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The Use of Trade Defense: Some Considerations for Brazil-China Bilateral Trade Relationship

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Settlements of Trade Disputes between China and Latin American Countries

Part of the book series: Laws in Emerging Economies ((LAEMEC,volume 1))

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Abstract

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974, the total value of bilateral trade between Brazil and China has been increasing constantly, from USD 17.42 million in 1974 to more than 90.3 billion in 2013. After China entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade ties between the two countries have been notably intensified. As a result, China surpassed the United States of America as Brazil’s top trading partner back in 2009, and Brazil is currently China’s 9th largest trading partner. In 2013, China and Brazil sealed a currency swap pact (190 billion yuan or 60 billion reais) that was designed to safeguard smooth bilateral trade regardless of global financial crises.

The Editor-in-Chief would like to acknowledge the financial and research support from the Research Committee of the University of Macau (Project No. MYRG167).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Statistics can be found, for example, at http://br.china-embassy.org/chn/gdxw/t1122678.htm.

  2. 2.

    WT/TPR/M/264, p. 18.

  3. 3.

    http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByRepMemVsExpCty.pdf.

  4. 4.

    http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_InitiationsByRepMemVsExpCty.pdf.

  5. 5.

    http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/asp_e/AD_InitiationsByRepMem.pdf.

  6. 6.

    http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf.

  7. 7.

    Olarreaga and Vaillant (2011), p. 297.

  8. 8.

    Bown (2011), 1967.

  9. 9.

    Bown (2013), p. 4.

  10. 10.

    Departamento de Defesa Comercial (DECOM) (2014), p. 8.

  11. 11.

    Article 26 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  12. 12.

    Paragraph 4 of Article 32 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  13. 13.

    Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 33 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  14. 14.

    Article 35 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  15. 15.

    Article 41 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  16. 16.

    G/ADP/AHG/W/199.

  17. 17.

    Article 3 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  18. 18.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 13 of February 29, 2012.

  19. 19.

    Article 3 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  20. 20.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 50 of July 5, 2012.

  21. 21.

    See Interministerial Directive MICT/MF No. 13/1998 and CAMEX Resolutions No. 11/2002, No. 02/2004, No. 36/2004, No. 10/2006, No. 36/2006, No. 7/2008, No. 48/2009, No. 49/2009, No. 24/2010, No. 41/2010 and No. 64/2010.

  22. 22.

    Departamento de Defesa Comercial (DECOM) (2014), Relatório Semestral Jan/Jun – 2014, Brasília, MDIC.

  23. 23.

    Chacur and Gazzoli (2014).

  24. 24.

    Wei and Furlan (2012), pp. 38 and 42.

  25. 25.

    Nappi (2011).

  26. 26.

    As for the legal provisions on the choice of a suitable surrogate country, Brazilian rules provide for very general guidelines such as the requirement of reasonableness. See International Bar Association (2012), at 5.

  27. 27.

    Article 15 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  28. 28.

    Article 17 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  29. 29.

    Marques (2009), p. 18.

  30. 30.

    Articles 15 and 16 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

  31. 31.

    See International Bar Association (2012), p. 31, “In September 2009, the Brazilian Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade imposed a provisional AD duty of $ 12.47 per pair on imports of shoes from the People’s Republic of China. The company, Alpargatas of São Paolo, challenged this decision before the Supreme Court and was granted an injunction in early October.” The case illustrates different positions of the Brazilian producers and the Brazilian importers.

  32. 32.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 6, of January 25, 2012.

  33. 33.

    Refer also to WTO DSB decision on: European Communities—Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China.

  34. 34.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 14 of March 3, 2012.

  35. 35.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 46 of July 2, 2014.

  36. 36.

    Wei and Furlan (2012), p. 58.

  37. 37.

    Article 4 of SECEX Directive No. 21 of 18 October 2010. It should be noted that originally one more situation shall be considered circumvention, “Any other practice designed to thwart the effective application of antidumping measures” (Article 4, IV); however, such disposition was deleted by the CAMEX Resolution No. 25, of May 5, 2011.

  38. 38.

    Article 5, paragraph 2 of SECEX Directive No. 21 of October 18, 2010.

  39. 39.

    Article 17 of SECEX Directive No. 21 of 18 October 2010.

  40. 40.

    For a more detailed analysis, see Wei and Furlan (2012), pp. 54–60.

  41. 41.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 12, of February 13, 2012.

  42. 42.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 42 of July 3, 2012.

  43. 43.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 52 of July 24, 2012.

  44. 44.

    For more details, see Article 8 of the WTO ADA.

  45. 45.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 3 of January 15, 2014.

  46. 46.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 57 of July 24, 2013.

  47. 47.

    http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/2013-08/21/content_16909921.htm.

  48. 48.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 77 of October 29, 2012.

  49. 49.

    CAMEX Resolution, No. 28 of April 9, 2013.

  50. 50.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 53, of July 3 of 2014.

  51. 51.

    http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/difang/fujian/201409/20140900732111.shtml.

  52. 52.

    http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/difang/fujian/201409/20140900732111.shtml.

  53. 53.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 46 of July 2, 2014.

  54. 54.

    The position of Jiangsu Xiuqiang was echoed by Brazilian importers, for example, Electrolux, which said that even if the former Decree 1.602 of 1995 does not establish the parameters or criteria of choosing the third market economy, some technical criteria have been listed by the new Antidumping Regulations. In this case, the investigations were still governed by Decree 1.602 of 1995 due to the time of initiation of the investigation. It is worth noting that if the new antidumping decree applies, the importers cannot even present any challenges regarding the choice of the third country.

  55. 55.

    More information can be found at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-07-24/1200074543.PDF.

  56. 56.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 74 of August 22, 2014.

  57. 57.

    CAMEX Resolution No. 49 of July 16, 2013.

  58. 58.

    http://www.pulsamerica.co.uk/2012/11/05/brazil-most-active-in-anti-dumping/.

  59. 59.

    For more details, see Wei (2013), 1, pp. 1–38.

  60. 60.

    Departamento de Defesa Comercial (DECOM) (2013), pp. 45 and 49.

  61. 61.

    Previously, No. 3 of Article 64 of the Decree 1602/95, and now Article 3 of Brazilian Antidumping Decree No. 8.058, of 26 July 2013.

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Wei, D. (2015). The Use of Trade Defense: Some Considerations for Brazil-China Bilateral Trade Relationship. In: Wei, D. (eds) Settlements of Trade Disputes between China and Latin American Countries. Laws in Emerging Economies, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46425-0_2

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