand, J. (1883). Review of Walras’s ‘Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale’ and Cournot’s ‘Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses’. Journal des Savants, 499–508 [translated by M. Chevaillier and reprinted in Magnan de Bornier (1992), 646–653].
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986). The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 176–188.
Bird, C. G. (1976). On cost allocation for a spanning tree: a game theoretic approach. Networks, 6, 335–350.
Black, D. (1969). Lewis Carroll and the theory of games. In American Economic Review, Proceedings.
Bondareva, O. N. (1962). Theory of the core in the n-person game. Vestnik Leningradskii Universitet, 13, 141–142 (in Russian).
Brams, S. J. (1980). Biblical games: A strategic analysis of stories in the Old Testament. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Churchill, W. (1983). Second world war. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Cournot, A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses [English translation (1897) Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth]. New York: Macmillan.
Curiel, I. (1997). Cooperative game theory and applications: Cooperative games arising from combinatorial optimization problems. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Dimand, M. A., & Dimand, R. W. (1996). The history of game theory, volume 1: from the beginnings to 1945. London: Routledge.
Dodgson, C. L. (1884). The principles of parliamentary representation. London: Harrison & Sons.
Dresher, M., Tucker. A. W., & Wolfe, P. (Eds.), (1957). Contributions to the theory of games III. Annals of mathematics studies (Vol. 39). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dresher, M., Shapley, L. S., & Tucker, A. W., (Eds.), (1964). Advances in game theory. Annals of mathematics studies (Vol. 52). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1974). Against method. London: New Left Books.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991a). Game theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gardner, R. (1995). Games for business and economics. New York: Wiley.
Gibbons, R. (1992). A primer in game theory. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Gillies, D. B. (1953). Some theorems on n-person games, Ph.D. Thesis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967/1968) Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players I, II, and III. Management Science, 14, 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.
Kuhn, H. W., & Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), (1950). Contributions to the theory of games I. Annals of mathematics studies (Vol. 24). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kuhn, H. W., & Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), (1953). Contributions to the theory of games II. Annals of mathematics studies (Vol. 28). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Wiley.
Luce, R. D., & Tucker, A. W. (Eds.), (1958). Contributions to the theory of games IV. Annals of mathematics studies (Vol. 40). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Maschler, M., Solan, E., & Zamir, S. (2013). Game theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morris, P. (1994). Introduction to game theory. New York: Springer.
Moulin, H. (1988). Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moulin, H. (1995). Cooperative microeconomics; a game-theoretic introduction. Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Myerson, R. B. (1991). Game theory, analysis of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Nasar, S. (1998). A beautiful mind. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18, 155–162.
Nash, J. F. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286–295.
Nash, J. F. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 21, 128–140.
Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Owen, G. (1995). Game theory (3rd ed.). San Diego: Academic.
Peleg, B., & Sudhölter, P. (2003). Introduction to the theory of cooperative games. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Perea, A. (2012). Epistemic game theory: Reasoning and choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rasmusen, E. (1989). Games and information: An introduction to game theory (2nd ed., 1994/1995). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50, 97–109.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schmeidler, D. (1969). The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 17, 1163–1170.
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfragezeit. Zeitschrift für Gesammte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301–324.
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In: A. W. Tucker & H. W. Kuhn (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games II (pp. 307–317). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shapley, L. S. (1967). On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 14, 453–460.
Sun Tzu (1988) The art of war [Translated by Thomas Cleary]. Boston: Shambala.
Thomas, L. C. (1986). Games, theory and applications. Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited.
von Neumann, J. (1928). Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Mathematische Annalen, 100, 295–320.
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944/1947) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
von Stackelberg, H. F. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Wien: Julius Springer.
Watson, J. (2002). Strategy, an introduction to game theory. New York: Norton.
Zermelo, E. (1913). Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels. In Proceedings Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians (Vol. 2, pp. 501–504).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Peters, H. (2015). Introduction. In: Game Theory. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-46949-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-46950-7
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)