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Treatises on Solvency II pp 67–96Cite as

Insurance Supervisory Law and Consumer Protection

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the relationship between insurance supervisory law and consumer protection within the ambit of Solvency II and the EIOPA system. To this, the article focuses on existing laws, with particular regard given to European rules on insurance supervision. The Solvency II Directive takes as its exclusive objective the protection of insureds and insurance beneficiaries. Solvency II does not address consumer protection. Nevertheless, consumer protection is a significant by-product of the Solvency II rules, in the sense of collective consumer protection. The EIOPA Regulation provisions, too, address consumer protection solely in the realm of collective consumer protection. The applicable profile is that of the mature and discerning consumer. The consumer protection guidelines of EIOPA on handling of complaints have no legal basis in the EIOPA Regulation.

First published as “Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht und Verbraucherschutz im Solvency-II- und EIOPA-System” [in English: The Insurance Supervisory Regime and Consumer Protection in the Solvency II and EIOPA System], VersR (2013), 401 ff.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See in more detail, Brand, “Verbraucherschutz im Versicherungsrecht” [in English: Consumer Protection in Insurance Law], in: E. Lorenz, ed., Karlsruher Forum 2011: Verbraucherschutz – Entwicklungen und Grenzen [in English: Karlsruher Forum 2011: Consumer Protection – Developments and Limits] (2012), 55 (59 f.).

  2. 2.

    Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Nov. 2010, OJEU L 331 [Official Journal of the EU], 15 Dec. 2010, 48.

  3. 3.

    Directive 2009/137/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Nov. 2009, OJEU L 335, 17 Dec. 2009,1.

  4. 4.

    RegE eines Zehnten Gesetzes zur Änderung des VAG [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] of 15 Feb. 2012, BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/9342, also found at BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 90/12 (hereafter VAG-RegE).

  5. 5.

    Compare also Recital 10, sent. 3 of the EIOPA Regulation, under which the EIOPA is to “strengthen international supervisory coordination, for the benefit of the economy at large, including....consumers” with Recital 66 of the EIOPA Regulation enumerating the “objectives of this Regulation” but not naming consumer protection.

  6. 6.

    See Recital 2, EIOPA Board of Supervisors, EIOPA procedures for issuing warnings, temporary prohibitions and restrictions of 12 Nov. 2012.

  7. 7.

    See on this point EIOPA Report on Financial Literacy and Education Initiatives by Competent Authorities of 16 Dec. 2011.

  8. 8.

    See in general EIOPA Board of Supervisors, id., n. 6, above.

  9. 9.

    See similarly Recital 47, sent. 3 of the EIOPA Regulation.

  10. 10.

    See EIOPA CCPFI Mandate of 29 Mar. 2012, sent. 1.

  11. 11.

    EIOPA, CCPFI Mandate, id., n. 10 above, at 2.

  12. 12.

    See in detail, Dreher/Häußler, “Die Aufsicht über Versicherungsunternehmen durch die BaFin und die Überwachungsaufgabe des Aufsichtsrat” [in English: Supervision of Insurance Undertakings by BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] and the Monitoring Task of the Supervisory Board], ZGR (2011), 471 (485); Wandt/Sehrbrock, “Regelungsziele der Solvency II-Rahmenrichtlinie” [in English: Regulatory Objectives of the Solvency II Framework Directive], ZVersWiss (2011), 193 (195 ff.).

  13. 13.

    See Dreher, “Solvenzanforderungen in der Versicherungsaufsicht nach Solvency II und künftigem VAG” [in English: Solvency Requirements in Insurance Supervision under Solvency II and the Future German Insurance Supervision Act], ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (384) (Chap. 4, below, at 4.2.2).

  14. 14.

    See the Proposal for a Regulation, COM (2012) 352 (final); also at BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 388/12 of 4 Jul. 2012.

  15. 15.

    See the Proposal for a Directive, COM (2012) 360 (final); also at BR-Drucks. [Document of German Bundesrat] 389/12, 4 Jul. 2012.

  16. 16.

    The abbreviation DVO-E when used here and after in reference to the Level 2 DVO signifies the EU Commission draft known as Draft Implementing Measures Solvency II, 31 Oct. 2011.

  17. 17.

    Hereafter: Governance Guidelines.

  18. 18.

    For a critical view, see Dreher, “Die aufsichtsbehördliche Kontrolle der Inhaber von Schlüsselfunktionen nach Solvency II und künftigem VAG” [in English: Review by Supervisory Authorities of the Holders of Key Functions under Solvency II and the Future German Insurance Supervision Act], VersR (2012), 1061 (1067) (Chap. 8, below, at 8.3.2.1).

  19. 19.

    VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act], id., n. 4 above, Begründung [Statement of Reasons], 258, 311.

  20. 20.

    See on this point Dreher/Lange, “Die Vollharmonisierung der Versicherungsaufsicht durch Solvency II” [in English: Full Harmonization of Insurance Supervision under Solvency II], VersR (2011), 825 (Chap. 1, above); Bürkle, “Die Zukunft der materiellen Missstandsaufsicht in Deutschland” [in English: The Future in Germany of Substantive Supervision According to the Principles of Abusiveness], VersR (2011), 1469; Bürkle/Grote, “Die aufsichtsbehördlichen Eingriffsbefugnisse nach Solvency II” [in English: Supervisory Intervention Powers under Solvency II] in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung [in English: Solvency II in Legal Application] (2009), 191 ff.( 225 ff.); Kaulbach in: Bähr, ed., Handbuch des Versicherungsaufsichtsrechts [in English: Manual of Insurance Supervisory Regime] (2011) sec. 8, end of ref. 46.

  21. 21.

    See criticizing, e.g., the asserted danger of misleading and the innovation-inhibiting effect, Dreher, Die Versicherung als Rechtsprodukt [in English: Insurance as a Legal Product] (1991), 223 f.; for still another view, Präve in: Prölss, VAG [German Insurance Supervision Act] (12th ed. 2005) sec. 8, ref. 25.

  22. 22.

    On the parallel issue for credit institutions, see the answer of the German Federal Government to a parliamentary question: Aufsichtspraxis der BaFin und finanzieller Verbraucherschutz [in English: Supervisory practices of the BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] and financial consumer protection], BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/8889, 6 Mar. 2012 and specifically from the consumer protection point of view, Reifner, “Europäische Finanzaufsicht und Verbraucherschutz – wie kann der Schutz der Verbraucherinteressen in die BaFin integriert werden?” [in English: European Financial Supervision and Consumer Protection – How Can Protection of Consumers’ Interests be Integrated into the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority?] VuR (2011), 410 and the articles in Keßler/Micklitz/Reich, eds., “Institutionelle Finanzmarktaufsicht und Verbraucherschutz” [in English: Institutional Financial Market Supervision and Consumer Protection] (2010).

  23. 23.

    See BaFin-Journal (Oct. 2011) 3; see on the earlier critical corresponding BAV [German Insurance Supervisory Agency] position, Dreher, id., n. 21 above, at 213 ff., 232.

  24. 24.

    RegE [Government’s Draft] BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/10040; see also the answer of the German Federal Government to a parliamentary question on “Verbraucherorganisationen und ihre Marktwächterfunktion als Teil der systematischen verbraucherorientierten Beobachtung des Finanzmarkts” [in English: Consumer organizations and market monitoring functions as part of the consumer-oriented supervision of the financial markets] BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/11751.

  25. 25.

    According to the Partei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen [German green party] per a report in VW 17 (2011), 1207: “Verbraucherschützer wollen Finanzmarktwächter werden” [in English: Consumer Protection Watchdogs Seek to Become Financial Market Guardians].

  26. 26.

    See 3.2.2 and 3.2.4, above.

  27. 27.

    See Recitals 17, 18, 22, and 23. This point is continued in Recitals 5 ff.: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance Mediation (recast) COM (2012) 360 (final); also at BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 389/12, 4 Jul. 2012.

  28. 28.

    See for more details on the internal insurance market in relation to basic freedoms, Rittner/Dreher, “Europäisches und deutsches Wirtschaftsrecht” [in English: European and German Economic Law] (3rd ed. 2008), sec. 31, ref. 1 ff.

  29. 29.

    For example, Recital 98 of the Solvency II Directive refers to an “adequate level of protection” in relation to group supervision.

  30. 30.

    See in detail Dreher/Ballmaier, “Das aufsichtliche Überprüfungsverfahren nach Art. 36 Solvency II-Richtlinie und § 289 VAG-RegE” [in English: The Supervisory Review Process under Art. 36 of the Solvency II Directive and Sec. 289 of the Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung [in English: Solvency II in Legal Application] (2012), 73 ff. (Chap. 2, above).

  31. 31.

    See for more detail Dreher/Ballmaier, id., n. 30 above, at 95, 109, 117.

  32. 32.

    See on this point BVerwG [Federal Administrative Court], VersR (1981), 221 (223) on sec. 8, para. 1, sent. 1, no. 3. of the VAG [German Insurance Supervision Act]; Rittner, “Die Versicherungsaufsicht nach dem D.A.S.- Urteil des BVerwG” [in English: Insurance Supervision Following the D. A. S. Judgment of the Federal Administrative Court], VersR 1982, 205; Dreher, n. 21 above, at 215 ff.

  33. 33.

    See also art. 38 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU): “Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer protection”.

  34. 34.

    See, e.g., Kahl, in: Callies/Ruffert, eds., TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] (4th ed. 2011) art. 114, para. 35, and see with a partially different view, Krebber, in: Callies/Ruffert, eds., TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] (4th ed. 2011) art. 169, para. 14, each with further references.

  35. 35.

    See in detail Dreher/Lange, n. 20 above, at 825; Bürkle, n. 20 above, at 1469 (1472 f.); Wandt/Sehrbrock, n. 12 above, at 200; Vogelgesang, “Die Aufsicht über Rückversicherungsunternehmen nach Solvency II” [in English: Supervision of Reinsurance Undertakings under Solvency II], ZVersWiss (2011), 233 (243); Saria, “Compliance nach Solvency II” [in English: Compliance under Solvency II], VersRdsch 11 (2011), 21 (22); Bürkle, “Vorgaben der Richtlinie Solvabilität II für die Compliance in Versicherungsunternehmen” [in English: Requirements of the Solvency II Directive for Compliance in Insurance Undertakings] in: Looschelders/Michael, eds., Düsseldorfer Vorträge zum Versicherungsrecht 2010 [in English: Dusseldorf Lectures on Insurance Law], (2011) 1, 5. Unclear as to its basis – “The Directive does not provide full harmonization in all areas” – and inconsistent with the continuation of the existing VAG [German Insurance Supervision Act] provisions, VAG-RegE [Government’s Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] 2012 id., n. 4 above, at 255. Full harmonization is also the presumption of the Bundesrat [German Federal Council], as expressed in the Empfehlungen der Ausschüsse zu dem Entwurf eines Zehnten Gesetzes zur Änderung des VAG [Committee Advice on the Draft of a Tenth Act Amending the German Insurance Supervision Act] BR-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundesrat] 90/12, 16 Mar. 2012, Begründung [Statement of Reasons] for no. 15, at 14, thus: “not compatible with the ‘full harmonization approach’ of the Solvency II Directive”; these recommendation require – id., no. 2, at 3: “a 1: 1 implementation of the Solvency II Directive.” Also supporting full harmonization, Wagner, “Solvabilität II und VAG neu: Was bleibt, was ändert sich?” [in English: Solvency II and the New German Insurance Supervision Act: What is Unchanged? What is Changed?], VersRdsch 9 (2010), 23 (24, 26) and recently FMA [Financial Market Authority (Austria)– Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht Solvency II Handbuch [in English: Austrian Financial Market Authority Solvency II Manual] (2012), 1, 5 in reference to the “new rules” under Solvency II.

  36. 36.

    See for the definition frequently applied in European law, e.g., art. 2 d of Directive 2002/65/EC on the distance marketing of consumer financial services, OJEC L 271 of 9 Oct. 2002, at 16: “every natural person who…is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession.” On the term “consumer” in European law, see Dreher, “Der Verbraucher – Das Phantom in den opera des europäischen und deutschen Rechts?” [in English: The Consumer – Phantom of the Opera in German and European Law?], JZ (1997), 167; and on the more recent view, H. Roth, “Verbraucherschutz – Entwicklungen und Grenzen” [in English: Consumer Protection – Developments and Limits] in: E. Lorenz, ed., Karlsruher Forum 2011: Verbraucherschutz – Entwicklungen und Grenzen [in English: Karlsruher Forum 2011: Consumer Protection – Developments and Limits], (2012), 5 (15 ff.).

  37. 37.

    See, e.g., on group supervision Recital 105 of the Solvency II Directive: “All policy holders and beneficiaries should receive equal treatment[…].”

  38. 38.

    On this point correctly, König, BaFin Journal 4 (2012), 13 (17) and in the context of Solvency II, Romeike, “Auswirkungen von Solvency II auf Verbraucher” [in English: Effects of Solvency II on Consumers] in: Brömmelmeyer/Heiss, et al., eds., Pflegeversicherung, Risikosteuerung und Versicherungsaufsicht, Europa, Versicherungsvertragsrecht [in English: Long-term Care Insurance, Risk Management, Insurance Supervision, Europe, Insurance Contract Law] (2009), 114 (130) (137).

  39. 39.

    See in detail on this point, Dreher, n. 13 above, at 381.

  40. 40.

    See, e.g., the response of the German Federal Government to the position of the German Federal Council on the Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen Finanzaufsicht [Act to Strengthen German Financial Supervision] BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/10252, 4. Jul. 2012, to no. 5: “Ensuring the solvency of the institutions and functioning of the financial markets is a basic cornerstone of overall investor and consumer protection.”

  41. 41.

    See in detail on this point, Dreher/Schaaf, “Die Veröffentlichungspflichten gegenüber der Allgemeinheit nach Solvency II” [in English: Duty of Disclosure to the Public under Solvency II] in: Dreher/Wandt, eds., Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung [Solvency II in Legal Application] (2009), 129 ff. Chap. 13, below, and on the function of the SFCR in connection with the regulatory review process, Dreher/Ballmaier id., n. 30 above, at 101 f. and on the duty of public disclosure related to ORSA, Dreher/Ballmaier, “Die unternehmenseigene Risiko- und Solvenzbeurteilung (ORSA) nach Solvency II und VAG 2012” [in English: Risk and Solvency Evaluation by Undertakings under Solvency II and the German Insurance Supervision Act 2012], VersR (2012), 129 (141 f.) (Chap. 5, below, at 5.8.4).

  42. 42.

    See generally on the transparency principle, Wandt, “Transparency as a General Principle of Insurance Law” in: Wandt/Ünan, eds., Transparency in Insurance Law (2012) 9 ff.

  43. 43.

    See in detail on this point, Dreher, n. 13 above, at 390.

  44. 44.

    See 3.2.2, above.

  45. 45.

    See in detail, Dreher/Schaaf, id., n. 41 above, at 136 ff. The CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Supervisory Reporting and Public Disclosure Requirements of October 2009, no. 3.62. at 3.3.3: Disclosure audience (p. 26) is restricted to listing the potential readers of the report as exhaustively as possible, without hierarchical rating.

  46. 46.

    See Sehrbrock/Gal, “Solvency II – Europäischer Rechtsrahmen einer neuen Versicherungsaufsicht” [in English: Solvency II – European Legal Framework of a New Insurance Supervision], CFL (2012), 140 (147).

  47. 47.

    See, however, Dreher/Schaaf, id., n. 41 above, at 138.

  48. 48.

    See in detail, Dreher/Schaaf, id., n. 41 above, at 153 ff.

  49. 49.

    Hereafter: EIOPA Guidelines.

  50. 50.

    All documentation is available on the EIOPA homepage under Consultation 2011.

  51. 51.

    Inexplicably, EIOPA considered focusing the Guidelines directly on the supervised undertakings. See, Impact Assessment, id., n. 50 above, at 3, point 4.

  52. 52.

    Impact Assessment, id., n. 50 above, at 3, point 4.

  53. 53.

    BaFin-Journal (Aug. 2012), 12.

  54. 54.

    See EIOPA Guidelines, 2, point 1.

  55. 55.

    Bernadino, “How EIOPA is ‘taking the lead’ in consumer protection,” address of 23 Mar. 2012, commends the EIOPA Guidelines on complaints-handling nevertheless as the main portion of EIOPA’s consumer protection achievements up to now.

  56. 56.

    See Sasserath-Alberti/Hartig, “EIOPA-Verordnung: Herausforderungen für die Praxis” [in English: EIOPA Regulation: Challenges for Practitioners], VersR (2012), 524 (531).

  57. 57.

    EIOPA, Public Consultation on the Guidelines and Best Practices Report on Complaints-Handling by Insurance Undertakings – Summary of the responses received, 14 Jun 2012, 5 (emphasis by EIOPA).

  58. 58.

    See in more detail, Callies, in: Callies/Ruffert, eds., TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] (4th ed. 2011), art. 296 ref. 11 ff.

  59. 59.

    EIOPA, EIOPA Newsletter, 27 Jun. 2012.

  60. 60.

    See 3.2.2, above.

  61. 61.

    Accord, Sasserath-Alberti/Hartig, VersR (2012), 524 (532).

  62. 62.

    See for a parallel in supervisory monitoring of those exercising key functions under the draft of corresponding governance guidelines, Dreher, “Begriff und Inhaber der Schlüsselfunktionen nach Solvency II und VAG 2012” [in English: Concept and Holders of Key Functions under Solvency II and the German Insurance Supervision Act 2012], VersR (2012), 933 (936) (Chap. 7, below, at 7.2.3).

  63. 63.

    See on the mandatory abandonment of the principle in the area of solvency supervision, Dreher, ZVersWiss (2012), 381 (391 f.) (Chap. 4, below, at 4.3.2.2).

  64. 64.

    See as a further example of the BaFin [Federal Financial Supervisory Authority] view, BaFin-Journal (Aug. 2012),12: “The undertaking must have a neutral body to receive and analyze the complaints.” Yet in Guideline 2 – Complaints management function – of the EIOPA Guidelines there is no mention of neutrality. Rather, the emphasis is on a fair method of investigating complaints along with identifying and mitigating possible conflicts of interest.

  65. 65.

    See on this point Dreher, “Das senior management der Versicherungsunternehmen und das künftige Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht” [in English: Senior Management of Insurance Undertakings and Future Insurance Supervisory Regime], VersR (2013), 35 (Chap. 9, below). The German version of the Guidelines speaks of “der Führungsebene, die auch für die Umsetzung und die Überwachung der Einhaltung dieser Maßnahmen zuständig ist” [senior management, who should also be responsible for [this policy’s] implementation and for monitoring compliance with it].

  66. 66.

    See in more detail, Dreher/Ballmaier, n. 41 above, at 135 ff., 143 with reference to the relationship between supervisory ORSA review and business strategy; Dreher, n. 13 above, at 411 with reference to supervisory risk consideration and business strategy.

  67. 67.

    Best Practices Report, 2; a reference to art. 1, para. 6, subpara. 1, sent. 2 f of the EIOPA Regulation would be pertinent from a legal standpoint.

  68. 68.

    Accord, Best Practices Report, 2.

  69. 69.

    Best Practices Report, 2.

  70. 70.

    EIOPA Guidelines, 4, point 9.

  71. 71.

    EIOPA, EIOPA’s Initial Overview of Key Consumer Trends in the EU, 1 Feb. 2012.

  72. 72.

    See EIOPA, Methodology Report for Collecting, Analysing and Reporting on Consumer Trends, November 2012, point 1.1. at end of section.

  73. 73.

    EIOPA, EIOPA Work Program 2013, 13, n. 1, although lacking rationale and with the somewhat pallid formulation: “EIOPA considers the needs of consumers as a whole rather than as individuals.”

  74. 74.

    ECJ, 12. 10. 2004, case no. C-222/02 (Peter Paul/Germany), VersR (2005), 101; also at EuZW (2004), 689 pnt. 30 together with 25, with reference to protecting investors only in the public interest.

  75. 75.

    See recently König, BaFin-Journal (Apr. 2012), 13 (18); (June 2012), 3 (4) and now also RegE Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen Finanzaufsicht [Government’s Draft of an Act to Strengthen German Financial Supervision] BT-Drucks. [Document of the German Bundestag] 17/10040, 19 Jun. 2012, 13.

  76. 76.

    See Dreher/Lange, “Die europäische Wirtschaftsverfassung nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon” [in English: The European Economic Constitution under the Treaty of Lisbon] in Publication in Honor of 50 Years, FIW (2010), 161 ff.; Rittner/Dreher, n. 28 above, sec. 2.

  77. 77.

    See on this point RegE zum Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen Finanzaufsicht, [Government’s Draft of an Act to Strengthen German Financial Supervision], id., n. 75 above, at 13.

  78. 78.

    See, e.g., Keßler, in: Keßler/Micklitz/Reich, eds., “Institutionelle Finanzmarktaufsicht und Verbraucherschutz” [in English: European Financial Supervision and Consumer Protection] (2010), 31.

  79. 79.

    RegE zum Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen Finanzaufsicht [Government’s Draft of an Act to Strengthen German Financial Supervision], id., n. 75 above, at 13.

  80. 80.

    See Recital 18 of Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices in the internal market (UCP Directive).

  81. 81.

    See ECJ (1998), case no. I-4657 (Gut Springenheide und Tusky) pnt. 31; 1999, case no. I-513 (Verbraucherschutzverein/Sektkellerei Kessler) pnt. 36; Glöckner, in: Harte-Bavendamm/Henning-Bodewig, eds., UWG [Unfair Competition Act] (2nd. ed. 2009) intro. B, ref. 143 ff.; Dreher, n. 36 above, at 170 ff.; Krebber, id., n. 34 above, art. 169, ref. 7; Micklitz, “Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des Verbraucherrechts?” [in English: Do Consumers and Undertakings Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law?] in 69th DJT [German Jurists’ Forum] – Gutachten [Report] – Part A (2012), passim; Gsell, “Verbraucherrealitäten und Verbraucherrecht im Wandel” [in English: Consumer Realities and Rights in Transition], JZ (2012), 809 (810 f., 813), each with further references; and in presentation to the ECJ, case no. C-51/11, on the restrictive interpretation of a ban on advertising of the BGH [Federal Court of Justice],13. Jan. 2011 – I ZR 22/09 – pnt. 3: “Query: whether a statement in view of the average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect is to be applied to the consumer under Recital 15 of Regulation (EU) 1924/2006.” See further OLG Naumburg [Naumburg Higher Regional Court], VersR (2012), 1034 (1037) on restricting the meaning of the terms broker and agent by sec. 11, para. 1 no. 3, VersVermV [Insurance Mediation Regulations]; on the discernment of the average consumer and on the consumer profile in pronouncements in insurance law, to differing effect, Präve, VersR (2012), 1159 (1163) (remarks to BGH [Federal Court of Justice], 25 Jul. 2012, − IV ZR 201/10 – VersR (2012), 1149).

  82. 82.

    See 3.2.2, above.

  83. 83.

    See H. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality (1982).

  84. 84.

    See on this point from the legal perspective, e.g., the articles in: Fleischer/Zimmer, eds., Beitrag der Verhaltensökonomie zum Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht [in English: Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Business and Economic Law] (2011); and OFT [Office of Fair Trading (UK)], What does Behavioral Economics mean for Competition Policy? (March 2010), also with particular focus on consumer protection.

  85. 85.

    See, e.g., Inderst, Consumer Protection and the Role of Advice in the Market for Retail Financial Services, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economies (JITE) (2011), 4 (18).

  86. 86.

    See for an appraisal that, however, ultimately refers only to the effect of the era on legal policy, Schön, “Zwingendes Recht oder informierte Entscheidung – zu einer (neuen) Grundlage unserer Zivilrechtsordnung” [in English: Mandatory Law or Informed Decision: Toward a (New) Basis of Our Civil Law System] in: Publication in Honor of Claus-Wilhelm Canaris on his 70th birthday (2007), 1191 ff.; differing, Koch, “Grenzen des informationsbasierten Anlegerschutzes” [in English: Limits on Information-based Investor Protection], BKR (2012), 485 (493): “when the concept of paternalism loses the negative connotation that many associate with it”.

  87. 87.

    See Saint-Paul, The Tyranny of Utility – Behavioral Social Science and the Rise of Paternalism (2011); and for the view according to constitutional law jurisprudence, see Volkmann, Darf der Staat seine Bürger erziehen? [In English: Should the State Be a Parent to its Citizens?] (2012).

  88. 88.

    See Micklitz, id., n. 81 above, at A 39.

  89. 89.

    See Kohte, “Der verletzliche Verbraucher” [in English: The Vulnerable Consumer], VuR (2012), 338; Micklitz, n. 81 above, at A 40 ff.; LG Erfurt [Erfurt District Court], 8. May 2007 – 1 HK O 28/07 – point of law 37 on the other hand, employing a different approach, attributes the vulnerability of consumers to the fiduciary relationship arising from earlier consultation and advice in the financial advice sector.

  90. 90.

    Thus the BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], VersR (2009), 957, pnt. 171 and also BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court], VersR (2009), 1057, approved mandatory insurance in the base rate schedule by reference to the societal principle of art. 20, para. 1, GG [German Basic Law] as well as on the basis of the dual phases of statutory and private health insurance; see also, Rittner/Dreher, “60 Jahre Grundgesetz und das Wirtschaftsrecht” [in English: Sixty Years of the Basic Law and Economic Law], in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts [Yearbook of Public Law], updated version, vol. 59 (2011), 59 (93 f.).

  91. 91.

    See to the same effect the statement of principle at the beginning of the RegE Gesetz zur Stärkung der deutschen Finanzaufsicht [Government’s Draft of an Act to Strengthen German Financial Supervision], n. 75 above, at 1 (likewise at 11, 13): “Consumer protection: The supervisory activities of the Federal Office in the future shall devote greater attention to consumer issues, provided, however, that this shall not impair the supervisory objectives directed toward ensuring solvency of the supervised institutions and the ability of the financial markets to function”.

  92. 92.

    See BGH [Federal Court of Justice], VersR (2012), 1149 and on this point Armbrüster, “Konsequenzen des Urteils zu unwirksamen Klauseln” [in English: Consequences of the Judgment on Ineffective Clauses], VW 19 (2012), 1434; id., “Kehrtwende des BGH bei der AGB-Kontrolle in der Lebensversicherung” [in English: The Federal Court of Justice Makes an About-face in Monitoring of Standard Terms and Conditions for Life Insurance], NJW (2012), 3001; Präve, n. 81 above, at 1163; id., “Individualrechte zulasten des Versichertenkollektivs?” [in English: Individual Rights at the Expense of the Insured Class?], VersR (2012), 657.

  93. 93.

    See Brand, id., n. 1 above, at 70 (84 ff.), and Dreher, “Die “bedingungsgemäße Entschädigung” des arglistig täuschenden Versicherungsnehmers” [in English: The ‘Conditional Indemnification’ of the Fraudulently Deceptive Policy Holder], VersR (1998), 539; JZ (1992), 926 (Comments to the BGH [Federal Court of Justice] of 25. Mar. 1992 – IV ZR 55/91 – VersR (1992), 603).

  94. 94.

    See on this particular segment of economic law in detail, Rittner/Dreher, n. 28 above, secs. 29 ff.

  95. 95.

    For example in Ireland, in a move with little reason to recommend it, the present consumer protection authority is about to be merged with the competition authority.

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    Meinrad Dreher

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Dreher, M. (2015). Insurance Supervisory Law and Consumer Protection. In: Treatises on Solvency II. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46290-4_3

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