Abstract
In this paper we analyze within the framework of individual choice theory assignments of moral responsibility. For this purpose we introduce a so-called responsibility function that describes for any choice situation the alternatives for which the agent would be deemed responsible if she were to choose one of them in that situation. We show under which conditions a responsibility function can be rationalized by information about which courses of action constitute reasonable alternatives to other courses of action. After thus having characterized one way of assigning responsibility, we show that it leads to what we call the agency paradox: a rational person will in many cases not be responsible for her actions. It is argued that a decision rule that is formally the same as the ‘never choose the uniquely largest’-rule characterized by Baigent and Gaertner (1996) circumvents the paradox. Turning to a possible counterargument to the analysis presented, we conclude by suggesting that moral responsibility should be seen as a criterion for the assessment of the quality of our choice sets rather than as a consideration that is relevant when making our choices.
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Notes
- 1.
We shall not distinguish between claims that an agent is responsible and claims that she can justifiably be held responsible.
- 2.
Completeness entails reflexivity and reflexivity can also be questioned: how can an option be a reasonable alternative to itself? Yet, reflexivity is of no further relevance for the analysis and could in fact also be dropped. That is, the results can be reformulated in such a way that they hold for connectedness (i.e. for all distinct x and y, x is a reasonable alternative to y or y is so to x) rather than for completeness of M.
- 3.
Another complication is that it can only work as an argument if one presupposes that there are different degrees of responsibility. That is, one can only claim that Sophie bears at least some responsibility for her choice if one takes the degree of her responsibility for the death of her child to be positive but minute compared to the responsibility of the Nazi who puts her in the position. Yet the framework that we develop here does not allow for such comparative judgments.
- 4.
Note that Barry Schwartz [9] takes this line in his analysis of choice stress.
- 5.
Note that, though they coincide, the preference relation and the reasonableness relation are still conceptually different.
- 6.
The argument parallels discussions in the freedom of will literature. There the luck principle, as Kane [6] has labelled the argument, states that indeterminism entails chance or luck which is incompatible with moral responsibility.
- 7.
For a more general account of norm-constraint choices, see Bossert and Suzumura [2].
- 8.
Note that with respect to B ∗(A, R) we use the term ‘best’ in a purely formal sense of the word: the uniquely best element is in fact an inadmissible alternative.
- 9.
As one of the referees pointed out to us, if one uses a theory of moral responsibility in which responsibility judgements only make sense if there is a conflict between individual rationality and some other motivation, then responsibility always is about the possibility of constrained choice; in other contexts the agency paradox does not arise.
- 10.
See also Sen [11].
- 11.
- 12.
A different response, but not compatible with our assumptions, is to argue for the existence of a praise-blame asymmetry. On that view, assignments of praise do not require alternative possibilities but assignments of blame do. For a defence of this view, see Moya [8].
References
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Binder, C., van Hees, M. (2015). Moral Responsibility and Individual Choice. In: Binder, C., Codognato, G., Teschl, M., Xu, Y. (eds) Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_6
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