Abstract
Many of the ideas I will present were developed in collaboration with Jonathan McCune, Bryan Parno, Adrian Perrig, Amit Vasudevan and Zongwei Zhou over the past couple of years. I will begin the presentation with my “axioms” of insecurity and usable security. These axioms are in fact observations that I believe will be true in the future. Then I will review virtualization for security and experiences that we have had with it practically since day one. I will also review the limitations of virtual-machine isolation for application-level code and usable security. And finally, the main proposition of this presentation is that we should switch our attention from virtualization and virtual-machine isolation, to redgreen machine partitions, which is somewhat of a new area, and to trustworthy communication. I will argue that trustworthy communication requires more than secure-channel protocols.
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© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gligor, V. (2014). Security Limitations of Virtualization and How to Overcome Them (Transcript of Discussion). In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J. (eds) Security Protocols XVIII. Security Protocols 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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