Abstract
Following Nick Baigent’s argument that one must go “behind the veil of preference” (Baigent, Jpn Econ Rev 46(1):88–101, 1995) to be able to develop a satisfactory theory of rational behaviour, we propose to analyse potential intrapersonal conflicts caused by different reasons, goals or motivations to choose one option over another, which may make the development of a coherent preference impossible. We do this by presenting an extensive, but certainly not exhaustive overview of psychological research on intrapersonal conflict, its influence on preference reversal (and hence on incoherent behaviour), on psychological well-being and on motivational and behavioural changes over time. We then briefly describe our own theory of choice under conflicting motivations (Arlegi and Teschl, Working Papers of the Department of Economics DT 1208, Public University of Navarre, 2012), which is a first attempt at putting psychological insights into intrapersonal conflict into an axiomatic economic context.
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Notes
- 1.
In regard to introspection, Mas-Colell et al. [34] write: “Introspection quickly reveals how hard it is to evaluate alternatives that are far from the realm of common experience. It takes work and serious reflection to find out one’s own preferences.” (p. 6).
- 2.
Mas-Colell et al. [34] for example write: “The [preference-based approach] treats the decision maker’s tastes, as summarized in her preference relation, as the primitive characteristic of the individual.” (p. 5).
- 3.
Sen [48] says: “Statements A and not-A are contradictory in a way that choosing x from {x, y} and y from {x, y, z} cannot be. If the latter pair of choices were to entail respectively the statements (1) x is a better alternative than y, and (2) y is a better alternative than x, then there would indeed be a contradiction here (assuming that the content of “being better requires asymmetry). But those choices do not, in themselves, entail any such statements. Given some ideas as to what the person is trying to do (this is an external correspondence), we might be able to “interpret” these actions as implied statements. But we cannot do that without invoking such an external reference. There is no such thing as purely internal consistency of choice.” (p. 499).
- 4.
What we call here an intrinsic preference.
- 5.
It should be clear by now that psychologists are far from imposing a strict preference structure in the economic sense on the individual (no consistency is imposed on people’s choices, from which their preferences are revealed). Psychologists usually assume much simpler behavioural factors, such as different motivations or impulses, sometimes triggered and changed by varying contextual effects. These are therefore on a much more elementary level than the concept of “preferences” in economics.
- 6.
Bazerman at al. [6] note that it has been argued in procedural justice literature that procedural injustice creates an emotive (want) response.
- 7.
With respect to these results, Milkman et al. [35] reflect on the possibility of “empowering” the should self and mention that their results give indications as to what people believe is better for them, rather than, as libertarian paternalism promotes, propose policies that facilitate the selection of options policy makers think are welfare-promoting (p. 336).
- 8.
At least since Daniel Kahneman’s book “Thinking Fast and Slow” [26], a particular kind of conflict, namely the one between, as Kahneman describes it, System 1 and the System 2 has become more well-known among economists. However, these are conflicts that have a cognitive origin most of the time and do not therefore correspond perfectly to the kind of psychological conflicts that we seek to consider here.
- 9.
As mentioned above, Dhar and Simonson [13] talk of “peak experiences” of people’s goals. It does not therefore seem strange to think of particular experiences and motivations as single-peaked orderings.
- 10.
Pattanaik and Xu [38], inspired by Hare [21], propose a general model of multi-attribute choice where the different attributes are prioritised in one or another way depending on the occurrence of certain contextual characteristics of the decision problem. In our theory we do not presuppose the existence of such exogenous information.
- 11.
The formal proof, which can be found in Arlegi and Teschl [1] is a little more sophisticated and distinguishes between several particular cases.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Arlegi, R., Teschl, M. (2015). Conflicts in Decision Making. In: Binder, C., Codognato, G., Teschl, M., Xu, Y. (eds) Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_2
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