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Climate Change and Social Choice Theory

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Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Abstract

The enlightenment was a philosophical project to construct a rational society without the need for a supreme being. It opened the way for the creation of market democracy and rapid economic growth. At the same time economic growth is the underlying cause of climate change, and we have become aware that this may destroy our civilization. The principal underpinning of the enlightenment project is the general equilibrium theorem (GET) of Arrow and Debreu (Econometrica 22:265–290, 1954), asserting the existence of a Pareto optimal price equilibrium. Arrow’s work in social choice can be interpreted as an attempt to construct a more general social equilibrium theorem. The current paper surveys recent results in social choice which suggests that chaos rather than equilibrium is generic.We also consider models of belief aggregation similar to Condorcet’s Jury theorem and mention Penn’s Theorem on existence of a belief equilibrium.However, it is suggested that a belief equilibrium with regard to the appropriate response to climate change depends on the creation of a fundamental social principle of “guardianship of our planetary home.” It is suggested that this will involve conflict between entrenched economic interests and ordinary people, as the effects of climate change make themselves felt in many countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Pagden [149] for an argument about the significance today of the enlightenment project, but a counter argument by Gray [79–81].

  2. 2.

    Weber (1904) speculated that there was a connection between the values of Protestantism and Capitalism. It may be that there are connections between the preference for scientific explanation and protestant belief about the relationship between God and humankind.

  3. 3.

    See Feingold (2004).

  4. 4.

    For Hobbes, see Rogow (1986). For Descartes, see Gaukroger (1995). For Spinoza and Liebnitz see Stewart (2006) and Goldstein (2006). See also Israel (2012) for the development of the Radical Enlightenment.

  5. 5.

    It is of interest that the English word “soul” derives from Old English sáwol (first used in the eighth century poem, Beowulf ).

  6. 6.

    Hawking and Mlodinow (2010) assert that God did not create the Universe, perhaps implying that the soul does not exist. However they do say that they understand Isaac Newton’s belief that God did “create” and “conserve” order in the universe. See other books by Dawkins [55] (2008) and Hitchens (2007) on the same theme, as well as Wright (2009) on the evolution of the notion of God.

  7. 7.

    See for example Hardin [87, 88], Taylor [215, 216], Axelrod and Hamilton [12], Axelrod [12, 13], Kreps et al. [109], Margolis [122].

  8. 8.

    Strong reciprocity means the punishment of those who do not cooperate.

  9. 9.

    Indeed, White et al. (2009) present evidence of a high degree of cooperation among very early hominids dating back about 4MYBP (million years before the present). The evidence includes anatomical data which allows for inferences about the behavioral characteristics of these early hominids.

  10. 10.

    Gintis cites the work of Robson and Kaplan (2003) who use an economic model to estimate the correlation between brain size and life expectancy (a measure of efficiency). In this context, the increase in brain size is driven by the requirement to solve complex cooperative games against nature.

  11. 11.

    See the discussion in [192].

  12. 12.

    Weitzman [225] and Chichilnisky [47]. See also Chichilnisky and Eisenberger [47] on other catastrophic events such as collision with an asteroid.

  13. 13.

    See Schofield [172, 175, 176]. In a sense these voting theorems can be regarded as derivative of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [8]. See also Arrow [9].

  14. 14.

    The theory of chaos or complexity is rooted in Smale’s fundamental theorem [198] that structural stability of dynamical systems is not “generic” or typical whenever the state space has more than two dimensions.

  15. 15.

    In their early analysis of chaos, Li and Yorke [115] showed that in the domain of a chaotic transformation f it was possible for almost any pair of positions (x, y) to transition from x to y = f r(x), where f r means the r times reiteration of f. 

  16. 16.

    See Minsky [135, 136] and Keynes’s earlier work in 1921.

  17. 17.

    Karklins and Petersen [99] and Lohmann [116]. See also Bikhchandani et al. [23].

  18. 18.

    The response by the citizens of these countries to the demise of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, is in large degree also unpredictable.

  19. 19.

    See for example Carothers [33] and Collier [50].

  20. 20.

    Golub and Jackson [76].

  21. 21.

    See Henrich et al. [90, 91], which reports on experiments in fifteen “small-scale societies,” using the game theoretic tools of the “prisoners’ dilemma,” the “ultimatum game,” etc.

  22. 22.

    See also Acemoglu and Robinson [3].

  23. 23.

    The popular protests in N.Africa and the Middle East in 2011 were in opposition to oligarchic and autocratic power.

  24. 24.

    See also Shafer and Sonnenschein [195] who use this result to extend the Arrow Debreu equilibrium existence theorem [10].

  25. 25.

    ie d(x)(v) > 0 for all x ∈ V, for all v ∈ H(x), whenever \(H(x)\neq \varnothing.\)

  26. 26.

    Results on belief aggregation include [153] and [127].

  27. 27.

    Schofield [169, 170], Ladha [111–113], Ladha and Miller [113].

  28. 28.

    Sunstein [209, 211] also notes that belief aggregation can lead to a situation where subgroups in the society come to hold very disparate opinions.

  29. 29.

    Gleick [73], Buchanan [29, 30], Gladwell [72], Johnson [97], Barabasi [17, 18], Strogatz [205], Watts [222, 223], Surowiecki [212], Ball [15], Christakis and Fowler [49]

  30. 30.

    See, for example, Mandelbrot and Hudson [121], Shiller [196, 197], Taleb [213], Barbera [19], Cassidy [35], Fox [67].

  31. 31.

    See for example Cavallli-Sforza and Feldman [37], Bowles et al. [25].

  32. 32.

    See also Eldredge [60] and Gould (1976).

  33. 33.

    Indeed as I understand the dynamical models, the chaotic episodes are due to the complex interactions of dynamical processes in the oceans, on the land, in weather, and in the heavens. These are very like interlinked coalitions of non-gradient vector fields.

  34. 34.

    This is suggested by Kahneman [98].

  35. 35.

    As Smolin [203] points out, the anthropic principle has been adopted because of the experimental evidence that the expansion of the universe is accelerating. Indeed it has led to the hypothesis that there is an infinity of universes all with different laws. An alternative inference is the principle of intelligent design. My own inference is that we require a teleology as proposed in the conclusion.

  36. 36.

    The work by Poincare in the late nineteenth century focussed on the structural stability of the solar system and was the first to conceive of the notion of chaos.

  37. 37.

    Zhang et al. [230] and Hsiang et al. [96] have provided quantitative analyses of such adverse effects in the past. See also Parker [152] for an historical account of the effect of climate change in early modern Europe.

  38. 38.

    See Sperber [202] for a discussion of the development of Marx’s ideas, in the context of nineteenth century belief in the teleology of “progresś” or the advance of civilization. The last 100 years has however,made it difficult to hold such beliefs.

  39. 39.

    The philosopher [141] argues that without a teleogy of some kind, we are left with Darwinian evolutionary theory, which by itself cannot provide a full explanation of what we are and where we are going. See also [217] and [20].

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  1. Center in Political Economy, Washington University in Saint Louis, 1 Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO, 63130, USA

    Norman Schofield

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Constanze Binder

  2. Department of Economics, University of Udine, Udine, Italy

    Giulio Codognato

  3. Aix-Marseille University, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS & EHESS, Marseille, France

    Miriam Teschl

  4. Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

    Yongsheng Xu

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Schofield, N. (2015). Climate Change and Social Choice Theory. In: Binder, C., Codognato, G., Teschl, M., Xu, Y. (eds) Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7_12

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