Abstract
We depart from the conventional quest for ‘Completely Secure Systems’ and ask ‘How can we be more Secure’. We draw heavily from the evolution of the Theory of Justice and the arguments against the institutional approach to Justice. Central to our argument is the identification of redressable insecurity, or weak links. Our contention is that secure systems engineering is not really about building perfectly secure systems but about redressing manifest insecurities.
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Chowdhury, P.D., Christianson, B. (2014). More Security or Less Insecurity. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J. (eds) Security Protocols XVIII. Security Protocols 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45921-8_18
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