Research of Satellite Receiver Anti-replay Attack Techniques

  • Mengjiang LiuEmail author
  • Zhixin Deng
  • Li Jun
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 340)


With the broad application of satellite navigation technique in the society and economy development, the satellite navigation technique has been facing with more and more hidden dangers of being attacked in such key fields as finance, public security, civil aviation and public rescue. In light of the vulnerability of satellite navigation receiver against replay attack in the above fields, this paper proposes several anti-replay attack techniques of low complexity, i.e., inertial positioning test, clock skew test and Doppler shift test. The simulation results show that Doppler shift test can resist replay attack effectively without additional hardware to the receiver. In addition, compared to SNR test, absolute power test and the other techniques, Doppler shift test has the advantages of low implementation difficulty and high adaptability, which can provide technical support for the security applications of satellite navigation technology in the fields of great concern.


Fields of great concern Replay attack Doppler shift test 



Supported by National “863 Plan”, No. 2012AA121801.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The 54th Research Institute of China Electronic Technology Group CorporationShijiazhuangChina

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